Univerzita Pardubice Fakulta filozofická

Univerzita Pardubice

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English

Publikace detail

Against a Foundational and Towards a Contextual Understanding of Moral Status

Autoři: Strammer Philip

Rok: 2022

Druh publikace: ostatní - konference, koncert

Strana od-do: nestránkováno

Tituly:

Jazyk	Název	Abstrakt	Klíčová slova
eng	Against a Foundational and Towards a Contextual Understanding of Moral Status	Discussions of equality and of its role in moral philosophy are commonly approached by, in a certain sense, already presupposing that you (the reader), I (the speaker), and all others simply are morally equal – and by then trying to give an explanation for why this is so and/or a justification as to why this should be so. While I would not dispute the claim that we all are moral equals, I think that approaching the issue by simply presupposing it nonetheless obscures the nuanced differences that arise when speaking about what equal moral standing means in different modes of interpersonal relation. More precisely, I think that the most important differences prevail a) between saying to someone that he/she is one’s moral equal and between saying it about someone, b) between saying it in reference to a single individual other and to a plurality of others, and c) between saying it as an individual speaker and as part of a collective We. Hence, this essay is an attempt to develop a sense of just such differences. In doing so, I will probably not simplify but complicate the picture – but in a way which I take to be irremissible for a thorough understanding of what we mean when we speak about different moral standing in different contexts.