Publication detail

Pojetí svobody v díle Bernarda Williamse

Authors: Hejduk Tomáš

Year: 2013

Type of publication: kapitola v odborné knize

Name of source: Pojetí svobody v dějinách a současnosti filosofie

Publisher name: CDK (Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury)

Place: Brno

Page from-to: 141-158

Titles:

Language	Name	Abstract	Keywords
cze	Pojetí svobody v díle Bernarda Williamse	Studie probírá Williamsův koncept svobody, u něhož předpokládá spojitost s autorovým popisem silných konceptů, jež jsou určovány světem tady a teď. Jejich kontroverzní charakter je spjat s jejich fungováním v politice. "Silnější svoboda" konstruovaná v a pro prostředí konfliktních sil povstává z konfliktních tužeb různých životů. V tomto smyslu Williams odmítá ideu korespondence mezi svobodou a právoplatnými nároky člověka, stejně jako založení svobody v morálce. Problém vidíme v tom, že Williams na jedné straně tvrdí, že politika, jež je základem koncepce svobody, je záležitostí pluralitní, a tak v jejím rámci nelze vést diskusi. Na druhou stranu ale Williams tvrdí, že je třeba se dohadovat s lidmi, kteří hořekují nad ztrátou svobody, protože si uvědomí, jak neoprávněné jsou jejich tužby a nároky.	Bernard Williams;svoboda;silný koncept; slabý koncept
eng	Bernard Williams´ Concept of Freedom	The study discusses the concept of freedom in Bernard Williams´ work. In my opinion, this concept can be related with Williams´ account of thick ethical concepts which are determined by the world in which we live. Such a controversial character puts these concepts together with political powers functioning ?now and around here?. The ?thicker freedom? constructed in (and for) the environment of conflicting powers arises from desirable ways of life which are conflictfully different. Within this cadre, Williams´ concept of freedom refuses ideas about the correspondence between freedom and people´s rightful claims, as well as any foundation in moral discourse. I find a discrepancy in the fact that Williams on the one hand claims that politics, which is the basis of freedom, is pluralistic, so a discussion cannot be made in its cadre. On the other hand he claims that we have to argue with people who complain about the loss of freedom, because there is a chance that they would understand how unjustified are their unrealizable desires. I pose a question whether this contradiction may be reasonably explained by Williams´ distinction between theoretical, institutional, thin thought and thick, ethical thought. In the cadre of thick concepts, a public discussion would then be possible and necessary. In more general cases, we would not discuss but fight. However, the inosculation of thin and thick concepts and overlaps of political to both areas speak against this solution. Another solution suggests itself: to distinguish both planes ? local and general ? and to connect political to the extent of ?national? or ?European? with thick concepts and discussion, whereas in the worldwide extent we can speak about ideological and thin. Nevertheless, this is not a solution to the inosculation of thin and thick concepts which Williams expresses and supports by the appeal to the universals of the so called liberalism of fear.	Bernard Williams;freedom;thick concept; thin concept

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