

Institute of Historical Sciences
Faculty of Arts and Philosophy
University of Pardubice

Theatrum historiae

21

2017

Pardubice 2017

The cover image depicts Stockholm after 1660. This engraving was made by Erik Dahlbergh and was taken from the work *Suecia antiqua et hodierna* (see https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Suecia_1-013_-_Stockholm_fr%C3%A5n_%C3%B6ster-right_side_detail.jpg).

© University of Pardubice, 2017

Registration number MK ČR E 19534
ISSN 1802–2502

Contents

Petr VOREL

Funding of the Papal Army's Campaign to Germany during the Schmalkaldic War (Edition of the original accounting documentation "Conto de la Guerra de Allemagna" kept by the Pope's accountant Pietro Giovanni Aleotti from 22 June 1546 to 2 September 1547) 9

Christof MUIGG

Montecuccoli's Fame, or: A Diplomat's Military Reputation at the Swedish Court in 1654 97

Miroslav DYRČÍK

Early Eighteenth Century' Jewish Religiousness: A Case of Leibele Prossnitz as Depicted in *Bashraybung fun Shabbetai Zevi* 117

Mariusz MISZTAL

The Intimate Picture of Queen Victoria and her Household, 1840–1843. Extracts from the Diary of Dr Robert Ferguson, the Queen's Accoucheur 141

Jiří HUTEČKA

"There Is Nothing New Out Here!" Communication Strategies and Gender Dynamics in the World War I Family Correspondence 167

Zbyněk VYDRA

British Jewry and the Attempted Boycott of Nazi Germany, 1933–1939 195

Reports and reviews	221
List of reviewers (in alphabetical order)	231
List of contributors (in alphabetical order)	232

Petr VOREL

Funding of the Papal Army's Campaign to Germany during the Schmalkaldic War

(Edition of the original accounting documentation "Conto de la Guerra de Allemagna" kept by the Pope's accountant Pietro Giovanni Aleotti from 22 June 1546 to 2 September 1547)

Abstract: This article is based on the recently discovered text of accounting documentation led by the Papal secret accountant Pietro Giovanni Aleotti. He kept records of income and expenses of Papal chamber connected with the campaign of Papal army that was sent from Italy to Germany by Pope Paul III (Alessandro Farnese) in the frame of the first period of so called Schmalkaldic War (1546–1547). The author publishes this unique source in extenso and completes the edition by the detailed analysis of the incomes and expenses of this documentation. The analysis is extended by three partial texts dealing with 1) so called Jewish tax that was announced by Paul III in the financial support of military campaign, 2) credit granting of this campaign by the bank house of Benvenuto Olivieri in connection with the collection of Papal tithe in the Romagna region and 3) staffing of the commanding officers of Papal army during this campaign (in the attachment one can find a reconstruction of the officers' staff with identification of the most important commanders). In the conclusion the author tries to determine the real motives why Paul III decided to take part in this campaign. In comparison to the previous works the author accents mainly the efforts of the Farnese family to raise their prestige at the end of the pontificate of Paul III and their immediate financial interests that are reflected in the account documentation.

Keywords: Pope Paul III – Emperor Charles V – Schmalkaldic War – 1546–1547 – Farnese family – accounts – edition – Pietro Giovanni Aleotti – Italy – Germany – military campaign

For Italian history, the participation of the Papal army in the so-called "Schmalkaldic War" (1546–1547)¹ in Germany represents seemingly a rather marginal matter. It has its logic. This campaign of the Papal army lasted only briefly and did not show any significant combat activity on the battlefield. Compared with what happened during the previous or following years on the Italian battlefields in the struggle between France, the Habsburgs and the Italian states (including the Papal State), it was as if there

¹ This article was published thanks the support of Istituto Storico Ceco di Roma and internal project of the University of Pardubice NR. SGS 2017_008.

was no significant military action. In addition, it also related to events somewhere beyond the Alps, from the Italian point of view that is “among barbarians”. Therefore, it is no wonder that this campaign is mentioned only marginally (or even not at all) not only in the more general history of the Papal State,² but no greater attention is paid to it even in more recent specialised Italian works concerning the period of the pontificate of Paul III (1534–1549).³

In German historiography, the situation remains similar. For German history, the Schmalkaldic War represents a crucial historical milestone, determining the first phase of the culmination of the power conflict that took place between the Emperor Charles V and the Estates’ (mostly Lutheran) opposition during the years 1546–1555.⁴ This conflict is usually interpreted primarily as a domestic affair, which was impacted by external influences on both sides, but the actual result was decided by the German internal forces. Perhaps this is the reason why, from the point of view of the current German historiography, the participation of the Papal army in the battlefields of the first phase of the Schmalkaldic War does not represent a particularly interesting circumstance, even within the confessional context.⁵ In the most recent scientific literature we cannot find any mention of the campaign of the army of Pope Paul III in Germany not only in works that are generally devoted either to early modern warfare⁶ or to the military activities of Emperor Charles V,⁷ but this question is even ignored by D. S. Chambers in his specific synthetic monograph concerning the involvement of the Catholic Church in the wartime conflicts of the Renaissance period. The author mentions this situation only marginally, not in any political or religious context, however with reference to Renaissance art, in

2 Franz Xaver SEPPELT, *Das Papsttum in der Neuzeit – Geschichte der Päpste vom Regierungstritt Paul III. bis zur französischen Revolution (1534–1789)*, Leipzig 1936, pp. 41–42; Franz Xaver SEPPELT – Klemens LÖFFLER, *Papstgeschichte von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, München 1938, pp. 211–214; Mario CARAVALE – Alberto CARACCILO, *Lo Stato pontificio da Martino V a Pio IX*, Torino 1978 (reprint 1997), chapter Relazioni tra Paolo III e Carlo V, pp. 259–260.

3 Elena BONORA, *Aspettando l’imperatore (Principi italiani tra il papa e Carlo V)*, Torino 2014.

4 Petr VOREL, *The War of the Princes: The Bohemian Lands and the Holy Roman Empire 1546–1555*, Santa Helena (California) 2015.

5 Gabriele HAUG-MORITZ, *Der Schmalkaldische Krieg (1546/47) – Ein kaiserlicher Religionskrieg?*, in: Franz Brendle – Anton Schindling (eds.), *Religionskriege in Alten Reich und in Alteuropa*, Münster 2010², pp. 93–105.

6 David PARROTT, *The Business of War (Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe)*, Cambridge 2012; Brian SANDBERG, *War and Conflict in the Early Modern World 1500–1700*, Cambridge 2016.

7 James D. TRACY, *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War (Campaign Strategy, International Finance, and domestic Politics)*, Cambridge 2010; Thomas MENZEL, *Der Fürst als Feldherr (Militärische Handeln und Selbstdarstellung bei Reichsfürsten zwischen 1470 und 1550) – Dargestellt an ausgewählten Beispielen*, Berlin 2003, chapter Karl als Kriegs- und Feldherr ab 1535, pp. 258–312.

which the subject of the Schmalkaldic War was used as a part of the visual representation of the House of Farnese (from which Pope Paul III originated).⁸

From the older works, the historical context of the campaign of the Papal army in the German territory in 1546 was last mentioned by Ludwig Pastor, who is known primarily as one of the most important German (confessionally Catholic) historians at the turn of the 19th – 20th centuries, dealing with the history of the Papacy.⁹ For his interpretation, L. Pastor used the comprehensive edition of diplomatic messages that were dispatched in the years 1546 and 1547 by the Pope's envoy Girolamo Verallo, published by W. Friedensburg in 1899.¹⁰ In the introduction to this volume, W. Friedensburg summarised the main factual information concerning the campaign of Papal army to Germany. This text by W. Friedensburg remains the most significant synthesis of the topic of the involvement of the Pope's troops in the Schmalkaldic War. His earlier researches concerning the relationship between Pope Paul III and Emperor Charles V, based on the editions of messages sent by Papal envoys, were later summed-up (without significant expansion) by the same author in the form of a minor monograph.¹¹ The later Italian works are based on the interpretation of the Papal participation in the Schmalkaldic War (if at all), mainly from the cited works of by W. Friedensburg and L. Pastor from the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.¹²

The short-term political alliance between Emperor Charles V and Pope Paul III (formed in the course of 1545 and culminating in the Allied Treaty of June 1546)¹³ was of crucial importance for the initial phase of the Schmalkaldic War. Simply said: Without

8 David S. CHAMBERS, *Popes, Cardinals and War (The military Church in Renaissance and Early Modern Europe)*, London – New York 2006, chapter Paul III: War, Peace, Rekonstruction, 1534–1549, pp. 152–162, here p. 161.

9 Ludwig PASTOR, *Geschichte Papst Pauls III. (1534–1549)*, Freiburg 1956¹³, Chapter XI Die päpstlich-kaiserliche Liga vom Juni 1546 und der Krieg gegen die Schmalkalden, pp. 555–573; Johannes JANSSEN – Ludwig PASTOR, *Allgemeine Zustände des deutschen Volkes seit dem Ausgang des sozialen Revolution bis zum sogenannten Augsburger Religionsfrieden von 1555*, Freiburg im Breisgau 1917^{19–20}, pp. 695, 718–719, 754–755.

10 Walter FRIEDENSBURG (ed.), *Nuntiaturreportage aus Deutschland 1533–1559 nebst ergänzenden Aktenstücken, Erste Abteilung 1533–1559, Neunter Band: Nuntiaturreportage des Verallo 1546–1547*, Gotha 1899 (next NBD I/9), pp. I–LVI.

11 Walter FRIEDENSBURG, *Kaiser Karl V. und Papst Paul III. (1534–1549)*, Leipzig 1932.

12 Carlo CAPASSO, *Il papa Paolo III 1534–1549*, II, Messina 1924, pp. 507–525; Angelo MERCANTI, *Ludovico barone von Pastor Storia dei Papi dalla fine del medio evo (Compilata col sussidio dell' Archivio segreto pontificio e di molti altri Archivi) – Nuova versione Italiana, Volume V. Paolo III (1534–1549)*, Roma 1959, pp. 542–559.

13 Paul KANNENGIESSE, *Die Kapitulation zwischen Kaiser Karl V. und Papst Paul III. gegen die deutschen Protestanten (1546)*, in: Festschrift zur Feier des 350 jährigen Bestehens des Protestantischen Gymnasiums zu Strassburg, Zweiter Teil, Strassburg 1888, pp. 211–244; L. PASTOR, *Geschichte Papst Pauls III.*, pp. 565–567.

this political and military support (though little effective it eventually proved to be), the Emperor Charles V probably did not intend to implement a direct military solution of a conflict of power (not primarily of religion) in the Holy Roman Empire of German Nation.

Compared to the religiously friendly policy that Emperor Charles V held in relation to the Lutheran reformation at the beginning of the 1540s, the change of his attitudes seemed illogical to his contemporaries. That is why, in the spring of 1546, leading figures of the German Estates' opposition did not expect the Emperor to be interested in solving the internal issues of the Empire by means of a direct military confrontation. In the context of the complicated relations that took place between the Imperial and Papal powers during the previous two decades, the Emperor's acceptance of the Pope's offer to conclude a military alliance against the German Lutherans, contained in the Allied Treaty of June 1546, constituted a fundamental change. However, in the background of this temporary (and from the point-of-view of the history of the 16th Century only a very short-term) friendly relationship between the Imperial and Papal powers were always primarily the family interests of both sides. In August 1545, the Emperor and the Pope both received joint biological descendants in the form of two boys, the twins Carlo and Alessandro. They came from the marriage between Ottavio Farnese (the son of Pier Luigi, illegitimate son of Pope Paul III) and Margaret of Austria, later called Margaret of Parma, the illegitimate daughter of Emperor Charles V. On the Farnese side, however, it is not possible to omit either clear property objectives or the question of the integration of this illegitimate lineage (the biological descendants of Pope Paul III) amongst the highest European aristocracy. I have attempted to interpret these circumstances in more detail in an independent study that has been published in parallel, which is why I do not consider them in detail here.¹⁴ Their outcome was the complex formation of the new Italian Territorial Principality of Parma and Piacenza, in which the common biological descendants of the Emperor Charles V and Pope Paul III of the Farnese family were destined to rule.¹⁵

The Allied treaty guaranteed a specific military support for the Emperor, which was not a negligible amount. Pope Paul III undertook to provide the Emperor with an army

14 Petr VOREL, *Za obnovu řádu v říši a pravé víry (Dočasné politické a rodinné spojenectví císaře Karla V. a papeže Pavla III. při vojenském tažení do Německa roku 1546)* [The Struggle for the Restoration of Order in the Empire and for True Faith (The Temporary Political and Family Alliance between Emperor Charles V and Pope Paul III during a Military Campaign to Germany in 1546)], in: Jaroslav Pánek (red.), *Dějiny – umění – jazyk / History – Art – Language, Acta Societatis Scientiarum Bohemicae 3*, Praha 2018, pp. 19–164.

15 Giovanni DREI, *I Farnese (Grandezza e decadenza di una dinastia italiana)*, Rome 1954; Gian Luca PODESTÀ, *Pier Luigi e Ottavio Farnese (1545–1586) – Gli albori del Ducato di Parma e Piacenza*, in: Giuseppe Bertini (red.), *Storia di Parma IV – Il ducato farnesiano*, Parma 2014, pp. 37–65.

of 12,000 infantrymen and 500 light-cavalry soldiers designated for the forthcoming war in the Empire, together with the appropriate commanding corps and the main command to be provided by the envoy who was appointed by the Pope. This army was to be funded by the Pope for six months (or for a shorter time if the war actually ended sooner). In addition, he pledged direct cash support from the Papal Treasury in the amount of 200,000 ducats (100,000 were already deposited in Augsburg at the time of the treaty, while another 100,000 ducats were to be paid in Venice within one month of the signing of the treaty). In addition to these expenditures, which were to be financed directly by the Pope, the treaty still provided additional income that Charles V was meant to collect himself in Spain (and the Pope agreed to it), as the war in the Empire should have been supported by half of the annual income of the Catholic Church from all over Spain (the anticipated amount had not been specified). That was the overall sum of the military and financial potential that indeed could have resolved the situation in the Empire.¹⁶

Older literature does not bring much data concerning the specific activities of the Papal troops during the Schmalkaldic War between August 1546 (which was when they reached the Bavarian Landshut) and January 1547 (when the Pope issued an order to withdraw them back to Italy). Well known is only the initial phase described above, which Charles V and Paul III needed to use for propaganda purposes at the beginning of the war, i.e. the official launching of the “Crusade” in Rome, where the Farnese brothers had taken over both the symbolic cross and the Papal battle flags (July 4, 1546); a parade of the entire Papal army at the army grounds in Bologna (July 16, 1546); a demonstration of military force before the participants of the Council of Trent (July 26, 1546), and the ceremonial arrival of the Papal army at the ground of the allied army close to the Bavarian Landshut (August 14, 1546).¹⁷

This initial propagandistic phase had already confirmed a significant mismatch between the two allies: Pope Paul III did not hide the fact that his troops were marching to Germany with the Emperor to extinguish the Lutheran movement. The Papal Bull of the 15th July 1546 even promised indulgences to all who participated in the elimination of a dangerous heresy during a military campaign to Germany.¹⁸ These activities were completely counter-productive from the perspective of Charles V because the Emperor in the German environment consistently stuck to his own interpretation, according to

16 NBD I/9, p. XIII; L. PASTOR, *Geschichte Papst Pauls III*, pp. 566–568; Richard M. DOUGLAS, *Jacopo Sadoletto 1477–1547–Humanist and Reformer*, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1959, p. 218.

17 P. VOREL, *Za obnovu řádu v říši a pravé víry*, pp. 95–99.

18 *Bulla des grossen Ablaß, welchen der Bapst Paulus der Dritte, zu diesem Zuge vnd Ausreuttunge der Lutherischen Ketzereyen gegeben hat*, s. l. 1546 (ÖNB Wien, sign. 39.G.72); Henri HAUSER – Augustin RENAUDET, *L'età del Rinascimento e della Riforma*, Torino 1957, p. 551; Norman HOUSLEY, *The Later Crusades (From Lyons to Alcazar 1274–1580)*, Oxford 1992, p. 260.

which the forthcoming military suppression of the Schmalkaldic League should have no religious context; that on his part it only involves the establishment of a rule of order in the government of the Empire, which the leaders of this League (i.e. the Saxon elector Johann Friedrich and Philip von Hesse) disturbed, inter alia, with their military occupation of the Duchy of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. Thanks to this, the Imperial party also gained (through material and other motivation) some important Lutheran princes (primarily Moritz of Saxony) and some lower commanders. This was important for the Lutheran allies of the Habsburgs because they could argue that by their engagement in the Imperial services in the coming conflict they did not actually betray their brothers in faith from amongst the members of the Schmalkaldic League, but they only contributed to the establishment of a legal order in the Empire.

In spite of this diplomatic mismatch, the Papal army played an important role, especially in the initial part of the military conflict between the Emperor and the Schmalkaldic League, which took place on the southern front along the Bavarian Danube region. From the beginning of the direct military conflict at the turn of August and September 1546 throughout the artillery battle of Ingolstadt until mid-October 1546, the Papal army constituted the most significant part of the Habsburg coalition army and secured a clear first victory for the Habsburg Party, which subsequently conquered the city of Donauwörth on the 8th of October 1546.

After a strong Habsburg army led by Earl Maximilian Egmont von Bürren, recruited predominantly in the Netherlands (and thereby it was made-up largely of soldiers of the Lutheran faith) reached the battlefield in mid-October 1546, the importance of the pontifical contingent began to decline and there were also problems with the coordination of military actions with the main command. Most of the remaining soldiers (mainly pedestrian units), still formally commanded by the Cardinal's brother, Ottavio Farnese, separated from the Habsburg army around the 18th of October 1546 and moved about individually along the Bavarian Danube region. Only the Papal cavalry units that were led by Giovanni Battista Savello remained under the control of the main Habsburg command. A part of the Papal army (approx. 3,000 men) subsequently left the battlefield around October 20, 1546 to accompany and protect Cardinal Alessandro Farnese on his return to Italy during the war. The possibility of fighting the main part of the Papal army in the struggle with the Schmalkaldic League had dropped to a minimum, especially when the number of combatant Papal soldiers had decreased rapidly as a result of illnesses, problems regarding material supplies and desertion.

The original mutual enthusiasm over the allied bond of the Emperor and the Pope in the Autumn of 1546 quickly cooled. This was undoubtedly contributed to by the fact that the combat effectiveness of the Papal troops did not meet the Emperor's expectations. Even

the effect of the “crusade” against the Lutherans anticipated by Paul III was not fulfilled. This was one of the reasons why in December 1546 Pope Paul III decided to consider the Allied treaty with the Emperor (which had only been concluded for six months) as having been fulfilled and then not to prolong it further. On the 22nd January 1547 he decided to withdraw the Papal troops from the Danube and to return them back to Italy. The Emperor did not oppose this act – on the contrary. His reply to the Pope was an ironic message of thanks, writing that he was glad that Paul III had finally rid himself of those Italian scoundrels who were no good anyway, and in Germany they were just causing damage. And he expected to complete the war successfully even without the Pope’s help.¹⁹

For the Emperor Charles V, however, with the advent of 1547, the war with the Schmalkaldic League was far from over. At the beginning of March 1547, the Saxon Elector Johann Friedrich began to win over the Habsburg allies in the north-eastern front and he gained predominance on the battlefield. Emperor Charles V had to quickly prepare for a new campaign of his army to Saxony and to the Czech-Saxon border, while his diplomats sought to provide political support and additional military assistance. Through his diplomats, therefore, the Emperor again turned to Pope Paul III with an urgent request for military assistance, yet this time in vain.²⁰ However, even without Papal assistance, Emperor Charles V eventually won this phase of the conflict with the opposition in the Empire thanks to the unexpected termination of the battle of Mühlberg in April 1547.

At that time Pope Paul III perceived the Emperor as an enemy who threatened both his personal and his family interests in Italy.²¹ Their personal relationships deteriorated rapidly in 1547 and they found themselves at a “freezing point” in September 1547, when the Pope’s illegitimate son, Pier Luigi Farnese, the father of the Emperor’s son-in-law Ottavio Farnese, was murdered in his residence in Piacenza, located in the north of Italy. The Pope blamed the Emperor for this crime in connection with the power struggle that was taking place at that time in northern Italy. This did have its logic as the Habsburg military troops from the Duchy of Milan (to which the Duchy of Parma and Piacenza belonged to prior to 1545 and where the Emperor Charles IV ruled from 1535) occupied this area immediately after the death of Pier Luigi Farnese.²²

19 L. PASTOR, *Geschichte Papst Pauls III*, pp. 593–594; Hermann Joseph KIRCH, *Die Fugger und der Schmalkaldische Krieg*, München – Leipzig 1915, p. 85.

20 August DRUFFEL, *Sendung des Cardinals Sfondrato an den Hof Karls V. 1547–1548*, Erster Teil, *Abhandlungen des historischen Classe der königlich bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 20, 1893, pp. 291–362.

21 L. PASTOR, *Geschichte Papst Pauls III*, p. 597.

22 Ireneo F. AFFO, *Vita di Pierluigi Farnese, primo Duca di Parma, Piacenza e Guastalla, Marchese di Novara ecc.*, Milano 1821, pp. 163–193; G. L. PODESTÀ, *Pier Luigi e Ottavio Farnese*, pp. 38–55.

The former allies became enemies and the ageing Pope Paul III, with the rest of his power, tried to protect the laboriously gained social and property positions of his biological descendants from the illegitimate branch of the Farnese family. Emperor Charles V in his symbolic political Testament of the 18th January 1548 also openly admits that he could not wait until the “*present Pope*” (i.e. Paul III whom he does not even define by name) finally died, which would resolve numerous problem.²³

The text includes several problems that Emperor Charles V symbolically assigned to his son and his successors to resolve when after the death of Paul III another Pope stepped in, also briefly referring to the “*most recent war*” (i.e. the Schmalkaldic War). In his Testament Charles V reminds his descendants that it was necessary to ask the future Pope to fulfil what the present Pope contractually pledged (i.e. in the treaty of June 1546), because in the recent war the Pope left the Emperor to bear all the costs (“[...] *da er mich die ganze Last tragen lässt* [...]”). However, it is unclear from the context whether the Emperor meant only the promised monetary subsidies (which the Pope had apparently failed to provide at the promised level)²⁴ or also the cost of the army.

Such a suggestively worded statement in the symbolic “Testament” of Emperor Charles V naturally raises the question of how it actually was with the funding of the Papal army, which, in the summer of 1546 indeed crossed the Alps to Germany and participated in the ongoing struggles. There is not the slightest doubt about it since this had been documented by many sources. Such an action had to be paid for.

Early modern Papal accounting represents such a complex issue that to get oriented in the vast number of preserved written sources requires a great deal of courage and many years of patient work. To research the organisation and the administration of Papal finance during the early modern period and in terms of the long-term context, the most important is the work of W. Reinhard’s, published in German²⁵ and Italian.²⁶ The rich archive of the Papal Chamber of Accountants and other sources have long been

23 Armin KOHNLE (ed.), *Das Vermächtnis Kaiser Karls V. (Die Politische Testamente)*, Darmstadt 2005, pp. 69–97, Nr. 3 “Das Große Politische Testament Kaiser Karls V”, here pp. 75–77.

24 Hermann KELLENBENZ, *Das Römisch-Deutsche Reich im Rahmen der wirtschafts- und finanzpolitischen Erwägungen Karls V. im Spannungsfeld imperialer und dynastischer Interessen*, in: Heinrich Lutz – Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (eds.), *Das römisch-deutsche Reich im politischen System Karls V.*, München – Wien 1982, pp. 35–54, here p. 50.

25 Wolfgang REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Kirchenstaat im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, in: Aldo De Maddalena – Hermann Kellenbenz (eds.), *Finanzen und Staatsräson in Italien und Deutschland in der frühen Neuzeit*, Berlin 1982, pp. 269–294; Wolfgang REINHARD, *Papstfinanz, Benefizienwesen und Staatsfinanz im konfessionellen Zeitalter*, in: Hermann Kellenbenz – Paolo Prodi (eds.), *Fiskus, Kirche und Staat im konfessionellen Zeitalter*, Berlin 1994, pp. 337–371.

26 Wolfgang REINHARD, *Finanza pontificia, sistema beneficiale e finanza statale nell’età confessionale*, in: Hermann Kellenbenz – Paolo Prodi (eds.), *Fisco religione Stato nell’età confessionale (Atti della settimana di studio 21–25 settembre 1987)*, Bologna 1989, pp. 459–504.

the subject of systematic research by Italian and foreign scholars dealing with economic history and Papal monetary and fiscal policy in the 16th century.²⁷ Specifically, for the period of the Pontiff of Paul III (1534–1549), we have available a detailed analytical work by the Florentine historian F. G. Bruscoli that brings a brighter light into what seems to be a confusing mix of interrelated accounting documents.²⁸

The bookkeeping on the financing of the campaign of the Papal troops to Germany in 1546 was handled by the Papal secret accountant (*tesoriero segreto*), Pietro Giovanni Aleotti. His role in the accounting system of the Papal Chamber was quite extraordinary, perhaps one to say unsymmetrical. That is to say that he was in charge of both the private and “special” personal expenses of the Pope himself. Within the Papal Chamber of Accountants, he was perceived as part of the staff of the Main Treasury (*depositaria generale*), but he was also a member of the Papal Datary (*dataria*)²⁹ and he was also personally commissioned by Pope Paul III. This direct bond (and the very fact that he could talk privately with the Pope) naturally significantly increased the informal influence of the secret accountant, regardless of his formal position in the official hierarchy of the Papal Chamber.³⁰

So far, historiography has not paid special attention to Pietro Giovanni Aleotti, although Benvenuto Cellini (1510–1571) and Giorgio Vasari (1511–1574) have written their testimonies of his important role as the “*éminence grise*” of the Papal Court. We know only that Pietro Giovanni Aleotti was already holding significant positions at the Papal Court in the year 1532 (i.e. the papal dresser and the chief chamberlain)³¹ and at

27 Aloys SCHULTE, *Die Fugger in Rom 1495–1523 (Mit Studien zur Geschichte des kirchlichen Finanzwesens jener Zeit)*, I. Darstellung, Leipzig 1904; Clemens BAUER, *Die Epochen der Papstfinanz (Ein Versuch)*, Historische Zeitschrift 138, 1927, pp. 457–505; Melissa M. BULLARD *Filipo Strozzi and the Medici (Favor and Finance in Sixteenth-century Florence and Rome)*, Cambridge 1980; Peter PARTNER, *Papal Financy Policy in the Renaissance and Counter-Reformation*, Past and Present 88, 1980, pp. 17–62; Enrico STUMPO, *Il capitale finanziario a Roma fra Cinque e Seicento – Contributo alla storia della fiscalità pontificia in età moderna (1570–1660)*, Milano 1985; Moritz ISENMANN, *Die Verwaltung der päpstlichen Staatsschuld in der Frühen Neuzeit (Sekretariat, Computisterie und Depositerie der Monti vom 16. bis zum ausgehenden 18. Jahrhundert)*, Stuttgart 2005.

28 Francesco Guidi BRUSCOLI, *Benvenuto Olivieri – I mercatores Fiorentini e la Camera Apostolica nella Roma di Paolo III Farnese (1534–1549)*, Florence 2000. This work, based on years of careful study of accounting sources, has also been published in a supplemented and expanded English version, see Francesco Guidi BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking in Renaissance Rome (Benvenuto Olivieri and Paul III, 1534–1549)*, Ashgate 2009.

29 Felix Josef LITVA, *L'attività finanziaria della Dataria durante il periodo Tridentino*, Archivum Historiae Pontificae 5, 1965, pp. 79–174.

30 W. REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Kirchenstaat*, p. 270, Abbildung 1: Organisation der Papstfinanz um 1600.

31 Léon DOREZ, *La cour du pape Paul III, d'après le Registres de la trésorerie secrète (collection F. de Navenne)*, Paris 1932, pp. 59–61.

the end of the pontificate of Paul III he was promoted to be a secret accountant who had access to the main treasury that was located in the Angelic Castle. At that time, Aleotti held a larger church benefice in the small bishopric of Bertinoro (near Forlì) in the province of Romagna, from where he had come and where he also would return to at the end of his life. For many years he had patiently waited for the bishop's office in his native Forlì to be vacated. This is evidenced by the fact that Pietro Giovanni Aleotti was appointed as the Bishop of Forlì on the same day as Bishop Bernard Antonio de Medici died there (October 23, 1551). In the history of the city of Forlì he subsequently made his mark as a generous patron of art and a supporter of the Jesuit Order.³² But the bishop's office he held only externally and of course he was receiving its income.³³ Subsequently Pietro Giovanni Aleotti remained in Rome at the Papal Chamber as a secret accountant. In this function he is still explicitly mentioned in January 1560.³⁴ He participated in the Trident Council meeting, where he died in August 1563. Bernardino Aleotti, his grand-nephew, took his body from Trident to the funeral in Forlì.³⁵

Aleotti worked for a long time at the Papal Court, but apparently it was Paul III who appointed him as a secret accountant, probably only in connection with the preparation of the funding of the Papal army in early 1546. No earlier mention of Aleotti holding this position before 1546 has so far been found in the sources of the Papal Chamber of Accountants. Aleotti is explicitly mentioned as being in the function of a secret accountant at the beginning of 1546 on the title sheet of the first volume of the newly established series of accounting books, which record extraordinary payment orders that were issued by Pope Paul III himself. Here, for the first time (to my knowledge), Aleotti is titled, *inter alia*, as a secret papal accountant ("*Petro Iohanni Aleotto, thesaurario Secreto et custodi iocalium S. D. N.*").³⁶ A similar title for him was used on the 17th May 1546, when he was paid the amount of 40 scudo for the provision of unspecified important matters

32 Anna FERRETTI COLOMBINI, *Dipinti d'altare in età di Controriforma in Romagna 1560–1650 – Opere restaurate dalle diocesi di Faenza, Forlì, Cesena e Rimini*, Bologna 1982, p. 38; Giordano VIROLI, *Pittura del Cinquecento a Forlì, I–II*, Forlì 1991; Giordano VIROLI, *Secoli di prestigio nel decoro del privato*, in: Giordano Viroli (red.), *Palazzi di Forlì*, Forlì 1995, pp. 9–58, here p. 11.

33 The routine episcopal agenda of Pietro Giovanni Aleotti was fulfilled by his one generation younger nephew Simone Aleotti who was apparently destined to take over this office after his uncle had died. However, he died even shortly before Pietro Giovanni, so this family strategy did not work-out properly.

34 Archivio di Stato di Roma (next ASR), Camerale I, Mandati Camerali, seg. 905 "Liber mandatorum extraordinarium dd. Pauli pape IV d, Pii pape IV"; here he is listed as "*Petro Iohanni Aleotto episcopo Foroliviensis, thesaurario secreto Pauli pape IV*".

35 Hubert JEDIN, *Geschichte des Konzils von Trient, Bd. IV/2 Dritte Tagungsperiode und Abschluß – Überwindung der Krise durch Morone, Schließung und Bestätigung*, Darmstadt 2017, p. 295.

36 ASR, Camerale I, Mandati Camerali, seg. 883 "Mandatorum extraordinarium Pauli pape III, Liber primus".

(“[...] *eum expenderi in rebus necessariis ad usum forerie sue* [...]”). Here he is listed as “*Petro Joanni Aleotto thesaur[ari]o et Jocalium S[anti]te Sue Custodi secreto*”.³⁷

I infer from this that putting Pietro Giovanni Aleotti into the office of a secret accountant was directly related to the preparation of the financing of the military campaign to Germany. The management of the accounting documentation for this campaign was probably the first “financial project” to be entrusted to Aleotti. He must have enjoyed the extraordinary trust of Paul III. It is clear from the context that as a secret accountant, Aleotti had to dedicate himself to the massive transfers of cash from the assets of the Papal Chamber to the private treasuries of the Farnese family, and he also co-created the accounting documentation that legalised these cash flows from the accounting perspective of the Papal Chamber.

A brief account of Aleotti's accounting documentation (simply the introductory part of the expenditure items with the names of the captains of the Papal troops of the size of just one-half of the printed page) was published in 1878 by the Italian historian Antonio Bertolotti. In his selective edition, however, he did not indicate the source of the data from which he had drawn his statements and also mistakenly read or recorded the year; it should be “22 *Giugno 1546*”, not “1547”.³⁸ The transcript of an incomplete copy (or the extract) of the accounting documentation which Aleotti led, was also included as an addendum to Walter Friedensburg's edition of the Papal envoys' reports in 1899.³⁹ However, in the later works related to the papal politics of that time, this source was practically unused and even L. Pastor referred to it only in an illustrative form without looking into the contents in greater detail.⁴⁰

When working on another subject on the monetary politics of Pope Urban VIII (1623–1644),⁴¹ I have more or less accidentally found the original Aleotti's accounting documentation from 1546–1547. Its content is slightly different from the description that was published in 1899 by W. Friedensburg. This source has not yet become known to the scientific public. After the division of the papal archives in modern times, this accounting documentation did not remain in the Vatican's Secret Archives (Archivio

37 Ibidem, seg. 882, fol. 30v.

38 Antonio BERTOLOTTI (ed.), *Spesie segrete e pubbliche di Papa Paolo III*, Atti e memorie per la Deputazione di storia patria delle provinzia dell'Emilia 1878, pp. 169–212, here pp. 210–211: “Estratti dal Registro di contailta per la guerra d'alemagna tenuto dal Tesoriere Segreto dal 22 Giugno 1547 al 2 Settembre 1547”.

39 NBD I/9, pp. 686–698. This source from “Tesoreria segreta pontificia” (exact source is not indicated by Friedensburg) could be identical with the transcription made by Baldassare de Opiciis, see Editorial Attachment, expenditure (May 25, 1547).

40 L. PASTOR, *Geschichte Papst Pauls III*, p. 571.

41 Petr VOREL, *La storia della piastra d'argento di Urbano VIII (L'attività della zecca romana sul finire del pontificato di Urbano VIII e il catalogo dettagliato delle piastre d'argento pontificie degli anni 1634–1644)*, Praga – Roma 2013.

Segreto Vaticano), as could reasonably be expected, but it was transferred to the State Archives of Rome (Archivio di Stato di Roma). But even here it is not logically saved in the *Tesoriere segreto* (where it was originally found), but in the archive fund called the “Military and Maritime Commission”, containing mainly sources related to the history of the 18th and 19th centuries.

The original of the accounting documentation of Pietro Giovanni Aleotti is entitled “*Conto de la Guerra de Allemagna*” and it contains a summary of the Papal Chamber’s income and expenditure in connection with the campaign of the Papal troops to Germany from the 22nd June 1546 to the 2nd September 1547.⁴² From the copy (or a statement) published by W. Friedensburg it differs not only in the details of the specific records (particularly in the expenditure section) but also in the reported amounts (though not very significantly). Above all, however, the original document contains also additional notes concerning the cost of the “German War” and the conduct of the Papal Court in this matter, including the financial statements. They took place from January 18, 1549, when the Bolognese Dean, Giovanni of Zophya, presented this documentation for inspection before the assembly of the officials of the Papal Chamber (“[...] *in Plena Camera* [...]”), until the 28th January 1549, when the inspectors, Dean Hieronymus Barentus and the Notary Antonio Bononiensis, wrote the final report. That is why I considered it appropriate to include the edition of the mentioned source in this study as well.

From the formal point of view, this source is not dissimilar to other accounting documents of the Papal Chamber from the middle of the 16th century, which created a very complicated and internally interconnected system of various incomes and expenditures, but also loans and their instalments. In this complex system, the “German War” represented only one of the sub-items that needed to be properly accounted for. The “income” and “expenditure” items therefore do not create a clearly interlinked system in this accounting source, since the army had also been funded from sources other than those initially established for that purpose.

The accounts are kept in the then normal numerical system of the Papal Chamber (1 scudo = 20 soldi = 240 denari, 1 soldo = 12 denari); the basic entity was “golden scudo in gold”, the equivalent of a contemporary Papal coin weighing 3.3 grams that is coined from almost pure gold. The golden scudi were coined in this physical form also at the time of the pontificate of Paul III. The largest standard silver coin was represented

42 ASR, Amministrazioni militari – Commisariato delle Soldatesche e Galere, busta 88 (Conti straordinari 1541–1552), fasc. 1546–Introito et exito delli denari per la guerra d[i] Alemagna di qui di conto d[i] tesoriere segreto Giovanni Aleotti.

by the nominal referred to as *giulio* (or *paolo*),⁴³ which theoretically paid 2 soldi in the monetary system (1 scudo = 10 giuli). The real exchange rate of the gold coins against the “common currency”, which consisted mainly of silver coins (and the copper coins with the lowest value), may have varied. At this time, the “agio” of the gold coins (i.e., the increase in real purchasing power to above the nominal value) was around 10 %. To pay off the book value of 1 scudo it was necessary to pay 11 giuli in nominal value of 22 soldi in 1546; and similarly, for lower value coins. Therefore, even in Aleotti's accounting documentation, in some cases, the recalculation of “coin” (i.e. in silver coins) appears to a lower amount that is recorded in “golden scudo in gold”.⁴⁴

Only exceptionally, other coins of the Papal monetary system appear in the accounts: i.e. golden ducats with a higher weight (cca. 3.5 g of pure gold) and thereby also a higher payment power than *scudi oro di oro*; and then also small coins referred to as *baiocchi*. These coins, the name of which gave rise to an entirely new monetary unit, thereby accelerated the gradual transition to a simpler decimal accounting system (1 scudo = 100 baiocchi; 1 teston = 30 baiocchi, 1 giulio = 10 baiocchi; 1 baiocco = 5 quattrini) that was used in the papal accounting in the middle of the 16th century. However, Allioti's accounting documentation is kept in an old monetary accounting system (1 scudo = 20 soldi, 1 soldo = 12 denari).



Fig. 1-2: Pope Paul III (1534–1549), mint Roma, gold scudo (photo P. Vorel)

43 Allen G. BERMAN, *Papal Coins (A Complete Catalogue of the Coins of the Popes from the Middle Ages to the Present)*, New York 1991, pp. 96–99.

44 See the Editorial Attachment, income section, 18. 9. 1546: An income of 2,000 “scudi di moneta” is converted to “scudi oro di oro” only at 1818 scudi 3 soldi and 8 denari. Ibidem, 1. 11. 1546: An income of 3,333 “scudi di moneta” is converted to 3,000 “scudi oro di oro”. Ibidem, 10. 11. 1546: An income of 950 “scudi di moneta” = 864 “scudi oro di oro”. The conversion rate therefore oscillates between 1.09 and 1.11; the actual calculation of the resulting amount also probably depended on what specific “common coins” were used for payment (not only the papal coinage, but also the coins of other Italian issuers and foreign mints were used).



Fig. 3-4: Pope Paul III (1534–1549), mint Roma, silver giulio (photo P. Vorel)

If we attempt to create a more detailed content analysis of this document, then it is possible to completely separate the revenues and expenditures. The revenue component is (in addition to cash reserves) for the most part made up of standard instruments that have only been formally reported as a source of funding: i.e. loans that have been guaranteed by papal income or taxes levied for a special purpose. For the papal accounting of that time, it did not matter what sources the money came from, only the sum was important. On the contrary, the expenditure component covers mainly the needs, actually or at least formally related to the military campaign to Germany in autumn 1546. However, that was not always the case.

1) Income of 275,024 scudi and 8 denari

The money that the Pope's accountant Aleotti reported as income for the "German War" can be divided into several different sources, thereby substantially differing in their type, their character and the total amount. These resources in the accounting documentation can be summarised as follows:

Cash deposited earlier in the Papal Treasury

By far, the largest source was cash, collected from the Papal Treasury located in the Angelic Castle, to which Aleotti (as a papal secret accountant) had direct access. Due to the campaign to Germany, he reached a total of six times in the papal chest (individual sums ranging from 5,000 to 88,000 scudi), collecting a total of 152,000 scudi in cash (i.e. 55.27 % of the recorded income for the "German War"). The original source of this money

cannot be identified in any way. It was money that the Papal Treasury had previously accepted in cash form.

In the analysed documentation from 1546, Aleotti does not specifically describe how he took away that much cash from the treasury. However, it is logical to assume that he proceeded in a similar way, as was described in detail in December 1552 (at that time he had already taken over the Bishop's office in Forlì, while he still remained a secret papal accountant) in another account concerning the cost of the Papal army passing through Rome. The gold coins were then counted in commissions and embedded in coloured purses, which were bundled, sealed and marked with the amounts that had been deposited in them. One thousand scudi or a little more were usually stored in one purse: In 1552, Aleotti distributed 22,000 scudi to twenty labelled and sealed purses. Another 15,600 scudi were prepared for release so that 2,000 scudi were put into one large red pouch (which weighed almost 7 kg), and the remaining 13,600 scudi were divided into thirteen smaller green purses.⁴⁵



Fig. 5: Roma, the Angelic Castle, main papal treasury during the 16th century (photo P. Vorel)

⁴⁵ ASR, Commissariato delle Soldatesche e Galere, busta 88, fasc. Conto delli denari, che si spenderantio nelle casse della militia per pr[e]sidio et securenza dell Alma Cita di Roma (13. 12. 1552).

Administrative expenses that were reported as being Aleotti's income

On the 18th of September 1546, a relatively high amount of 15,535 scudi and 1 soldo was assigned for the “German War”; this amount was issued for the administrative activity of the Roman Papal Office in August 1546, on the basis of an explicit Pope's decree. The reason is not entirely clear from the context. This amount is explicitly mentioned as part of a “third income” (*terzia entrata*), which seems to have meant the financial resources that served to pay the “third instalment of the army payroll” (see expenditure items below). The specific breakdown of this item was also attached as a special appendix to Aleotti's accounts, perhaps also to ensure that the follow-up commission inspection could not object the inclusion of this item in the revenue folder of Aleotti's documentation (which is really illogical), since it was an explicit command from the Pope.

New cash incomes of the Papal Treasury

In terms of accounting documentation, this group mainly includes income from the “Jewish tax” paid by the Jewish population settled in the territory of the Papal State. In the context of the entirety of Aleotti's accounting documentation, it was not a large amount (all “Jewish taxes” totalling 6,484 scudi and 16 soldi), but it was a much more complex matter. From other sources it is clear that under the pretext of financing the “German War”, the Jewish population was burdened with much higher taxes than it appears from the income items of Aleotti's account. That is why below I have paid particular attention to this issue: See below Digression a) Jewish *vingesima* to “German War”.

A unique sum (400 scudi) is also reported as a new cash income, which was paid for somewhat unclear reasons to the Papal Treasury by Giovanni di Pace⁴⁶ on September 22, 1546.

Drawing cash from long-term loans, guaranteed by the permanent incomes of the Papal Chamber

By the end of the first half of the 16th century, the vast majority of permanent Papal revenues were “leased” to Italian bankers on the basis of long-term credit agreements. The actual bankers took on current payment obligations (and covered them from their sources), while managing the long-term Papal assets financially and disposing of their debts (of course, with the appropriate interest). This was a low-risk investment and therefore the interest rate on such guaranteed loans was lower.

46 I was unable to establish the identity of this person.

In relation to the “German War” itself, I see no causal link between why any of these specific “open loans” was used for the needs of this military campaign. These were the following long-term loans:

- a) Contributions from the three provinces of the Papal State, the proceeds of which were guaranteed by the loan provided to the Papal Chamber by Johann Baptist Perini⁴⁷ (Campania), Bartolomeo Sauli⁴⁸ (Perugia) and Benvenuto Olivieri⁴⁹ (Romagna).
- b) Papal tithe from two Italian territories outside the Papal State (Milan, Florence); with this source the Papal Chamber guaranteed the loan provided by above-mentioned Benvenuto Olivieri and the Bandini Bank House.⁵⁰
- c) Regular income of St George Knights’ Order⁵¹ (this source was used for guaranteeing the loan provided by the above-mentioned Benvenuto Olivieri) and of St Lawrence (the Papal Chamber used this income for guarantees to the Altoviti Family Bank).⁵²
- d) This group also includes the 1,000 scudi item, received on January 22, 1547, from Benvenuto Olivieri, a Florentine banker, that was guaranteed by government bonds

47 Johann Baptist Perini, a Florentine burgher and merchant, working at the Roman Papal Court. He is mentioned by Bruscoli in the position of a witness in a document from 1545; any other direct credit activities in relation to the Papal Chamber have not yet been identified. See F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, p. 233.

48 Bartolomeo Sauli, a member of the branched Roman bank family, regularly financing the Papal budget. In this documentation he is acting along with his relative Girolamo Sauli (Archbishop of Bari), with whom he did systematic business in financing of the Papal budget, see *ibidem*, pp. 22, 87, 92–93, 137–139, 150–151, 235.

49 A separate section is dedicated to Benvenuto Olivieri, see Digression b) Benvenuto Olivieri and the Papal tithe for the “German War” from the Province of Romagna.

50 Aleotti’s accounts mention only the “Bandini” surname. Apparently, it refers to the entire Bandini financial company, which was at that time represented by Piero Antonio Bandini and Alamanno Bandini. See F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, pp. 18–21, 88–92, 127, 150.

51 This medieval Order of Byzantine tradition, the activity of which was interrupted for some time in the early 16th century, was restored by Paul III in the early 1540s during an upcoming offensive against the Ottoman Empire. The hereditary grandmasters of the Order were always the oldest living male members of the Komnenos family, descendants of the Byzantine reign, who after the fall of Constantinople (1453) resorted to Italy. For an overview of the history of this Order, see [anonymous], *Compendio storico dell’origine, fondetione, e stato Privilegii Imperiali, Regi et Bolle, brevi, Motuproprii, Monitorii, Fulminatorii, Pontifici, et altri Diplomi dell’Ordine Equestre Imperiale Angelico Aureato Costantiniano di San Giorgio del Cavaliere Gran Croce*, Venezia 1696, p. 32.

52 There is no distinction in Aleotti’s accounting documentation as to who specifically from the Altoviti family provided the loan; they are denoted as the whole family community by plural (Degli Altoviti). It was the originally Florentine banker family who had found shelter in Rome after the expulsion from Florence during Medicean rule. The main representatives of this bank house in the middle of the 1540s were Bindo Altoviti (1491–1557) and his son, the titular Florentine bishop Antonio Altoviti, see F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, p. 17.

(“à conto di Monte”).⁵³ In the case of Olivieri, who was at that time a governor of the State Debt of the Papal State, this is not an unusual procedure (see Note 49).

A new one-off special purpose loan, guaranteed by the collection of duties by the Papal State

A one-off loan of 30,000 scudi, guaranteed by the duties collected by the Papal State. This loan was co-sponsored by bankers Christoph Sauli (22,500 scudi) and Tobias Palavicini (7,500 scudi).⁵⁴

A new short-term one-off cash loans guaranteed by a debit note

This form of obtaining operating cash was the most expensive one (with a high interest rate) and therefore it was used by the Papal Chamber only exceptionally. In this manner Pope Paul III borrowed 19,000 scudi for the “German War” from two financiers: 15,000 scudi for Thomas Cavalcanti⁵⁵ and another 4,000 scudi from Giovanni di Rossi and Luigi Ruccellay.⁵⁶ However, these two loans were accounted for the “German War” only formally. First, they had not been realised until April and June 1547 (when the remnants of the Papal army had long returned to Italy); moreover, more than half of that money (10,000 scudi) was returned by Aleotti back to the main treasury in Angelic Castle in cash in July 1547. In this way, this transaction only fictitiously increased the

53 Ibidem, pp. 103–110. The creation of the systemic state debt of the Papal State by issuing government bonds (*Monti Camerali*) began in 1526 under the pontificate of Clement VII. It was a permanent, gradually growing public state debt, guaranteed by the property and income of the Papal State, that was managed by Florentine bankers. The long-term development of this form of financing of the Papal State is being analysed by Moritz ISENMAN, *Die Verwaltung der päpstlichen Staatsschuld in der Frühen Neuzeit (Sekretariat, Computisterie und Depositerie der Monti vom 16. bis zum ausgenenden 18. Jahrhundert)*, Stuttgart 2005, pp. 19–20. However, this comprehensive study focuses mainly on the later period of the 17th – 18th centuries. To clarify the origins of this system and its functioning during the 16th century, earlier Italian works are more important, see Armando LODOLINI, *I „Monti Camerali“ nel sistema della finanza pontificia*, Archivi storici delle aziende di credito 1, 1956, pp. 263–278 and Michele MONACO, *Il Primo debito pubblico pontificio: il Monte della Fede (1526)*, Studi Romani 8, 1960, pp. 553–569.

54 They both were the members of the branched Roman bankers’ families, who regularly lent resources for the Papal Budget, see F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, pp. 22, 84–85, 87, 92–93, 137–139, 150–152, 250.

55 Ibidem, pp. 22, 83–84, 127, 178.

56 Luigi Ruccellay, a notary at the Papal Court, was a member of a branched Roman banking company that commonly financed the Papal budget. See ibidem, pp. 18–19, 22, 40–41, 89–92. The exact identity of Giovanni di Rossi, with whom Ruccellay participated in this loan, was not found. He was probably a member of a branched family of that name, originally from Parma, see Letizia ARCANGELI – Marco GENTILE (red.), *Le signorie dei Rossi di Parma tra XIV e XVI secolo*, Florence 2007.

total amount expended for the “German War”. Part of this money was taken from Aleotti by Pope Paul III himself for his personal use.

Items of another type that someone else paid for the Papal Chamber

The only item that belongs to this income group is the amount of 950 scudi “*in coins*” (that is, paid in common silver or small copper coins) paid by Benvenuto Olivieri for the accommodation of the Duke of Parma and Piacenza, at that time that was Pier Luigi Farnese, the Pope’s illegitimate son. This item was recorded in the accounting documentation on November 10, 1546, as an income item, that is a form of loan that Olivieri had repaid in a different way. The aforementioned 950 scudi “*in coins*” were recorded after conversion as 864 scudi “*in gold*”⁵⁷

Table 1: A summary table of income reported by P. G. Aleotti in connection with the “German War”

Accounting justification of income items		Creditors or payers in place of the Papal Chamber	total	%
Cash withdrawal from the Papal Treasury in the Angelic Castle		-	152,000	55.27 %
Administration Costs for August 1546		-	15,535 ^{1s}	5.65 %
Jewish tax	Marca (6000 sc for <i>vingesima</i> ; withdrawn was 5158 ^{10s})	the Altoviti Bank House	6485 ^{16s}	2.36 %
	Campania (2 instalments 363 ^{13s} each = 727 ^{6s})			
	Rome (600)			
A purpose loan of 30,000 sc payable from the collection of duties of the Papal State		Christoph Sauli	30,000	10.91 %
		Tobias Palavicini		
Drawn from a long-term loan guaranteed by the collection of contributions from the provinces of Campania, Perugia and Romagna		Johann Baptist Perini (Campania = 4818 ^{3s} _{8d})	7720 ^{3s} _{8d}	2.81 %
		Bartolomeo Sauli (Perugia = 2000)		
		Benvenuto Olivieri (Romagna = 902)		
Drawn from a long-term loan guaranteed by the collection of tithe from Florence		Benvenuto Olivieri	19,500	7.09 %

⁵⁷ See Note 44.

Drawn from a long-term loan guaranteed by the collection of tithe from Milan	Pier Antonio Bandini (4800)	8800	3.20 %
	Benvenuto Olivieri (a total loan of 20,700, drawn 4000)		
“Bulk” payments not differentiated in terms of individual items	Cassi	3,200	1.16 %
Drawn from the long-term loan guaranteed by the income of the Order of Knights of St George	Benvenuto Olivieri	6,200	2.25 %
Drawn from the long-term loan guaranteed by the income of the Order of Knights of St Lawrence	the Altoviti Bank House	1,000	0.36 %
Drawn from credit guaranteed by the income from Portugal	Pier Antonio Bandini	3,300	1.21 %
Drawn from a bank loan	Benvenuto Olivieri	1,000	0.36 %
One-off loan with interest under a special agreement	Giovanni di Rossi (4,000)	19,000	6.91 %
	Thomaso Cavalcanti (15,000)		
Cash issued to the Duke of Farnese for accommodation	Benvenuto Olivieri	864	0.31 %
Cash received to the Papal Treasury	Giovanni di Pace	420	0.15 %
total		275,024^{-s}_{8d}	100 %

In the above-described income items, I would like to draw attention to two broader connections that we can document through the information from other sources (these are further documented in short digressions, attached after the main text of this study):

The first is the question of the “Jewish Tax”, declared by Pope Paul III in connection with the “German War” [see Digression a) Jewish *vingesima* for the “German War”].

The second is the question of the extent of the financial services provided by the Florentine banker Benvenuto Olivieri [see Digression b) Benvenuto Olivieri and the Papal tithe for the “German War” from the Province of Romagna].

2) *Expenditure in the amount of 274,954 scudi and 14 soldi*

The expense component of Aleotti’s accounting documentation is somewhat simpler than income, but its informative value about the course of the campaign of the Papal army to Germany is, in my opinion, very high. Here we can find a relatively large amount of data that is easiest to analyse in their chronological order. That is to say that the expense part is broken down (even if it is not apparent at first glance) according to the terms of payroll of the Papal army. Pope Paul III contractually guaranteed its funding for six months, which not only can be symbolically divided into six monthly instalments of the army payroll, but Aleotti indeed used this division, although it is explicitly specified only for two instalments (fourth and fifth, quoted as “*quarta paga*” and “*quinta paga*”).

**Two (the first and the second) instalments of the army payroll (June and July 1546)
= 100,000 scudi**

The largest volume of cash was paid from the Papal Treasury at the very beginning of the campaign. This money can be divided into three parts: 12,000 for lower commanders, 82,000 for soldiers' payroll and 6,000 for Farnese brothers.

The first part of this sum includes the salary for the lower military commanders (captains), whose names are mostly explicitly specified. This is the main source that refers to staffing of the lower command corps at the beginning of the campaign. Given the extent and complexity of this information, I have separated this topic and I deal with it below in a special digression: See Digression c) Command corps of the Papal army in the Schmalkaldic War.

Payments to lower commanders (captains) were booked as an expense item on the 22nd Juny 1546 in the amount of 12,000 scudi, either 300 (mostly cavalry commanders) or 200 (infantry commanders). The payments to captains had not been recorded as a spending item anywhere else (with the only exception),⁵⁸ from which I conclude that this amount represented the payroll to captains for the entire duration of this military campaign and it was paid in full for all the 6 months at the beginning of the campaign.

Pope Paul III needed to make this advance payment quickly and in cash. That is why he ordered to reach deep into the Papal Treasury in the Angelic Castle and he withdrew this money from a long-term cash reserve in gold. The secret papal accountant Piero Giovanni Aleotti had new purses produced for this purpose.⁵⁹

Ordinary mercenaries (whose names are not recorded anywhere) were paid a total payroll of 82,000 scudi (i.e. 41,000 per month) two months in advance in Bologna, i.e. during the campaign from Rome to the Danube region. This spending item was recorded on the 3rd July 1546. The money for the army was taken over by Matthias Gherardi di San Cassiano,⁶⁰ referred to as the director of the Datarary (*datario*), as post master (*maestro delle poste*) or *mastro di campo* (Matthias Gherardi was responsible for the army payroll and for the relocation of the field and its technical background during

58 The captain named "*Hieronimo di Pisa*" (next Jerome from Pisa) was paid 100 scudi of "*retained payroll*" ("*... a conto della prouisione di maestro di campo non pagata gli...*") on 25. 4. 1547, i.e. three months after the troops returned to Italy.

59 A. BERTOLOTTI (ed.), *Spesie segrete e pubbliche*, p. 200: "[...] *sacchetti delli scudi 12 M che si sono pagati alli capitani che hanno a far fronte contro lutherani [...]*".

60 This man, who, according to Aleotti's record, demonstrably held the position of the Datarary director at that time, is not recorded amongst the holders of this office by F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, p. 296.

the campaign). The first instalment was assisted by an official from his office, Giouani Battista da Toffia.⁶¹

One day later, the two principal representatives of the Papal army were paid: Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, the Papal legate in this campaign charged with a diplomatic mission at the Imperial Court, and his brother Duke Ottavio Farnese, who served as the chief military commander in this campaign. Both received 3,000 scudi, that is a salary for three months in advance (June to August, each 1,000 scudi per month).

The third instalment of the army payroll (August 1546) = 43,500 scudi

At the end of August 1546, the third payroll instalment was paid to the army, in the amount of 41,500 scudi, which in total corresponds to the first and second instalment. Matthias Gherardi di San Sassino again arranged the orderly payment. Together with this money for the army, a reward was paid in advance (as a deposit for September 1546) to the two Farnese brothers, 1,000 scudi each.

The fourth instalment of the army payroll (September 1546) = 35,300 scudi

48,227 scudi were formally transferred for the fourth payroll instalment (“*a conto della quarta paga*”), but Matthias Gherardi used only 35,300 scudi to pay the soldiers – only this amount was entered in Aleotti’s accounting records.⁶²

The difference of 13,527 scudi was explained by the fact that the banker Bartolomeo Sauli had already paid the sum of 1,727 scudi to the Papal Chamberlain (*camerlengo*) in Perugia. The banker Benvenuto Olivieri also paid 5,000 scudi to the same chamberlain in Perugia and in Bologna he paid out 4,800 scudi to Matteo Palmerini (i.e. 11,527 scudi in total). The remaining 2,000 were paid by the same Olivieri in Perugia to the Farnese brothers (“*al Cardinal et al Duca*”), 1000 scudi each (even though they drew an advance on the September payment already in August).

During these cash transactions, the accounting difference was caused by the overvaluation of the gold coin (or the *scudo oro in oro* which was a currency equivalent to the gold coin) in relation to the silver coin.⁶³ A cash payment in the amount of 1,950 scudi was received in the accounting, but these were silver coins. The agio in the amount of

61 Ibidem, p. 246.

62 During this fourth payment (in September), it seems likely that the cash-handling machination in regard to the payroll had reached more significant proportions, as indicated by the instruction from 21. 9. 1546, received by Flaminio Savello who was sent by the Pope to oversee the proper payment, see NBD I/9, pp. 265–266: “[...] *si stabili l’ordine de pagamenti noc la defalcatione da farsi del un scudo per fante anticipato et delli denari prestati per l’arme [...]*”.

63 See Note 44.

10 % (i.e. 19½ scudi) was counted as a loss or an expenditure item that was accepted by the dealer and merchant Bernardo Corbinegli.⁶⁴

At the same time, the cash costs of 5,000 scudi were paid, which Matthias Gherardi continuously expended for the technical provision of military camps. Thus, the influx of money from Italy to the army ceased for a longer time, certainly in connection with the military activities that accompanied the conquest of Ingolstadt and the positional war in the Danube region, taking place in September and October 1546, which did not produce any clear result.

The lack of money and the related dissatisfaction within the Papal army (which had suffered significant losses at that time) is quite well documented by the testimony of the captured Italian nobleman named Hanibal Suarius, who was captured by the troops of the Schmalkaldic League at the end of October 1546. He was very outspoken in the captivity; among other things, he also mentioned what had been said in the Habsburg camp in connection with the overdue payroll: “[...] *sagt auch, er habe gehört, der Bapst wölte dem Keyser kein Geld mehr schicken, denn er besorget sich, so der Keyser geschlagen were, würde er auch geschlagen sein. Derhalben halte e ran sich, und wölte dem Keyser nichts mehr helfen [...]*”. Of course, this could be well used in the leaflet propaganda of the time.⁶⁵

During October, however, according to Aleotti's record, no money was sent from Rome to the army. Aleotti posted only two payments that were not directly related to the Schmalkaldic War: On October 16, 1546, the accountant Aleotti received an extraordinary reward of 210 scudi from Paul III for his great work. (i.e., in the amount exceeding the half-year payroll of the Infantry Battalion Commander). On the same day (also on the basis of the Pope's own decree), Antonio Gavrieli, a lawyer in papal services,⁶⁶ was paid an amount of 48 ducati and 66 baiocchi, which, when converted to the accounting monetary unit, was 52 scudi, 18 guili and 5 denari.⁶⁷

The fifth instalment of the army payroll (November 1546) = 24,000 scudi

The new money supply was not sent to the German battlefield until the beginning of November 1546; Aleotti expressly refers to it as “*the fifth payroll*” (“*quinta paga*”). It was again Matthias Gherardi who received the money, but only 24,000 scudi were sent from

64 This man belonged to the middle-class of Florentine merchants working at the Papal Court, see F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, pp. 156–157, 215, 246.

65 *Wahrhaftige zeitungen, aus dem Feldlager bey Sengen, Vom Fünffzehenden, bis in den zwentzigsten tag Octobris Anno M. D. xlvj.*, Sengen, 20. 10. 1546, fol. a IIII – a IIIIV.

66 F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, p. 235.

67 See Note 44.

Rome. It is not clear from the context why it was exactly this amount; the gradual decline of the army payroll (starting with the fourth instalment in September) apparently reflects the decreasing numbers of soldiers as a result of death in combat, sickness or desertion. The Papal Chamber issued a total of 180 scudi to a carrier of Bergamo mailing company for the transport of cash (which was transported over the mountains to the military camp in the Danube region). Matthias Gherardi also charged the amount of 9,705 scudi spent on the operation of the military camp and its numerous relocations at that time, as well as 130 scudi that he paid for chartered carriers.

The sixth instalment of the army payroll (December 1546) = 20,500 scudi

The last payment is included in the amount of 20,500 scudi, which Matthias Gherardi received for this purpose on December 13, 1546.⁶⁸

11,500 scudi were discharged in cash from the Papal Treasury, while the remaining 9,000 were secured by Cornelio Malvasia⁶⁹ through a credit note issued in Bologna. Ottavio Farnese received 1,500 scudi from this sum, the rest (19,000 scudi) was intended for the payment to the remainder of the Papal infantry (“[... scudi] 1500 al signor duca Orrauiio et il resto alla Fanteria [...]”); i.e. that part of the army, which was commanded by Duke Ottavio and which was (despite increasingly declining numbers) dangerously plundering the area of the Bavarian Danube region.

By making the payment for December (i.e. the sixth month of the military campaign), the funding of the Papal army was ended, the army no longer intervened in the struggle with the Schmalkaldic League and provided for the livelihood as it was possible, especially by looting and plundering the countryside in South Germany.⁷⁰

On January 22, 1547, Paul III issued the decision to withdraw his troops from Germany. The only additional money that was charged in the context of the Schmalkaldic War, was only the cost that Matthias Gherardi incurred in association with the transport of the army back through the Alps at the end of January and in February 1547.

January supply of money (the 22nd January 1547 in the total amount of 8,180 scudi) was delivered from Rome mostly in cash (7,000 scudi, 180 scudi was paid for the transfer

68 Matthias Gherardi himself explicitly mentions this amount (20,500 scudi) as money that was “[...] *comportanda in Germaniam pro sexta pagha exercitus [...]*” in his bill of income from 13. 12. 1546, see NBD I/9, Nr. 119, pp. 387–390 (here Note 1, p. 389).

69 F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, pp. 81, 90–91, 110, 140.

70 The poor behaviour of the mercenaries of the Papal army in connection with the problems in the army payroll is also mentioned by Veralo in his reports sent to Pope Paul III from Ulm on 7. and 8. 2. 1547, see NBD I/9, Nr. 134, pp. 462–471.

of money), with a smaller portion (1,000 scudi) being again secured by Cornelio Malvasia in Bologna via a credit note.⁷¹

At the beginning of February (the 4th February 1547) the gradual return of troops was secured by a similar amount (altogether 8,000 scudi), but in the opposite proportion. Cornelio Malvasia secured 6000 scudi based on a credit note in Bologna; the remaining 2000 scudi were sent in cash (while the carrier named Cherubio retained 150 scudi).

In February 1547, the actual funding of the army ended; the pitiful remnants of the Papal army returned to Italy and did not enter the war in Germany again. Nevertheless, in April and in June 1546, the accountant Aleotti was still reporting relatively high sums in the item “income” (new cash loans of 24,500 scudi from Benvenuto Olivieri and Tomaso Cavalcanti), but also “expenditure” (from April to September 1547 he records expenditures in the amount of 20,177 scudi, 5 soldi and 7 denari).

From these “post-war” expenditures, the only one definitely associated with the campaign to Germany was an additional payment in the amount of 100 scudi paid to one of the infantry chiefs (Jerome from Pisa) on April 20, 1547, and, in a way, also the payment to Alessandro Vitelli (101 scudi, 7 soldi and 4 denari).

The other expenditures were no longer related to the war: they are various types of spending or internal accounting assignments, for example, when Aleotti transferred 10,000 scudi in cash to the treasury in the Angelic Castle. In a certain sense, as a “military” expense we can consider the money (454 scudi, 10 soldi and 10 denari) paid by Aleotti to Silvestro Berreto, the governor of the great Nepi fortress, located near Rome. Beretto was to inspect the fortress and secure its defence ability. This fortress, which in 1546, together with the adjoining city of the same name, formed the territorial enclave of the Farnesian Duchy of Castro (ruled by Ottavio Farnese), certainly did not have anything to do with the Schmalkaldic War, nor could it be assumed that the Lutheran troops could endanger this fortress located in the Italian inland.

In July 1547 Pope Paul III himself withdrew 1,700 scudi from the account of the “German War” for his own needs and Aleotti declared additional more than 900 scudi as expense for the unspecified needs of the Farnese family and the Pope himself. And eventually, perhaps the most curious cost item charged by Aleotti in connection with the German War: a pearl necklace with the price of 4,300 scudi, which was for the personal use of Paul III, secured by the banker Tomaso Cavalcanti.

It is a pity that Aleotti had not written down on which girl's neck this necklace had ended (though he probably knew which for lady the Pope bought this jewel). We can

71 NBD I/9, Nr. 127, pp. 421–425.

assume, however, that only the Emperor's illegitimate daughter, Margaret, could deserve such a gift at that time, the wife of the Papal grandson, Ottavio Farnese, and the mother of the two recently born Papal great-grandsons. Why would the Pope buy such a precious jewel for someone else, beyond the closest family?

Table 2: Expenses recorded by Aleotti in connection with German War from June 1546 to September 1547 (according to the chronological breakdown) [in: scudi ^{soldi} denari]

period	salary			securing troops and a camp	Other costs of the cam-paign	Other costs of unclear determination	Costs that are not directly related to the War		total
	Farnese brothers	captains	soldiers				issued to the Pope (cash and jewels)	other	
1546 / VI – VII	6 000	12 000	82 000	-	-	-	-	-	100 000
1546 / VIII	2 000	-	41 500	-					43 500
1546 / IX	(2 000)	-	35 300	5000	19 ¹⁰ ₀	(11 527)			40 319 ¹⁰ ₀ (+ 13 527)
1546 / X	-	-	-	-	-	-		262 ¹⁸ ₅	262 ¹⁸ ₅
1546 / XI	-	-	24 000	9705	310	-		-	34 015
1546 / XII	1 500	-	19 000	-	-	-		-	20 500
1547 / I	-	-	-	8000	180	-		-	8 180
1547 / II	-	-	-	7850	150	-		-	8 000
1547 / III	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-
1547 / IV	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	405 ⁹ ₂	505 ⁹ ₂
1547 / V	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2661 ⁷ ₃	2761 ⁷ ₃
1547 / VI	-	-	-	-	-	-	4300	-	4300
1547/ VII	-	-	-	-	-	-	1700	10 101 ⁷ ₄	11 801 ⁷ ₄
1547 / VIII	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1547 / IX	-	-	-	-	-	-	909 ¹ ₁₀	-	909 ¹ ₁₀
total	9 500 (2 000)	12 100	201 800	30 555	659 ¹⁰ ₀	(11 527)	6909 ¹ ₁₀	13 421 ² ₂	274 954 ¹⁴ ₀ (+ 13 527)

The accounting documentation led by Pietro Giovanni Aleotti in connection with the Papal campaign to Germany represents, in my view, an important source not only for the study of the history of the Schmalkaldic War itself but also for the history of the diplomatic, military, monetary and fiscal policies of the Papal court in the mid-16th century.

It unequivocally illustrates the direct dependence between the funding of the Papal troops and the rate of their activity on the German battlefield. It was clear from the

documentation available to L. Pastor that there were problems with the payment of salary from the very beginning of the operation of the Papal army in Germany.⁷² That is probably why the Papal army behaved on the German territory the way they were used to behave in the Northern Italian wars: That is like villains, looting rural houses and robbing anyone who cannot resist, no matter whether it is a subdued enemy or an ally. Moreover, it was hardly possible to distinguish it in the complex territory of southern Germany, especially since the Papal soldiers, in their vast majority, did not speak German.



Fig. 6: Coat of Arms of the Pope Paul III; main gateway of the Nepi Fortress (photo P. Vorel)

Description of violence allegedly committed by Papal troops to southern Germany rural population was indeed a normal part of contemporary propaganda which was in the form of printed leaflets disseminated by the enemy (Lutheran) side, but inappropriate

⁷² L. PASTOR, *Geschichte Papst Pauls III*, p. 575.

behaviour of Papal troops in Germany was also clearly expressed by Emperor Charles V himself.⁷³

The army itself ended in an infamous way. A large part of the Italian soldiers perished directly on the battlefield, some of which died of hunger and cold in an unexpected worsening of weather at the end of November 1546⁷⁴ and during the return trip through the Alpine passes at the turn of January and February 1547.⁷⁵

The entire Papal “German War” is a matter of sharp contrasts and questions still unanswered. The initial impetus to the whole event probably came from the Papal, not from the Imperial side. The promises of great financial and military support by the Papal State were probably the main argument on a plate of imaginary diplomatic scales which eventually outweighed the Emperor Charles V’s political considerations on the side of the military solution to his long-standing conflict with the Schmalkaldic League. Without the promise of massive Papal support, he would probably consider this step more cautiously; at the beginning of June, the Emperor explicitly appreciated that Papal money would allow for easy financing of the war in Germany and that the Pope’s terms are quite acceptable.⁷⁶

However, Aleotti’s accounts show clearly that, in the case of the “German War”, Pope Paul III was willing to reach deep into the cash reserve in the chests at the Angelic Castle. This is unusual, because the vast majority of other expenditures (including earlier military activities) were solved by loans, contributing both to the total debt of the Papal State and to the long-term decommissioning of regular income sources, through which these loans were guaranteed (and subsequently used for instalments). In my opinion, the reason is that a substantial part of the cash (paid out in gold) ended directly in the hands of the nearest Pope’s relatives of the Farnese family, whether it was their direct remuneration for the military and diplomatic service to the Papal State or the money issued in association with financing of the mercenary army (which was also subsequently available to the Farnese).

73 W. MAURENBRECHER, *Karl V. und die Deutschen Protestanten*, Nr. 11, pp. 86–99. The letter of Charles V addressed to Diego Hurtado de Mendoza was sent from Ulm on 11. 2. 1547. There the Emperor outlines the course of the Danubian campaign and criticises the behaviour of the Papal command and the mercenaries (pp. 89–92) in indiscriminate words. For an Italian excerpt of this letter written in Spanish and its interpretation, see G. LEVA, *Storia documentata di Carlo V*, Vol. IV., pp. 256–257.

74 Girolamo FALETI, *Prima Parte delle guerre di Alamagna*, Ferrara 1552, pp. 108–109.

75 Rolando BUSSI (ed.), *Cronaca di San Cesarino (dalle origini al 1547) – Alessandro Tassoni seniore Cronaca di Modena (1106–1562)*, Mantova 2014, p. 264: “[...] e in quell’esercito morirono per fame e per freddo molti Modenesi [...]”.

76 J. D. TRACY, *Emperor Charles V*, p. 209.

From the very beginning of this campaign, the family representation and the advancement of the glory of his grandchildren represented a crucial issue for Paul III.⁷⁷ This is also quite well documented by a relatively detailed source, available to us in the form of contemporary newspaper. The Italian public was regularly informed of the news from the battlefield (and above all, of the merits of the Farnese brothers) in the form of brief newspaper leaflets produced by the Farnese in large volumes in the printing shop at the piazza di Parione. Almost every day, the Romans could follow the “heroic epic” of the Farnese who were supposed to wipe out the nest of “Lutheran heresy” and repair the humiliation caused to Papal Rome twenty years ago (*Sacco di Roma*, 1527), starting with the outpouring of the Papal army from Rome, through their festive parade in the Imperial camp and the first military experience in the siege of Ingolstadt and other minor events. This regular supply of news ends in October 1546.⁷⁸

The Papal army actively participated in two larger combat operations within the coalition army: The first of these was a several-day artillery battle during the siege of Ingolstadt in early September 1546. At that time, a major field battle was expected, in which the Papal units were placed at the forefront. Therefore, they suffered greater losses immediately at the outset, during the enemy's unexpected massive artillery fire. Especially the Papal soldiers then participated in repeated minor skirmishes taking place on the plains spreading between the enemy field camps in the period between the artillery fire. The second major combat action conducted by the Papal troops independently was an unexpected night raid and conquest of the city of Donauwörth on the 8th October 1546. This, however, was the last most significant military action in which the Papal army operated in the Danube region, as part of the Habsburg coalition army. Ten days later, on the 18th October 1546, the rest of the Papal army separated from the allied troops (with the exception of Savello's cavalry troops) for unclear reasons (apparently due to disagreements regarding command) and began to operate in the territory of Bavaria without coordination with the main Habsburg command.⁷⁹

There were probably several reasons for this development (disagreements between the commanders and the Farnese brothers themselves, the absence of Cardinal Farnese in the army due to recurrent illness, the impossibility of fulfilling the declared purpose of the crusade against the Lutherans); the decisive role in the disintegration of the Papal

77 A similar conclusion was also reached already by the contemporaries of Paul III, who were more involved in the backstage of “high politics”. As early as 1539, the main Pope's interests were characterised by the Venice ambassador at the Imperial Court, Pietro Mocenigo, see Gustav TURBA (ed.), *Venetianische Depeschen vom Kaiserhofe*, Bd. I, Wien 1899, p. 328 (22. 5. 1539) and NBD IX/I, p. 446.

78 P. VOREL, *Za obnovu řádu v říši a pravé víry*, pp. 100–116.

79 *Ibidem*, p. 117.

army was undoubtedly played by the problems with the payroll for the soldiers who were last paid at the end of September 1546. From October 1546 until the end of December 1546 and the beginning of January 1547, the soldiers did not receive any money, while the supply was also seriously weakened. The Papal Infantry began to plunder the Bavarian countryside, ensuring both their supply and spoil by looting, regardless of whether the estates belonged to Catholic or Lutheran rulers. On the 23rd November 1546, unusually strong frost struck the area in the Danube region, to which the Italian soldiers were not accustomed. The numbers of Papal soldiers began to shrink rapidly in field conditions; the loss was caused not only by hunger, frost and illness, but also by frequent desertions. At the turn of 1546 and 1547, when the money for the payroll instalments for the fifth and sixth months of the campaign arrived from Rome to the field camp near Heilbronn, only about two thousand infantrymen remained from the original twelve thousand army. On the 22nd January 1547 Pope Paul III issued an order to end the military campaign and withdraw the rest of the army back to Italy. The winter return over the Alps, which lasted until the second half of February 1547, caused further loss of life due to cold and hunger.

Contemporary commentators (including the Emperor Charles V) evaluated the Pope's participation in this part of the Schmalkaldic war as a great disgrace to the whole of Italy and as a failure to fulfil the promises which the Pope contractually committed to in June 1546. However, in March 1547, when the Habsburgs ended up in defensive on the Eastern Front in Saxony, the Emperor Charles V asked Pope Paul III for an urgent military assistance again. Yet this time with no success. The Papal troops did not participate in the surprise victory of the Habsburg army at the Battle of Mühlberg (on the 24th April 1547).

Pope Paul III completely lost his interest in another armed struggle with German Lutherans. From his point of view, the campaign of the Papal army to Germany did not meet the expectations he had put in it. Even the Pope did primarily pursue the military liquidation of the Lutheran "heresy" (it was only a propaganda at the beginning of the campaign); the military campaign was to bring fame to the Pope's two grandsons and to confirm their dominant position amongst the European aristocracy. This effect did not occur, however; on the contrary, the Farnese demonstrated their incompetence both in the battlefield and in the diplomatic negotiations associated with this campaign, disgraced themselves and, under the pretext of military spending, they reached deep into the financial resources of the Papal State. Already during the year 1547, when the Pope's son Pier Luigi Farnese was murdered, Emperor Charles V occupied the Duchy of Parma and in the last years of Paul III's pontificate there was an outbreak of apparent hostility between the Emperor and the Pope, growing into a state of war.

There was nothing to boast of. The Pope's low military effectiveness in combat, the scornful condemnation of the Emperor, the infamous end of parts of the remnants of the

papal expedition in the snow-drifts (only a small fraction of the original army returned to Italy in February 1547) and a new war that began in Italy in 1547 between Pope Paul III and Emperor Charles V, put aside the original idea of using the military campaign of 1546 in the interest of the Farnese family representation. For this, an appropriate situation did not occur until two decades later, when the Farnese family in European politics was represented primarily by Margaret of Parma, the illegitimate daughter of Emperor Charles V, and her son Alessandro Farnese (1545–1592). Only then, after clarifying the property-legal relations to the Duchy of Parma and Piacenza (for the benefit of the Farnese) and after an active involvement of the entire family on the side of King Philip II of Spain in his struggle with the Dutch insurgents, a historical fiction emerged, involving the role of Pope Paul III and his grandsons in the Schmalkaldic War. This fiction came in both literary (in the form of printed interpretations of the contemporary history at that time) and visual (in the family palace in Rome and Caprarola) form.⁸⁰ However, this is already a connection that far exceeds the scope of this contribution.

Digression a)

Jewish *vingesima* to “German War”

The relatively complicated relations that formed between the Papal Chamber and the Jewish population of the Papal State by the middle of the 16th century are documented in detail by the research of S. Simonsohn's. It was also made accessible to the public by a comprehensive small-scale (hardly accessible in Europe) edition of medieval and early modern judaica from the Vatican archive (the period of Paul III is covered in volume VI.)⁸¹ and the final synthetic volume.⁸² S. Simonsohn obviously could not use Aleotti's accounting documentation, because it was stored in a different archive fund than the one which represented the main source for his monumental editorial project.

Although the main intermediaries of the loan for Papal Chamber in the middle of the 16th century were Florentine bankers, the Jewish financiers also had their irreplaceable role in the complex financial system of that time. Primarily because in their case the legally limited interest rate in Europe was set considerably higher than in the case of Christian financiers or it was not limited at all. Thus, any financial assets could be much better multiplied through Jewish financiers, as long as a sufficiently secure legal space

80 Ibidem, p. 133–145.

81 Shlomo SIMONSOHN (ed.), *The Apostolic See and the Jews, Vol. 6, Documents: 1546–1555*, Toronto 1990.

82 Shlomo SIMONSOHN, *The Apostolic See and the Jews, Bd. VII (History)*, Toronto 1991.

was created for such a transaction. Extraordinary taxes and levies imposed on Jewish financiers by the monarchs may not have always been a negative phenomenon for Jewish entrepreneurs, it was often about a mutually beneficial agreement. The requirements for extraordinary “Jewish” taxes were often accompanied by a politically-guaranteed extension of the license to perform credit operations at riskier (significantly higher) interest rates. It is evident from the preserved documentation that it was similar to the relationship between the papal power and the Jewish bankers operating in the territory of the Papal State by the time of the pontificate of Paul III.⁸³

Right at the beginning of the pontificate of Paul III, in 1534, Jewish banking was subordinated directly to the Papal Chamber, both in Rome (where the most important Jewish financiers resided), and in the territory of the entire Papal State. The renewal of the privileges for the Roman Jewish bankers⁸⁴ was followed by the gradual adjustment of the legal status (more favourable for the credit activities of Jewish bankers) and other parts of the Papal state.⁸⁵ Along with this centralization, Paul III began to strive for a clear determination of settlement area for this community. From earlier times, the number of Jewish bankers in Rome was limited to twenty “families”; this number was raised to forty in 1543. Former and newly established Jewish bankers were to be confined only in the designated part of Rome (later Piazza Giudea and Via Guidea) since 1545. Although this rule failed to become fully enforced during the pontificate of Paul III, the basis of the Roman Jewish ghetto of the 16th century was created at that very time.

Pope Paul III (or the Papal Chamber officials) was interested in expanding the number of Jewish financiers and their lending activities, but the negotiations were interfered by the efforts of the “old families” to maintain their former exclusivity. The compromise solution of 1543 took the form of an agreement, according to which the maximum interest rate for the former twenty licensed Jewish bankers was reduced from 60 % to 48 % (at the same time, it was reduced from 10 % to 6 % for Christian financiers in Protestant Europe), while twenty “new” Jewish bankers were allowed to lend money at a maximum annual rate of 30 %.⁸⁶

As a result of the centralization described above, the officials of the Papal Chamber had a better insight into the lending activities of the Jewish financiers, and could easily enforce a variety of taxes and fees.

83 Kenneth R. STOW, *Taxation, community and state (The Jews and the fiscal foundations of the early modern papal state)*, Pápste und Papsttum, Bd. 19, Stuttgart 1982.

84 S. SIMONSOHN, *The Apostolic See*, VII, pp. 407–409, 412.

85 Max RADIN, *A Charter of Privileges of the Jews in Ancona of the year 1535*, Jewish quarterly review, N.S. 4, 1913, no. 2, pp. 225–248.

86 S. SIMONSOHN, *The Apostolic See*, VII, pp. 413–414.

The “proper” Jewish tax was twofold: 1) the so-called “Jewish tithe” (*decima*), which was taken out of all movable and immovable property (just like the religious tithe in the case of the Christian population); 2) a tax on all interest earned by Jewish financiers with high interest-bearing loans; to collect this tax (the amount of which was not precisely fixed), the Pope Commissars could use any means.

In addition to these “proper Jewish taxes”, an extraordinary tax called *vigesima* was collected in the middle of the 16th century. Originally, it was a special tax of 5 % of all property and income, announced in 1460 to finance struggle against Turks. It was to be collected for only three years, but the later Popes also sometimes collected it.

Formally, therefore, the tax burden on the Jewish population was so high that tax collection at an official level was economically unrealistic. The “Jewish tax” was therefore collected in a non-systematic way, essentially at such level as the papal collectors were able to enforce. In practice, its level stabilized on the usual “tithe”, increased by a “fine” of 4 %. Even these measures contributed to a significant decline in the number of Jewish inhabitants in the territory of the Papal State at the beginning of the 16th century.⁸⁷

It was not until the beginning of the pontificate of Paul III when this situation has changed significantly. Instead of vaguely defined taxes, papal clerks agreed with the leaders of the Jewish community on a fixed amount (traditionally called *vigesima*), which consisted of 10,000 scudi from the whole of Italy throughout the year. The Roman Jewish bankers themselves contributed 560 scudi to this sum. The precisely defined financial obligations of the Jewish community then allowed the Papal Chamber to use this income to regularly guarantee loans granted to Pope Paul III by Florentine and Genovese bankers. Those bankers then organized the Jewish *vigesime* collection themselves (as in the case of the Papal tithe from the Christian population or other permanent incomes of the Papal Chamber).

Due to the wars into which Pope Paul III was drawn during the 1540s, the originally agreed financial model was disrupted and the Pope began to raise demands on Jewish bankers. The first such step was the launch of a new “war” tax in 1542 that was designed to defend the coast of the Papal State against the attacks of the pirate Barbarossa, then operating in the service of the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁸ This tax was to be collected from the Jewish population of the coastal provinces of Marche and Ancona (for the fortification of the Ancona port, the Jews from these provinces were said to had paid a respectable amount of 15,000 scudi), but soon it spread to Rome as well.⁸⁹

87 Ibidem, pp. 418–419.

88 Ernle BRADFORD, *The Sultans Admiral (Barbarossa – Pirate and Empire-Builder)*, London 2009, pp. 138, 161.

89 K. R. STOW, *Taxation*, p. 24; S. SIMONSOHN, *The Apostolic See*, VII, p. 420.

Paul III chose a similar procedure for financing of the Schmalkaldic War. A new Jewish *vigesima* was announced, which was supposed to bring 20,000 scudi.⁹⁰ It concerned the Jewish population under the jurisdiction of the Papal State (not the whole of Italy), and also the French enclaves (Avignon and Venaissin).⁹¹

This tax, which was originally to be collected directly by the Papal collector, was soon used (as well as most of the permanent papal receipts) to guarantee a cash loan of 20,700 gold scudi. This was a one-year loan, with an interest rate of 12 %.⁹²

The consortium of creditors, which consisted of five Florentine bankers working at the Roman Papal Court (Alois de Oricellaris, Benvenuto Oliveri, Pier Antonio Bandini, Aleman Bandini and Jerome Ubaldino), should receive 23,144 scudi in total; the costs of the actual collecting of the money (collector's fee) of several hundred scudi were added separately.

This loan was guaranteed mostly by the Jewish *vigesima* mentioned above, respectively the money collected in the city and province of Bologna, the province of Romagna, the Ravenna Exarchate,⁹³ the province of Umbria and the French enclave (the county of Venaissin and the city of Avignon); the cost of two collectors for two years amounted to one hundred scudi.

However, the Jewish *vigesima* would not be sufficient to cover the repayment, the interest and the cost of collection, even if it was collected in full (which could not be assumed). Moreover, the territory in which the consortium was to collect *vigesima* for the creditors did not concern the entire territory of the Papal State.⁹⁴ Therefore, the range of guarantees was extended to two additional sources of cash collected from Christians to make up for insufficient funds: 1) arrears of the last two tithes in the city of Bologna and the dioceses of Bologna, Marche, Umbria and the French enclave (*Patrimonium*

90 S. SIMONSOHN (ed.), *The Apostolic See*, Vol. 6, Nr. 2621, 2622, 2631, 2633, 2634.

91 The task of collection of the extraordinary Jewish tax for financing of the war in Germany in the papal enclave in France (Avignon, Venaissin) was given to Zikmund Albano, a clergyman from Urbino on 2. 11. 1546. For the city and the province of Bologna, Alessandro Franceschi of Foligno was appointed as the main collector on 4. 11. 1546, see S. SIMONSOHN (ed.), *The Apostolic See*, Vol. 6, Nr. 2646–2647, pp. 2557–2558.

92 This contract was fully published by S. SIMONSOHN (ed.), *The Apostolic See*, Vol. 6, Nr. 2644, pp. 2556–2557. The contract is not dated; but was concluded before 5. 11. 1546. On the Papal side, four high-ranking officials signed the loan agreement: Cardinal Guido Ascanius Sforza, Bernardinus Elvini, Bishop of Ancona and Treasury Secretary Julius Gonzaga and Julius de Grandis, President of the Papal Chamber. It is probably the same loan of 20,700 scudo (dated 30. 10. 1546), which is registered in Florentine sources by Bruscoli F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, p. 90 (he mentions Luigi Rucellai instead of Aleos Oricelaria in the consortium, but otherwise the conditions are virtually the same).

93 S. SIMONSOHN (ed.), *The Apostolic See*, Vol. 6, Nr. 2648, p. 2558.

94 *Ibidem*, Nr. 2651 and Nr. 2653, p. 2559.

Provinciis); in addition to the cost for collectors of one hundred scudi; 2) tithe from Milan (cost per 4 collectors – one hundred scudi).

The increased financial burden on Jewish financiers was accompanied by a higher level of legal protection. Just at the time when the extraordinary *vigesima* was collected, Pope Paul III ordered the Roman municipality (via a letter dated December 3, 1546) not to punish four Jewish Roman bankers (Master Josef, Isaac Zarfari, Leo Abem Pensat and David Rossulus) in connection with credit activities (which apparently violated the maximum interest rates) as they are not under the jurisdiction of the city of Rome, but in legal affairs they are subject to the Papal chamberlain. A few days later (December 8, 1546), the same argument was used again in the case of the aforementioned Isaac Zarfati (who is explicitly mentioned as one of the twenty “old” Jewish bankers in Rome as defined in 1543, see above) and in addition (July 4, 1547), the protection also concerned Isaac’s sons Salomon and Joseph and his grandson Isaac.⁹⁵

From the surviving sources it is not clear whether the aforementioned extraordinary Jewish tax for the “German War” was collected in full. It was probably not, because after the end of the Papal participation in this military campaign in early 1547, officials of the Papal Chamber again began to negotiate with representatives of Jewish communities regarding the amount of regularly levied taxes. This is documented, for example, by the agreement between the Papal Chamber and the Jewish Community in the province of Marche, in the city of Ancona (where the very large and influential Jewish community was still settled in the late 1540s due to the special economic position of this port city) and other locations (Ascoli, Camerino, Fano) about their share of regular “Jewish taxes”.⁹⁶ From these negotiations, it is clear that before July 1547, it was agreed that the Papal Chamber ceased collecting the rest of the extraordinary *vigesima* (announced under the pretext of mobilizing resources for the war in Germany in the amount of 20,000 scudi). The Jewish community proceeded to pay two tax instalments in the previously agreed amount (of 6,000 scudi), but the condition was the return to the original conversion rate between the “ordinary coin” and the gold scudi (*scudo oro in oro*, the main monetary accounting unit of papal accounting). Within the aforementioned extraordinary *vigesima*, the value of the golden scudo had been increased by 10 % (to pay 1 scudo it was necessary to pay 11 silver giuli “to the coin”).⁹⁷ After the 4th July, 1547, to pay 1 scudo (as a monetary unit)

95 Ibidem, Nr. 2652 and Nr. 2654, pp. 2559–2560.

96 Ibidem, Nr. 2694, p. 2592.

97 This accounting practice is documented in the edited Aleotti documentation. For money collected from the “Jewish tax” and registered as income on 17. 9. 1546 (see receipts in the Editorial Attachment), the amount of 400 *scudo di moneta* was registered as income in the accounting amount of 363 scudi and 13 soldi. However, this was not a specific feature of the “Jewish tax”; similarly, the gold coins (and

within taxes levied on the Jewish population, only 10 silver giuli were enough, as it was in the past.

The sources we have on the collection of the “Jewish tax” for the war in Germany seemingly do not correspond much with Aleotti’s accounting records. This is logical, however, because the most of the anticipated yield of this tax was transferred to the consortium of bankers to cover the cash loan shortly after it was announced. The collection of money from the Jewish population was already arranged by the Florentine bankers themselves. Nevertheless, there is a considerable amount in Aleotti’s record (6,485 scudi and 16 soldi), the source of which is the “Jewish tax”. It is a *vigesima* collected in other territories of the Papal State (Marche, Campania and Rome itself) than those included in the aforementioned loan agreement in the amount of 20,700 scudi (the provinces of Bologna, Romagna, Umbria, the Ravenna exarchate and the French enclaves, that is the Venaissin county and Avignon). Here the largest item is the 3,000 scudi that Aleotti received from the Altoviti bank house on the 1st November 1546; these were guaranteed by the Jewish *vigesima* from Marche province. This transaction was apparently connected with the Papal regulation of the same day (1st November 1546), according to which Bindo de Altoviti, the Treasurer of the provinces of Marche and Ancona, who at the same time acted as the extraordinary collector of the Jewish *vigesima*, was supposed to hand over the amount of 2,390 scudi in cash to the Pope’s secret accountant, Pietro Giovanni Aleotti (here written in the form of “Aleveto”).⁹⁸ The *vigesima* payments from Campania and Rome were handed over by the Papal collectors in cash.

The extraordinary *vigesima*, intended to cover parts of the cost of the withdrawal of the Papal army against German Lutherans, was the last measure by which Paul III tried to increase the tax burden on the Jewish population (and, above all, financiers and bankers settled in Rome and Ancona). Yet basically it can be said that Paul III, as an experienced politician, was aware of the benefits that the Papal Treasury got from consensual relations with the leaders of the Jewish community settled in the territory of the Papal State. That is why he did not insist on consistent enforcement of *vigesima* for the “German War”, once the activity of the Papal army in this conflict had ended. However, his followers on Peter’s Throne did not follow this strategy and did not hesitate to use violent means to enforce special taxes on profits, generated by high interest rates on short-term loans. Then, in 1555, this also led to executions of the main leaders of the Jewish community in Ancona.

hence the main monetary units of the accounting system of the Papal Chamber) were overvalued by about 10 % over the “ordinary coin”, see Note 44.

98 S. SIMONSOHN (ed.), *The Apostolic See*, Vol. 6, Nr. 2645, p. 2557.

Digression b)

Benvenuto Olivieri and Papal title for the “German War” from the province of Romagna

In the middle of the 16th century, the fiscal policy of the Papal Chamber was virtually entirely dependent on the services of the Italian financiers, bank houses or consortia of investors, mostly located in Rome. A substantial part of these financial entrepreneurs came from Florence, the main medieval centre of Italian finance. The Florentine financiers were of course attracted to the “eternal city” primarily by the wealth based on a regular influx of money from the entire Christian world. This flow was again directed to Rome at the end of the 14th century, when the main Papal residence was moved back to Rome from French Avignon. Some of the Florentine bankers also resorted to the Papal Court for political reasons when the Medici family took over the government of Florence.⁹⁹ The Olivieri (in the Italian sources also written “*Ulivieri*”)¹⁰⁰ banker family also belonged to the large group of Florentine families settled in Rome in the first half of the 16th century.¹⁰¹ It was represented primarily by Paul Olivieri (born in 1464) and his sons,¹⁰² who controlled a major bank house and were co-owners in a number of lending companies.

At the end of the pontificate of Paul III the interests of the “Olivieri Bank” were represented primarily by Benvenuto Olivieri (1496–1549), one of the sons of the aforementioned Paul, whose position at the Papal Court was quite extraordinary. He belonged to the main creditors of the Papal Chamber, the loans he had granted had a long-term guarantee from a significant portion of the permanent income of the Papal State and through his officials or associates in various consortia he actually controlled the Papal fiscal policy.¹⁰³

Of course, Benvenuto Olivieri was not the only creditor of the Papal Chamber, but his role in financing Papal policies is comparable to the contemporary significance of

99 Melisa M. BULLARD, *Filipo Strozzi and the Medici (Favor and Finance in Sixteenth-century Florence and Rome)*, Cambridge 1980; Tim PARKS, *Medici Money (Banking, Metaphysics, and Art in Fifteenth-Century Florence)*, New York – London 2005.

100 F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, pp. 25–68.

101 Melisa M. BULLARD, „*Mercatores Florentini Romanam Curiam Sequens*“ in *the early sixteenth century*, *The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 6, 1976, pp. 1–18.

102 F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, p. 27, Table 2–Genealogy of the Olivieri family: the branch of Michele di Matteo.

103 A detailed analysis of these relationships was carried out by F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, pp. 69–206: Part Two: Benvenuto Olivieri and the Apostolic Chamber.

the Augsburg Banking House of Fuggers in relation to the Habsburgs.¹⁰⁴ In the last years of the pontificate of Paul III (in 1543 and later), Benvenuto Olivieri was the chief of the three Florentine bankers who led the administration of the accounts of the Papal Chamber (with him there were Tobias Pallavicino and Bindo Altoviti).¹⁰⁵




Fig. 7: Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Segnatura Galli Tassi 1874, title page (photo P. Vorel)

In the context of the very complicated relations between the Olivieri Bank House and the Papal Chamber, F. G. Bruscoli mentions the accounting of the credit for the “German war” in connection with the collection of tithe in the province of Romagna, where Olivieri served as the administrator of collection of papal tithe.¹⁰⁶ That is why I was curious to find out how the Olivieri’s financiers actually went about collecting the money to repay the loan for the “German War” granted to the Pope. It is a view “from the other side”, which cannot be comprehended in the archives of the Papal Chamber.

The archive fund of the Olivieri Bank House preserves a detailed overview of the collection of papal tithe from the Romagna province, which should have repaid the “German War” loan.¹⁰⁷ Aleotti did not consider this source in the income part of his accounts; it is clear that, just as in a number of other cases, it was just a normal loan guaranteed by one of the permanent income sources of the Papal Chamber. This

104 Jean-François BERGIER, *From the Fifteenth Century in Italy to the Sixteenth Century in Germany: A New Banking Concept?*, in: *The Dawn of Modern Banking*, New Haven – London 1979, pp. 105–129.

105 Consequently, they were also officially titled, see for example ASR, Camerale I, Mandati Camerali, seg. 877 “Liber mandatorum d[omi]ni Pauli pape III” (3. 2. 1543): “[...] *Bindo de Altovitis, Thobie Pallavicino, Benvenuto Olivieri, merc[atores] flor[entini], pecuniarum Camere Apostolice generali administratores* [...]”.

106 F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, pp. 129, 161–162.

107 Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Segnatura Galli Tassi 1874.

corresponds with the title of the whole document, from which it is clear that it is only one of the chronologically continuous series of volumes, documenting the collection of papal tithe from the respective territory (“*Entrata della Dec[i]ma Papale della Romagna Pontificia attenente alla Ragione Olivieri di Roma del 1546*”). Only the subtitle specifies the loan project to which the documentation relates (“*Dua x^{mi} Romagna 1546 p[ro]la Guerra d Germania*”).

I chose the term “loan project” intentionally, because of the fact that it has no other connection with the war in Germany. The Bank House of Olivieri has only provided the Pope with an interest-bearing loan, and basically, they did not care what resources would be used to repay it, as long as the expected profit and reimbursement were achieved.

Consequently, it is clear from the context that Benvenuto Olivieri provided Paul III with just one more unspecified loan for warfare in Germany (one of many) in the order of tens of thousands scudi, which was to be repaid by the collection of two papal tithe from the province of Romagna, situated in the north-eastern part of the Papal state, along the Adriatic coast. The preserved document records the income from this source, which was collected in 1546 (i.e. one of the two presumed annual instalments of tithe).¹⁰⁸

The data on the collection of the Papal tithe respect the church division of the province of Romagna, then into nine bishoprics (of a very small scale, in comparison to Central European conditions): Ravenna, Forlì, Faenza, Rimini, Imola, Casena, Sarsina, Cernia and Bertinoro. Within each bishopric, data are related to particular payers of papal tithe, be it parishes, monasteries, houses of church orders, but also individual “altars” (adminstrating income from real estate or financial sources tied to individual church altars), possibly private persons, who, for any legal reason, possessed property or income subject to papal tithe. Such a detailed account therefore provides an elaborate overview not only of the theoretical amount of paid tithe, but also of the church structure of the province itself in the given year and of the economic potential of the given area. From this point of view, the most prominent in the province of Romagna are the three “rich” bishoprics of Faenza, Rimini and Imola. However, in the case of the Rimini bishopric, the resulting amount is affected by the fact that, for an unknown reason, a special surcharge (“*per lo aumento*”) in the range of 25–30 % was added to the original tithe. A similar “privilege” was held by the bishopric of Sarsina, but this surcharge was lower (10–15 %).

108 It is a well-preserved original copy of standard accounting documentation; paper sheets of standard format are tied together with five leather straps into a workbook and fitted with parchment sheets tied with four leather straps. Several blank sheets were later cut out; together with them (apparently by mistake) also fol. 10, on which a part of the Forlì bishopric accounting records was documented. However, this partial loss of information is not essential in the context of the whole source.

Andrea Tanini di Ponto, the administrator of the papal tithe in the province of Romagna, prepared the accounting documentation and presented it to Olivieri. For the year 1546 he collected papal tithe in the amount of 8,471 scudi and 1 soldo in the province of Romagna; however, it was necessary to deduct a commission of 423 scudi and 11 soldi, which was retained by the accounting administrator for his work.¹⁰⁹

From the tithe collection of Romagna province in 1546 the Bank of Olivieri deducted only the amount of 8,047 scudi 10 soldi and 6 denari for repayment the loan.

In this case, the difference between the theoretical amount of collectable tithe and the actually collected money is important. The papal tithe collectors collected in cash just over half (58.5 %) of the Papal tithe to be collected from the Romagna province.¹¹⁰

It was not the case, however, that the unpaid tithe was “not collectable”. The accountant kept his annual records accurate and knew well how much was to be collected from whom. There are two items in each of the bishoprics: money collected (“*Denarii riscossi*”) and the remaining money, i.e. “arrears” (“*Denarii residui*”). These records were kept continuously on a long-term basis (individual annual billing followed each other) and consistently from the accounting point of view, so as not to miss even a tiny bit of papal income. For example, even though a certain Julio Ceseri Masini in the diocese of Cesena paid the Papal tithe in the amount of 29 scudi and 3 soldi, he still remained on the list of debtors because the money paid was registered only as a payment of arrears from previous years, not as a new tithe for 1546.¹¹¹

However, the relatively low “yield” of the collection of tithe was rather caused by the fact that many taxpayers had some special exceptions, due to which they either did not have to pay the tithe in the given year at all or settled this payment obligation to the Papal Chamber in a different way. The most common reason for which the taxpayers were listed as “*residui*” was justified in the accounting records by the fact that they submitted a written receipt from the Papal Chamber (the dating of such receipt ranges from August 30th, 1546 to May 20th, 1547) confirming they were not obliged to pay any money to the

109 He also probably retained an amount of 34 scudi and 8 soldi, which was additionally collected from the five taxpayers in the Imola bishopric. This income was additionally credited to fol. 38 (after the summary for Imola bishopric on fol. 37v). In the basic register, all five taxpayers were listed under arrears (on fol. 40–40v) but in their record an information is added that they paid with delay and that the record of this can be found on folio 38 (“*pago et posto ant in fol. 38*”). However, the sum of 34 scudi and 8 soldi did not end up in the total sum of revenues (neither at the Imola bishopric level or in the total sum of the province of Romagna) even though it was paid. Apparently, it was left in the collector’s purse “by mistake”.

110 Precise calculation was not possible due to the loss of part of the information on money not collected for the Forlì bishopric. In the enclosed table, I estimated this figure according to the other bishoprics, in order to make a cumulative calculation.

111 Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Segnatura Galli Tassi 1874, fols. 46–47.

collector. There were 24 such cases recorded in 1546; their payment obligation amounted to 742 scudi, 15 soldi and 2 denari. The second most frequent reason was the fact that the taxpayer kept his own accounting records (“*Composti co[n]ti regularii*”). This group of eleven taxpayers with a total payment obligation of 1,335 scudi and 11 giuli were mostly wealthy monasteries, of which the greatest payer was the St Mary’s Abbey in the bishopric of Rimini.¹¹²




Fig. 8: Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Segnatura Galli Tassi 1874, detail of the section “denarii residui” where is (among others) recorded the obligation of Pietro Giovanni Aleotti to pay (or more precisely “to be in an abeyance” to pay) the Papal tithe (photo P. Vorel)

112 Among the payers of the papal tithe who were deprived of the obligation to pay money to the collector in favour of the Olivieri Bank House through a special charter of the Papal Chamber was the Pope’s secret accountant, Pietro Giovanni Aleotti. In the bishopric of Bertinoro, he had an obligation to pay three benefices (at the Church of St Mary in the village of Lizzano, at the vicary in the town of Meldola, and from the church of St Cosma) totalling 50 scudi and 14 soldi, see also the photo-documentation attached to this study.

Table 3: A summary of the collection of Papal tithe in the province of Romagna in the year 1546 [scudi – soldi – denari]

Bishopric	Money collected	Money remaining	Total
Ravenna	1,086–8–0	231–3–0	1,317–11–0
Forlì	1,067–3–0	approX. 230–0–0	approx. 1,297–3–0
Faenza	1,682–9–4	888 – 9–6	2,570–18–10
Rimini	1,527–14–0	1,510–6–0	3,038–0–0
Imola	1,504–14–0	1,347–14–4	2,852–8–4
Cesena	760–16–2	1,296–5–0	2,057–1–2
Sarsina	299–6–10	95–1–10	394–8–8
Blacks	61–2–8	22–17–8	84–0–4
Bertinoro	481–7–6	320–2–10	801–10–4
Total	8,471–1–6 (58.8 %)	approx. 5,942–0–2 (41.2 %)	14,413–1–8 (100 %)

Digression c)

Command corps of the Papal army in the Schmalkaldic War

At first sight, this topic seems to be very simple: in Aleotti's documentation, we have a precise list of commanders who had been paid in advance. Also, current news from the battlefield and contemporary historical work inform us in detail about the personnel composition of the Papal army command corps at the beginning of the campaign: Probably, while at the military camp in Landshut (in early August 1546), Nicolaus Mammeranus made and later published a detailed list of the commander corps of the Papal army.¹¹³

Since then, this information was continuously adopted by younger publications, until they became part of an extensive schematics of the coalition army,¹¹⁴ published by

113 Nicolao MAMERANO, *Catalogvs Omnium Generalium, Praefectorum, Primariorum Ducum, seu Capitaneorum & Commissariorum totius exercitus Caesaris in expeditionem super Rebelles, & Ferdinandi Regis Roman. Super Rebelleis inobedientis Germ. quosdam Principes ac Ciuitates inobedientes quosdam Germaniae Principes conscripti, onscripti, & Coacti, Anno M. D. XLVI.*, Ingolstadt 1548. A brief mention of Papal cavalry is here on fol. Bi ("Equestris Pontificiae Armaturae Primarius"); a detailed description of the infantry (which was adopted by all the younger authors, including the numerical data) is here on fol. Biiiiv–Cii ("De Primariis peditum italorum").

114 I have included this schematic overview (created based on a comparison of Mammeranus' and Hortleder's data) as an attachment entitled "Reconstruction of the Papal army command structure at a Land Camp in the Landshut at the beginning of August 1546" to the aforementioned analytical study, see P. VOREL, *Za obnovu řádu a pravé víry v říši*, pp. 146–153.

Friedrich Hortleder¹¹⁵ at the beginning of the 17th century (and in an earlier edition of his work from 1645).

From a source directly from the Farnese (to whom the respective book was dedicated, first part to Ottavio, second part to Alessandro), the data on the command corps of the Papal army were available at the beginning of the sixties of the 16th century, apparently also available to Cipriano Manente from Orvieto, who included this list in his extensive publications on the history of Italian states.¹¹⁶ Similarly, the Lutheran historiographer Sleidan¹¹⁷ included a list of the most important commanders of the Papal army in his historical work. And the bravery of some of them is chanted in a poem dating back to 1557, included by Giulio Ariosto into a set of festive texts on the Farnese brothers, the grandsons of Pope Paul III.¹¹⁸

Still, this is not a trivial matter. The older authors (starting with L. Pastor) were content to refer to the list published by Mammeranus, or (later) in the Friedensburg edition. No more accurate analysis of the list has ever been carried out. The apparent lack of interest in this source of information apparently stemmed from the fact that some of the major commanders, who were provably in the service of Pope Paul III with this army, are not listed in Aleotti's list. On the other hand, the majority of the names mentioned here are completely unknown in the history of the Italian military of the 16th century. And to

115 Friedrich HORTLEDER (ed.), *Der Römischen Keyser- Vnd Königlichen Maiestete, Auch des Heiligen Römischen Reichs Geistlicher vnnd Weltlicher Stände, Churfürsten, Fürsten, Graffen, Reichs- vnd andeder Stätte, zusamt der heiligen Schrifft, geistlicher und weltlicher Rechte Gelehrten, Handlungen und Außschreiben, Rathschäge, Bedencken, Send- und andere Brieffe, Bericht, Supplicationsschriften, Befehl, Entschuldigungen, Protestationes, Recusationes, Außführungen, Verantwortungen, Ableinungen, Absagungen, Achterklärungen, Hüßbrieffe, Verträge, Historische Beschreibungen und andere viel herrliche Schriften und Kunden, mehr: Von Rechtmässigkeit, Anfang, Fort- und endlichen Ausgang deß Teutschen Kriegs, Keyser Karls deß Fünfften, wider die Schmalkaldische Bundsoberste, Chur- und Fürsten, Sachsen und Hessen, und. I. Chur- und Fürstl. G. G. Mitwerwandte, Vom Jahr 1546. biß auf das Jahr 1558*, Gotha 1645, Nr. 22, pp. 375–404: “Verzeichnuß aller Generaln, Obristen, HauptLeut und Commissaren über Caroli V. Römischen Keyser und Ferdinandi Römischen Königs ganzes Kriegsheer wider etliche Rebellische und ungehorsame Fürsten und Städte in Teutsch Land Anno 1546”. The Papal cavalry is described here as sub-item Nr. 31, pp. 385–386: “Vom General und dessen RittMeisterit über die Bäpstliche Reuterey”; Papal infantry is described here as sub-items Nr. 47–55, pp. 391–392: “Von den Obristen über das Italianische FußVolck”.

116 Cipriano MANENTE, *Historie di Ciprian Manente da Oruieto. Libro secondo, nelle quali si raccontano i fatti successi dal 1400. insino al 1563*, Venezia 1566, Libro settimo, pp. 285–286.

117 Johannes SLEIDANUS, *De statu Religionis et Reipublicae Carolo V. Caesare Commentarii ac multiplici rerum utilissimarum cognitione referti*, Frankfurt 1568, p. 390.

118 *Profetia dell'illustris[sima] signora donna Antonia Gonzaga all'illustrissimo sig[nore] duca Ottavio Farnese, verificata nel MDLI. a XI. di giugno il venerdì a XII. hore, quando s'apresento l'esercito pontificio, et cesareo sotto Parma*, in: Giulio Ariosto (red.), *I fatti, e le prodenze dell'i illust[rissimi] signori di casa Farnese de'temti nostri, nepoti della santa memoria di Paolo III. Pontefice, Venezia 1557*, fol. 5–12; see here “De la guerra d'Alemagna”, fol. 7v–9v.

make it even more complicated, the names of the captains and colonels that the other authors recorded are different from Aleotti's "payroll list". Some of the captains paid in June 1546 are not recorded in the Mammeranus' list of the Bavarian field camp in August 1546, let alone in the earlier sources. On the other hand, these younger sources provide names of captains who were not registered by Aleotti or Mammeranus as part of the command corps. So where is the error?

The history of military and hired mercenary captains, who with their men served whoever paid more, is an essential part of Italian history from the second third of the 14th century.¹¹⁹ This way of organizing military force culminated in Italy during the 15th century, but with the introduction of large permanent mercenary armies during the first half of the 16th century it no longer functional.¹²⁰ Actually, we can say that the campaign of the Papal troops to southern Germany in 1546 was the last significant military action that was (to such a large extent) organized by the "poor" with the help of a large number of hired captains – mercenary captains.¹²¹

We know for sure who was entrusted with the main diplomatic assurance of the entire expedition. Formally, Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, the grandson of Pope Paul III, was named the highest representative of the Papal State for this war campaign. The formal position of the chief military commander (*Capitan Generale*) was then held by his younger brother, the Duke Ottavio Farnese, Duke of Castro and Camerino. Indeed, their role in the upcoming campaign was, in my opinion,¹²² one of the main immediate impulses that led Paul III to the idea of direct military and financial support of the Emperor Charles V in the planned intervention against the opposition in the Empire. Only by taking this step, the young grandsons of the Pope actively entered the highest levels of European politics (their father, Pier Luigi Farnese, the illegitimate son of Pope Paul III, never reached such positions – apart from the immediate Papal influence in Italy).

Ottavio Farnese was named the supreme commander of the Papal army, but although he was educated for military service and had personal experience from Italian battlefields,

119 This makes the research of these military groups and their commanders continuous and systematic. Basic factual data from original sources is available on the Internet, see *Note biografiche di Capitani di Guerra e di Condottieri di Ventura operanti in Italia nel 1330–1550*, accessible freely on URL: <<http://condottieridiventura.it/>> [accessed 12. 10. 2017]. However, the vast majority of the officers mentioned in Aleotti's list are not in this record.

120 Geoffrey TREASE, *Die Condottieri (Söldnerführer, Glücksritter und Fürsten der Renaissance)*, München 1974, pp. 231–241; Franco CARDINI, *La crisi militare e la politica italiana fra Quattro e Cinquecento*, in: Mario Scalini (red.), *Giovani delle Bande Nere*, Milano 2001, pp. 9–41.

121 Christine SHAW, *Barons and Castellans (The military Nobility of Renaissance Italy)*, Leiden – Boston 2015.

122 See Note 14.

he was only twenty-two in 1546. The young Duke certainly did not lack courage, self-confidence and skills in dealing with the sword, but did not have the experience of a strategist capable of efficiently commanding a large army in battle.

The actual command of the battle was in the hands of two commanders: the commander of the papal cavalry, Giovanni Battista Savello (also written as “*Savelli*”),¹²³ and the infantry commander, Alessandro Vitelli (also written as “*Vitello*”).¹²⁴ Both were experienced soldiers; both of them had also been on military campaigns over the Alps from Italy to the Danube region as commanders of minor military troops sent by Paul III to the army grounds in Vienna (1542). From Vienna the (at that time) common Christian army (which was significantly supported by the German Lutheran princes and cities, including the members of Schmalkaldic League at that time)¹²⁵ was drawn to the borders of the Ottoman Empire in occupied Hungary. Although this campaign was not very successful, it was important to gain knowledge of the fighting environment. And, of course, they acquired personal experience with the chief commanders of the Schmalkaldic League, whom Savello and Vitelli knew from the joint campaign against the Turks.

The names of these two commanders are not listed in Aleotti’s “pay list”;¹²⁶ however, it can be assumed that both were paid in a different way than the Papal grandchildren or the hired mercenary captains or even ordinary mercenaries. This assumption corresponds to the records in the accounting documents, according to which, based on a special decree of Cardinal Farnesse, these chief commanders (and probably other members of the main command, see the Annex) were paid from the main Papal treasury in another way, and not through the special account kept by Aleotti, the secret treasurer.

Giovanni Battista Savello (1505–1551), the chief commander of the papal cavalry, had been a commander of the personal guard of Pope Paul III already before the German campaign, but he was also the husband of the Pope’s great-niece, Camilla, the daughter of the Pope’s cousin, Ranuccio Farnese († 1495). The cavalry troops were divided into two battle units that included Sforza Pallavicino (the husband of Pope’s granddaughter, Julia de Santa Fiore) and Federico Savello (the son of John Battista, who died in the

123 *Note biografiche di Capitani di Guerra*, Nr. 1727.

124 *Ibidem*, Nr. 2173, 2185.

125 Petr VOREL, *Směnné kursy jako nástroj mocenské politiky v Římsko-německé říši počátkem čtyřicátých let 16. století*, *Český časopis historický* 112, 2014, Nr. 3, pp. 379–401.

126 Alessandro Vitelli’s name appears in Aleotti’s list; however, he did not accept the mentioned 2000 scudi for himself, but for the payment of other not-mentioned captains (the amount of the payroll corresponds to ten captains).

Sienna attack of 1554).¹²⁷ Each hundred riders formed a cavalry unit (a squadron) led by its own commander.

Four noble colonels were subordinate to the chief commander of the Papal infantry, Alessandro Vitelli (1500–1556): Giovanni Orsini, the Count of Pitigliano,¹²⁸ the Pope's grandson Sforza I Sforza di Santa Fiore (1520–1575),¹²⁹ Giulio Orsini¹³⁰ (cousin of Cardinal Farnese from the mother's side) and Paulo Vitelli.

This Paulo Vitelli (Alessandro's nephew or illegitimate son)¹³¹ was an important link in the family network of the main command of the Papal army in 1546, for his wife was the daughter of Giovanni Batista Savello. The main command corps de facto only consisted of the Farnese and their close relatives, which is also applicable to the most important "professionals", Vitelli and Savello.

During the campaign, there were likely changes in the command corps, which could explain the differences in the data from the sources coming from a different time span. As for the infantry, the structure of the command corps and the size of the individual battalions are described in detail in the Mammeranus' report, written already at the beginning of August 1546. In the case of the papal cavalry, however, the extent of the command powers is explained in more detail in the summary description of the entire coalition army that Hortleder included in his edition. From this later reconstruction, the infantry colonels, who commanded several (about 6–10) battalions with their own captains, had a cavalry unit of a hundred horses at their disposal (which were subject to their direct command), but for combat actions they were represented by another authorised officer. Also, the internal organization of the Papal army (composed by the mercenary captains – private entrepreneurs in the military craft) differed from the Imperial divisions, which was also the cause of different data in the contemporary

127 C. SHAW, *Barons and Castellans*, p. 145.

128 The uncle of Cardinal Farnese from his mother's side, an Italian condottiere who had previously served in the army of the French King Franz I. As a commander of the French army he battled against the Imperial army in 1544, in the battles of Milan.

129 C. SHAW, *Barons and Castellans*, pp. 216–217.

130 Giulio Orsini later (in 1551) participated in the war of Parma. At that time, Camillo Orsini was the chief commander of the Papal army; Giulio and Carlo Orsini and Antimo Savello also took part in the struggle. *Ibidem*, pp. 145–146.

131 His identity is, however, specified in the Papal newspaper from 12. 9. 1546: [V. S. S. a P. P.], *Copia d- una Lettera del le cose successe ne i Eserciti, dall cinque sino per tutt' i Dodici del presente, Noc riscatto di M. Aurelio Ruffino, Et altri perticola Raguagli* [12. 9. 1546], Roma 1546 (see P. VOREL, *Za obnovu řádu a pravé víry v říši*, pp. 111–112). There it is explicitly stated that the military oversight was carried out also by "[...] Signor Alessandro Vitelli, con il signor Paulo suo nipote [...]", among others. In this context, we can interpret the ambiguous Italian word *nipote* as "nephew" or "grandson". Also, an illegitimate son could be identified as a *nipote*.

descriptions of the command corps (not only the number of soldiers in the individual battalions).

The most important commanders of the Papal army are not mentioned in Aleotti's list. Although this fact questions the completeness of Aleotti's records of the composition of the command corps, it also provides an explanation for why it was like that:

In the case of army costs, Aleotti recorded three types of payments: 1) An advance payment continuously paid to brothers Farnese themselves; 2) a one-off payroll to all lower commanders for the entire duration of the campaign; 3) sums to pay six monthly instalments to hired mercenaries. Higher commanders were certainly able to see that their promised money was paid in full. Through the accountant Aleotti (to whom Pope Paul III and his two grandchildren apparently had an extraordinary confidence), the Farnese checked and controlled ongoing payments of large sums, a detailed evidence of which was virtually impossible to do retrospectively.

This was the payroll for soldiers on the battlefield, which they were to receive in monthly instalments, and with money for some of the captains. They were paid in advance before the campaign, even yet without the names of all the captains who had been assigned that money. That's why Aleotti literally rewrote the list he received from Cardinal Farnese in his accounting records. For him, Farnese's order constituted an indisputable document for the accounting of the money; Aleotti made no further verification (let alone the verification of the names of specific captains). This is explicitly emphasized in his record (“[....] *Per mandato del Reverendissimo et Illustrissimo Cardinal Farnesse, legato dell' exercito in Alemagna di detto ho pagati li sottiscritti denari à sottiscritti capitani [....]*”).

Of course, it is a question of whether some (or most) names in Aleotti's list are not fictional, just for the purpose of accounting justification for such a large amount of money in cash. I do not think so; the names are real, but Aleotti could not name all of them, because at the end of June, this phase of army preparation had not yet been completed. Some of the main commanders (Alessandro Vitelli, Sforza di Santa Fiore and Paulo Vitelli) received the money for other supporters who were still to be hired. The money to pay to the captains, with whom an agreement had not yet been concluded, was also taken over by the banker Benedetto Bussini, a close associate of Benvenuto Olivieri, or Giovanni Battista di Toffia, a notary working in the Papal office.¹³² This way, money was referred to a total of 14 officers whose names are not explicitly mentioned in Aleotti's list.

132 F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Benvenuto Olivieri – I mercatores Fiorentini*, pp. 65–68; 271–275; F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, p. 246.

When considering the structure of Aleotti's list, obviously we cannot resist the question of how the Papal party managed to organise such a relatively large command corps so quickly, and kept the information about its gathering in relative secrecy. Such preparation needed to take place well before June 22, 1546. On that day a draft of an allied treaty was approved (the Pope did not sign it until June 26, 1546), but on the same day, money was spent in cash on payroll for about sixty specific captains! Consequently, they were bound to know much earlier that they were supposed to command during the campaign to Germany and had to agree with this engagement. How did the Papal recruiters succeed in organizing this complicated action? A logical response is apparent, if we consider the very pragmatic and sophisticated approach of the Farnese to preparation of this campaign.

The captains were the key persons in the military system at that time, not only in command of combat operations, but also in hiring of mercenaries. The captain was paid for his services, which included the fact that he would arrange hiring (or even training) of the required number of soldiers (those were paid separately). For a rapid build-up of the basic structure of a large army, it was sufficient to get the necessary number of captains (then called "condottiers", the military entrepreneurs), providing them with sufficient financial motivation and adequate time to gather the necessary number of soldiers from the territory or the environment they knew.¹³³

A key person in the preparation of the fast and more or less secret preparation of the Papal troops in the summer of 1546 was, in my opinion, Ascanio della Corgna, a Perugian nobleman and a prominent contemporary mercenary captain, who used the title of Marquis Castiglione di Lago. In the early 1540s, he served the French King in the wars with the Emperor. He remained in Habsburg captivity for a long time. However, in May 1546 Emperor Charles V released him from prison, no doubt because he was persuaded (as an experienced professional) to participate on the Papal side (then Habsburg as well) in the upcoming war.

Immediately after being released from the Habsburg prison, Ascanio called for a duel with another mercenary captain, a Florentine nobleman named Giovanni Taddei, due to an insult. Pitigliano, near Rome (located conveniently in the middle of a rock formation, consisting of gradually eroding subsoil of volcanic tuff), was chosen as the place of the combat. Pitigliano belonged to the Orsini family; Gerolama Orsini (1504–1570), the wife of Pope's son, Pier Luigi Farnese, came from there.

133 Mario SCALINI, *Condottiero, cavaliere o soldato?*, in: M. Scalini (red.), *Giovani delle Bande Nere*, pp. 180–201.

The attractive place and reputation of the famous warrior Ascanio della Corgna attracted thousands of people on the day of the combat (May 26, 1546),¹³⁴ which was set as a large stage show with thousands of spectators, especially from among potential prospective military service candidates, because it could be expected that when Ascanio got out of jail after a long time, he was not going to be idle.

Of course, a number of military commanders who knew Ascanio from the former battlefields also showed up. The fight itself ended as expected;¹³⁵ the subsequent celebration was also used to negotiate mercenary contracts without a great concentration of mercenaries and commanders in one place raising attention (all of them came to greet Ascanio, released from jail, and to support him in the duel).

This process, and perhaps also the necessity to provide the structure of the command corps and the troops for a very large army (in terms of the Italian standard of that time), led to the engagement of less experienced soldiers in command positions, for whom this campaign was the first opportunity to prove their command skills. Even more experienced warlords, such as Savello or Vitelli, apparently arranged such an opportunity for young men from their closest family, longing for a military career.¹³⁶ For most of them, however, the military expedition to Germany was the last adventure of their life, for a substantial majority of the Papal soldiers (ordinary mercenaries and lower commanders) died on the battlefield or on the return trip in the Alps. Probably that is why most of the names in Aleotti's list cannot be identified with specific persons, because they did not appear in the written sources either before (they had not become renown) or after the campaign (they did not return from Germany).¹³⁷

The factual accuracy of Aleotti's list is, however, confirmed in principle by an overview of the Papal army, which Mammeranus wrote in August 1546 in a field camp in Landshut. There we find most of Aleotti's list, albeit in a slightly different form of their names. We also know their exact classification in the structure of the Papal army and the number of men they commanded.

134 Silvio LONGHI, *Il duello dipinto di Castiglione del Lago (Pitigliano, 26 maggio 1546)*, Cortona 1995. The very same text was published later, but under a different name, see Silvio LONGHI, *Il duello d'onore del XVI secolo (Pitigliano, 26 maggio 1546)*, Cortona 2008.

135 The descendants of the winner had the highlight moment of the duel depicted at their residence (Palazzo della Corgna in Castiglione del Lago) around 1573, showing the prominent Ascanio (in a red suit) striking the chest of his rival (dressed in white) with a sword. A good reproduction of this wall painting is published on the cover of the aforementioned publication, see S. LONGHI, *Il duello d'onore*.

136 G. LEVA, *Storia documentata di Carlo V.*, Vol. IV, p. 256.

137 Some of these captains remained in Papal services in the subsequent wars, e.g. in the Parma war of 1551, see Ch. SHAW, *Barons and Castellans*, p. 145.

The names of some captains who had been paid at the end of June 1546 were not recorded in Mammeranus' list, which was compiled in early August of that year in Landshut, Bavaria. Seven names in total are listed in the appendix at the end of the command corps list (in the second column, which lists the names of Aleotti's list; see Annex).

Of these seven, I found a logical explanation in just one case: Among the relatively small group of captains who were paid a higher amount (300 scudi), Giovanni Francesco da Monte Melino appears. We know that this man, before his campaign to Germany, was serving as captain of artillery in permanent Papal services.¹³⁸ Since the Papal army was accompanied by a convoy carrying twelve cannons of unspecified calibre (which were decisive in the successful conquest of Donauwörth on October 8, 1546), we can logically assume that captain de Monte Melino commanded the Papal artillery. However, the Mammeranus' list only records commanders of infantry battalions and cavalry squadrons (he was interested in the number of men brought by the Papal army to the battlefield) and that is probably why Monte Melino does not appear in this record.

Another captain who, according to Aleotti, was paid in June 1546 and was demonstrably present on the German battlefield, although Mammeranus did not register him in the structure of the command corps, was a man named Gostanzo d'Ascoli. In his history of the 16th century (1566), the Farnesian historian Manente of Orvieto himself described him as one of the prominent Papal commanders in a passage about the history of the Schmalkaldic War.¹³⁹

There are left five names from Aleotti's "payroll list" that Mammeranus did not record in the Bavarian camp. Some of them I have succeeded to identify more closely, thanks to their subsequent engagement in Italian wars of the 1550s, but I did not find any evidence of their participation in the campaign to Germany in 1546. Two of them were honoured with a higher amount (300 scudi), so it can be assumed that they were captains of cavalry: Bell'Ant[oni]o Corso and Farina.¹⁴⁰ Three of them received a lower amount (200 scudi),

138 In April 1546 he was paid a service payment of 25 scudi (10 paoli per scudo), see ASR, Camerale I, Mandati Camerali, seg. 882, fol. 18v.

139 See Note 116.

140 Captain named Battista Farina served in the army of the Duke of Florence Cosimo Medici in 1542–1544, see Anna BELLINAZZI – Claudio LAMIONI, *Carteggio Universale di Cosimo I de Medici: Archivio di Stato di Firenze – Inventario II (1541–1546), Mediceo del Principato, filze 354–372*, Firenze 1982, p. 83 (Filza 358, Nr. 667), p. 224 (Filza 365, Nr. 481) and p. 248 (Filza 366, Nr. 126).

therefore they were probably the infantry commanders: conté Lionetto dalla Corbara,¹⁴¹ Ferante Corso and signor Camillo Sassatello.¹⁴²

There are two possible explanations: Some captains who promised to go to Germany in June (and received a deposit) did not participate in the campaign for some reason and somebody else took their place. But Aleotti's list (supplied by Cardinal Farnese) could also be used to identify the captain's name or nickname, which they commonly used in the military environment, but was also identifiable by another name (which was recorded by Mammeranus). So far I just have not been able to identify such cases, of people mentioned in the sources under slightly different names.

There is quite a lot of captains listed in the Mammeranus' list as part of the structure of the Papal troops in August 1546, but whose names are not found with Aleotti. This is logical; among them, there must have been at least 14 captains for whom (without mentioning their names) both Vitellis, Sforza di Santa Fiore, banker Bussini and notary Toffia accepted money.¹⁴³ Even from the comparison of the two lists, which were created only two months apart (Aleotti at the end of June, Memmerano at the beginning of August), it is clear that the structure of the lower commanders was supplemented gradually before the army set out from Bologna towards the north to the Alps.

Aleotti did not record the names of the command corps at all, as these senior commanders and field specialists were paid from sources other than the account kept by Aleotti. Not even Mammeranus recorded this structurally largest part of the Papal troops, we only know it from Hortensius' retrospective list. Therefore, it is not clear at this point whether all the members of the Papal army were present (see the Annex) for the entire campaign, that is who actually belonged to the army and who was rather a member of the travel "courtyard" of Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, which stayed in the field only relatively shortly. Of these men, of course, attention is drawn to the presence of the Archbishop of Dubrovnik as the chief commissioner of the Papal army, as Giovanni Angelo de Medici, later Pope Pius IV (1559–1565), held this position.

141 Lionetto Corbara served in 1554 as cavalry commander in the army of the Duke of Florence Cosimo Medici; he was the commander of a 50-horse cavalry unit and was a subject to the command of Sforza di Santa Fiore, see Jacque-Auguste de THOU, *Monsieur de Thou's History of His Own Time Translated from the Geneva Edition of 1620*, London 1729, Book XIV, p. 666.

142 Camillo Sassatello was a member of a branched noble family from the province of Romagna. At the beginning of the 1550s, he served as the cavalry colonel of the Papal army; at the time of disputes over Farnese family property after the death of Paul III (1549), the new Pope charged him with the administration of the Margraviate of Novara with the Duchy of Camerino, see Tiberio PAPOTTI, *Elogi d' Illustri Imolesi*, Imola 1841², p. 90.

143 See Note 132.

The highest-ranking commanders and some officers were, however, of interest to those who participated in the campaign of the Papal (or Italian) army to Germany and left a written testimony about it; of course, also the historians of this era understandably observed this group. These sources are even more interesting, as there are people listed here as distinguished participants in the Papal campaign who are not recorded in Aleotti's, Mammeranus' or even Hortensian's schematic lists at all. This is the reason why I tried to include this data in the summary reconstruction table of the Papal command corps, which is attached to this study as a separate annex entitled "Command of the Papal army during the campaign to Germany in 1546". I compared lists of names that Sleidan (1568) and Manente (1566) published in the form of an enumeration of the most important commanders of the Papal army, but also those whose bravery on the battlefield in Germany in 1546 is celebrated by a versed hymn, which Ariosto included in his poetry collection compiled in honour of the Farnese family (1557). They all mention the Farnese brothers (Cardinal Alessandro and Duke Ottavio) as the main figures; so I was only concerned with references to the other officers.

In both Sleidan's and Manente's records, the order in which the names were listed is important (suggesting the importance with which the officers were perceived), while it is not so important with Ariosto, because the author primarily needed the text to rhyme.

Sleidan's list is the most difficult of these sources; there are only eleven people recorded. Of these, eight include chief commanders and colonels, the real core of the command corps, which consisted of: Giovanni Battista Savello, Alessandro Vitelli, Jerome from Pisa,¹⁴⁴ Sforza Pallavicino, Giulio Orsini, Paulo Vitelli, Nicolo de Pitigliano and Federico Savello. As the only one, Sleidan listed both the chief commanders of the guards (Giovanni Maria from Padua and Niccolo from Plumbino), whom no one else considered important. Johann Sleidan was an "opposite" historiographer of the Lutheran party. He did not have any interest in making any of the papal commanders "famous" in his work. In a relatively prominent place, both Sleidan and Manente also introduced a captain named Alexius Lascaris, who does not appear in any summary. Apparently, he was a member of the traditional family of mercenary captains of Lascari di Tenda,¹⁴⁵ but I could not find out more about this person.

Manente wrote his two-volume historical work as a celebration of the Farnese family (each part is dedicated to one of the Farnese brothers who apparently also funded this work). The second part, including the period of the Schmalkaldic War, was issued

144 *Note biografiche di Capitani di Guerra*, Nr. 516.

145 Ch. SHAW, *Barons and Castellans*, p. 90.

two decades after the war. Thus, we can assume that besides the main “core” of the main commanders of the Papal troops (the eight people Manente had recorded in correspondence with Sleidan), in the list of deserving officers he also included other persons (including “ordinary” captains) who became famous later, and their names could serve to represent the Farnese even in the mid-sixties. It was Girolamo Cialdon, Ascanio della Corgna, Adriano Baglione,¹⁴⁶ Count Sforza di Santa Fiore, Captain Tomasso (probably Tomaso Brozzo from the town of Castello), Captain Bombaglino from Aretto, Captain Lanzi from Perugia (probably the same as Capo Aguzzo from Perugia), Captain Morgante from Prato, Giovanni Nicelius from Piacenza, Bartolomeo from Halens and Costantino d'Ascoli. We can identify these persons with the commanders of the units from Mammeranus' or Hortleder's schematics and they are mostly listed in Aleotti's list as well. “In addition”, besides from the aforementioned Alexius Lascaris, Manente also mentioned a man named Cencio di Fino, whom I have not been able to identify yet, as a prominent participant of the campaign in 1546.

Another “selection key” in celebrating the merits of Papal officers in the campaign to Germany was chosen by the author of a rhymed prophecy (“prophetia”), which was supposed to be revealed on June 11, 1551 through Antonia Gonzaga (born 1492), the cousin of Milan Governor Ferrante Gonzaga. Ariosto published this text (probably authored by Antonia's daughter, Livie Torniella),¹⁴⁷ in his compendium of verse compositions celebrating the Farnese brothers in 1557. Of the eight commanders mentioned above, on which Sleidan and Manente “agreed”, there are only five in this text: The missing ones are Jerome from Pisa, Federico Savello (though he already died in 1554) and even Alessandro Vitelli. The reason for the “concealment” of these important commanders is not clear from the context, but between 1546 and 1557 several wars took place in Italy in which the commanders were switching sides (French, Imperial, Papal, Florentine, etc.) and at the time of creation of this text (which was intended primarily for the Farnese), it was apparently undesirable that the names of these three men would appear in such a context. On the other hand, the bravery of some other specific commanders was emphasised. Some of them are also mentioned in Manente: Girolamo Cialdone, Ascanio della Corgna, Adrian Baglione, Sforza di Santa Fiore, Bombaglino from Aretto. Bartolomeo d'Almonte is apparently the same person as the lightweight squadron commander named Bartolomeo of Halese. Besides from these men, however, the poem celebrates the bravery of four other captains, whose names are not explicitly mentioned in the later history of

146 C. SHAW, *Barons and Castellans*, pp. 56–57 and Christopher F. BLACK, *The Baglioni as tyrans of Perugia 1488–1540*, *The English Historical Review* 85, 1970, pp. 245–281.

147 P. VOREL, *Za obnovu řádu v říši a pravé víry*, pp. 110, 130–131.

this campaign: Papirio Capozucca, Marcel di Negro, Bartolomeo Boreto from Mirandola and Sforza da Tore (who is apparently the same person as Sforza of Orvieto, commander of the lightweight squadron).¹⁴⁸



Fig. 9: Imperial and Papal allied forces at the beginning of the Schmalcaldic war; Caprarola Castle, Italy (photo J. Pánek)

148 At the end, the poem mentions several other valiant Italian warriors of noble origin, whose roles in the Papal troops are not clear. Due to the character of this source (which does not distinguish the soldiers in the Papal service from the military congregations of the Italian territorial princes, supported in this campaign by the Papal troops), they could have been lower commanders in the service of the Duke of Florence or Ferrara, but also Italians who were part of the Neapolitan or Milanese divisions of Charles V: Signor Carlotto Orsino, Signor Erico (Orsino), Gran Signor Torquato, Flaminio Signor di Zambecari, Grand Alcide, Ippolito Tassone and his cousin Ferrante and finally Giulio Viterbo.

Annex to Digression c)

Command of the Papal army during the campaign to Germany in 1546

Ottavio Farnese, Duke of Camerino and Castro, army general, chief commander of the Papal army, divided into 8 infantry regiments (a total of 60 infantry battalions, 11,459 infantrymen and 58 lower commanders – captains, 8 colonels, 2 field marshals of infantry and 1 general of infantry) with eight light-cavalry squadrons (800 men and 8 lower commanders – sergeants, 1 field marshal of the cavalry and 1 general of cavalry) and field artillery.

The name of the commander and his position in the hierarchy of the Papal troops	Information sources					
	Mamerano (1548) and Hortleder (1645)		Aleotti (22. 6. 1546)	Ariosto (1557)	Sleidan (1568)	Manente (1566)
	Direct command (number of men):					
Infantry	Cavalry					
Johann Baptista Savello , a representative of Ottavio Farnes (<i>"locum tenens"</i>) and a general of cavalry	-	-	-	5. Giouene Sauello	2. Johann Battista Sabellus	1. Signor Giouambattista Sauelli
Alessandro Vitelli , Infantry General and Commander of 16 infantry battalions (3,017 men in total) and one cavalry squadron (100 men); at the same time direct commander of one infantry battalion	341	-	-	-	1. Alexander Vitellius	2. Signor Alessandro Vitelli

Hieronymo Cialdonius from Rome, the field marshal of cavalry, to whom the entire Papal cavalry is subject, directly commands one squadron of light cavalry within the regiment of Federico Vitelli's	-	100	-	18. Girolamo Cialdon Mastro di Campo	-	7. Capitan Cialdone
Johannes Baptista Orsini , Field Marshal of Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hieronimus from Pisa, Field Marshal of Infantry	-	-	13. Cp. Hieronimo da Pisa (200)		8. Hieronymus Pisanus	13. Capitan Hieronimo da Pisa
The Archbishop of Ragusa , the chief commissioner (i.e. the Archbishop of Dubrovnik Giovanni Angelo de Medici , later Pope Pius IV in 1559–1565)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Johannes Baptista Galletus , chief accountant (“ <i>Pfen-nigmeister</i> ”)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hieronymo Gros-sus , accountant (“ <i>Zahlmeister</i> ”)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Modestus Guign-ionus , accountant (“ <i>Zahlmeister</i> ”)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Johannes Maria from Padua, commander of the guard (“ <i>Wach-meister</i> ”)	-	-	-	-	9. Johannes Maria Paduanus	-
Nicolaus from Plumbino, commander of the guard (“ <i>Wach-meister</i> ”)	-	-	-	-	10. Nicolaus Plumbinus	-

Papyrius Capasuccus from Rome, captain of infantry under the command of A. Vitelli	228	-	54. Cp. Papiro (200)	20. de stirpe de Romani Papiro Capozucca	-	-
Ascanius de Corgna , captain of infantry under the command of A. Vitelli	117	-	2. Cp. Ascanio della Corgna (300)	19. Ascanio della Corgna	-	14. Capitan Ascanio della Corgna
Adrianus Baglionus , captain of infantry under the command of A. Vitelli	294	-	-	7. Andrian Baglion Signor preclaro	-	12. Signor Astor Baglione (?)
Alphonso from Siena, captain of infantry under the command of A. Vitelli	151	-	-	-	-	-
Rivierus from Pugio, captain of infantry under the command of A. Vitelli	208	-	-	-	-	-
Johannes Baptista Taffiae , captain of infantry under the command of A. Vitelli	272	-	7. Cp. Gio[uanni] Batt[ist]a da Toffia (200)	-	-	-
Nicolaus from Castello, captain of infantry under the command of A. Vitelli	166	-	-	-	-	-
Nicolaus from Castello, captain of infantry under the command of A. Vitelli	122	-	-	-	-	-
Ciencius from Urbino, captain of infantry under the command of A. Vitelli	176	-	-	-	-	-

Piero from Monte, captain of infantry under the command of A. Vitelli	144	-	-	-	-	-
Brozzo from Castello, captain of infantry under the command of A. Vitelli	197	-	-	-	-	-
Iacobo from Castello, captain of infantry under the command of A. Vitelli	175	-	-	-	-	-
Antonio from Castello, captain of infantry under the command of A. Vitelli	170	-	-	-	-	-
Ursinus from Castello, captain of infantry under the command of A. Vitelli	202	-	-	-	-	-
Tomasso Brozzo from Castello, captain of infantry under the command of A. Vitelli	144	-	-	-	-	20. Capitan Tomasso (?)
Count Sforza di Santa Fiore , Colonel and Commander-in-Chief of ten infantry battalions (1,725 men in total) and one squadron of light cavalry (100 men)	-	-	-	2. Di' Santa Fiore il ualoroso Conte	-	3. Conte Sforza Santafiore

Ludovicus Magnus from Bologna, sergeant and squadron commander within the Sforza di S. Fiore Regiment (died in battle)	-	100	-	-	-	-
Theodorus Poetis from Bologna, sergeant and squadron commander within the Sforza di S. Fiore Regiment (replaced L. Magnus)	-		-	-	-	-
Mogantinus , captain of infantry under the command of Sforza di S. Fiore	185	-	-	-	-	-
Alessandro from Camerino, captain of infantry under the command of Sforza di S. Fiore	259	-	20. Cp. Alessandro da Camerino (200)	-	-	-
Philippo from Lucca, captain of infantry under the command of Sforza di S. Fiore	150	-	-	-	-	-
Cesare Rasponus , captain of infantry under the command of Sforza di S. Fiore	153	-	55. Cp. Cesare Rasponi (200)	-	-	-
Arcus Agrippa , captain of infantry under the command of Sforza di S. Fiore	132	-	32. Cp. Marco Agrippa da Cesena (200)	-	-	-
Tarquinius from Roma, captain of infantry under the command of Sforza di S. Fiore	144	-	11. Cp. Tarquinio da Rochette' (200)	-	-	-

Andreas from Todi, captain of infantry under the command of Sforza di S. Fiore	143	-	8. Cp. Andrea da Todi (200)	-	-	-
Ludovicus Savelli , captain of infantry under the command of Sforza di S. Fiore	190	-	10. S[ign]or Lutio Sauello (200)	-	-	-
Virgilius from Fermo, captain of infantry under the command of Sforza di S. Fiore	206	-	25. Cp. Virgilio da Fermo (200)	-	-	-
Cornelius from Parma, captain of infantry under the command of Sforza di S. Fiore	163	-	-	-	-	-
Sforza Pallavicino , Colonel and Commander-in-Chief of nine infantry battalions (1,705 men in total) and one squadron of light cavalry (100 men)	-	-	45. Sforza Palauicino (300)	1. Sforza Palauicino	3. Sfortia Pallauicinus	5. Signor Sforza Monaldesco della Ceruara
Ludovicus Rasponi from Ravenna, sergeant and squadron commander within the Sforza Pallavicino Regiment (died in battle)	-	100	-	-	-	-
Tomas Cochspano from Carpi, sergeant and squadron commander within the Sforza Pallavicino Regiment (replaced T. Rasponi)	-	-	-	-	-	-

Salvator Corsus , captain of infantry under the command of S. Pallavicino	205	-	48. Cp. Saluator Corso (200)	-	-	-
Bonaventura Trissinus , captain of infantry under the command of S. Pallavicino	196	-	-	-	-	-
Paolo from Parma, captain of infantry under the command of S. Pallavicino	175	-	-	-	-	-
Oliverio from Ponte Tremulo, captain of infantry under the command of S. Pallavicino	163	-	-	-	-	-
Battista Venturus , captain of infantry under the command of S. Pallavicino	202	-	-	-	-	-
Alphonso from Pisa, captain of infantry under the command of S. Pallavicino	288	-	-	-	-	-
Scipio from Roma, captain of infantry under the command of S. Pallavicino	147	-	21. Cp. Scipion dal Monte' (200)	-	-	-
Piero Latino from Viterbo, captain of infantry under the command of S. Pallavicino	154	-	-	-	-	-
Paolo from Parma, captain of infantry under the command of S. Pallavicino ¹	175	-	-	-	-	-

Count Giulio Orsini , Colonel and Commander-in-Chief of six infantry battalions (1,129 men in total) and one squadron of light cavalry (100 men)	-	-	-	3. Il generoso Signor Giulio Horsino	6. Iulius Vrsinus	9. Signor Giulio Orsino
the unnamed Albanian (“ <i>Albaneser</i> ”), the cavalry squadron commander of the Giulio Orsini’s regiment	-	100	-	-	-	-
Marcus Antonius de Riua from Roma, captain of infantry under the command of G. Orsini	188	-	15. Cp. Marcantonio da Riua (200)	-	-	-
Joannes Antonius from Roma, captain of infantry under the command of G. Orsini	188	-	19. Cp. Giouanni Antonio Romano	-	-	-
Joannes Baptista Fabius from Roma, captain of infantry under the command of G. Orsini	188	-	18. Cp. Giouanni Battista de Fabii (200)	-	-	-
Bambaglius from Aretto, captain of infantry under the command of G. Orsini	209	-	-	21. Il Bombagli-no il Capitan valente	-	17. Capitan Bombagli-no
Pietro from Pisa, captain of infantry under the command of G. Orsini	197	-	16. Cp. Pietro da Pisa (200)	-	-	-
Troianus of Terni, captain of infantry under the command of G. Orsini	159	-	17. Cp. Troiano da Terni (200)	-	-	-

Paolo Vitelli , Colonel and Commander-in-Chief of six infantry battalions (1,235 men in total) and one squadron of light cavalry (100 men)	-	-	-	4. Gran signor Paulo Vitello	5. Paulus Vitellius	4. Signor Paolo Vitello
the unnamed sergeant from Castello, cavalry squadron commander of the Paolo Vitelli's regiment	-	100	-	.	.	.
Marcus from Castello, captain of infantry under the command of P. Vitelli	156	-	5. Cp. Marcon da Castello (200)	-	-	-
Conraduss from Castello, captain of infantry under the command of P. Vitelli	184	-	-	-	-	-
Longinus from Fabriano, captain of infantry under the command of P. Vitelli	296	-	9. Cp. Longino da Fabriano (200)	-	-	-
Hercules from Castello, captain of infantry under the command of P. Vitelli	198	-	-	-	-	-
Connius from Monte Doglio, captain of infantry under the command of P. Vitelli	197	-	-	-	-	-
Massus from Castello, captain of infantry under the command of P. Vitelli	184	-	-	-	-	-

Nicolaio of Pitigliano, Colonel and Commander-in-Chief of six infantry battalions (1,021 men in total)	-	-	-	6. Da Pitiglian Conte Nicola	11. Nicolaus Petilianus	10. Nicola di Pitigliano
Hercules Villa , captain of infantry under the command of N. of Pitigliano	177	-	-	-	-	-
Marcelus from Nero, captain of infantry under the command of N. of Pitigliano	164	-	6. Cp. Marcello del Nero (200)	14. Marcel di Negro	-	-
Cornelio from Parma, captain of infantry under the command of N. of Pitigliano	163	-	-	-	-	-
Caspar from Orvieto, captain of infantry under the command of N. of Pitigliano	172	-	-	-	-	-
Gambuccius , captain of infantry under the command of N. of Pitigliano	163	-	-	-	-	-
Federicus from Ascoli, captain of infantry under the command of N. of Pitigliano	182	-	-	-	-	-
Federico Savello , Colonel and Commander-in-Chief of five infantry battalions (1,138 men in total) and one squadron of light cavalry (100 men, see above Hieronymo Cialdonus)	-	-	-	-	4. Friedericus Sabellus	11. Signor Federigo Sauello

Antonio Savello , captain of infantry under the command of F. Savello	293	-	1. Signor Antimo Sauello (300)	-	-	-
Philippo Malveti , captain of infantry under the command of F. Savello	212	-	33. Cp. Filippo Maluezzo (200)	-	-	-
Bartholomeo from Mirandaola, captain of infantry under the command of F. Savello	144	-	31. Cp. Bartolomeo dalla Mirandaola (200)	22. Capitan Bartholomeo Boreto (?)	-	-
Giulio from Ascoli, captain of infantry under the command of F. Savello	239	-	3. Cp. Julio d'Ascoli (200)	-	-	-
Capaguttus from Perugia, captain of infantry under the command of F. Savello	250	-	4. Cp. Capo Aguzzo da Perugia (200)	-	-	16. Capitan Lanzi da Perugia
Americo Antinoro , Colonel and commander of two infantry battalions (392 men in total), ² of which one battalion under his direct command	226	-	-	-	-	-
Alessandro Morengus , captain of infantry under the command of A. Antinoro	166	-	12. Cp. Morgantino Heluino (200)	-	-	18. Capitan Morgante da Prato
Sforza from Orvieto, squadron commander	-	100	-	8. Sforza da Torre (?)	-	-
Joannes Nicelius from Piacenza, squadron commander	-	50	-	-	-	19. Capitan Giouanni da Niceto
Bartolomeo from Halese, squadron commander	-	50	-	13. Bartholomeo signor d'Almon-te (?)	-	21. Capitan Bartolomento da Gallese

Rodolfo Baglione , the commander of a light cavalry squadron, was sent as a support for the Papal army by the Florentine Duke Cosimo Medici	-	300	-	-	-	-
Alfonso , a half-brother of the Duke of Ferrara, the com- mander of a light cavalry squadron, by which the Duke supported the Papal army.	-	200	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	27. Cp. Gio[uanni] Franc[esc] o da Monte Melino (300)	-	-	-
-	-	-	26. Cp. Gostanzo d'Ascoli (200)	-	-	15. Capitan Costantino d'Ascoli
-	-	-	14. conté Lionetto dal- la Corbara (200)	-	-	-
-	-	-	30. Cp. Bell'Ant[oni] o Corso (300)	-	-	-
-	-	-	46. Cp. Fari- na (300)	-	-	-
-	-	-	47. Cp. Fer- ante' Corso (200)	-	-	-
-	-	-	56. Signor Camillo Sassatello (200)	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	7. Alexius Lascaris	6. Capitan Alessio Lascari
-	-	-	-	-	-	8. Capitan Cencio di Fino

Information sources:

Aleotti = The edition of Pietro Giovanni Aleotti's accounting documentation, which is published here in the appendix to this article, p. 83-85.

Ariosto = see body text, Note 118.

Hortleder = see body text, Note 115.

Mamerano = see body text, Note 113.

Manente = see body text, Note 116.

Sleidan = see body text, Note 117.

Table endnotes:

- 1 Double stated (by mistake?); see the fifth line above.
- 2 This unusually small regiment of two infantry battalions was apparently attributed to the Papal troops additionally from the units that Maxmilian Egmont, Count von Bürren, brought to the battlefield in mid-September. This is evident from Hortleder's note, which records the captain Americo Antinori, among the infantry sent by the Hungarian Queen-widow Marie Habsburg (regent of the Netherlands) under the command of Count Egmont, but also refers to him being recorded (together with two battalions) in the Papal infantry. This obviously resulted in a difference in total sums. While Duke Ottavio stated that his command was subject to about 11,000 infantrymen, the actual headcount in the individual battalions reached almost half a dozen thousands. However, the small regiment of Antinori was included in this sum.

Editorial Attachment:

**The accounting documentation
“*Conto de la Guerra de Allemagna*”
kept by the Papal accountant, Pietro Giovanni
Aleotti, from June 22, 1546 to September 2, 1547,
and approved by the financial statement
of 18th January 1549**



Fig. 10: Coat of Arms of the Pope Paul III. Title page of the „papal news“ (*La ordinanza de l’Essercito di sua Beatidine... etc.*), published in Roma, 1546, August 14 (photo P. Vorel)




Fig. 11: Archivio di Stato di Roma, Amministrazioni militari, Commisariato delle Soldatesche e Galere, Busta 88, fasc. 1546, cover inscription of the 19th Century (photo P. Vorel)

I would like to thank MA. Jessica Marzani from Modena (www.hero-translating.com) and Mgr. Eva Chodějovská, Ph.D., for their cooperation in the edition of this Italian (and partly Latin) manuscript. I considered the fact that editorial rules for early modern Italian texts are not codified. The general trend is to minimise interference with the original text, including keeping the same words written in different forms. At present, the editions emerging in the Czech historiography are dominated by larger publishing projects that are created in collaboration with Italian historians and linguists. Interactions with the text made for the sake of continuous reading described below are based on editorial principles detailed in: Zdeněk Hojda – Eva Chodějovská et al., *Heřman Jakub Černín: Na cestě za Alpy a Pyreneje*, Praha 2014, where they were formulated in collaboration with Alessandro Catalano (Università degli Studi di Padova). The editorial interventions have been minimized and transliteration has been applied as a starting point. The edits were made for the sake of readability of the text for readers who do not speak Italian, while keeping the specifics of the language of the document, and correcting errors from the view of today's Italian (e.g., latinising suffixes /-tione/, simple or double consonants, different spelling of the same words, etc.). The suggested abbreviations were spelled out in square brackets, according to the rules of today's Italian. Interlinear inserts are mentioned in the editorial notes. Writing of upper and lower-case letters has been modified. Capitals are left only for proper and local names and the most important functions or authorities (Sua Santità) and for expressing respect (Reverendissimo), and Roman numerals are also consistently written with capital letters. Where the pronunciation requires it, the letter “u” has been rewritten to “v”. Accents were also adapted without notice (added: sarà, di, Santità; the accent of preposition a was removed).

A laude di Iddio et della gloriosissima Vergine Maria
 Introito et exito delli denari della Cam.^a ap.^{ca} per conto della guerra
 di Alemaqua et altre occorrenze di detto Cam.^a per mano di me P.
 Giovanni Aleotti Thes.^o secreto di H. S.^o da di. 22. di Giugno 1546.
 per tutto 12. di Settembre 1547.

Da car.¹ sino à car.³ sarà l'entrata.
 Da car.⁵ sino à car.⁷ sarà l'uscita.

Dil. xvij. Januarij 1599.

P.^{du} Dns Petrus Johannes Aleottus S.^{mi} D. N. Pauli PP. Tertij
 Thesaurarius Secretus exhibuit in Plena Camera infra scripta copula
 iuravit esse vera, et no habere diversa, aut contraria et fuerit
 demissa. R. P. D. Decano 112 Bononia
 Jo: de Doffina

Fig. 12: Archivio di Stato di Roma, Amministrazioni militari, Commisariato delle Soldatesche e Galere, Busta 88, fasc. 1546, title page of Alleotti's accounting documentation (photo P. Vorel)

Archivio di Stato di Roma, Fond Amministrazioni militari – Commisariato delle Soldatesche e Galere, Busta 88 (Conti straordinari 1541–1552), fasc. 1546–Introito et exito delli denari per la guerra d. Alemagna di qui di conto d. tesoriere segreto Giovanni Aleotti

A laude di Iddio et della glorissima Vergine Maria

Introito et exito delli denari della cam[er]a ap[ostoli]ca per conto della guerra de Alemagna et altre occorrenze di de[t]ta cam[er]a per mane me P[ier] Giovanni Aleotto, thes[orie]re secreto di N[ostro] S[ignore] da di 22 di Giugno 1546 per tutto 2 di settembre 1547.

Da car[ta] 1 sino a car[ta] 3 sarà l'entrata

Da car[ta] 5 sino a car[ta] 7 sarà l'uscita

Die XVIII Januarii 1549

R[everen]dus D[omi]n[u]s Petrus Johannes Alleottus, S[anctissi]mi D[omini] N[ostri] Pauli P[apae]. Tertii thasaurarius secretus, exhibuit in Plena Camera introscripta coputa iuravit esse iura, et no[n] habere diversa, aut co[n]traria et fueru[n]t com[m]issa R[everendo] P[atri] D[omini] Decano in Bononia

Jo[hannes] de Zophya

1546

f.			scudi	sol.	d.
1	1546 giugno [22. 6.]	Dall'erario di castel Sant'Ang[el]lo addi 22 di giugno [scu]di dodici milla di oro in o[ro] havuti io P[ier] Giovanni Aleotto contanti per mane delli S[ecreta]ri deputati	12000		
	luglio [3. 7.]	Dal soprad[e]tto erario addi 3 di luglio [scu]di ottanta otto mila di oro in o[ro] a me P[ier] Giovanni per mane delli sop[radet]ti deputati	88000		
	agosto [16. 8.]	Da Cristofaro Sauli a conto delle dogane di patrimonio addi 16 di Agosto [scu]di diecimila di oro in o[ro], cioè [scu]di 7500 dallui et [scu]di 2500 da Pallaucini per virtù di un man[da]te cam[er]ale ¹	10000		
	[21. 8.]	Dell'erario di castel Sant'Ang[el]lo addi 21 di agosto [scu]di ventiduemilacinquecento di oro in o[ro] et a me P[ier] Giovanni contanti	22500		

	[27. 8.]	Da Benvenuto Ulivieri addi 27 di agosto [scu]di due mila di oro contanti per conto de' cauallieri di San Giorgio	2000		
	sette[m]bre [15. 9.]	Da Cristofaro Sauli per le dogane del Patrimonio addi 15 di Sette[m]bre [scu]di undicimila cinquecento di oro, cioè [scu]di 7500 dal Lui et [scu]di 4000 da Thobbia Pallavicini riscossi in più partite da più persone	11500		
	[17. 9.]	Dagli Hebrei di Roma addi 17 di Sette[m]bre [scu]di seicento di oro contanti per la impositione fatta loro	600		
	[17. 9.]	Dagli Hebrei di Campagna addi detto [scu]di quattrocento di [giu]li X per scuto, contanti che sono d'oro à [giu]li xi	363	13	-
	[18. 9.]	Da Gio[vanni] Batt[ist]a Perini addi 18 di sette[m]bre [scu]di duemila di m[one]ta a conto della contributione di Campagna per mane di Francesco Belloti, sono d'oro	1818	3	8
	[18. 9.]	Dagli Ufficiali di Roma addi detto per la impositione fatta da S[ua] S[anti]tà per la mesata di agosto [scu]di quindicimilacin[ue]cento trentacin[ue] [soldo] 1 di oro in o[ro] riscossi io P[ier] Giova[n]ni da più ufficiali, come si vede p[er] la copia notata i[n] q[uesto] a XI ²	15535	1	-
		[total fol. 1]	164 316	17	8
1v	[18. 9. 1546]	Da Barth[olome]o Sauli per la contributione di Perosia addi 18 di sette[m]bre [scu]di mille di oro, contanti	1000	-	-
	[19. 9. 1546]	Da Benvenuto Ulivieri per la contributione di Romagna addi 19 di sette[m]bre [scu]di novecentodue di oro in o[ro] a me P[ier] Giovanni contanti il quartiere che paga a S[ua] Ecc[ellenz]a	902	-	-
	[19. 9. 1546]	Dal detto addi detto a conto de' Cavallieri di San Giorgio [scu]di ducento di oro contanti	200	-	-
	[22. 9. 1546]	Da M[esser] Giovanni di Pace a conto della thes[orie]ra del stato nuovo addi 22 di sette[m]bre [scu]di quattrocentoventi di oro cont[anti]	420	-	-
	[25. 9. 1546]	Dall'erario di castello addi 25 di sette[m]bre [scu]di tredicimila di oro in o[ro] a me P[ier] Giovanni contanti	13000	-	-
	ottobre [22. 10. 1546]	Dagli hebrei di Campagna addi 22 di ottobre [scu]di quattrocento di m[one]ta contanti in più volte per resto di [scu]di 800 hanno pagato per le vigesime di Campagna Maritima et Savina di Roma	363	13	-
	[17. 10. 1546]	Dal R[everendissimo] Mons[ignor] datario ³ di N[ostro] S[igno]re addi 17 di ottobre [scu]di quattromila di oro havuti da M[esser] Giovanni de' Rossi et p[er] lui da M[esser] Luigi Ruccellai	4000	-	-

	[25. 10. 1546]	Da M[esser] Cristofaro Sauli a conto delle dogane di Patrimonio addi 25 di ottob[re] [scu]di quattromilacinquecento d'oro cont[anti]	4500	-	-
	[26. 10. 1546]	Da Bandini addi 26 di ottobre [scu]di tremilatrecento di oro contanti per il cambio di duc[ati] m[ille] 4 larghi che sono in mane di Mons[igno]ri Monte Pulciano ⁴ in Portugallo per la compositione fatta con Mons[ignore] della guardia in Portugallo	3300	-	-
	novembre [1. 11. 1546]	Da Casi a conto del partilo fatto sopra il sussidio et vigesime degli hebrei de' ressidui delle due ultime [deci]me ⁵ nel Stato ecc[lesiasti]co et [deci]me del Stato di Milano addi p[ri]mo novemb[re] [scu]di tremila duge[n]to d'oro	3200	-	-
		[total fol. 1v]	30885	13	-
2	[1. 11. 1546]	Dagli Altoviti addi p[ri]mo di novemb[re] per è duc[ati] tremilatrecentotrenta di m[one]ta a conto detta rata degli hebrei della Marca et di detto sussidio di [scu]di m[ille] 6 sim[ili] [scu]di tremila d'oro cont[anti]	3000	-	-
	[3. 11. 1546]	Dall'erario di castel Sant'Angelo addi 3 di novemb[re] [scu]di cinquemila d'oro contanti a me P[ier] Giovanni	5000	-	-
	[3. 11. 1546]	Dagli Altoviti addi detto a conto degli hebrei della Marca [scu]di centoottanta di oro in o[ro] per dar a bergamino corr[ie]re per portare danari al campo ⁶	180	-	-
	[6. 11. 1546]	Da Cristofaro Sauli per le dogane di Patrimonio addi 6 di novemb[re] [scu]di cinquecento di oro contanti	500	-	-
	[6. 11. 1546]	Da Thobbia Pallavicini addi detto per detto conto [scu]di cinquecento di oro in o[ro] contanti	500	-	-
	[10. 11. 1546]	Da Cristofaro Sauli a conto di dette dogane addi X di novemb[re] [scu]di mille di oro in o[ro] contanti	1000	-	-
	s.d. [10. 11. 1546]	Da Bandini a conto della cedola delli [scu]di m[ille] 4 delle [deci]me di Milano addi detto [scu]di dui milaottocento di oro contanti	2800	-	-
	[10. 11. 1546]	Dagli Altoviti addi detto a conto delle vigesime degli hebrei della Marca [scu]di mille di oro contanti	1000	-	-
	[10. 11. 1546]	Da Casi addi detto per resto del partio delle [deci]me di Milano [scu]di ottocento di oro in o[ro] contanti	800	-	-
	[10. 11. 1546]	Dagli Ulivieri a conto del quartiere che si paga all'ecc[ellentissi]mo S[igno]r Duca di Parma et Piacenza addi detto [scu]di ottocento sesa[n]taquattro di oro contanti per valuta [scu]di 950 di moneta	864	-	-
	[15.11.1546]	Da Sauli a conto delle dogane di Patrimonio addi 15 di novemb[re] [scu]di mille di oro contanti	1000	-	-
	[18. 11.1546]	Da Bandini per resto delle [deci]me di Milano addi 18 novem[re] [scu]di mille dugento d'oro contanti	1200	-	-
		[total fol. 2]	17844	-	-

2v	[22. 11. 1546]	Da Sauli a conto delle dogane di Patrimonio addi 22 di novemb[re] [scu]di cinquecento di oro contanti	500	-	-
	dicemb[re] [2. 12. 1546]	Dagli Altoviti per resto delle vigesime degli hebrei della Marca addi 2 di decemb[re] [scu]di novecentosettantasette et mezo di oro contanti	977	10	-
	[13. 12. 1546]	Dall'erario di castel Sant'Ang[el]lo addi 13 di dicemb[re] [scu]di undicimilacinquecento di oro contanti a me P[ier] Giovanni	11500	-	-
	[13. 12. 1546]	Dagli Ulivieri a conto della p[ri]ma [deci]ma triennale di Firenze [scu]di cinq[ue] mila di oro contanti addi 13 di dicemb[re]	5000	-	-
	[13. 12. 1546]	Da Gio[vanni] Batt[ist]a Perini a conto della contribuzione di Campagna addi detto [scu]di duemila di oro in o[ro] contanti per ma[n]o di Franc[esc]o Bellotti	2000	-	-
	1547 genn[ai]o [8. 1. 1547]	Da Thobbia Pallavicini addi 8 di genn[ai]o [scu]di cinquecento di oro in o[ro] per resto di [scu]di m[ille] 30 delle dogane del Patrimonio	500	-	-
	[8. 1. 1547]	Dagli Ulivieri addi detto [scu]di tremila di oro in o[ro] per mano di Giannozzo Cepperello contanti a conto di un man[da]to di [scu]di m[ille] 5 del R[everendissi]mo camerlengo per il partito delli [scu]di 20700 delle [deci]me di Milano	3000	-	-
	[12. 1. 1547]	Da detti per mano del detto [scu]di mille di oro addi 12 di genn[ai]o contanti per detto conto	1000	-	-
	[12. 1. 1547]	Da detti Ulivieri [scu]di mille di oro in o[ro] a me P[ier] Giovan[ni] co[n]tanti per detto conto fino addi 13 di dicemb[re] del 46	1000	-	-
	[12. 1. 1547]	Da Barth[olome]o et Hier[onym]o Sauli addi 22 di genn[ai]o [scu]di mille di oro in o[ro] a conto della contribuzione #di Perugia à conto# ⁷ del quartier de' Cavalieri di febr[ai]o et per loro da Montanuti a me P[ier] Giovan[ni] contanti	1000	-	-
		[total fol. 2v]	26477	10	-
3	[22. 1. 1547]	Dagli Ulivieri addi 22 di genn[ai]o [scu]di mille di oro a conto di Monte a me P[ier] Giovan[ni] cont[anti]	1000	-	-
	[22. 1. 1547]	Dagli Altoviti addi detto [scu]di mille di oro in o[ro] a conto de' Cavalieri lauretani, contanti a me P[ier] Giovan[ni]	1000	-	-
	[22. 1. 1547]	Da Dom[ini]co Guardini agente del S[igno]r Duca di Castro addi detto [scu]di mille di oro in o[ro] in una l[ette]ra degli Ulivieri p[er] Bologna	1000	-	-
	febr[ai]o [4. 2. 1547]	Da Hier[onym]o Ubaldini e[t] compagn[i] addi 4 di Febr[ai]o [scu]di settemila ⁸ di oro in o[ro] per loro da Benvenuto Ulivieri e[t] compagn[i] a me P[ier] Giova[n]ni cont[anti] et se ne hanno a rivalore fra due mesi pross[imi] sopra i Cavalieri di S[an] Giorgio et le [deci]me di Firenze	7000	-	-

	[28. 2. 1547]	Da Gio[vanni] Batt[ist]a Perini addi ul[tim]o di febr[ai]o [scu]di mille di oro in o[ro] per mane di Franc[esc]o Bellotti a conto della contribuzione di Campagna	1000	-	-
	aprile [5. 4. 1547]	Da M[esser] Barth[olome]o Gualterotti et per lui da M[esser] Benuenuto Olivieri addi 5 di aprile [scu]di novemila cinq[ue]cento d'oro a conto del parti[t]o che detto M[esser] Barth[olome]o ha fatto con la cam[er]a ap[ostoli]ca sopra le [deci]me di Firenze	9500	-	-
	giugno [18. 6. 1547]	Da M[esser] Thomasso Cavalcanti et comp[agni] [scu]di quindicimila di oro in o[ro] addi 18 di giugno per il partito ch'ha fatto detto M[esser] Thomasso con la cam[er]a ap[ostoli]ca della gabella d'contratti	15000	-	-
		[total fol. 3]	35500	-	-

Fol. 3v:

1549

Sum[m]ario del'introito d'i[m]p[ro]nte libro di M[esser] P[ier] Gio[vanni] Aleotto, thes[oriere] sec[re]to di N[ostro] S[ignore] p[ro] toto d[el]la Guerra d[el]la Alemag[na] com, conto a 22 di giugno 1546 p[er] famo il saldo d sono

	d'oro in oro		
	scudi	soldi	denarii
La prima faccia inq[adr]o (1)	164 316	17	8
La seconda inq[adr]o (1v)	30 885	13	-
La terza inq[adr]o (2)	17 844	-	-
La quarta inq[adr]o (2v)	26 477	10	-
La quinta inq[adr]o (3)	35 500	-	-
Sum[m]a tutto q[uan]to p[ro]nte introito ⁹	275 024	-	8

f.			scudi	sol.	d.
5	1546 giugno [22. 6.]	Addi 22 di giugno. Per mandato del R[everendissi]mo et Ill[ustrissi]mo Car[adin]al Farnesse, legato dell'esercito in Alemagna di detto di ho pagati li sott[iscritt]i denari a sott[iscritt]i cap[ita]ni:			
		Al s[igno]r Antonio Savello [scu]di trecento d'oro	300		
		Al Cap[ita]n Ascanio della Corgna [scu]di ¹⁰ trecento sim[ili]	300		
		Al Cap[ita]n Julio d'Ascoli [scu]di ducento di oro	200		
		Al Cap[ita]n Capo Aguzzo da Perugia [scu]di ducento simi[li]	200		
		Al Cap[ita]n Marcon da Castello [scu]di ducento di oro	200		
		Al Cap[ita]n Marcello del Nero [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200		
		Al Cap[ita]n Gio[vanni] Batt[ist]a da Toffia [scu]di ducento di oro	200		

	Al Cap[ita]n Andrea da Todi [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200		
	Al Cap[ita]n Longino da Fabriano [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200		
	Al S[ign]or Lutio Savello [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200		
	Al Cap[ita]n Tarquinio da Rochette ducento sim[ili]	200		
	Al Cap[ita]n Morgantino helvino [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200		
	Al Cap[ita]n Hier[ony]mo da Pisa [scu]di ducento sim[ile]	200		
	Al conte Lionetto dalla Corbara [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200		
	Al Cap[ita]n Marcantonio da Riva [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200		
	Al Cap[ita]n Pietro da Pisa [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200		
	Al Cap[ita]n Troiano da Terni [scu]di ducento di oro	200		
	Al Cap[ita]n Gio[vanni] Batt[ist]a de' Fabii [scu]di ducento di oro	200		
	Al Cap[ita]n Gio[vanni] Ant[oni]o Romano [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200		
	Al Cap[ita]n Aless[and]ro da Camerino [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200		
	Al Cap[ita]n Scipion dal Monte [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200		
	+ ¹¹ A M[esser] Benedetto Busini per dare al cap[ita]n Hier[ony]mo da Pisa che gli ricevè per il depositario [scudi] trecento sim[ili]	300		
	Al s[igno]r Paulo Vitelli per due Cap[ita]ni [scu]di quattrocento sim[ili]	400		
	Al Cap[ita]n Virgilio da Fermo [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200	-	-
	Al Cap[ita]n Gostanzo d'Ascoli [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200		
	[total fol. 5]	5500	-	-
	Al Cap[ita]n Gio[vanni] Franc[esc]o da Monte Melino [scu]di trecento di oro	300	-	-
	Al s[igno]r conte Santaflora per due cap[ita]ni [scudi] quattrocento sim[ili]	400	-	-
	Al cap[ita]n Bell'Ant[oni]o Corso [scu]di trecento di oro	300	-	-
	Al Cap[ita]n Barth[olome]o dalla Mirandola [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200	-	-
	Al Cap[ita]n Marco Agrippa da Cesena [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200	-	-
	Al Cap[ita]n Filippo Malvezzo [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200	-	-
	Al s[igno]r Aless[and]ro Vitelli per più Cap[ita]ni [scu]di duemila di oro	2000	-	-
	Al s[igno]r Nicola ¹² per un cap[ita]no [scu]di ducento di oro	200	-	-
	Al s[igno]r Sforza Palaucino et per lui al Cap[ita]n Farina [scu]di seicento di oro in o[ro]	600	-	-
	Al Cap[ita]n Ferantè corso [scu]di ducento di oro	200	-	-
	Al Cap[ita]n Salvator Corso [scu]di ducento sim[ili] ¹³	200	-	-
	Al Cap[ita]n Franc[esc]o de Medici et p[er] lui al Cap[ita]n Farina [scu]di ducento sim[ile]	200	-	-

	Al s[igno]r Gio[vanni] Batt[ist]a de Toffia per due cap[ita]ni nominandi ¹⁴ per il s[igno]r duca Ottavio [scu]di quattroento sim[ili]	400	-	-
	Al Cap[ita]n Gio[vanni] Batt[ist]a Borghese et al cap[ita]n Prolatino et per loro al Castiglione [scu]di quattrocento sim[ili]	400	-	-
	Al Cap[ita]n Papirio et per lui a M[esser] Curtio [scu]di ducento sim[ili]	200	-	-
	+ ¹⁵ A M[esser] Benedetto Busini per rimetter in Romagna al Cap[ita]n Cesare Rasponi et il s[igno]r Camillo Sassatello [scu]di quattroce[n]to	400	-	-
	+ ¹⁶ A M[esser] Modesto del s[igno]r Aless[andr]o Vitelli per pagare lo Agozino del campo [scu]di cento di oro	100	-	-
luglio [3. 7. 1546]	Al cap[ita]n Gio[vanni] Batt[ist]a da Toffia et a M[esser] Matthia Gherardi, ¹⁷ M[aest]ro delle poste di N[ostro] S[igno]re addi 3 di luglio per man[da]to del R[everendissi]mo Car[di]nal Farnese di detto di [scu]di ottantaduemila di oro contanti per consignerli in Bologna al thes[orie]re g[e]n[er]ale dell'essercito	82000		
[4. 7. 1546]	Al R[everendissi]mo Car[di]nal Farnese addi 4 di luglio [scudi] tremila di oro in o[ro] per sua prov[isio]ne della legatione in Alemagna d[e]l mese p[rese]nte	3000	-	-
	[total fol. 5v]	91500	-	-
[4. 7. 1546]	All'ill[ustrissi]mo s[igno]r duca Ottavio [scu]di tremila di oro per sua prov[isio]ne del capitaniato g[e]n[er]ale del mese di luglio p[rese]nte, addi 4 detto	3000	-	-
[21. 8. 1546]	A Matthia da San Cassiano m[aest]ro delle poste di N[ostro] S[igno]re addi 21 di agosto [scu]di quarantaunomillecinquecento di oro in o[ro], cont[enti] per man[dat]o cam[er]ale ¹⁸ per portargli all'essercito i[n] Alemagna	41500		
agosto [27. 8. 1546]	Addi 27 di agosto [scudi] duemila di oro pagati per man[da]to del R[everendissi]mo camerlengo cioè [scudi] 1000 a M[esser] Ber[nardi]no Maffei per mandare al R[everendissi]mo car[di]nal Farnese et [scudi] 1000 al baron del Borgo per mandare al s[igno]r duca Ottavio a conto delle loro provisioni di settembre pross[imo] futuro	2000		
settembre [17. 9. 1546]	A Nisi da San Cassiano addi 17 di settembre [scudi] cinq[ue]mila di oro per man[da]to cam[er]ale pagatigli per mandare a Perosia al R[everendissi]mo camerlengo per mandare al campo	5000		

[27. 9. 1546]	A Matthia M[aest]ro delle poste per man[da]to cam[er]ale addi 27 di settembre [scudi] trentacinquemilatrecento d'oro in o[ro] contanti per portagli al campo a compimento di [scudi] 48827 a conto della quarta paga che [scudi] 1727 rimesse M[esser] Barth[olome]o Sauli a Perosia al R[everendissi]mo camerlengo et [scudi] 4800 d'oro ne ha fatto pagar[e] Benuenvto Ulivieri in Bologna a Mattheo Palmerini et [scudi] m[ille] 5 si mandorono [!] a Perosia al R[everendissi]mo camerlengo et [scudi] m[ille] 2 al Car[din]al et al duca	35300		
[25. 9. 1546]	A Bernardo Corbinegli addi 25 di settemb[re] per aggio di [scudi] 1950 di m[one]ta riscossi dagli ufficiali di Roma cambiati a oro a un per cento [scudi] dicinove ½ d'oro	19	10	-
ottobre [26. 10. 1546]	A me P[ier] Giovanni Aleotto per man[da]to Cam[er]ale addi 26 di ottobre [scudi] ducento dieci d'oro che tanti mi ha donati S[ua] S[anti]tà per le fatiche mie di riscuotere et pagar[e] la guerra d'Alemag[n]a	210		
[total fol. 6]		87029	10	-
[16. 10. 1546]	A M[esser] Ant[oni]o Gabrieli addi 16 di ottob[re] duc[ati] quarantaotto di Cam[er]a nuovi [baiocchi] 66 pagati gli per man[da]to cam[er]ale per tanti se ne erano riscossi dagli uffici de' suoi fig[li]o[li] per la mesata di agosto che se gli restitui scono per ordine di N[ost]ro S[igno]re	52	18	5
novemb[re] [3. 11. 1546]	A Matthia di San Cassiano addi 3 di novembre [scudi] ventiquatromila di oro cont[anti] per man[da]to cam[er]ale ¹⁹ per portare al campo a conta della quinta paga	24000	-	-
[3. 11. 1546]	Al detto per man[da]to cam[er]ale addi detto [scudi] centoottanta di oro per dare a bergamino corr[ie]re che portò i sop[radet]ti denari ²⁰	180	-	-
[12. 11. 1546]	Al detto M[esser] Matthia addi XII di novembre ²¹ per man[da]to cam[er]ale [scudi] nouemila settecento di oro in o[ro] et cinq[ue] contanti per portargli al campo per provisione de' diversi	9705		
[12. 11. 1546]	Al detto [scudi] centotrenta di oro addi detto per dare a Franciosino che gli porti ²²	130		
dicembr[e] [13. 12. 1546]	Al detto M[esser] Matthia addi 13 di Dicembre [scudi] ventimila cinquecento di oro in o[ro] per man[da]to cam[er]ale ²³ cioè [scudi] 11500 cont[anti] et [scudi] m[ille] 9 in una l[ette]ra per Bologna a Cornelio Malvasia ch[e] sono per portar al campo [scudi] 1500 al s[igno]r duca Ottavio et il resto alla Fanteria	20500		
1547 genn[ai]o [22. 1. 1547]	A M[esser] Matthia ²⁴ m[aest]ro delle poste di N[ost]ro S[igno]re addi 22 di genn[ai]o [scudi] ottomila cento ottanta di oro in o[ro] per man[da]to Cam[er]ale cioè [scudi] m[ille] 7 per condurre al campo [scudi] 180 per il corr[ie]ri cont[enti] et [scudi] 1000 in una l[ette]ra per Bologna diritta a Cornelio Malvagia di tutto n'ho fatto quitanza M[esser] Hier[ony]mo Tarano	8180	-	-

febr[ai]o [4. 2. 1547]	A M[esser] Matthia ²⁵ sop[radet]to addi 4 di febr[ai]o [scudi] ottomila di oro in o[ro] cioè [scu]di m[ille] 6 in una l[ette]ra p[er] Bologna a Cornelio Malvania et [scudi] m[ille] 2 co[n]tanti, de' quali [scudi] m[ille] 2 [scudi] 150 servi[n]o per Cherubio corr[ie]re ²⁶	8000		
	[total fol. 6v]	70747	18	5
aprile [13. 4. 1547] ²⁷	A me P[ier] Giovanni Aleotto addi 13 di aprile [scudi] quattroce[n]to cinq[ue] di oro per altanti io havevo sborsati per ordine di Mons[ignor] thes[oriere] cioè [scudi] 300 al car[din]al Visco, [scudi] 60 a M[esser] Ant[oni]o Helio et [scudi] 50 di m[one]ta a m[aest]ro Agnolo ²⁸ ricam[at]ore ²⁹ et questi mi ritengo cioè metto a uscita alla cam[er]a ap[ostoli]ca p[er] man[da]to cam[er]ale	405	9	2
[20. 4. 1547]	Al Cap[ita]n Hier[ony]mo da Pisa addi 20 di apri[le] [scudi] cento di oro in o[ro] ³⁰ a conto della ³¹ provisione di m[aest]ro di campo non pagatagli	100	-	-
maggio [2. 5. 1547]	A M[esser] Sylvestro Beretta Castellano di Nepi [scudi] cinq[ue]cento di m[one]ta per man[da]to Cam[er]ale #2 di maggio ³² <u>per ispendergli nelle fortezze che</u> ³³ si fanno intorno a detta città per ordine di N[ostro] S[igno]re	454	10	10
[13. 5. 1547]	A M[esser] Vinc[enz]o Spada depositario della cam[er]a ap[ostoli]ca addi 13 di maggio [scudi] ducento di m[one]ta per man[da]to cam[er]ale, i quali lui gli mette a entra[t]a di detta cam[er]a ³⁴	181	16	5
[19. 5. 1547]	A M[esser] Hier[ony]mo Spinola mercante genovese ³⁵ addi 19 di maggio [scudi] duemile di oro in o[ro] a buon conto del suo credito ch'egli ha con la cam[er]a ap[ostoli]ca per il partio delle m[ille] X ³⁶ some di grano tutto per man[da]to cam[er]ale	2000	-	-
[26. 5. 1547]	A Baldassare de' Opiciis ... di M[esser] P[ier] Giovanni Aleotto per man[da]to cam[er]ale addi 26 di maggio [scudi] venticinq[ue] di oro per sue fatiche di riscuoter et tener gli conti de' M[esser] P[ier] Giovanni sop[radet]to per la cam[er]a ap[ostoli]ca ³⁷	25		
giugno [18. 6. 1547]	A M[esser] Thomasso Cavalcanti ³⁸ addi 18 di giugno per man[da]to cam[er]ale [scudi] quatromilatrecento di oro per il prezzo di un vezzo di 50 perle, che lui ha vendute a N[ostro] S[igno]re. ³⁹	4300	-	-
	[total fol. 7]	7466	16	5
luglio [6. 7. 1547]	Addi 6 di luglio per man[da]to del R[everendissimo] Mons[ignore] di Casale ⁴⁰ ho messo nell'erario di castel Sant'Angelo di [scu]di diecimila di oro in o[ro], i quali [scu]di m[ille] X erano delli [scudi] m[ille] 15 sim[ili] riscossi da cavalcanti sotto di <u>18 di giugno pross[imo] passato come a questa entr[at]a a 3/c⁴¹</u>	10000	-	-

[9. 7. 1547]	Al s[igno]r Aless[and]ro Vitelli addi 9 di Luglio [scudi] cento undici et mezo per man[da]to cam[er]ale <u>che se gli restituiscono per ordine di N[ostro] S[ignore] per essersi riscossi degli suoi uffici nella mesata di agosto pross[imo] passato da S[ua] S[anti]tà a tutti gli ufficiali di Roma imposta⁴²</u>	101	7	4
[9. 7. 1547]	A N[ostro] S[ignore] [scudi] mille di oro in o[ro] delli [scudi] 9500 delle [deci]me di Firenze quali sono <u>a entr[at] a in q[uesto] [libr]o a 3/c pagati a S[ua] S[anti]tà sotto di 9 di luglio⁴³</u>	1000		
[9. 7. 1547]	A N[ostro] S[ignore] addi detto [scudi] settecento di oro in o[ro] <u>riscossi da Cavalcanti delli [scudi] m[ille] 15 sopradetti⁴⁴</u>	700		
settembre [2. 9. 1547] ⁴⁵	A me P[ier] Giovanni per man[da]to cam[er]ale addi 2 di settemb[re] [scudi] mille di moneta per tanti ch'io prestai per poliza del R[everendissimo] vesc[ovo] di Anglone thes[oriere] g[e]n[er]ale sotto 5 di apr[ile] d[el]l [15]47 a M[esser] Hie[ronym]o Bonelli per uso delle spese della casa et della famiglia di S[ua] S[anti]tà	909	1	10
	[total fol. 7v]	12710	9	2

Fol. 8:

+ 1549

Sum[m]ario dello exito del p[rese]nte libro di M[esser] P[ier] Gio[vanni] Aleotto, thes[oriere] sec[re]to di N[ostro] S[ignore] fa[tto] p[er] la expeditio d[el]la guerra d[el]la Alemagna [et] altro occo[ren]to admiss[...] dal s[...] commiss[ari]o et induito qui Toma[m] p[ro] portarlo al saldo in q[ant]o com[] que r[i]p[ro]sto.

Som[m]a la p[ri]ma faccia in q[ant]o ⁴⁶	5 500	-	-
La seconda in q[ant]o ⁴⁷	91 500	-	-
La terza in q[ant]o ⁴⁸	87 029	10	-
La quarta in q[ant]o ⁴⁹	70 747	18	5
La quinta in q[ant]o ⁵⁰	7 466	16	5
La sex[t]a et ultima q[ant]o ⁵¹	12 710	9	2
Sum[m]a tutto q[uant]o exito com[e] apare	274 954	14	-

Qui apresso segno il salito del p[rese]nte libro del R[everend]o M[onsignore] Pietro Gio[vanni] Aleotto thes[oriere] secreto di N[ostro] S[ignore] p[er] li dinari p[er]venuteli mano et spesi p[ro] toto d[el]la guerra della Alemagna in subsidio dello Imperator[e] gli lutherani com[m]inciato da 22 d[i] giugno 1546 p[er] tutto 2 di septembr[e] 1547 com i[n] q[ant]o da conto i revisto, examinato d[i] saldato p[er] li R[everend]i S[ignori] clerici et commiss[ar]ii et p[er] loro S[ignore] scrupio et sottoscrup[i]o secondo lo stile cam[er]al e come qui apedi ut s[upra].

	d'oro i[n] oro		
La S[anti]tà di N[ostro] S[ignore] et sua R[everen]di[ssima] Cam[era] ap[ostolica] de dar[e] p[er] dinari pagati a soldati, capi[tan]i et R[everendissi]mo legato et altri bisog[n]i da 22 di giu[gn]o 1546 a 2 di septemb[re] 1547 ridotto al somario come	274 954	14	-
Ex p[er] salito di q[ue]sti co[s]ti et resto ch[e] ditanti il [...] M[onsignor] P[ier] Gio[vanni] resta debitore et portatolo deba dare ad altari sui co[s]ti d[ue] libri di spese p[er] S[ua] S[anti]tà a posto qui p[er] pagar il toto	69	6	8
Sum[m]a	275 024	-	8
	d'oro i[n] oro		
La S[anti]tà di N[ostro] S[ignore] et sua cam[era] ap[ostolica] de hora[m] p[er] dinari fa p[er] venir i[n] mano di me P[ier] Gio[vanni] Aleotto tanto dello erario e p[ro]prio q[ua]nto da doicurat[us] et altri p[er] diversi p[ro]fitti f... p[er] essa cam[era] come nel p[re]sente libro apare et in sum[m]ario ridotto [?] i[n] q[ua]nto	275 024	-	8

Visis et ditiatorum discussis et examinatis [con]putis p[re]sentis libri d[omi]ni Petri Joannis Aleotti S[ancti] D[omi]ni N[ostri] p[ap]ae Thesaurarii secreti sup[er] pecuniis tam a Sua S[anti]te et o suo orario quam a m[er]catorib[us] e pecuniis camere ap[ostolice] et almundi p[er] on[er]a habitis et in expeditione [con]tra Lutheranos ad partes Alemanie ac alijs d[e] causis expensis d[e] anno 1546 et 1547 in camera ap[ostolica] p[er] ductis et Juratis et nobis infrascrip[tis] clericis ex decreto ca[m]ere sub die 18. Januarii p[ro]p[ri]is anni 1549 [com]missis re[c]ipitur introitu[s] dicti Libri a folio primo et p[ri]ma partita sub die 22 Junii 1546 ex orario ap[ostolico] [scu]ta m/12⁵² auri in auro usq[ue] foliu[m] 3 et ultima partita sub die 18 Junii 1547 a d[omi]nis d[e] Giraldis et Caualcantibus [scu]ta m/15⁵³ auri in totu[m] et partitis 49 ascendor ad su[m]ma[m] [scudi] 275 024 [soldi] – d[enarii] 8 auri in auro ut p[re]fertur exitu[m] vero ut in eodem Libro et p[er] nos admissu[m] a folio 5 et p[ri]ma partita sub die 22 Junii 1546 [?] d[omi]no Ant[oni]o Sabello [scudi] 300 auri usq[ue] foliu[m] 7 et ultima partita sub die 2 [septem]bris 1547 d[omi]no magistro domus S[ancti] D[omi]ni N[ostri] [scudi] 909 Juli 1 d[enari] 10 insimul in partitis 71 facer su[m]ma[m] [scudi] similiu[m] auri in auro 274 954 sol[di] 14 q[ui]bus deductis o sum[m]a sup[ra] notati introitus Liq[ua]ndo [con]stat dictu[m] d[ominem] P[etrem] Joannem remanere debitore[m] d[e] [scu]tis 69 [soldo] 1 d[enarii] 8 similit[er] nos igitur Hier[onymu]s Baren[us] decanus et A[ntonius] Bononien[sis] ca[m]ere ap[ostolice] p[re]sidentes, clerici et [nota]rii dicta [con]puta pro ut descripta, admissa et calculata sunt approbantes et solidantes dictu[m] d[ominum] P[etrem] Joannem Aleotu[m] S[ancti] D[omi]ni N[ostri] p[ap]ae et eius ca[m]ere ap[ostolice] debitore[m] d[e] scutis 69 [soldo] 1 d[enarii] 8 auri in auro remanere et esse dicimus et declaramus in reliq[ui]s pro huius modi [con]putor[um] sono reddita absoluimus et liberamus in q[ui]bus fidem hec s[cri]psimus et manu n[ost]ra subs[cri]psimus. Datu[m] Rome in camera ap[ostolica] die 28 Januarij 1549 pontificatus S[ancti] D[omi]ni N[ostri] Pauli p[ap]ae tertii anno decimoq[ui]nto.

Ego Hie[ronymus] Barent[us] cam[erae] ap[ostoli]cae decan[us] et co[m]missar[iu]s approbo manu p[ro]p[ri]a

Ego A[ntonio] Bononien[sis] ca[me]re ap[ostoli]ce clericus et [nota]rius approbo et manu p[ro]p[ri]a [con]firmo.

1546

Dagli Altoviti addi 9 ^{mo} di Nouemb. per è dugi tremila trecento trenta di m ^{te} a conto della gata degli hebrei della Marca et di detto sussidio di 76. sim. tremila d'oro contanti	3000
Dall' Emio di Castel Sant'Angelo addi 3. di Nouemb. e cinque mila d'oro contanti a m ^{te} T. Giovanni	5000
Dagli Altoviti addi detto a conto degli Hebrei della Marca e cento ottanta di oro in ^o per dar' a Bergamino Carr. ^o per portare danari al campo	180
Da Cristofano Sauli per le rogane di Patrimonio addi 6. di Nouemb. e cinquecento di oro contanti	500
Da Iobbia Pallavicini addi detto per detto conto e cinquecento di oro in ^o contanti	500
Da Cristofano Sauli a conto di dette rogane addi 2. di Nouemb. e mille di oro in ^o contanti	1000
Da Bandini a conto della cedola delli 7 ^{mi} delle 2 ^{me} di Milano addi detto e duemila ottocento di oro contanti	2800
Dagli Altoviti addi detto a conto delle Vigesime degli hebrei della Marca e mille di oro contanti	1000
Da Casi addi detto per resto del partito delle 2 ^{me} di Milano e ottocento di oro in ^o contanti	800
Dagli Ulivieri a conto del quartiere che si paga all' Ecc ^{mo} S ^{ca} di Parma et Piacenza addi detto e ottocento sessantaquattro di oro contanti per valuta di 950. di moneta	864
Da Sauli a conto delle rogane di Patrimonio addi 15. di Nouemb. e mille di oro contanti	1000
Da Bandini per resto delle 2 ^{me} di Milano addi 18. Nouemb. e mille dugento di oro contanti	1200
	17844

Fig. 13: Archivio di Stato di Roma, Amministrazioni militari, Commisariato delle Soldatesche e Galere, Busta 88, fasc. 1546, page 2, Income from 1546, November 1, to November, 18 (photo P. Vorel)

Appendix⁵⁴

Copia del riscosso dagli Ufficiali di Roma per la mesata di Agosto et prima

	Moneta	Oro
Dalle Portioni et Presidenti	3200 [scudi]	-
Da Cauallieri di San Pietro	2800 [scudi]	-
Da Cauallieri di San Paulo	1599 [scudi] 60 [baiocchi]	-
Da Cubicularii et scudieri	1240 [scudi] 15 [baiocchi]	-
Da Gianizzeri	223 [scudi] 75 [baiocchi]	327 [scudi]
Dagli Abbreuiatori de Minori et de Maiori	-	766 [scudi] 90 [baiocchi]
Da Piombi	-	872 [scudi]
Da Secretarii ap[ostoli]ci	-	1000 [scudi]
Da Registratori di bolle	-	104 [scudi] 64 [baiocchi]
Da Prothonotarii	52 [scudi] 32 [baiocchi]	-
Da Correttori di contradette di Cancellaria	61 [scudi] 20 [baiocchi]	-
Da Frati del Piombo	-	69 [scudi] 46 [baiocchi]
Dagli Accoliti	29 [scudi] 90 [baiocchi]	-
Da Clerici et Registratori de supp[licatio]ni	130 [scudi]	-
Da Mastri di Registro de supp[licatio]ni	50 [scudi]	-
Dall' Archiuio	763 [scudi]	-
Dagli scrittori di Penitentiaria	44 [scudi]	355 [scudi] 75 [baiocchi]
Da Procuratori di Penitentiaria	-	193 [scudi] 32 [baiocchi]
Da Correttori di Penitentiaria	-	6 [scudi]
Da Nothari di Rota	48 [scudi] 40 [baiocchi]	156 [scudi]
Da Nothari di Cam[er]a	-	101 [scudi]
Da Nothari de Gou[ernato]re del Ciuile	30 [scudi]	-
Da Corsori	44 [scudi]	-
Da Nothari di Cancellaria	-	40 [scudi]
Da Nothari del Gou[ernato]re Criminale	-	25 [scudi]
Da Nothari del Vicario del p[a]p[a]	-	16 [scudi]
Da Mastri del Piombo	-	140 [scudi]
Dal Custode di Cancellaria	-	25 [scudi]
Da Mastri di Reg[ist]ro di bolle	-	65 [scudi] 40 [baiocchi]
Da Scrittori di breui	-	741 [scudi] 14 [baiocchi]
Da Scrittori ap[ostoli]ci	-	1002 [scudi]
Da Nothari dell Auditor[e] della Cam[er]a	-	120 [scudi]
Da Mazzieri	-	30 [scudi]
[total]	10 316 [scudi] 32 [baioc.]	6156 [scudi] 61 [baiocchi]

Che ridutti tutti à iul[io] xi. per scudo fanno la soma⁵⁵ di [scudi] 15535 [soldo] 1 come à q[ua]nto [ter]za⁵⁶ entr[at]a.

Table endnotes:

- 1 ASR, Camerale I, Mandati Camerali, sg. 883, fol. 72. 16. 8. 1546 Hieronymus de Tarano orders the amount of 10,000 scudi to be paid to the secret accountant Pietro Giovanni Aleotti.
- 2 See below, Appendix“ of this Editorial Attachment.
- 3 “*Datario*” = “*mastre della poste*”; see F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, p. 70. In 1546, this office was held by Mathia Gherardi da San Cassiano, as evidenced by other accounting items in this documentation.
- 4 Giovanni Riccio da Montepulciano, the Papal ambassador in Portugal (for identification see NBD I/9, p. 688).
- 5 Written “X^{mo}” in both cases in this entry from 1. 11. 1546 and in all of the other case from 10. 11. 1546.
- 6 See expenditures from 3. 11. 1546.
- 7 Interlinear insert.
- 8 In the transcript of Baldassare de Opiciis (next “Obizzi’s transcript”) in the text section it is written “... *scudi settemilla cento vinti* ...” and the numerical expression “7120” (see above body text, Note 39).
- 9 In Obizzi’s transcript there is a total sum of 275 144 scudi and 8 denari, i.e. 120 scudi higher. This difference is due to incorrectly recorded income from the 4. 2. 1547 (7120 scudi instead of 7000 scudi); see the previous note.
- 10 In Obizzi’s transcript, the amount is not stated in words (as it is the case with all the other records of the payrolls for the individual chieftans); in numerical form, this entry only lists “200” instead of “300”.
- 11 A cross is later inscribed to the left of the record.
- 12 Without any commentary or reasoning, W. Friedensburg identifies this chieftan as “Nicola di Pitigliano” (sic; see viz NBD I/9, p. 693); correctly “Pitigliano”.
- 13 This entry is missing in Obizzi’s transcript.
- 14 The word “nominandi” is missing in Obizzi’s transcript.
- 15 A cross is later inscribed to the left of the record.
- 16 A cross is later inscribed to the left of the record.
- 17 In the Obizzi’s transcript, “*da S. Cassiano*” appears instead of the surname “*Gherardi*”.
- 18 ASR, Camerale I, Mandati Camerali, sg. 883, fol. 73. On 21. 8. 1546 Hieronymus de Tarano orders the sum of 41,500 scudi, which was justified as follows: “... *causata ad felicissimu[m] exercitu[m] aplic[at]um in Germania contra hereticos militante[m] computum...*”. Money was accepted by “*Matthie Magistro de Posta*” (i.e. Matthia da San Cassiano).
- 19 ASR, Camerale I, Mandati Camerali, sg. 883, fol. 82v. On 3. 11. 1546 Hieronymus de Tarano orders the amount of 24,500 scudi for “*exercitui ap[ostoli]ce*”, which was justified as follows: “... *causata ad felicissimu[m] exercitu[m] ap[osto]licum in Germania contra hereticos militante[m], computum quintum...*”. Money was accepted by “*Matthie Magistro de Posta*” (i.e. Matthia da San Cassiano).
- 20 The “al campo” is added to Obizzi’s transcript.
- 21 Obizzi’s transcript is dated 11. 11.
- 22 In Obizzi’s transcript, there is a different word order while retaining the same meaning.
- 23 ASR, Camerale I, Mandati Camerali, sg. 883, fol. 98.
- 24 In Obizzi’s transcript, there is “*Matthia da San Cassiano*”.
- 25 In Obizzi’s transcript, there is “*Matthia da San Cassiano*”.

- 26 In Obizzi's transcript, the text of this entry continues with the following words: "...et n' ha fatto quitanza per mano di messer Giovanni Antonio Scribano".
- 27 Before this record, dated 13. 4. 1547, another item (dated 4. 2. 1547) is kept in Obizzi's transcript as follows: "... Addi detto a Benvenuto Ulivieri scudi centovinti d'oro per il cambio delli scudi 7000 d'oro delli due mesi [scudi] 120."
- 28 For identification, see Walter FRIEDENSBURG, *Die Briefwechsel Gasparo Contarini's mit Ercole Gonzaga*, Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 2, 1899, pp. 161–222, here p. 183.
- 29 From this word on, the rest of the text in the Obizzi's transcript is missing.
- 30 In Obizzi's transcript, there is also the text "... di comissione di monsignor thesoriere".
- 31 In Obizzi's transcript, there is the added word "sua".
- 32 Interlinear insert; it is added to Obizzi's transcript at the end of this record.
- 33 In Obizzi's transcript, instead of the underlined text, the following wording is used: "... quali sono per spendere nelle fortezze che vi".
- 34 In Obizzi's transcript, there is the added: "secondo narra il mandato".
- 35 In Obizzi's transcript, there is the added: "et compagni".
- 36 I.e. "10 000".
- 37 In Obizzi's transcript, this record is worded quite differently, as follows: "A Baldassare de Opiciis scudi venticinque d'oro per mandato camerale addi 26 di maggio, quali sono per sue fatiche in scrivere li conti del presente libro, cioè li denari che mi sono venuti in mano et usciti per conto della caera apostolica [scudi] 25."
- 38 In Obizzi's transcript, there is the added: "et compagni".
- 39 In Obizzi's transcript, there is the added: "delli 15 dallui riscossi sotto di detto".
- 40 In Obizzi's transcript, the underlined part of the text is missing.
- 41 I.e. a link to page 3 of this account with income items, where on 18. 6. 1547 a loan from Cavalcanti in the amount of 15,000 scudi (see above) is registered. In Obizzi's transcript, the underlined part of the text is formulated differently, that is: "18 di giugno 1547 in ta entrata del presente libro".
- 42 In Obizzi's transcript, the underlined part of the text is worded differently: "che tante haveva pagati per lui et suoi figlioli nella mesata d'agosto imposta a tutu gli ufficiali, che Nostro Signore glieli fa restituire, addi 9 di luglio".
- 43 I.e. a link to page 3 of this account with income items, where on 5. 4. 1547 9,500 scudi is drawn from an account, guaranteed by a Florentine tithe (see above). In Obizzi's transcript, the underlined part of the text is worded differently: "quali sono a entrata in questo libro sotto di 5 d'aprile a di 9 di luglio".
- 44 In Obizzi's transcript, the underlined part of the text is worded differently: "quali sono ressiduo delli scudi 15 000 simili havuti da Cavalcanti posti a entrata a questo libro di 18 di giugno".
- 45 This item is not listed as a continuous record in Obizzi's transcript, but is detached at the very end as an unrecognised cost.
- 46 See total fol. 5.
- 47 See total fol. 5v.
- 48 See total fol. 6.
- 49 See total fol. 6v.
- 50 See total fol. 7.
- 51 See total fol. 7v.

- 52 I.e. “12 000”.
- 53 I.e. “15 000”.
- 54 See above “entrata” ad 18. 9. 1546. For transcript of this document, see also NBD I/9, pp. 691–692.
- 55 The methodology of this calculation is not mentioned in the source. There are two types of currency, the “common coins” and the gold scudi. Their conversion is in a ratio of 1,1: 1.0 is explicitly mentioned here: The gold scudo was divided into 10 giuli; in “common coins” (i.e. ordinary silver coins), however, it was necessary to pay coins in the total value of 11 giuli (“... *che ridutti tuti à iulii 11 per scudo...*”) as the equivalent of one gold scudo. Two counting systems are also combined here. Expenditure is kept in “new” counting units of 1 scudo = 100 baiocchi; the final summarisation is converted (to allow the final amount to be included in Aleotti’s documentation) to “old” counting units of 1 scudo = 20 soldi = 240 denari. The conversion was (with rounding of the lowest units) probably done as follows: 6,156 scudi 61 baiocchi in gold corresponds to the “old currency” amount of 6,156 scudi 12 soldi 2½ denari. An amount of 10,316 scudi 32 baiocchi “on coin” was recalculated (rounded to the lowest units) to 9,378 scudi 8 soldi 9½ denari “in gold”. The resulting total was 6,156 scudi 12 soldi 2,5 denari + 9,378 scudi 8 soldi 9,5 denari = 15,535 scudi 1 soldo.
- 56 Typed “3”.

List of abbreviations:

approx. =approximately

Cp. = captain

d. = denarii

f., fol. = folio

fasc. = fascicolo

Nr. = number

p., pp. = page, pages

s. = soldi

seg. = signature

sign. = signature

sol. = soldi

v = verso

Christof MUIGG

Montecucoli's Fame, or: A Diplomat's Military Reputation at the Swedish Court in 1654

Abstract: This article is about the weight of military fame in the inaugural audience of Imperial general and diplomat Raimondo Montecucoli (1609–1680) at the Swedish court in 1654. The assumption is, that Montecucoli's military fame was a resource for him as a diplomat. Military fame was a resource because it was symbolic capital that mediated Montecucoli's reputation in the language of symbolic communication. How military fame worked in the language of symbolic communication is discussed by looking at Raimondo Montecucoli's Swedish journal. Montecucoli's own account is contrasted by the Swedish journal of the English ambassador Bulstrode Whitelocke (1605–1675), who was at the Swedish court at the same time.

Keywords: Early Modern Diplomacy – Early Modern Era – Military Fame – Raimondo Montecucoli – Bulstrode Whitelocke – Symbolic Capital – Symbolic Communication

In 1670, Raimondo Montecucoli listed the acquisition of military fame (“*Acquistisi fama all'arme*”) as a necessary disposition for a military leader in his *Della guerra col turco in Ungheria*, his work on the Turkish war 1663–1664, which he dedicated to Emperor Leopold I.¹ In this war, he was supreme commander of an alliance army in the decisive Battle of Saint Gotthard on 1st August 1664, the battle that cemented Raimondo Montecucoli's fame and reputation as one of the most important military leaders of his age and of Austrian military history. A work of praise entitled *Schauplatz Serinischer auch anderer Teutschen Tapfern Helden-Thaten* was published in the same year.² This work celebrates the military leaders of the Turkish war, with a special emphasis

1 *Della guerra col turco in Ungheria*, in: Raimondo LURAGHI (ed.), *Le Opere di Raimondo Montecucoli*, Vol. 2, Roma 2000, pp. 253–550, here p. 303.

2 Wolfgang JULIUS – Georg FRIEDRICH, *Schauplatz Serinischer auch anderer Teutschen Tapfern Helden-Thaten: Was nemlich Verwichnes 1663. und nochlauffendes 1664. Jahr, Ruhm- und Truckwürdiges von ... Herrn Generalen ... verrichtet worden; Die Namen ermeldter Helden sind folgende: Herr Graf Peter und Niclaus Serin ...; Sehr nützlich, anmuthig und Zeitverkürztlich zu lesen*, s. l. 1664. On the Battle of

on Raimondo Montecuccoli, to whom the work is also dedicated, as *Helden* – heroes. This publication represented Raimondo Montecuccoli's *military fame*, fame that he had started to accumulate long before 1664 and continued to accumulate after that year, during his long military career – a career that had started when he was 16 years old and had ended in 1676 when he was 67.³ Mainly through military deeds, patronage and kinship, Montecuccoli had managed to make a career in the military and at the Imperial court.⁴ Montecuccoli certainly knew what he was speaking about when he made his recommendation on the acquisition of military fame in 1670, at a time when his reputation as military leader was already well secured.

How important reputation was for a military leader and how difficult it was to obtain and to conserve can be learned from the French Huguenot soldier and writer Henri de Rohan (1579–1638) who writes: “*C'est une chose qui ne se peut comprendre, combien la réputation d'un Chef d'armée sert & combien elle est difficile à conserver.*”⁵ An army was commonly referred to by the name of its commander. His good reputation could win the respect and appreciation of both friends and enemies as much as bad reputation could result in dishonour. Fame as a medium of reputation went hand in hand with a military leader's recognition by patrons and enemies alike. The vicomte de Turenne (1611–1675), who was Montecuccoli's main opponent in the Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678), said about him: “*on ne peut pas se mieux comporter qu'il faisait dans cette retraite.*”⁶ That military

Mogersdorf / St. Gotthard see: Karin SPERL – Martin SCHEUTZ – Arno STROHMEYER (eds.), *Die Schlacht von Mogersdorf / St. Gotthard und der Friede von Eisenburg / Vasvár 1664: Rahmenbedingungen, Akteure, Auswirkungen und Rezeption eines europäischen Ereignisses*, Eisenstadt 2016.

- 3 1676 was the end of his active career as field commander. He remained Hofkriegsratspräsident until his death in 1680.
- 4 Cesare CAMPORI, *Raimondo Montecuccoli, la sua famiglia e I suoi tempi*, Firenze 1876; Sandonnini TOMMASO, *Il Generale Raimondo Montecuccoli e la sua famiglia*, Modena 1914; Harms KAUFMANN, *Raimondo Montecuccoli 1609–1680: Kaiserlicher Feldmarschall, Militärtheoretiker und Staatsmann*, Berlin 1974; Luciano TOMMASINI, *Raimondo Montecuccoli capitano e scrittore*, Roma 1978; Fabio MARTELLI, *Le leggi, le Armi e il Principe. Studi sul pensiero politico di Raimondo Montecuccoli*, Bologna 1990; Berardo ROSSI, *Raimondo Montecuccoli: Un cittadino dell'Europa del Seicento*, Bologna 2002; Raffaella GHERARDI – Fabio MARTELLI, *La pace degli eserciti e dell'economia. Montecuccoli e Marsili alla corte di Vienna*, Bologna 2009; Adolf SCHINZL, *Montecuccoli, Raimund Fürst von*, in: *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie (ADB)*, Band 22, Leipzig 1885, pp. 183–189.
- 5 Henri de ROHAN, *Le parfait Capitaine, autrement l'abrege des guerres des commentaires de César*, Paris 1639, p. 258. For the importance of reputation as a leading factor of early modern international relations see: Michael ROHRSCHEIDER, *Reputation als Leitfaktor in den internationalen Beziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit*, *Historische Zeitschrift* Vol. 291 (2), 2010, pp. 331–352.
- 6 H. KAUFMANN, *Raimondo Montecuccoli*, p. 15. Turenne referred to Montecuccoli's retreat – which saved the Imperial troops from a more crushing defeat – after the defeat of the Imperial army in the Battle of Zusmarshausen on 17th May 1648 against Franco-Swedish troops under John Banér and Turenne. Montecuccoli took the command over the Imperial troops after Peter Melander was severely injured in the battle. See: A. SCHINZL, *Montecuccoli*, p. 185.

fame was crucial in maintaining a military reputation is quite obvious. But how was it important in other areas of princely service? Hardly any military leader was a military leader exclusively. On the contrary, noblemen in princely service had to negotiate between a plurality of roles and expectations.⁷

In this article, I will discuss the role of military fame as a medium of reputation and as symbolic capital⁸ in the context of diplomacy. I chose Montecucoli's mission precisely because it is already well studied, as compared to other diplomatic missions by military leaders from the Early Modern Period. There is already a considerable body of insightful literature on Montecucoli's mission to Sweden in Winter 1653–1654 and on his relationship with Christina, Queen of Sweden.⁹ This allows me to focus on one side of the dice: How did military fame work as symbolic capital in Raimondo Montecucoli's inaugural audience at the Swedish court on 6th February 1654? The audience as an occasion of symbolic communication provides an opportunity to study the weight of military fame within the ceremonial order of the Swedish court.¹⁰

In the last two decades, *Kulturgeschichte der Diplomatie* has developed as a dynamic field of scholarship. The traditional view, that anachronistically projected a modern image of international relations unto the past was refuted by an impressive wave of studies dealing with a huge variety of subjects. Instead of studying the interaction of “states” and

-
- 7 Dorothea NOLDE, *Was ist Diplomatie und wenn ja, wie viele? Herausforderungen und Perspektiven einer Geschlechtergeschichte der frühneuzeitlichen Diplomatie*, *Historische Anthropologie* Vol. 21 (2), 2013, pp. 179–198, here pp. 194 f. Hillard von Thiessen is speaking of a *Rollenvielfalt*, a variety of roles. See: Hillard von THIESSEN, *Diplomatie von type anciens. Überlegungen zu einem Idealtypus des frühneuzeitlichen Gesandtschaftswesens*, in: Hillard von Thiessen – Christian Windler (eds.), *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen. Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel*, Köln – Weimar – Wien 2010, pp. 471–503, here p. 476.
- 8 Pierre BOURDIEU, *The Field of Cultural Production. Essays on Art and Literature*, Cambridge 1993, pp. 75 f. For Bourdieu's forms of capital see: Pierre BOURDIEU, *The Forms of Capital*, in: John G. Richardson (ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, New York 1986, pp. 241–258. For the Habitus of Diplomats see: Heiko DROSTE, *Im Dienst der Krone: Schwedische Diplomaten im 17. Jahrhundert*, Münster 2006, pp. 34–43.
- 9 Susanna ÅKERMAN, *Raimondo Montecucoli and Queen Christina's betrayal*, in: Marie-Louise Rodén (ed.), *Politics and Culture in the Age of Christina: Acta from a Conference held at the Wenner-Gren Center in Stockholm, May 4–6, 1995*, Stockholm 1997, pp. 67–75; Vera NIGRISOLI WÄRNHJELM, *Il viaggio in Svezia del conte Raimondo Montecucoli nel 1654*, in: Marco Gargiulo – Margareth Hagen (eds.), *Carte di viaggio. Studi di lingua e letteratura italiana* 4, Pisa – Roma 2011, pp. 45–52; Suzanne SUTHERLAND, *From Battlefield to Court. Raimondo Montecucoli's Diplomatic Mission to Queen Christina of Sweden after the 'Thirty Years' War*, *Sixteenth Century Journal* Vol. 47 (4), 2016, pp. 915–938. My gratitude goes to Suzanne Sutherland, who kindly send me an earlier version of her article prior to its publication.
- 10 On the audience as a field for studying symbolic communication in an intercultural perspective see: Peter BURSCHHEL, *Einleitung*, in: Peter Burschel – Christine Vogel (eds.), *Die Audienz: Ritualisierter Kulturkontakt in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Köln – Weimar – Wien 2014, pp. 7–15, here p. 8.

“great men”, the New Diplomatic History conceives diplomacy as a cultural practice.¹¹ The change of perspective included many aspects, groups and agents that were excluded from the traditional view. While the traditional view conceived diplomats as “puppets-on-a-string” led by an official mind and/or sovereign, actor-centred studies showed that kinship, patronage and family traditions guided diplomats to a large extent.¹²

The vocabulary of symbolic communication presented in Montecuccoli’s account of his inaugural audience provides us with insights on how military fame worked as symbolic capital for an early modern diplomat. For this reason, scenes of symbolic communication in Montecuccoli’s Swedish journals are more than just individual accounts of an inaugural audience at a Northern court.¹³ Rather, the validity of values and the stability of norms manifests itself in the condensed moment of the audience.¹⁴ My assumption is that military fame was symbolic capital for Raimondo Montecuccoli at the Swedish court mainly for two reasons: 1. Most Swedish courtiers pursued a military career and therefore preferred a military ethos like that of Montecuccoli above every other.¹⁵ 2. Montecuccoli was well known to many among the Swedish courtiers and to the Queen herself from his time as their military enemy in the Thirty Years’ War. The aim of asking this study is to get to a first understanding of the weight of military fame within the symbolic order of diplomacy in Early Modern Europe.

11 Ursula LEHMKUHL, *Diplomatiegeschichte als internationale Kulturgeschichte: Theoretische Ansätze und empirische Forschung zwischen Historischer Kulturwissenschaft und Soziologischem Institutionalismus*, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 27, 2001, pp. 394–423.

12 See: Hillard von THIESEN – Christian WINDLER, *Einleitung*, in: Hillard von Thiessen – Christian Windler – Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger – André Krischer (eds.), *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen. Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel*, Köln – Weimar – Wien 2010, pp. 1–14, here p. 5; H. v. THIESEN, *Diplomatie vom type ancien*, pp. 485 f; Hillard von THIESEN, *Diplomatie und Patronage: die spanisch-römischen Beziehungen 1605–1621 in aktorszentrierter Perspektive*, Epfendorf – Neckar 2010; Andreas BEHR, *Diplomatie als Familiengeschäft: die Casati als spanisch-mailändische Gesandte in Luzern und Chur (1660–1700)*, Zürich 2015.

13 Both journals are published: *Viaggio in Svezia del mese di Dicembre, l’Anno 1653*, in: Andrea TESTA (ed.), *Le Opere di Raimondo Montecuccoli*, Vol. 3, Roma 2000, pp. 279–303. The original source is in the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna: KA NL 492, a74/10, s. d. (1654) *Viaggio in Svezia nel mese di dicembre 1653*. A German edition was also published: *Reise nach Schweden im Monate Dezember 1653*, in: Alois VELTZÉ (ed.), *Ausgewählte Schriften des Raimund Fürsten Montecuccoli*, Bd. 3, Wien 1899–1900, pp. 75–108. Compared to Testa’s edition, Veltzé’s edition – despite it being also a translation from the original source, is weaker in its scholarly apparatus but offers a very helpful register on names, places and things (Orts-, Namen-, und Sachregister). See A. VELTZÉ (ed.), *Ausgewählte Schriften*, 4, pp. 375–530.

14 Barbara STOLLBERG-RILINGER, *Symbolische Kommunikation in der Vormoderne. Begriffe – Thesen – Forschungsperspektiven*, *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung* 31, 2004, pp. 489–527, here p. 505.

15 See: Fabian PERSSON, *The Courts of the Vasas and Palatines 1523–1751*, in: John S. A. Adamson (ed.), *The Princely Courts of Europe: Ritual, Politics and Culture under the Ancien Regime 1500–1750*, London 1999, pp. 275–293, here pp. 290 f.

The inaugural audience

On 6th February 1654, Christina, Queen of Sweden welcomed the Imperial envoy Raimondo Montecucoli at her court in Uppsala in his inaugural audience. Montecucoli's mission consisted in being the representative of Emperor Ferdinand III (1608–1657) during the process of Christina's planned abdication and to make a marriage proposal to the Queen of Sweden on behalf of the Emperor's son, Leopold. However, Montecucoli himself writes in his journal that he travelled in "*affari privati*"¹⁶ which signified the confidentiality and delicacy of his mission.¹⁷ In Montecucoli's account of his inaugural audience, the Queen "*was standing and was surrounded by her cavaliers and royal officers but without the ladies. The Queen had a bloodletting and wore her arm in a bandage, and as I began to make my obeisance, she slowly walked towards me until I stood before with her and kissed her hand [... she said] that she is well familiar with my name and that she will strive to make my stay as pleasant as possible for me, that her weapons would have made greater progress, if she would not have had an opponent like me, and similar remarks...*"¹⁸

The vocabulary of the "*language of the ritual*"¹⁹ in this scene begins with the Queen's standing reception of Montecucoli. Usually, a sovereign would receive a foreign diplomat sitting on his or her throne, while the diplomat had to perform gestures of humility.²⁰ But the possibility of ignoring the ceremonial order was part of the game. Ceremonial order was produced not only by following the rules but also by breaking them. Symbolic communication structured every social order through collectively recognized fictions and symbols.²¹ This fictions and symbols also included deviation from the ceremonial

16 A. TESTA (ed.), *Le Opere*, 3, p. 279.

17 For a thorough discussion of premodern connotations of the term "*private*" see: Peter von MOOS, *Die Begriffe „öffentlich“ und „privat“ in der Geschichte und bei den Historikern*, Saeculum Vol. 49 (1), 1998, pp. 161–193. Montecucoli's travel companion was Aeneas Sylvius de Caprara (1631–1701), who later was *Feldmarschall* in Imperial service and who also accompanied Montecucoli in many military campaigns. See: Wilhelm Edler von JANKO, *Caprara, Aeneas Sylvius Graf von*, in: *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie (ADB)*, Band 3, Leipzig 1876, pp. 776 f.

18 A. TESTA (ed.), *Le Opere*, 3, p. 291. "*...la quale stava in una sala, dov'era Corona di Cavaglieri, ed uffiziali del Regno, senza alcuna dama. La Regina s'era salassata la mattina, e teneva il braccio in una banda, e com'io incomincio a far la riverenza, ella si va pian piano avanzando, sin ch'io arrivo dinnanzi a lei, e gli bacio la mano. [...] che il mio nome gli era già molto noto; ch'ella cercherà di farmi ogni piacere; e che le sue Arme avriano fatto maggiori progressi, si non fossero stati persone com'io, e simili...*" KA NL 492, a/4/10, s. d. (1654), fol. 8^v. All translations in this article are by the author.

19 Gerd ALTHOFF, *Das Grundvokabular der Rituale. Knien, Küssen, Thronen, Schwören*, in: Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger – Matthias Puhle – Jutta Götzmann – Gerd Althoff (eds.), *Spektakel der Macht: Rituale im alten Europa 800–1800*, Darmstadt 2009, pp. 149–153, here p. 149.

20 *Ibidem*, p. 153.

21 See, for example: Barbara STOLLBERG-RILINGER, *The Emperor's Old Clothes. Constitutional History and the Symbolic Language of the Holy Roman Empire*, New York – Oxford 2015, pp. 2–5. For an

order – like the standing reception of Montecuccoli. This justifies the assumption, that there was something about Raimondo Montecuccoli's reputation, that ascribed him an exceptional – or, in other words – famous position within the Swedish court's ceremonial order. Of course, diplomats had a strong tendency to exaggerate their extraordinary status in accounts of their inaugural audience and Montecuccoli is certainly no exception in that. Still, his account of his inaugural audience can be read in terms of symbolic communication. Like most diplomats, Montecuccoli possessed a highly developed “*semiotic sensibility*”²², and therefore was fully aware of the meaning of every single detail in the audience. A standing reception in Montecuccoli's case could be interpreted as appreciation or, at least, as a compliment, since the standing reception of a foreign diplomat was not the norm at the Swedish court.

To contrast Montecuccoli's account, it may be helpful to look at the Swedish journal of a different diplomat, who was present at the Swedish court at the same time as Raimondo Montecuccoli. The English ambassador Bulstrode Whitelocke (1605–1675) also wrote a detailed journal during and after his mission to Sweden.²³ Whitelocke was a lawyer who had made a career in Oliver Cromwell's Commonwealth regime. In 1653 Whitelocke was sent to Sweden to negotiate the 1654 Anglo-Swedish alliance. Similar as Raimondo Montecuccoli, Whitelocke had quite a reputation when he travelled to Sweden. Contrary to Montecuccoli, he was not a military leader and although Whitelocke's account gives the impression that he was very well received at the Swedish court, some details were different. Whitelocke writes of himself in the third person: “*He [= Bulstrode Whitelocke] perceived the Queen sitting, at the upper end of the room, upon her chair of state of crimson velvet, with a canopy of the same over it. Some ladies stood behind the Queen, and a very great number of lords, officers and gentlemen of the Court filled the room; upon the foot-carpet, and near the Queen, stood the senators and other great officers, all uncovered; and none but persons of quality were admitted into that chamber. Whitelocke's gentlemen were all let in, and a lane made by them for him to pass through to the Queen. As soon as he came within this room he put off his hat, and then the Queen put off her cap, after the fashion of men, and came two or three steps forward upon the foot-carpet. [...] Whitelocke made his three congees,*

introduction see: B. STOLLBERG-RILINGER, *Symbolische Kommunikation in der Vormoderne*. For diplomacy see: André KRISCHER, *Souveränität als sozialer Status. Zur Funktion des diplomatischen Zeremoniells in der Frühen Neuzeit*, in: Ralph Kauz – Giorgio Rota – Jan Paul Niederkorn (eds.), *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im Mittleren Osten in der frühen Neuzeit*, Wien 2009, pp. 1–32.

22 P. BURSCHEL, *Einleitung*, p. 11.

23 Henry REEVE, *A Journal of the Swedish Embassy in the Years 1653 and 1654*, Vol. I & II, London 1855. On Bulstrode Whitelocke see: Ruth SPALDING, *The Improbable Puritan. A Life of Bulstrode Whitelocke 1605–1675*, London 1975.

came up to her and kissed her hand; which ceremony all ambassadors used to this Queen; [...] Whitelocke told her in English (which Mr. De la Marche interpreted in French) that the Parliament had commanded him to present those letters to her Majesty.”²⁴ Whitelocke writes that the Queen was sitting when she received him and only walked towards him after he and his entourage had approached her. Another noteworthy difference between Montecucoli's and Whitelocke's audience is the use of an interpreter. Both Whitelocke and the Queen used an interpreter to communicate with each other. In Raimondo Montecucoli's account, no interpreter is mentioned and this indicates that Montecucoli spoke directly with the Queen, which is quite exceptional in the ceremonial order of the Swedish court.²⁵ Montecucoli writes that the Queen spoke with him for half an hour “*con parole molto obliganti*”²⁶ – in a very obliging manner. During this conversation, Montecucoli spoke directly to the Queen, which was a sign of preference. An interpreter as mediator denominated the hierarchical difference between the Queen and the foreign diplomat. Of course, the Queen did not treat Montecucoli as her equal when she spoke directly with him. But, Montecucoli's access to the Queen was of a different quality from the start, his relationship to the Queen and his standing in the ceremonial order of the Swedish court was settled already from the beginning and this status was expressed in his inaugural audience.

Raimondo Montecucoli was aware of the ceremonial order's importance at a foreign court: His memorandum on noteworthy issues on a voyage is entitled *Osservazioni ne'viaggi* and lists knowledge on the “*Ceremoniale delle Corti*” first among other points, indicating the importance ascribed to ceremonial knowledge by early modern noblemen.²⁷ On the 19th February 1654, a Muscovite embassy visited the Swedish court. Montecucoli and Whitelocke, both describe the audience of the Muscovites. Montecucoli writes: “*In the morning, the Queen held a public audience for the Muscovite emissaries. She received them sitting on her throne under a red velvet baldachin with gold fringes, surrounded by her courtiers, without the ladies of the court. To be found there was the English ambassador. The emissaries were introduced and presented their ovations in their language, preceding name and title of their sovereign to the Queen's. The interpreter, who stood next to the Queen, translated what he [= the Muscovite emissary] said into the Swedish language.*

24 H. REEVE, *A Journal*, Vol. I, pp. 231 f.

25 On ceremony at the Swedish court see: F. PERSSON, *Courts*, pp. 279–285.

26 *Viaggio in Svezia del mese di Dicembre, l'Anno 1653*, in: A. TESTA (ed.), *Le Opere*, 3, p. 291 (KA NL 492, a/4/10, s. d. (1654), fol. 8^v).

27 KA NL 492, a/4/6, s. d. (1652–1654), *Osservazioni ne'viaggi*. For the importance of ceremonial knowledge see: Lucien BÉLY, *Das Wissen über das diplomatische Zeremoniell in der Frühen Neuzeit*, in: Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger (ed.), *Alles nur symbolisch? Bilanz und Perspektiven der Erforschung symbolischer Kommunikation*, Münster 2013, pp. 141–159, here p. 148.

The Queen told her secretary, who stood next to her, who translated her answer into the Russian language. The First Emissary presented to the Queen the Grand Duke's letter which she received and handed to her secretary. The envoy kissed the Queen's hand, bowed down two steps away from her with his hands lowered to the earth, as if he wanted to kiss the floor, he righted himself up and retreated."²⁸

The gesture performed by the Muscovite envoy was a pyrokinesis, an ancient ritual act of submission. Neither Montecuccoli or Whitelocke had performed such a gesture in their inaugural audience. Whitelocke, who, as we have learnt from Montecuccoli, was also present at this audience, gave an almost identical account of it: "*The Audience was in this manner: – First, there presented himself a tall, big man, with a large, rude, black beard, pale countenance, and ill demeanour. His habit was a long robe of purple cloth, laced with a small gold lace, the livery of his master. On his right-hand was a companion in the same livery, and much like the Envoy in feature and behaviour; he carried on high the great Duke's letters set in a frame of wood, with a covering of crimson sarsenet over them. On the left-hand of the Envoy was his interpreter. After his uncouth reverences made, he spake [sic] to the Queen in his own language. The greatest part of his harangue in the beginning might be understood to be nothing but his master's titles. In the midst of his speech he was quite out, but after a little pause recovered himself again with the assistance of a paper. When he had done, one of the Queen's servants interpreted in Swedish what was said; then one of the Queen's secretaries answered in Swedish to what the Envoy had spoken, and that was interpreted to him in his own language by his own interpreter. After this, the Envoy cast himself flat upon his face on the floor, and seemed to kiss it; then rising up again, he went and kissed the Queen's hand, holding his own hands behind him. In the same order his fellow demeaned himself, and presented to the Queen his master's letters.*"²⁹

These two elements of symbolic communication, the standing / sitting reception and the use of interpreters, are matters of hierarchy and status, assigning to each participant a place that matches his or her reputation. Hierarchy and status were represented for example

28 "*La mattina la Regina dà publica audienza à gli Inviati di Moscovia. Ella stà a sedere nella sedia sotto al baldachino di velluto rosso con frangie d'oro, mà senza gradini, è attorniata da tutti li cavalieri, ma senza dame, e vi si trova anche l'Ambasciator d'Inghilterra. Sono introdotti gl' Inviati, e fanno il lor complimento in lor lingua, premetendo il titolo del lor signore, e poi quello della Regina. L'interprete, il quale sta a canto della Regina, ridice in Svedese quello, che costui ha detto, la regina parla ad un suo Segretario, che similmente li sta a canto, e più vicino che l'interprete, il quale risponde, e l'interprete ripiglia la risposta, e la dice in lingua Russica. L'invioato presenta poi nelle mani della Regina la lettera del Gran Duca, la quale è piegata sì ampla, come un foglio di carta ed è tenuta da un canto in un ornesimo: la Regina la piglia, e la dà al Segretario. Poi l'invioato bacia la mano della Regina, ed a due passi di là, si china con le mani per terra, come s'egli volesse bacciar la terra, e poi si rizza, e si ritira.*" A. TESTA, *Le Opere*, 3, pp. 294 f.

29 H. REEVE, *A Journal*, Vol. I, pp. 406 f.

by seating arrangements on a banquet table.³⁰ For the 6th of March 1654, Montecucoli's journal describes such an arrangement at the banquet table in the castle of Västerås: "*La mattina alle 10 ore vado alla Corte, e vi trovo il Principe Reale: si desina e sono alla tavola: la Regina, il Principe Reale, il Principe Adolfo suo fratello, Todt, Steinberg, ed io.*"³¹ The location of Raimondo Montecucoli at the table is described as opposite to the Queen, next to the Royal prince and his younger brother. Sitting next to the Royal prince – the future King Carl X. Gustav – in a confined circle confirms Montecucoli's standing in the symbolic order of the Swedish court. Montecucoli pays special attention to this scene in his journal, as he not only explicitly mentions all the protagonists and their function but also produces a drawing depicting the seating arrangement. Bulstrode Whitelocke writes in his journal and clearly is acknowledging Montecucoli's exceptionality at the Swedish court: "*This Montecucoli was General of the Horse to the Emperor, and one of the gentlemen of his bedchamber. He came hither from the Emperor's Court to visit the Queen; others said he came to solicit a marriage between the Queen and his master's son, the King of the Romans. The Queen used him with great civility and testimonies of favour, whereof he is deserving, being a gentleman of much honour and very ingenious in his discourse, and of a gallant carriage.*"³² If even the English ambassador is recognizing the exceptionality of an Imperial diplomat, it can be assumed that Montecucoli's fame was working for him as a diplomat. Montecucoli's exceptionality was not a matter of just one deviation from the ceremonial norm. Rather, it was a matter of a dialectics between several components, some of which already became apparent in his inaugural audience. If Montecucoli's military fame would have been of no symbolic weight, the Queen would not have mentioned it in the inaugural audience and Montecucoli would not have referred to her words in his journal.

Montecucoli's fame and the Swedish court

Montecucoli records an occasion where he was invited by Swedish general Arvid Wittenberg (1606–1657) for lunch: "*General Wittenberg invited me for diner. After I had been at court earlier, I went to Wittenberg, where I was treated lavishly.*"³³ Arvid Wittenberg

30 William ROOSEN, *Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial. A Systems Approach*, *Journal of Modern History* 52, 1980, pp. 452–476.

31 A. TESTA, *Le Opere*, 3, p. 299. "*In the morning at 10 o'clock I went to court where I found the Royal Prince. For dinner at the table were: The Queen, the Royal Prince, Prince Adolphus his brother, Todt, Steinberg and I.*"

32 H. REEVE, *A Journal*, Vol. I, p. 419.

33 "*Il General Wittenberg, mi fa pregare a desinare. Vado a Corte, poi a desinare da Wittenberg, il quale tratta sontuosamente.*" A. TESTA, *Le Opere*, 3, p. 301.

(Montecuccoli consequently writes about “Wittenberg”), *Reichszeugmeister* at the time of Montecuccoli’s mission, was cavalry officer under the Swedish army’s supreme commander General Field Marshal (*General Fältmarskalk*) Lennart Torstenson (1603–1651), who threatened Vienna in 1645 after his major victory in the Battle of Jankau. The Imperial Army managed to defeat Torstenson despite its own weakness near Brigittenau, after Raimondo Montecuccoli successfully led 2 000 men to attack an auxiliary army under Wittenberg of 8 000 men, thereby severely hampering the Swedish offensive.³⁴ In 1646, Wittenberg followed Torstensson as supreme commander of the Swedish army in Germany and encountered Montecuccoli on the war theatre of Silesia. From his time as a Swedish prisoner of war, Raimondo Montecuccoli was familiar with Swedish customs and it is very likely that he had at least a rudimentary knowledge of the Swedish language. He employed them to gather valuable social contacts at the Swedish court, hence to strive for social capital in the form of social contacts and networks.³⁵ Like Montecuccoli, early modern diplomats pursued the establishment of networks by visiting eminent courtiers during their mission. For Montecuccoli however, visiting Swedish courtiers often was synonymous with encountering former war opponents, though this time he faced them at the dining table rather than on the battlefield. Montecuccoli was familiar with Swedish customs and it is very likely that he had at least a rudimentary knowledge of the Swedish language. After being wounded on the left arm during a skirmish with Swedish troops near Mělník, Raimondo Montecuccoli was captured by the Swedish in 1639. He was not captured for the first time, but this time his name was well known to Swedish field marshal Johan Banér (1596–1641), who rejected any attempt to exchange Montecuccoli with two Swedish colonels, held in captivity by the Imperial Army. Instead, Raimondo Montecuccoli was held as a prisoner in Stettin and Weimar from 1639–1642 under honourable conditions and he not only got acquainted to the Swedish language and culture but propably also learnt more about the Swedish military and its leading figures.³⁶ Knowledge of that kind is not only indispensable for a military leader but also for a diplomat. Therefore, we find the “*Case principali di Cavalieri, Dame e ministri*” – the most important noble houses, ladies and ministers in Montecuccoli’s *Osservazioni ne’viaggi*.³⁷ For the 7th of February 1654, one day after his inaugural audience, Montecuccoli’s journal mentions the highest court offices and their bearers by name: “*The highest court offices are: 1. The keeper of*

34 Constantin von WURZBACH, *Montecuculi, Raimund Fürst*, in: Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich. 19. Theil, Wien 1868, pp. 46–50, here p. 46.

35 Matthias KÖHLER, *Strategie und Symbolik. Verhandeln auf dem Kongress von Nimwegen*, Köln – Weimar – Wien 2011, pp. 169–174.

36 H. KAUFMANN, *Raimondo Montecuccoli*, p. 14.

37 KA NL 492, a/4/6 s. d. (1652–1654), *Osservazioni ne’viaggi*.

the seal, who also is responsible for justice, presently entrusted to Count Brahe, from the Danish family Ticone. 2. The field commander, an office held by field marshal Gustav Horn; subordinated to him is Reichszeugmeister Wittenberg. 3. The admiral, presently an Oxenstierna and Grand Vice-admiral is marshal Wrangel. The chancellor, an office held by the old Oxenstierna. The treasurer, Count Magnus de la Gardie, fell from grace presently. The first equerry is Steinberg and the captain of the Queen's guard is Count Todt, son of the deceased General Todt. There are four companies of guards, each with 150 men. Die number of senators counted 24, now the Queen had increased it to 40."³⁸ Occasionally personated by their family ties, all the court offices are designated by the names of the bearers. Among them is General Wittenberg, whose office's name, *Reichszeugmeister*, is listed – like others – under a German term, which probably should make it easier for Montecucoli's successors as diplomats to Sweden to distinguish the different offices at the Swedish court. Wittenberg was also one of three people³⁹ Montecucoli informed about his arrival in Uppsala on the 5th of February 1654: The other two were the Spanish ambassador Antonio Pimentel de Prado y lo Bianco (1604–1671/72) and another Swedish general, referred to as “*Linden*” in Montecucoli's journal, whose full name was Lorens von der Linde (1610–1670), brother of Erik von der Linde (1611–1666) the Swedish court's *maître des ceremonies*, who was responsible for the ceremonial introduction of foreign ambassadors. The *maître des ceremonies* was a key figure for a diplomat's inaugural audience and it is likely that Montecucoli tried to approach Erik von der Linde via his brother Lorens, who Montecucoli probably knew from the Thirty Years' War.⁴⁰

Personal relationships were of utmost importance for a diplomat, especially in the initial phase of his mission: “*I announced my arrival to the Spanish ambassador, General Wittenberg and General Linden. The latter came to me in the afternoon, followed by the Spanish ambassador. This one said friendly things to me and praised the Count Andreas*

38 “*La cariche maggiori del Regno sono: 1. Reichsdroste, che ha in cura le cose della giustizia, e tale è oggi un Conte Brahe, della casa di Ticone, e vennto di Danimarca. 2. Veldherr, ovvero Connestabile, ch'è Gustavo Horn, che fu già Maresciallo di Campo, e sotto di lui il Reichszeugmeister, ch'è il general Wittenberg, et altri capi di guerra. 3. Reichs Admiral, ch'è un Oxenstiern, e grande Vice Ammiraglio è il Marescial Wrangel. 4. Il gran cancelliere| Reichscanzler| ch'è il vecchio Oxenstiern. 5. Il gran tesoriere| Reichs Schatzmeister| ch'è il conte Magni de la Garde ora disgraziato. Le premier escuyer è il Steinberg, et il Capitano delle guardie della Regina è il Conte Todt, figlio dell già Generale Todt. La compagnia di guardia del Corpo sono 4, di 150 uomini. Il numero de 'Senatori era già di 24, ora la Regina l'irà accresciuto sino a 40.*” A. TESTA, *Le Opere*, 3, p. 292.

39 Mistakenly, Veltz's edition speaks of two generals of that name – “*den beiden beide Generalen Wittenberg*”. A. VELTZÉ (ed.), *Ausgewählte Schriften*, 3, p. 90. Montecucoli in fact only refers to one general of that name, Arvid Wittenberg and only is in Veltz's register: A. VELTZÉ (ed.), *Ausgewählte Schriften*, 4, p. 526.

40 Often, the diplomat negotiated with the master of ceremonies about the details of the inaugural audience. See: L. BÉLY, *Wissen*, p. 148.

Montecuccoli, especially for his bravery in the Battle of Rocroi, in which he, in a Spanish regiment, conquered a pike and was captured by the French. In the evening, another Linden visited me, the brother of the general, and maître des ceremonies, whose office it is to introduce the Ambassadors to the Queen, and the foreigners of status. I beseeched him to get permission to introduce myself to Queen. He promised me to present my wish to the Queen the next morning after her rising and to let me know her decision."⁴¹

As representative of the Spanish king Philipp IV (1605–1665), Pimentel's relationship with the Imperial envoy Montecuccoli was despite the apparently deteriorated relation between the Spanish and the Austrian branches of the House of Habsburg characterised by mutual appreciation. Pimentel makes compliments to Raimondo Montecuccoli and emphasizes his appreciation by praising Montecuccoli's cousin Andrea Montecuccoli and his conduct in the Battle of Rocroi 1643. In 1655, when Christina was already in Flanders after her abdication, Andrea Montecuccoli was issued with the Amaranterorden after Raimondo Montecuccoli had strongly supported his cousin's request to be invested with it. Raimondo himself already was a member of this Order, which Christina had founded in 1653. While she was still a sovereign, Christina issued many foreign diplomats at the Swedish court with the Amaranterorden: The Spanish ambassador Antonio Pimentel,⁴² who was the first to be issued with the Order, Pierre Chanut (1601–1662) who was French ambassador in Sweden 1645–1649⁴³ and Bulstrode Whitelocke all were knights of the Amaranterorden like Raimondo Montecuccoli.⁴⁴ Unfortunately, Whitelocke gives no account of when or how he became a member of the Order. The reason for this is according to Howard Reeve that the Amaranterorden was at the time when the journal was composed not recognized by the English College of Arms, and therefore Whitelocke's knighthood

41 “...io mando a complimentare l'Ambasciatore di Spagna, il General Wittemberg ed il General Linden; dopo mezzo dì, viene egli Linden a visitarmi, e poco dopo viene l'Ambasciatore di Spagna e mi fa mille complimenti, e loda molto il Conte Andrea Montecuccoli particolarmente per l'azione fatta alla battaglia di Rocroy, nella quale prese una pica in un Reggimento spagnuolo e fu fatto prigioniero da' francesi. La sera viene a visitarmi un altro Linden, fratello del Generale, ed il quale è maître des ceremonies, ed ha l'uffizio d'introdurre alla Regina gli Ambasciatori, e li forestieri di condizione: Ond'io lo prego ch'io possa per mezzo del suo favour inchinarmi alla Regina, e degli mi dice, che la mattina seguente, subito al levar della Regina, gli notificherà il mio desiderio, emi farà sapere la risoluzione.” A. TESTA (ed.), *Le Opere*, 3, pp. 290 f.

42 The Spanish ambassador Pimentel was the first recipient of Christina's Amaranterorden after its foundation in 1653.

43 Pierre Chanut was the first foreign diplomat to learn about Christina's abdication scheme in 1649. See: H. REEVE, *Journal*, Vol. I, p. 444.

44 Susanna ÅKERMAN, *Queen Christina of Sweden and her Circle: The Transformation of a Seventeenth-Century Philosophical Libertine*, Leiden 1991, pp. 146 f.

was not legitimate in England at the time. Only in 1661, Whitelocke's knighthood of the Amaranterorden was recognized by the College, after Christina had confirmed it.⁴⁵

Whitelocke, who was present at Raimondo Montecucoli's investment ceremony, gives a description of the Order itself: "... *the jewel of the order hung in the scarf, which was about the compass of half-a-crown; it was made of gold, a round wreath wrought and enamelled like to laurel, and in the midst thereof two great As reversed, set thick with diamonds, the two As for the first and last letters of Amaranta; and about the wreath was written in Italian "Dulce nella memoria" [= sweet in the memory], that is, of a certain noble and famous great lady named Amaranta, who was an eminent pattern and example of honour and virtue, in memory of whom this Order was instituted. The Queen herself is sovereign of the Order; the companions of it made by her were the Prince Palatine and his brother Prince Adolphus, the King of Poland, the Duke of Brandenburg, the Landgrave of Hesse, the Spanish Resident, the Count de Montecuculi, and divers other great lords, and afterwards Whitelocke was honoured also by the Queen to be made a knight of this order.*"⁴⁶

Whitelocke lists the most illustrious knights of the Amaranterorden, among them two Swedish princes and a king, before he mentions that he himself is one of them. Like many secular orders, the Amaranterorden was founded to bind high-ranking noblemen to a sovereign's cause and to establish and secure bonds with other sovereigns.⁴⁷ The ceremony of investment included kneeling and an oath – two actions of symbolic communication that were heavily loaded with meaning. The whole ceremony should establish a bond between Christina, the Order's founder and Montecucoli, the knight. Raimondo Montecucoli was invested with the *Amaranterorden* on the 26th February 1654, as he writes in his journal: "*I took her hand and the dance started; after the ball had lasted for an hour, pastries and refreshments were handed round. Hereupon, the Queen send for the Amaranterorden which she herself used to wear, and a crimson ribbon to be brought. I knelt before her and swore the oath, while laying my hands in hers, thereafter she attached the Order to my coat and put the ribbon around my neck.*"⁴⁸ As in the inaugural audience, the investment ceremony offers a rich symbolic vocabulary. The symbolic

45 R. SPALDING, *Puritan*, p. 290.

46 H. REEVE, *A Journal*, Vol. I, p. 424.

47 Martin WREDE, *Ohne Furcht und Tadel – Für König und Vaterland. Frühneuzeitlicher Hochadel zwischen Familienehre, Ritterideal und Fürstendienst*, Ostfildern 2012, pp. 245 f. For the Amaranterorden see: S. ÅKERMAN, *Queen Christina of Sweden*, p. 144.

48 "...io piglio per la mano, e si comincia il branlò; un'ora doppo di aver ballato si portano confetture e rinfreschi, poi la Regina fa venire l'ordine d'Armaranta (è quel medesimo ch'ella ha portato) ed una banda di colore di fuoco con pizzi d'argento ed oro, e dandomi l'ordine, e prestando io il giuramento à ginocchioni innanzi a lei, e con le mani fra le sue, mi lega l'ordine al giubbone, e mi mette la banda al collo." A. TESTA (ed.), *Le Opere*, 3, p. 297.

gesture of kneeling was deeply rooted in Christian culture, resting on the belief that elevation follows the gesture of humility.⁴⁹ Montecuccoli, the invested, is thereby elevated by the Queen to be a knight of the Amaranterorden, after he knelt before her and swore the oath. The swearing of the oath, the touching of the Queen's hands inasmuch as the actual ribbon denote the symbolic bond between Christina, the knights and ladies of the Order, in the light of the ideals of the order described by Bulstrode Whitelocke in his journal: "... she declared his duty in that order, to maintain and defend virtue and the honour of virtuous ladies, to endeavour to correct vice, to perform honourable actions, to keep his faith inviolable, with divers the like matters relating to honour and virtuous performances, which the Count promised to observe". This instruction was more meant as a performed compliment for the invested, it was requested that the invested already observes the mentioned duty, which was the very reason why he received the Order in the first place. To become a member of the Amaranterorden – and it was by any means like other European secular Orders – the aspiring knight's reputation should already match the ideals of the Order before he is knighted. In the entry of 23rd of February 1654–three days before to his investment – Raimondo Montecuccoli describes "After him came one Jacob, who makes miniature portraits of wax. He said, he was send by the Queen, to portray me in that fashion, like he already made portraits of all the other illustrious people, and that her majesty has the intention of framing all the portraits in golden medallions."⁵⁰ By referring to the members of the Amaranterorden as "uomini illustri", the member-to-be Raimondo Montecuccoli classified himself as an *uomo illustre*, an illustrious man, which has deserved to be a knight of Christina's Order because of his merits, achievements and virtues.⁵¹

The 17th century still largely associated the nobility with chivalry's ideal of honour; it favoured values and practices, like the carrousel, the early modern version of the medieval tournaments. This code of chivalry had not yet lost its military connotation and provided a frame of reference for reciprocal expectations that configured social relationships.⁵² The confidence Christina put in Montecuccoli was legitimized by his reputation, which can

49 G. ALTHOFF, *Das Grundvokabular der Rituale*, pp. 150 f.

50 "Doppo viene da me un certo Jacopo inglese, il quale fa ritratti di cera in picciolo, e dice d'essere mandato dalla Regina per ritrarmi à quell modo, sì come fa di tutti gli uomini illustri, volendo poi la S. Maestà farli gettar tutti in medaglie d'oro." A. TESTA (ed.), *Le Opere*, 3, p. 296.

51 Christina's Order was open for men and women: According to Henry Woodhead, the Amaranterorden consisted of 15 men and 15 ladies. See: Henry WOODHEAD, *Memoirs of Christina, Queen of Sweden. In 2 Volumes. Vol. 1*, London 1863, p. 141.

52 For chivalry and early modern courtly culture see: Martin WREDE, *Code, Konzept und Konjunkturen des Rittertums in der französischen Hofkultur des 17. Jahrhunderts*, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 33, 2007, pp. 350–374.

be described in terms of expectations directed towards chivalry, expectations that were both imperative for Montecucoli as for Christina: On the evening of the 1st of March 1654, Montecucoli went to court, where he found Christina already in her dressing gown: “*In the evening, I went to court. The Queen in her dressing gown ensured me that under confidence in my ingenuity and my chivalric virtue she wishes to confide me a matter of utmost importance and that she believes that God has led me here: I was a bit doubtful, although I will be told about everything by Pimentel, in whose room I have an appointment at eight in the morning.*”⁵³ It is noteworthy that Montecucoli uses a version of the Swedish word for “Queen” – “*drottning*” – although he refers to Christina with the Italian *Regina* elsewhere in his journal.⁵⁴ By using the Queen’s language to represent a scenario in which Christina intends to divulge her most secret plans to him, Montecucoli depicts himself as a formidable nobleman, whose “*valore cavalleresco*” (“chivalric values”) besides his “*ingenuità*” (“frankness”/“candour”) apparently made the Queen to bestow him with the Amaranterorden. All this virtues and ideals were part of the nobility’s education and where as much of importance as patronage and kinship for a career in princely service.

Montecucoli’s mission to Sweden was crucial for his later career in Habsburg service.⁵⁵ He visited the Brandenburg court where he had an audience with Friedrich Wilhelm, Elector of Brandenburg (1620–1688), was introduced to the Electress of Brandenburg, Louise Henrietta of Nassau (1627–1667) and sat at the Elector’s table between the Prince of Croy, *Hofmarschall* at the Brandenburg court and Otto Christoph von Rochow, a Swedish noble and soldier.⁵⁶ This visit in Brandenburg on his journey to the Sweden was very likely a reason why Raimondo Montecucoli was selected for a diplomatic mission to Brandenburg in 1658. Then, Raimondo Montecucoli’s task was to support the Imperial envoy Franz von Lisola (1613–1674) in alliance negotiations with Brandenburg during the Second Northern War (1655–1660). Lisola, a renowned Imperial diplomat, was

53 “*Vado la sera à corte. Droning in robba di note mi dice assicurassi, ed aver fidezza nella mia ingenuità, e valore cavalleresco, voler confidarmi cosa di sua maggior importanza, e credere Dio avermi condotto qua a posta: Io starsi un pezzo insieme essere sospetto, e però ch’io intenderò ogni cosa dal Pimentel, alle cui stanza concerto d’essere la mattina seguente all’otto ore.*” A. TESTA (ed.), *Le Opere*, 3, p. 298. The matter of utmost importance (“*cosa di sua maggior importanza*”) was concerning Christina’s secret plans to convert to Catholicism. She converted in Innsbruck on her way to Rome in 1655, one of the witnesses was Raimondo Montecucoli.

54 This word is spelled differently in the individual Scandinavian languages: *Drottning* (Swedish, Islandic), *dronning* (Norwegian, Danish). In the German 1899 edition of Montecucoli’s writings, Alois Veltzé does not translate *Droning* and makes no comment on it in a footnote, as if it was just the name of a person. However, a *Droning* is absent from the register in his volume, so he probably was aware of the word’s meaning. A. VELTZÉ (ed.), *Ausgewählte Schriften*, 3, p. 101.

55 S. SUTHERLAND, *Battlefield*, pp. 915–938.

56 A. TESTA (ed.), *Le Opere*, 3, p. 281.

a jurist and had no military vocation whatsoever. When Montecuccoli was sent to Brandenburg, Lisola already had negotiated with Brandenburg for months, without much success so far. Brandenburg, which before was allied with Sweden, switched sides in 1657 to join the anti-Swedish alliance and therefore the Habsburg Monarchy.⁵⁷ In Montecuccoli's and Lisola's joint legation, the former was preferred to the latter, since he received a special instruction ("*Nebeninstruction*") – for his eyes only – including an authorization for Montecuccoli which was missing in Lisola's otherwise identical instruction.⁵⁸ This authorization concerned concessions, which consisted in the concession of sending 6 000 Imperial troops to support the war effort in Brandenburg against the Swedish. Obligated to not inform Lisola about this special instruction, it appears that Montecuccoli was chosen for this mission for three reasons: First, his acquaintance with the Berlin court and with the Elector. Second, his military fame, which added symbolic weight to the Imperial position in the negotiations, which Lisola already had pursued for months.⁵⁹ Third, Montecuccoli should counter-balance Lisola, whose conduct of negotiations was not to the satisfaction of the Viennese court.⁶⁰

Military Experience and Diplomacy

Military experience was honoured by acknowledging an officer's aptitude for the assigned command. Finding that a supreme commander lacks experience also questioned his reputation. In his account of the events and peculiarities of the German campaigns in 1647 and 1648, Raimondo Montecuccoli criticized the newly appointed supreme commander of the Imperial army Peter Melander Count of Holzappel (1589–1648) and judged him to be unqualified to be *Generalleutnant*,⁶¹ stating: "*At the beginning of the year Count Matthias Gallas, who for a long time since Wallenstein's death had commanded the Imperial Army in the charge of General-Lieutenant, had passed on to the other life. And Count Heinrich Schlick, who was president of the Aulic War Council and who privately befriended Count Holzappel, took this opportunity, to recommend him to the Emperor to*

57 Robert FROST, *The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721*, Harlow 2000.

58 Alfred Francis PRIBRAM, *Franz Paul Freiherr von Lisola (1613–1674) und die Politik seiner Zeit*, Leipzig 1894, p. 146.

59 *Ibidem*, pp. 128–152, especially pp. 146–149.

60 Klaus MÜLLER, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Frieden 1648–1740*, Bonn 1976, p. 89.

61 The *Generalleutnant* was the acting commander-in-chief and the Emperor's deputy in the military camp. See: Michael HOCHEDLINGER, *Austria's Wars of Emergence: War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy 1683–1797*, New York – London 2003, p. 112.

provide him with the supreme command over the army in the charge of a field marshal. Because he never commanded an army in the meaning of the word, and because his command never extended over the army of the Landgrave of Hessen, he was no match for this position, and because he was new to the army as the army was new to him, this caused disharmony in the minds and disturbance in the arrangements. Gallas used to say about Holzappel, that he will need a period of at least two years, in which he, to instruct himself and acquire the needed skills, should do nothing but observe, what is practice in the army, and gather experience in command.”⁶² A lowborn like Melander benefited from social conditions – for example his family’s connections with the princely family of Orange-Nassau – to fashion his career in the military. Melander gained his military reputation in the service of Hessen-Kassel in the Thirty Year’s War fighting the Catholic League, although he changed sides and was awarded by the Emperor with the title of Reichsgraf von Holzappel.⁶³ It is neither fruitful nor justified to interpret Montecucoli’s critical remarks as proof for Melander’s actual lack of qualification or as a hint to personal animosities between him and Montecucoli. The latter’s doubt of Melander’s qualification as *Generalleutnant* can be interpreted as an act of symbolic positioning. By describing Melander’s incapability for the assigned position, Montecucoli issues his criterions for what an *ideal successor* for Matthias Gallas should be like: While the most eminent problem of Melander is his lack of experience, the hypothetical *ideal Generalleutnant* should already own the required experience and be familiar with the army. This familiarity should enable the implicitly portrayed *ideal commander* to bring uniformity to the war effort, while Melander fails in this respect, in Montecucoli’s account. While the description of Melander avoids disputing his military qualification in general, it is explicit in arguing that his missing qualification for the

62 “Su l’*principio dell’Anno era il Conte Mattias Gallasso, il quale da molto tempo adietro, cioè dalla morte del Wallenstein sin allora, avea retto l’Arme Cesaree in carica di Tenente Generale, passato all’altra vita. Ed il Conte Enrico Schlick, ch’era in quel tempo Presidente del Consiglio Aulico di Guerra, che avea private amicizia col Melandro, detto Conte di Holzappel, prese questa occasione di promoverlo appresso all’ Imperatore, e di fargli avere il commando dell’Arme, con carica di Maresciallo di Campo. Ma non avendo egli mai per l’adietro governati esserciti giusti, né steso il suo commando più oltre che sovra le truppe della Landgravia di Hessen, veniva stimato non pari al posto, e l’esser egli all’essercito, e l’essercito a lui nuovo, cagionava disarmonia negli animi, e sconcerto nelle disposizioni. Soleva dire Gallasso dell’Holzappel, che bisognava ch’egli per due anni di spazio non facesse altro che osservare quello che si praticava nell’essercito, e praticar nella Cavalleria per bene istruirsi, e rendersi abile.” A. TESTA (ed.), *Le Opere*, 3, p. 161. On Matthias Gallas see: Robert REBITSCH, *Matthias Gallas (1588–1647): Generalleutnant des Kaisers zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Eine militärische Biographie*, Münster 2006.*

63 Two monographies deal with Peter Melander von Holzappel, both are dated and apologetic: Wilhelm HOFMANN, *Peter Melander, Reichsgraf zu Holzappel. Ein Characterbild aus der Zeit des 30jährigen Krieges*, München 1882; Rudolf SCHMIDT, *Ein Calvinist als Kaiserlicher Feldmarschall im 30jährigen Krieg*, Berlin 1895. A reference for his biography is: Fritz GEISTHARDT, *Holzappel, Peter Graf zu*, in: *Neue Deutsche Biographie (NDB)*, Bd. 9, Berlin 1972, p. 571.

position of *Generalleutnant* is due to his lack of experience. Imperial general, diplomat and writer Giorgio Basta (1550–1607) understood experience (“*isperienza*”) as cultural capital: Experience enabled military leaders to make the right decisions and to act according to prudence.⁶⁴ The importance of experience was hardly confined to the military. Often, diplomats were selected for a mission because of their experience with the receiving court and countries people, culture and language.⁶⁵ A distant relative to Raimondo, Alfonso Montecucoli (1546–1607)⁶⁶ was military leader and Tuscan ambassador extraordinary to the Court of St James in 1603, a post he received because of the “*prudent experience that besides your military profession you have of the actions of the world and of the courts of the Princes, and your knowledge of diverse languages*”.⁶⁷ In its different variations, prudence marked both the *ideal commander* and the *good ambassador*. Prudence went hand in hand with physical qualities like *la prestance* in distinguishing the ideal military commander.⁶⁸ *La prestance* referred to stoutness, meaning a handsome appearance in accord with the ideal noble masculine body image of the time. This ideal is represented, for example, in the shape of cuirasses worn by noble military commanders, which mirrored the pyknic ideal body image of the time.⁶⁹ Raimondo Montecucoli himself related physical and moral qualities of generals in his *Della Guerra col turco in Ungheria* by labelling them as natural (“*naturali*”) and acquired (“*aquistate*”). Montecucoli lists natural qualities: “*Martial spirit, a healthy, robust temperament, large limbs, vivid blood, which causes boldness in danger, dignity in manners and indefatigability in businesses*.”⁷⁰ Montecucoli reproduces early modern medicine’s view, which saw vivid blood (“*sangue ispiritoso*”) in consistency with

64 Giorgio BASTA, *Il maestro di campo generale di Giorgio Basta conte d’Hust. Generale per l’imperatore nella Transilvania ...*, Venice 1606, p. 1.

65 Daniela FRIGO, *Prudence and Experience: Ambassadors and Political Culture in Early Modern Italy*, *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 38 (1), 2008, pp. 15–34, especially pp. 24–29.

66 See: Zoltán Péter BAGI, *Alfonso Montecucoli a Habsburg család szolgálatában*, AETAS – Történettudományi folyóirat 30 (3), 2015, pp. 37–50; Zoltán Péter BAGI, *Die Karriere Alfonso Montecucolis im Dienste der Familie Habsburg 1570–1593*, in: Podravina: časopis za multidisciplinarna istraživanja 14 (28), 2015, pp. 73–83.

67 English translation of his instructions in: Alessandra CONTINI, *Aspects of Medicean Diplomacy in the Sixteenth Century*, in: Daniela Frigo (ed.), *Politics and Diplomacy in Early Modern Italy*, Cambridge 2000, pp. 49–94, here pp. 92 f.

68 On *la prestance* in the ideal noble masculine body image see: M. WREDE, *Ohne Furcht und Tadel*, p. 326.

69 See, for example, the field cuirass of Johann Count Sporck (1600–1679), Imperial general of the cavalry, in the permanent exhibition of the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum Wien (Museum of Military History Vienna), Hall 1. The pyknic body type is characterized by a big head, thickset body and sturdy muscularity. It was seen in coherence with the above mentioned moral qualities.

70 “*Il genio marziale ed il temperamento sano, robusto, di estremità grandi, e ripieno di sangue ispiritoso, onde de risultano la intrepidezza nel pericolo, il decoro nella presenza e l’infatigabilità nel negozio*.” R. LURAGHI (ed.), *Le Opere*, 2, p. 266.

moral qualities.⁷¹ Military commanders should control their emotions, to deploy them when necessary, for example to teach disobedient soldiers to follow orders.⁷² In addition to his natural qualities, the ideal general should seek to acquire “*The virtues of prudence, of justice, of firmness and of temperance*”.⁷³ Here, Montecucoli lists the Platonic cardinal virtues, preserved and reinterpreted in the political philosophy of the Renaissance.⁷⁴ Of all four, prudence was given emphasis by writers like Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), who defined prudence as the ability of anticipation, affirming the good and fighting evil.⁷⁵

Montecucoli's fame outlived him and his contemporaries, transcending even the borders of the at some point in history separated military traditions of Italy and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: In the 1930s, a whole class of the Italian Navy's light-cruisers was named after the Condottieri-class light cruiser *Raimondo Montecucoli*, an Italian warship named after Raimondo Montecucoli himself. Later, the class of 1980 of the Austrian Military Academy *Theresianische Militärakademie* chose the name *Raimondo Montecucoli* in honour of the great military commander, to remember the tercentenary of his death. Of course, both the Italian Navy and the *Militärakademie* thought not of Raimondo Montecucoli, the diplomat but of Raimondo Montecucoli, the military hero.

Perspectives

Examining noble military agents in the military and in diplomacy promises a deeper understanding of in noblemen's practices in both fields. Due to Montecucoli's military reputation, he was assigned a status at the Swedish court which opened possible ways of accessing the Queen and her inner circle of confidants, manifested in the Queen's Amaranterorden. His military fame worked in Montecucoli's favour, because of the symbolic capital of being well-known at the Swedish court for his military conduct against the Swedish in the Thirty Year's War, where he had encountered many Swedish officers on the battlefield, he later met again during his stay at the Swedish court.

71 On Galen's theory see: Mary LINDEMANN, *Medicine and Society in Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge 1999, p. 69.

72 Jonathan DEWALD, *Aristocratic Experience and the Origins of Modern Culture: France, 1570–1715*, Berkeley – Los Angeles 1993, p. 65.

73 “*La virtù della prudenza, della giustizia, della fortezza, e della temperanza.*” R. LURAGHI (ed.), *Le Opere*, 2, p. 266.

74 For example, Giovanni Cavalcanti (1381–1451) in his *Trattato politico-morale*. See: Marcella T. GRENDLER, *The “Trattato politico-morale” of Giovanni Cavalcanti. A Critical Edition and Interpretation*, Genf 1973.

75 See: Giovanni PANNO, *Die Tugenden des Fürsten zwischen Sein und Schein (Kapitel 15–17)*, in: Otfried Höffe (ed.), Niccolò Machiavelli, *Der Fürst*, Berlin 2012, pp. 96 f.

Besides, Montecuccoli owned cultural capital for this mission: He was familiar with Swedish customs, understood and spoke at least some Swedish and was as military commander especially qualified to connect with the courtiers who shared military experience. Experience as a distinguishing quality was even increased in its value if it was accompanied by prudence. Prudence was equally important for *perfect commanders* and for *ideal ambassadors*. Experience and prudence therefore were main factors for a career as military leader, diplomat and court office holder. By constituting the military fame of a noble military commander like Montecuccoli, experience and prudence provided him with a resource for his diplomatic mission. Montecuccoli's social capital existed in the form of acquaintance with important people like Pimentel or General Wittenberg. His cultural capital existed in form of a noble education, military experience and experience with the Swedish. Both forms were associated with the virtue of prudence: The social recognition and attribution of this virtue increased Montecuccoli's symbolic capital and secured his reputation at the Swedish court and beyond it. This article wished to make a proposal as much as present an attempt for an integrative study of the military, diplomacy and the court. The promising outcome of such a study would be a refined understanding of the workings of early modern cultures of war and peace.

Miroslav DYRČÍK

Early Eighteenth Century' Jewish Religiousness: A Case of Leibele Prossnitz as Depicted in *Bashraybung fun Shabbetai Zevi*¹

Abstract: *The study analyses parts of Bashraybung fun Shabbetai Zevi dedicated to Leibele Prossnitz, the best-known Moravian adherent of the Sabbatian movement. This early modern Jewish messianic movement is reflected as heretical in academic and non-academic discourse alike and Bashraybung is the only contemporary source describing Leibele Prossnitz' religious behaviour in more detail. Such described behaviour is put in general context of the early modern European Jewish society to derive those deeds and thoughts of Leibele Prossnitz which are in the text perceived as "normal" (orthodox) and those which are perceived as "extraordinary" (heterodox, heretical). Further, the study distinguishes the deeds and thoughts of Leibele Prossnitz which are specifically Sabbatian, that means those which are shared neither by other messianic enthusiasts of the time nor by other contemporary Jews, and those which are of his own invention. The study is intended to be a contribution to the present discussion on early modern Jewish orthodoxy and heterodoxy.*

Keywords: *Sabbatian movement – Leibele Prossnitz – messianic movements – Jewish heterodoxy – Jewish orthodoxy – heretical movements – early modern Jewish history – early modern Jewish society*

In the summer of 1665 Nathan of Gaza,² a well-known healer of the souls in the land of Israel, proclaimed Shabbetai Zevi³ as the "messiah". The news on for so long awaited Jewish "messiah" spread rapidly from Israel to all around the Jewish world.⁴

1 The study was made within the project of the Faculty of Arts, Palacký University Olomouc *Society in Historical Development, since Middle Ages to Modern Times*, thanks to the grant for specific university research granted to the Palacký University Olomouc by the Ministry of education, Youth and Sport in 2015.

2 Nathan ben Elisha Hayyim Ashkenazi (1643/4–1680) was one of the two most important persons of the Sabbatian movement (as the messianic movement of the second half of the seventeenth and the eighteenth century is in the Jewish historiography refer to, or less frequently also as Sabbatianism), considered as its main prophet and exaggerator.

3 Shabbetai Zevi (1626–1676) was the central person of the Sabbatian movement, a Jewish messianic movement in the second half of the seventeenth and the eighteenth century. He was considered as the long-awaited Jewish messiah.

4 The continent of America was an exception. There is no evidence that the movement influenced the Jewish community in America (the Southern and the Northern alike).

Already in the winter 1665 every Jew in Europe, Asia and North Africa was excited about the messiah, and only little reservation and opposition aroused. The huge excitement, however, extinguished very quickly, when the Jewish “messiah”⁵ converted to Islam in the September 1666. Though, the most of the former believers in the Shabbetai Zevi’s messianic role deserted, there were groups of Sabbatians (as the believers in messianic role of Shabbetai Zevi are labelled in the Jewish historiography) living long after Shabbetai Zevi’s apostasy, and even after his death in 1676, until the end of the eighteenth century.

After the apostasy there were several Sabbatian centres established in Europe. These centres were, however, moving in the course of the time. In the beginning the centres were situated predominantly in Italian communities, foremost Leghorn and Modena amongst them, where the eager Sabbatians from all around the Europe were aimed to. There was a Sabbatian school in Leghorn, which was surrounded around Abraham Rovigo (ca. 1650 in Modena – 1713 in Mantua), a leading Italian Sabbatian, who kept close ties with Meir Ben Hiyya Rofe (ca. 1610–ca. 1690), a Sabbatian emissary of the Jewish community in Hebron, and other Sabbatians linked to the land of Israel, who provided him with the news on the Sabbatian movement there.

After the death of Shabbetai Zevi and, foremost, of Nathan of Gaza, with the declining dominative position of the movement in Israel in the eighties of the seventeenth century, the importance of the Sabbatian centres in Italian Peninsula decayed. Contrary the importance of the Sabbatian centres in the north, in the German lands (in Hebrew: *’arẓot Ashkenaz*, were those lands, where German languages dominated, including Dutch Republic for example), and in the north-east, above all in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, grew. This situation had prevailed until 1725, when a great anti-Sabbatian campaign aroused in the Western and the Central Europe. Since then the core of the Sabbatian movement remained just in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (mainly in the provinces of Galicia, Volhynia, White-Russia, Podolia and Bessarabia until the mid of the eighteenth century).⁶

5 For elementary information on Jewish messianism, see entry *Messiah*, in: *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 2nd ed., vol. 14, 2007, pp. 110–115; and entry *Messianic movements*, in: *ibidem*, pp. 115–122.

6 For elementary information on Sabbatian movement, see entry *Shabbetai Zevi (1626–1676)*, in: *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 2nd ed., vol. 18, 2007, pp. 340–359. The most comprehensive study on the subject still remains Scholem’s classic study Gershom SCHOLEM, *Sabbatai Ševi. The mystical Messiah, 1626–1676*, Princeton 2016. For new perspectives on the movement in English, see Elisheva CARLEBACH, *The pursuit of heresy. Rabbi Moses Hagiz and the Sabbatian controversies*, New York 1990; Ada RAPOPORT-ALBERT, *Women and the messianic heresy of Sabbatai Zevi, 1666–1816*, Oxford 2011; Paweł MACIEJKO, *The mixed multitude. Jacob Frank and the Frankist movement, 1755–1816*, Philadelphia 2011.

Sabbatian activities in Moravia and Bohemia are also well documented.⁷ The upheaval of the years 1665 and 1666 is attested by collection of Sabbatian penitential prayers (in Hebrew: tiqqunim), which was printed in Prague in 1666.⁸ There is a known upheaval of Jews in Jungbunzlau (in Czech: Mladá Boleslav, Czech Republic today) in 1666, which Alexandr Putík correctly put into the context of the Sabbatian movement.⁹ The seventeenth century' German historian Martin Meyer informs, that the Moravia militia had to be called up, in order to extinguish the Jewish (messianic) unrest in 1666.¹⁰ The known sources do not throw much light upon subsequent thirsty years of the movement in Bohemia and Moravia.¹¹ It is known that Mordecai (Mokhi'ah) Ben Ḥayyim of Eisenstadt (1650–1683), a Sabbatian and an alleged brother of Meir Eisenstadt,¹² who spent some years in Abraham Rovigo's school, travelled through the Bohemia and the Moravia in early eighties of the seventeenth century. Another Abraham Rovigo's colleague in Modena in the late seventeenth century was Issachar Behr Ben Judah Moses Perlhefter (died after 1701), author of the famous Yiddish tractate Beer Sheva. His Sabbatian activities in Prague, however, remains unknown, it is possible that he was not a Sabbatian anymore after his return to Prague.

The evidence of Sabbatian activity grows with the rise of the Judah Ḥasid's exodus project to Israel.¹³ The activities of the group are attested in Moravia and also in Bohemia; a Sabbatian meeting considering the immigration plan was held in Nikolsburg (in Czech:

7 The Jews of Silesia were expelled from the land in the late fifteenth century and only privileged Jews with their families were allowed to be settled in Silesian towns up to 1781. The Sabbatian activities of these families' members are unknown. The only known Sabbatian activities in the land are connected to the person of Leibele Prossnitz (see below).

8 Natan of GAZA, *Tikun Kri'yah le-Khol Yom*, Praha 1666. These collections of tiqqunim were printed in many Jewish communities in Europe and Levant between the years 1665–1666.

9 Alexandr PUTÍK, *The tumult of Mladá Boleslav (jungbunzlau, bumsla) in the messianic year 5426/1666*, *Judaica Bohemiae* 34, 1998, pp. 4–106. Another event probably connected to the Jewish messianic expectation appeared in Kolin (in Czech: Kolín, Czech Republic today), see IDEM, *Fight for a Conversion in Kolín nad Labem, Bohemia, in the Year 5426/1666. A Contribution on the Subject of Reverberations in Bohemia of Shabbatai Zevi's Messianic Appearance*, *Judaica Bohemiae* 33, 1997, pp. 4–32.

10 Martin MEYER, *Philemeri Irenici Elisii Diarium Europaeum*, Bd. 16, [Frankfurt] 1668, p. 516.

11 The charter for the new synagogue in Prossnitz (preserved in the minute book of the Prossnitz Jewish community) indicates the year of the foundation as the year of our salvation and our redemption. The Sabbatian connotation, however, could not be proved unambiguously, since messianic expectations were symptomatic for the Jewish society in the early modern era (see below).

12 Meir Eisenstadt (ca. 1670–1744) was a famous rabbi serving in Prossnitz (in Czech: Prostějov, Czech Republic today) in the first decade of the eighteenth century. Initially, he should have been a Sabbatian and a follower of Leibele Prossnitz (see below), but also a rabbi who expelled Leibele Prossnitz from the community in the end (in 1706/1707).

13 Judah Ḥasid (Segal) ha-Levi (ca. 1650–1700 in Jerusalem) was a Sabbatian from the town of Dubno (the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, today's Ukraine). He and Ḥayyim Ben Solomon Malakh

Mikulov, Czech Republic today) in early 1699. Judah Ḥasid and his emissary sojourned in Prague and met with David Oppenheim, a Bohemian and Prague chief rabbi at that time, to gain financial fund for the Ḥasid's exodus project in 1700. Nethanel ben Solomon, an emissary of the land of Israel, who engaged to the project, after Judah Ḥasid's arrival to Israel, visited Prague and David Oppenheim in 1700. Also the inception of the most famous Sabbatian of Moravian origins Leibele Prossnitz could be a consequence of Judah Ḥasid's emissaries (Leibele Prossnitz is said that he underwent inner conversion after a sermon of an itinerant preacher who came into his community sometime after the year 1702, and it is very likely that the itinerant preacher was afore mentioned Nethanel ben Solomon, who was known as a fiery preacher of the repentance).¹⁴

After the year 1706 a period of unknown Sabbatian activity, or perhaps non-activity, follows until 1725, when Sabbatian "heretical" pamphlets, circulating all around the Europe, were disclosed in German Lands and in Moravia.¹⁵ Jonathan Eybeschuetz, a prominent Prague' rabbi, was identified as the source of the pamphlets. Jonathan Eybeschuetz, himself being a Sabbatian, in order to protect his life and reputation, promptly issued a document condemning Sabbatian "heresy" (the document is in Jewish historiography known as Prague excommunication).¹⁶ Besides the Prague, other four excommunications were issued in the year 1725; the excommunications of Frankfurt, of the Triple community, and of Amsterdam generally condemn the Sabbatian "heresy", call for the persecution of the Sabbatians regardless their social standing, and urge the

(ca. 1650–1716/1717) established a group of Sabbatians, which emigrated from the Europe to Israel in 1700.

- 14 For the Judah Ḥasid, emissaries of his and Nethanel ben Solomon' activities in Prague, see S. KRAUSS, *Die Palästinasiedlung der polnischen Hasidim und die Wiener Kreise im Jahre 1700*, in: *Abhandlungen zur Erinnerung an Hirsch Perez Chajes*, Wien 1933, pp. 51–94; Alexandr PUTÍK, *Prague Jews and Judah Hasid. A Study on the Social, Political and Religious History of the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries*, *Judaica Bohemiae* 38, 2002, pp. 72–105; *ibidem* 39, 2003, pp. 53–92; *ibidem* 46, 2011, pp. 33–72.
- 15 In that year an itinerant book-seller Moses Meir Kamenker from Żółkiew (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the time, in Yiddish: Zalkva, today's Zhovkva in Ukraine) was arrested in Frankfurt am Main and his satchel with goods was confiscated and searched. "Illegal" Sabbatian letters and pamphlets were found amongst other writings and books. An investigation had started and ended with bans excommunicating Sabbatians. Also in Moravia some "illegal" Kabbalistic pamphlets were discovered in 1725, but there is no clear continuity between the investigation in Frankfurt and in Moravia. It is ambiguous, whether the "heretical" treatises discovered in Frankfurt and in Moravia are the same.
- 16 Recently Paweł Maciejko analysed the wording of the document and revealed that the document is not merely feigned condemnation of Sabbatian "heresy", but a Sabbatian pamphlet in deed. See Paweł MACIEJKO, *Coitus Interruptus in And I Came this Day unto the Fountain*, in: Paweł Maciejko (ed.), *R. Jonathan Eibeschütz, And I Came this Day unto the Fountain*, Los Angeles 2014, pp. i–lii.

Sabbatians to repent. Contrary, the Kanitz's excommunication¹⁷ expelled the person of Leibele Prossnitz, his adherents and those, who believe in them from the land of Moravia.¹⁸

After the 1725' affair the information on Sabbatian activities in Moravia and Bohemia are scanty. The inhabitants of the Jewish community in Prossnitz used to be called Shebses (a Yiddish word derived from a Hebrew word denoting Sabbatians) by the end of the nineteenth century. Katarina Schöndel Dobruschka, according to Gershom Scholem a benefactress of Moravian Sabbatians, was born and, before her marriage and move to Brünn (in Czech: Brno, capital of Moravia in the eighteenth century), lived in Prossnitz. She should have carried on a salon in the second half of the eighteenth century, which the both Jews and Christians alike should have attended. Jacob Frank (ca. 1726–1791) – an eighteenth century' messianic person of Sabbatian origins who converted to Catholicism and who established a movement of his own (in the Jewish historiography known as Frankism) – was a cousin of hers. In the sixties of the eighteenth century he sojourned at her place in Brünn and, probably, under his influence ten out the twelve Schöndel Dobruschka's children converted to Catholicism.¹⁹

Information on Schöndel Dobruschka and on other Moravian Sabbatians, predominately those linked to Schöndel Dobruschka's fate, are scattered throughout the work of Jacob Emden (1697–1776), an arch-pursuer of Sabbatians in the second half of the eighteenth century. His information has to be taken with utmost circumspection, since he is mainly describing their scandalous misdemeanours, mostly of sexual nature.²⁰ With the course of the time to the end of the century the sources on Sabbatian activity in Moravia and Bohemia are very rare and frugal, speaking more on individuals rather than groups.²¹ The last well documented and known Sabbatian (or maybe Frankist, the distinction between the Sabbatian and Frankist movement in Moravia and Bohemia is blurred and it has still been waiting for its particular research) controversy aroused in early nineteenth century' Prague, when the members of well-fare Wehle's family were accused of this "heresy".

17 In the Jewish historiography the excommunication is known as of Nikolsburg, since Nikolsburg was the largest and the most important Jewish community in Moravia, and therefore the best place for issuing such an important document. However, a letter of Issachar Berush Eskeles (1692–1753), a Moravian chief rabbi in 1725, disproves the presumption. See Josef PRAGER, *Gahalei' esh*, manuscript, Bodleian Library, Department of Oriental Collections, Catalogue Neubauer #2189, vol. I, fols. 58v–59r.

18 For more information on the Sabbatian campaign in 1725–1726, see E. CARLEBACH, *The pursuit*, pp. 161–194.

19 For more information on Katarina Schöndel Dobruschka and Jacob Frank' sojourn in Brünn, see P. MACIEJKO, *The mixed multitude*, pp. 12, 192–196.

20 For example see Jacob EMDEN, *Sefer Hit'avkut*, Altona 1762, fols. 19v, 20v, 24r, 28r, 30r–v, 32v, 38v, 43r, 45v, 50r, 82r; Jacob EMDEN, *Beit Yehonatan ha-Sofer*, Altona 1763, fol. 20v.

21 For example see Eleazar FLECKELES, *Teschuva me- 'ahavah*, Prague 1809, p. 69.

The records on Sabbatian activities in Moravia are abundant, nevertheless there is not much information on a Sabbatian everyday life, inner spirituality, thoughts and religious practise in Moravia and Bohemia. Since the 1666' edition of Sabbatian tiqqunim, there is no other Sabbatian printing of Bohemian or Moravian province. Similarly, none extant manuscript mediates to us an account describing those details of a Moravian or a Bohemian Sabbatian. The exception is a career of Leibele Prossnitz, an early eighteenth century' Sabbatian, who is, after Shabbetai Zevi, the only Sabbatian ever excommunicated namely (Shabbetai Zevi was excommunicated by Jerusalem rabbis in 1665, but the excommunication had no effect. All other excommunication were generally condemning Sabbatians with no names given).

Leibele Prossnitz²² is the most famous Moravian Sabbatian. He was born around 1670 in Ungarisch Brod (in Czech: Uherský Brod, Czech Republic today) and he spent most of his life in the Moravian Jewish community of Prossnitz (since his predicate; in Hebrew and Yiddish sources spelled as Prostitz). Sometime in 1702, under the influence of an itinerant preacher, he passed through inner conversion. Since then, he was seeing two persons in his dreams. These two persons were Isaac Luria²³ and Shabbetai Zevi, who transferred the secret Kabbalistic explanations of the Torah to him.²⁴ Leibele Prossnitz started to preach the secret meanings not only in Prossnitz, but also in other Jewish communities in Moravia and even Silesia (he was reprehended not to do so and to go back to Prossnitz by rabbis in Wrocław and Głogów).

Leibele Prossnitz claimed that after the 40 years of hiding shall Shabbetai Zevi reveal himself again, and bring the redemption. To confirm his prophecy, Leibele Prossnitz had performed several "miracles" which were uncovered as fraudulent and Leibele was expelled from the Jewish community of Prossnitz. After few months in Coventry he did repent, return to the community, and since that time until the year of 1725 he should have been an obedient member of the Prossnitz community.

22 His full name is Judah Leib Ben Jacob Holleschau Prossnitz.

23 Isaac Ben Solomon Luria (1534–1572) was a late sixteenth century Safed's Kabbalist, ideas based on his teaching and legends on him dominated the Jewish spiritual milieu in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Isaac Luria was considered as a saint and holy person.

24 Divine persons appearing in someone's dreams or visions as spiritual instructors are well documented phenomenon in the Kabbalistic literature since the middle ages (in Hebrew: *maggid*, plural *maggidim*). It is very interesting that afore mentioned Nethanel ben Solomon is known for seeing *maggidim* as well. Another possible proof of Nethanel ben Solom being the preacher that inspired Leibele Prossnitz to his career. For elementary information on *maggidim*, see entry *Maggid*, in: *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 2nd ed., vol. 13, 2007, pp. 339–341. For detailed explanation within the system of Lurianic Kabbalah, see Gershom SCHOLEM, *Major trends in Jewish mysticism*, New York 1946, pp. 244–286 and 287–324.

Prior to the year 1718 Leibele Prossnitz established in Prossnitz a Kabbalistic study group surrounded around him.²⁵ Soon after, study groups based on the Prossnitz's Kabbalistic explanations spread all over the land of Moravia. Well-attested are the Prossnitz's close ties with other known Sabbatians of the time, particularly with Jonathan Eybeschuetz and Judah Ḥasid. After the expulsion from Moravia in 1725, the last known evidence on him is from Mannheim, where the Jewish community prohibited his entrance into its walls in late 1725.²⁶

The most elaborate account on Leibele Prossnitz's life is of Leyb ben Ozer, a trustee of the Ashkenazic synagogue in Amsterdam. His in Yiddish written chronicle *Bashraybung fun Shabbetai Zevi* (further in the study just as *Bashraybung*) is the most voluminous chronicle of Sabbatian movement of Ashkenazic origins.²⁷ The chronicle re-counts the history of the movement since its beginnings up to the year 1718, when the manuscript was accomplished. The manuscript itself remained undiscovered for very long time and only the modified and translated text into Hebrew (both by Jacob Emden) was known.²⁸ Only Zalman Shazar in 1978 published an edited text from the original manuscript. Along the original Yiddish text, the Hebrew translation, explanation notes and introduction study are provided within the edition.²⁹ This study shall make use of this edition, since there have not been doubts risen on the edition's correctness.

The fact, that the text of the *Bashraybung* as it preserved in Jacob Emden's *Z'ot Torat ha-Kena'ot* (further in the study just as *Z'ot Torat*) is corrupted, is also evident from the story on Leibele Prossnitz. Leyb ben Ozer's story starts at folio 56r and ends at folio 69v (there are, nevertheless, few parenthesis inserted in the story), while the Jacob Emden's version is only two folios long. Moreover, in Jacob Emden's version there are many details on Leibe Prossnitz's fate, that Leyb ben Ozer could not know in 1718, as

25 According to Jacob Emden, Leibele Prossnitz became active again with the sojourn of Nehemiah Ḥiyya Ben Moses Ḥayon (ca. 1655–ca. 1730, a Bosnian Sabbatian of Sephardic descent, his 1713' controversy in Amsterdam is well known) in Moravia in 1713. See Jacob EMDEN, *Z'ot Torat ha-Kena'ot*, Amsterdam 1752, fols. 34v–35r.

26 For elementary information on Leibele Prossnitz, see entry *Prossnitz, Judah Leib ben Jacob Holleschau* (c. 1670–1730), in: Encyclopaedia Judaica, 2nd ed., vol. 16, 2007, pp. 623–624. For more elaborate study, see Miroslav DYRČÍK, *Hnutí Šabtaje Cvi na Moravě v raném novověku*, diplomová práce, Olomouc 2012.

27 That means Jews of Western, Central and Eastern Europe. There were none Jews in early modern Spain and Portugal since 1492, respectively 1496. The Jews of Balkan Peninsula were predominately of Sephardic origins and the Jews in Italian Peninsula compose pedigree of their own. All the pedigrees differ foremost in ritual manners. In the eighteenth century's Amsterdam there were three independent communities: Ashkenazic, Sephardic and Portuguese.

28 J. EMDEN, *Z'ot Torat*.

29 Judah Leyb Ben 'OZER, *Sipur Ma'asei Shabbetai Zevi. Bashraybung fun Shabbetai Zevi*, Jerusalem 1978, pp. 168–212.

that Leibele Prossnitz was expelled from the land of Moravia in 1725 for example. Jacob Emden blurred *Bashraybung* as his main source on the Leibele Prossnitz's life and at the beginning of the story Jacob Emden informs his reader, that the Leibele Prossnitz's story is retold in accordance, what he heard from his father-in-law (Mordecai Ben Naftali Kohen, a rabbi of Ungarisch Brod in early eighteenth century) and the members of the Jewish community in Ungarisch Brod.³⁰

There is no doubt that Jacob Emden, besides *Bashraybung* and his father-in-law, used an additional source for his Leibele Prossnitz's story.³¹ The same today lost source was used by Joseph Prager, a supporter of Jacob Emden in Emden-Eybeschuetz controversy.³² In his *Gahalei 'esh*, a collection of testimonies on Sabbatian and anti-Sabbatian activities since the beginning of the movement until the fifties of the eighteenth century, Joseph Prager headed the testimony on Leibele Prossnitz *Deed of evil person Leibele Prostitz* (further in the study just as *Deed of evil person*) and in its preamble states that it was already printed long time ago.³³ No wonder that Jacob Emden utilized the same source that Joseph Prager, his fellow in the struggle with the "heresy", incorporated into *Gahalei 'esh* (moreover, the both testimonies were accomplished in more or less the same time).

The main topos of the all stories (in *Bashraybung*, in *Z'ot Torat* and in *Deed of evil person*) is the best known performance of Leibele Prossnitz which he was forced to do by the Jewish community in Prossnitz, in order to confirm his prophecy on immediate coming of the redemption; Leibele Prossnitz is making Shekhinah, a God's presence in the world,³⁴ visible to others in the form of burning letters of the Tetragrammaton, four Hebrew letters representing God's name in texts. The performance is, however, disclosed as a "fraud". Nevertheless, the story of Jacob Emden and the testimony *Deed of evil person* are lacking particular details on Leibele Prossnitz's everyday life included in *Bashraybung*, but contain a lot of additional information on Leibele Prossnitz's fate after the year 1718.

Along *Deed of evil person* Joseph Prager collected in *Gahalei 'esh* also other documents relating to Leibele Prossnitz; a letter of Yeshaya Ḥasid, a son-in-law of Judah Ḥasid the

30 J. EMDEN, *Z'ot Torat*, fol. 34v.

31 Jacob Emden mentions that the story was already printed (prior to 1752) in the language of the Ashkenaz (that means in Yiddish) and *Bashraybung* remained in manuscript until 1978.

32 In 1750 Jonathan Eybeschuetz won a post of rabbi in the Hamburg Jewish community over Jacob Emden. After finding Sabbatian amulets in Metz, previous Jonathan Eybeschuetz's place of work, Jacob Emden accused Jonathan Eybeschuetz being a Sabbatian, which accusation the latter refused. The controversy at some extent last up today. Some scholars, mostly of religious background, are reluctant to believe that such prominent rabbi as Jonathan Eybeschuetz could be a Sabbatian "charlatan".

33 J. PRAGER, *Gahalei 'esh*, fols. 38v–45v.

34 For elementary information on Shekhinah, see entry *Shekhinah*, in: *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 2nd ed., vol. 18, 2007, pp. 440–444.

leader, to Leibele Prossnitz³⁵ (both in Hebrew) and letters of Leibele Prossnitz to rabi Jonathan Eybeschuetz³⁶ and to Yeshaya Ḥasid³⁷ (in Yiddish). The first letter is condolences of Yeshaya Ḥasid to Leibele Prossnitz on his excommunication from the land of Moravia in 1725. The second letter is on Leibele Prossnitz' night visions and the last letter is a response to the first. The content of the letters is useful for analysing the (not only) Leibele Prossnitz's prolific inner world and thoughts around 1725. The last document within *Gaḥalei'esh* concerning Leibele Prossnitz is his excommunication from Moravia issued in Kanitz in July 1725.³⁸ The excommunication, surprisingly, do not give any specific transgression of Leibele Prossnitz, but very general condemnation of him, his companions and those whom believe in them.

This case study shall analyse the text of *Bashraybung* to derive Leibele Prossnitz's everyday life (including his inner world, thoughts and believes) and ritual practice prior the year 1706 (for explanation see below) as an example of the early eighteenth century' Sabbatian. Pursuant to Leibele Prossnitz's anomaly the study shall distinguish the deeds, behaviours and thoughts which are in the text perceived as "normal" and those which are perceived as "extraordinary".³⁹ The study shall also derive the deeds of Leibele Prossnitz which are specifically Sabbatian; that means those deeds, behaviours and thoughts of Leibele Prossnitz which are shared neither by other messianic enthusiasts of the time (see below) nor by other contemporary Jews (see below), and those which are of Leibele Prossnitz's own invention. To do so, the text of *Bashraybung* shall be put in general context of early modern European Jewish society.

After the apostasy of Shabbetai Zevi, the majority of the former "believers" (as Sabbatians are always referred to themselves in their writings) did not simply become foes of the Sabbatians and even did not leave the faith in the immediate coming of the

35 J. PRAGER, *Gaḥalei'esh*, fols. 57v–58v.

36 Ibidem, fols. 56v–57v.

37 Ibidem, fols. 74v–76r.

38 Ibidem, fols. 46r–47v.

39 To become famous already in own lifetime and to keep this popularity for centuries means to be an extraordinary and Leibele Prossnitz definitely was not an ordinary Jew of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. This is obvious from the fact that there were three eighteenth century Jews who thought his fate worthy of recording for the next generations (and there is also one eighteenth century' Christian account in German, see Johann Jakob SCHUDT, *Judische Merckwürdigkeiten*, chapter 31, book VI, Frankfurt and Leipzig 1714–1717, p. 334; and in Swedish, see Christian Petter LÖWE, *Speculum religionis judaicæ*, chapter 32, Stockholm 1732, pp. 79–82). If you were not a wealthy generous member of your community or a rabbi of an extraordinary reputation, there was little chance in early modern Jewish society made your fate to be written down, but to do extraordinary deeds. These deeds used to be of two contradictory kinds, those perceived positively and those perceived negatively, since breaking contemporary ethics and even law. As it shall be shown the Leibele Prossnitz' extraordinary deeds were of the both kinds.

messiah and the redemption at all. The messianic expectations had been already very vivid amongst the majority of the Jewish population since the early seventeenth century and remained vivid until the first half of the eighteenth century. The Sabbatian movement was not the cause of the Jewish messianic enthusiasm of the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth century, but only a consequence of those expectations already aroused in the late sixteenth century' Safed (a town in the north of Israel today, in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth century the town was a part of the Ottoman Empire).

Safed was a place, where some of the Jews expelled from the Iberian Peninsula in 1492 settled and established community based on studying and practicing Kabbalah, a mystical branch of Judaism. They emphasized ritual purity, repentance and ascetic way of life instigated by the idea of the immediate coming of the redemption. The expectations got its momentum with the teaching of Isaac Luria, or rather with the interpretations of the Isaac Luria's teaching in the writings of Ḥayyim Vital⁴⁰ and Israel Sarug,⁴¹ since Isaac Luria himself was not a prolific writer, and penetrated into the wide public's consciousness in the beginning of the seventeenth century. The Isaac Luria's teaching (the cosmogony and the cosmology), the derived believes from the teaching, and the ritual practise affiliated to the derived believes are in the Jewish historiography known as Lurianic Kabbalah (or less commonly as Lurianism).

These (non-Sabbatian) messianic enthusiasts (as Elisheva Carlebach titled them)⁴² have been at the margin of the scholarly attention. The recent stage of the research reveals, that the attitude of these messianic enthusiasts (former Sabbatian believers or not) to the person of Shabbetai Zevi, and his role in the redemption, varied greatly. Amongst the messianic enthusiasts were those completely indifferent to the movement, those being agnostic⁴³ about the movement, and also the opponents of the movement including the prominent pursuers of the Sabbatians and the Sabbatian "heresy" (anti-Sabbatians).

The indifferent messianic enthusiasts believed in the immediate coming of the redemption, and even if the person of Shabbetai Zevi had no role in their concept of the redemption, they did not take any (at least public) action against the Sabbatians and their belief. The agnostic messianic enthusiasts also believed that the redemption is at hand,

40 Ḥayyim Ben Joseph Vital (1542–1620), the main interpret of the Isaac Luria's work.

41 Israel Sarug (floruit 1590–1610), after Ḥayyim Vital the second main interpret of the Isaac Luria's work, his interpretation are dominative in the seventeenth and eighteenth century' Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

42 Elisheva CARLEBACH, *Two Amens That Delayed the Redemption. Jewish Messianism and Popular Spirituality in the Post-Sabbatian Century*, *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, New Series 82, 1992, No 3/4, pp. 241–261.

43 In the meaning as used in religious studies: a person who is interested in the matter but not sure what to believe or think about.

but kept all the possible way open to the future, not excluding the Sabbatian. Also the anti-Sabbatian messianic enthusiasts believed the redemption being at hand, however simultaneously denouncing Sabbatian “heresy”.⁴⁴

The latest recognized attitude of a messianic enthusiast is of semi-Sabbatian nature. Leyb ben Ozer recounts in *Bashraybung* that he used to be a Sabbatian, and that it had been reasonable not to denounce the faith in Shabbetai Zevi completely until 1706, when the “messiah” would have been re-appeared after the forty years in hiding. For Leyb ben Ozer the believing in the messianic role of Shabbetai Zevi after the year of 1706 was only foolishness, and subsequent prophecies on him, and also predictions of his re-appearing, were the deeds of the evil side.⁴⁵

Besides these messianic enthusiasts, there was a minority of messianic indifferent Jews, who were interested in all other matters, but the messiah and the redemption. The scale of their attitude to Shabbetai Zevi and the movement was, at least, as wide as of the messianic enthusiasts; from the utmost indifference to the utmost hostility. They did believe in the coming of the messiah and the redemption, as one of the principal tents of the Jewish faith, nevertheless this tent had no immediate impact on their everyday life and religious practise. Contrary to the messianic enthusiasts, these indifferent Jews practised only one custom directly relating to the expectation of immediate coming of the messiah and the redemption. The custom of saying additional penitential prayers for the restoration of the souls and the world (in Hebrew: tiqqun, plural tiqqunim)⁴⁶ within the day begun to be practised also in the sixteenth century’ Safed, and some of these additional prayers became an inherent part of the daily Jewish liturgy in Ashkenaz already in the course of the seventeenth century. In this (probably unconscious) way became the messianic indifferent Jews “a part” of the messianic enthusiasm of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century.

The majority of the messianic enthusiasts, however, stayed at the same level in expressing their faith in the immediate coming of the redemption as the indifferent Jews. They had been reciting more penitential prayers within the day, beyond those already fixed in the liturgy,⁴⁷ but their faith had almost no other effect on their everyday life.

44 Some of them believed that the Sabbatians removed, by means of their “heretical” thoughts and acts, the time of the redemption.

45 J. ‘OZER, *Sipur Ma’asei*, p. 209–212. See Miroslav DYRČÍK, *Šabatianismus: Sekta nebo hereze? Příkladová studie – Leibele Prossnitz a Jakob Emden*, in: Hana Ferencová et al. (eds.), *Proměny konfesijní kultury*, Olomouc 2015, pp. 197–209.

46 For the explanation on tiqqunim within the system of Lurianic Kabbalah, see G. SCHOLEM, *Major trends*, pp. 244–286 and 287–324.

47 Best-known penitential prayers for restoration were taking place at midday and at midnight. The collections of these additional penitential prayers were very often printed in the seventeenth and

Their expectation of the immediate redemption was rather a hope for, than an intrinsic faith. The everyday life of this majority was far more influenced by fallouts of the Isaac Luria's teaching. The folk (the majority) prefers tales to the high speculative thinking. The elaborated Lurianic cosmogony and cosmology was in folk's mind reduced to the legends on the person of Isaac Luria and other prominent Kabbalists of the time, to the task of the "other side" (in Hebrew: *sitra achra*, generally it means evil)⁴⁸ in the world, to believes related to popular version of Lurianic cosmogony and cosmology, and to the rituals (in Jewish historiography known as practical Kabbalah, contrary to theoretical Kabbalah) which were to diminish the influence of the "other side", as the amulets for example (the most famous are those which gave to rise the Emden-Eybeschuetz controversy).

The ritual practice of the messianic enthusiasts' minority was, however, considerably different. Their faith in the immediate redemption did affect their everyday life to a great extent. This minority of the messianic enthusiasts used to imitate the ritual practise of the sixteenth century' Kabbalists in Safed. They used to fast all the week long, but the Shabbat (the seventh day of the week, when God finished his creation and rested. It is an every week Jewish holiday on which the thirsty-six kinds of work are forbidden to do. Since the Jewish week starts with Sunday and the Jewish day starts with sunset, the Shabbat day lasts from the Friday evening to Saturday evening). Their extreme sense for ritual purity is best-known. In the time, when the significance of the ritual bath (in Hebrew: *mikveh*) had been declining (men used to immerse in the *mikveh* just before the Shabbat, and women before the Shabbat and after the menstruation), the minority messianic enthusiasts did immerse daily (some of them did it even several times a day). Along with the immersions went the sexual abstinence (contrary to the common practise to "consume the marriage" on the Shabbat evening, some of them refused their wives for years). The mortifications of many kinds and many other ascetic practises are also well documented. These messianic ascetics were very often solitary persons living within a Jewish community, or, where possible, they formed small study groups. Some of them even preferred total solitude.

In the beginning of the movement, in the years 1665 and 1666, Shabbetai Zevi was keen to invent new rituals, to introduce new fasts, and to abolish established ones. In the maniac periods of his bi-polar disorder he intentionally transgressed the contemporary Jewish religious law (in Hebrew: *Halakhah*) and sometimes he forced his followers to do

early eighteenth century all around the Europe. The Sabbatian printed in the years of 1665 and 1666 bearing the name of the prophet Nathan of Gaza are of particular interest.

48 For elementary information on *sitra achra*, see entry *Kabbalah*, in: *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 2nd ed., vol. 11, 2007, pp. 638–641. For detailed explanation within the system of Lurianic Kabbalah, see G. SCHOLEM, *Major trends*, pp. 244–286 and 287–324.

so as well (these transgressions of the contemporary Halakhah are in sources referred to as Shabbetai Zevi's strange deeds). Few Sabbatian calendars were fixed during those and the consecutive years and were obeyed by the Sabbatians even long after the Shabbetai Zevi's conversion. Nonetheless, Gershom Scholem claims that already in the beginning of the eighteenth century none of the Sabbatian calendars was observed.

According to the eighteenth century' sources, foremost of Jacob Emden, some Sabbatian individuals, and in some places even groups of Sabbatians, imitated their "messiah" and violated the contemporary Halakhah. The reason for violating the Halakhah was that the messianic time already had begun, and therefore the contemporary Halakhah (connected with this world and being of physical nature) is no more valid and have to be replaced by new Halakhah of messianic time (connected with upper worlds and thus being of spiritual nature). For some of the Sabbatians, the new messianic Halakhah was the so far valid Halakhah, just reversed upside down; so far forbidden was permitted, and vice versa. Gershom Scholem called the attitude "antinomian" (from Latin words anti – against, and nomos – law). These "antinomian" Sabbatians transgressed the Halakhah publicly or, hidden in the veil of "orthodoxy", in private. The scale of violation is blurred and Jacob Emden reports mainly on sexual transgressions of Sabbatians, which make this "antinomian" theory very doubtful (in parallel, many sixteenth and seventeenth century' Catholics accused Protestants of sexual libertinage and vice versa).⁴⁹

Besides them, there were many Sabbatians obeying the Halakhah and not transgressing normative behaviour of the time in any way. The everyday life of majority of these Sabbatians was the same as of majority of non-Sabbatian messianic enthusiasts; affected by popular Lurianic ideas of cosmogony and cosmology, associated believes and rituals. Neither the ascetic minority of these Sabbatians differs from the ascetic minority of non-Sabbatians. The scale of practise varied from a community to a community (Local geographical conditions mattered for example; ascetics living by sea were using the sea for ritual immersions; ascetics living in places with good snow conditions were using the snow for mortification.), and even from a person to a person, but no specific Sabbatian innovations in ascetic way of life are recorded.

The known part of Leibele Prossnitz's life begins with coming of an itinerant preacher to Prossnitz. It is not said that the preacher is a Sabbatian, but it is very likely that the

49 Recent research abandons the nomenclature *antinomian* for its pro anti-Sabbatian inclination. In his research, Maoz Kahana proves that the Halakhic transgressions of Sabbatians are in the perfect match with the Halakhah of the time, if the Sabbatians thought that the messianic era already had begun. In this way, the behaviour of the Sabbatians did not contradict the Halakhah, and it is not antinomian at all. See Maoz KAHANA, *Shabbetai Zevi ha-^cish ha-Halakhah*, Zion 81, 2016, No 3–4, pp. 391–433.

preacher could have been one of the Judah Ḥasid's emissaries who had wandered the Central Europe up to 1720 when the project failed (contrary, there also were plenty of non-Sabbatian itinerant preachers who wandered across the Europe, from a place to a place, in the early eighteenth century). Leibele Prossnitz took preacher's rebuke to his heart and underwent catharsis. Since then he turned his life upside down, he left his previous career whatever had been and became an ascetic Kabbalist, a preacher and a "prophet". Leyb ben Ozer and Jacob Emden agreed that before his inner conversion, Leibele Prossnitz was a very poor and ignorant peddler. This information, however, could not be taken for granted, since the both stories are educative and make of Leibele Prossnitz a "charlatan" and thus stress his ulterior intentions of social nature. More likely he was a teacher of children than an itinerant peddler. Leyb ben Ozer in *Bashraybung* depicts that Leibele Prossnitz started to teach children the Mishna,⁵⁰ and that after his career of a "prophet" he returned to this profession.⁵¹ Teaching children was in early modern Jewish society appreciated much higher than the profession of an itinerant peddler, but the social impact of poverty was almost the same.⁵²

Leyb ben Ozer and Jacob Emden suggest that before his career of an ascetic Leibele Prossnitz was not much a man of devotion (contrary to Leyb ben Ozer that the Leibele Prossnitz's career started with the itinerant preacher, Jacob Emden claim that the prophecies of Leibele Prossnitz started with his move into an abandoned house full of demons.). Both authors indicate that Leibele Prossnitz's dilatoriness in ritual manners derives from his busyness in gaining living for him and his poor family (and thus not

50 Mishna is a part of "classical" Jewish religious system. Very simplified it is a collection of "commentaries" on Torah made by rabbis during the first and the second century. The "classical" Jewish religious education system is Torah (five books of Moses) – Mishna – Talmud (later "commentaries" on Torah and Mishna). In the early modern period the teaching of Mishna was at margins. This is the reason for that Leyb ben Ozer claims that Leibele Prossnitz taught Mishna; to an ignorant could not be permitted to teach anything else, but Mishna.

51 Leibele Prossnitz did not belong to the most prominent strata of early modern Jewish society (the learned rabbinic, nor the wealthy), but he definitely was not an ignorant, since there are writings of his preserved up today. Besides above mentioned letters to Jonathan Eybeschuetz and to Yeshaya Ḥasid, he is the author of the mystical Kabbalistic commentary on the book of Rut (Leybl PROSNIZ, *Sefer Ṣadiq Yesod 'olam*, Jerusalem 1993). The authorship of this treatise, however, had remained unknown until Judah Liebs revealed only recently Leibele Prossnitz as its author (see Judah LIEBS, *Mehaber Sefer Ṣadiq Yesod 'olam, ha-Navi' ha-Shabta'i rabi Leybelei Prosniz*, in: idem, *Sod ha-'emunah ha-Shabta'it*. Qoveṣ Ma'amarim, Jerusalem 1995, pp.70–76.

52 There is not much known about the other social aspects of Leibele Prossnitz's life. It is known that already in 1702, the year of his catharsis, he had a wife and children. Nonetheless, nothing more is said about them in later period. Only the testimony Deeds of evil person Leibele Prossnitz states that Leibele Prossnitz divorced his first wife and married a daughter of a wealthy member of Prossnitz Jewish community Gerschon Ben rabbi Shimon Yechiel. Thanks to the marriage Leibele Prossnitz should have become rich (J. PRAGER, *Gahalei 'esh*, fol. 45r).

having time to keep religious duties). The more neglect of ritual practise before the more striking is the turning point, and the history, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, is full of similar sudden and striking catharsis. It is a topos and for that the information has to be taken with utmost precaution. Whether Leibele Prossnitz was negligent regarding the religious duties of an early modern Jew or not, since the certain point, according to Leyb ben Ozer between the year 1702 and 1706, he became a person of extraordinary devotion.⁵³ Leibele Prossnitz was more likely an ordinary pious Jew of non-extraordinary devotion before the turning point.

Leibele Prossnitz's devotion was on one hand "extraordinary", but also very ordinary on the other. As an extraordinary was Leibele Prossnitz's devotion perceived at least by the authors of *Bashraybung* and *Deed of evil person*, also by the narrators of the stories and probably by the other contemporary members of the Jewish community in Prossnitz. *Bashraybung* several times emphasize the ascetic practice of Leibele Prossnitz; "... and he was pious very much, he fasted all the time..."⁵⁴, "... and everyday he fasted, he was temperate in his living and several times a day he immersed into ritual bath. And sometimes he immersed even three hundred and ten times into the bath..."⁵⁵, "[he and chosen ten people] shall live in solitude and in self-denial (mortification)"⁵⁶...⁵⁷. Unfortunately, Leyb ben Ozer does not describe the self-denial (mortification) modus operandi in more details. With utmost probability the reason is that his informants (the narrators of the story) were not aware what was going on behind the closed door.

The Leibele Prossnitz's ritual practise is extraordinary in the eyes of the early eighteenth century' Jewish folk, but the anomaly is diminishing in the perspective of an early modern ascetic. Everyday fasts and ritual immersions are not something extraordinary amongst the ascetics. Since the sixteenth century Safed Kabbalists pious Jews used to fast every day except the Shabbat, since the Shabbat is the foremost amongst the week days and even God stopped his work on this day. The Shabbat day is dedicated for celebration of God and his work and the celebration (expressed also in consummation of festive meal) is a commandment and therefore the fast is strictly forbidden (the commandment could be broken in life saving purposes only). The everyday fast does not mean that an individual did eat and drink nothing all the week long, but on Shabbat. These minor (in contrast to

53 As such is depicted just in the *Bashraybung*, but not in *Deed of evil person* and in the Jacob Emden's *Z'ot Torat*. Jacob Emden diminishes the extraordinary devotion of Leibele Prossnitz to highlight his deceitfulness. The author of *Deed of evil person* doubts the Leibele Prossnitz's intrinsic devotion through the mouth of Leibele Prossnitz's father-in-law. Ibidem.

54 J. 'OZER, *Sipur Ma'asei*, p. 171.

55 Ibidem, p. 173.

56 The Yiddish word *sigufim* used here means the both the *self-denial* and also the *mortification*.

57 J. 'OZER, *Sipur Ma'asei*, p. 173.

major fasts, the days established in Jewish calendar for complete renunciation) everyday fasts were about avoiding the certain kinds of meals (meat for example, generally it was a custom to avoid the meat on Mondays and Thursdays, but the ascetics used to eat the meat only on Shabbat) and drinks (foremost those including alcohol. Contrary on Sabbath it was worthwhile to consume a drink of alcohol.).

As well the everyday ritual immersions of Leibele Prossnitz are not nothing extraordinary in the perspective of an early modern ascetic. This custom of everyday ritual immersions begun to be more spread with the Safed Kabbalists again. Even the notion on three hundred and ten immersions in a day is not a Leibele Prossnitz invention.⁵⁸ It is known that already Safed Kabbalists did so. The reasoning for the number is a bit obscure, but it is a third of the number nine hundred and thirty, which allegedly were years of Adam the first (man).⁵⁹ Adam the first (in Hebrew: 'adam ha-Rish'on) is a well-established Kabbalistic symbol of purity intact by sins, the utmost aim of whole ascetic effort. The meaning of the symbol became widespread amongst masses with the dissemination of Lurianic Kabbalah in the first half of the seventeenth century. Leyb ben Ozer (or his informants) used this symbol in the story, when Leibele Prossnitz would have sacrificed a black cock to the "other side" (the evil).⁶⁰ Leibele Prossnitz immersed ritually nine hundred and thirty times the day before the night he sacrificed the cock. By immersing into the bath as many times as were the years of Adam the first, Leibele Prossnitz vanished all his sins and became the sinless person, Adam the first, because only the completely sinless person could have deal with the evil side.

No details on Leibele Prossnitz's fasting and other mortification indicate two possibilities. The less likely is that the informants of Leyb ben Ozer were not aware of any extraordinary ascetic practise specifically of Leibele Prossnitz invention or of Sabbatian origin, because it all taken place behind the closed doors. Notwithstanding, Leibele Prossnitz was not alone behind the doors, but accompanied by other ten men "*who shall live with him in solitude and in self-denial*"⁶¹. The more likely is that Leibele Prossnitz and his attendance did not practise any "extraordinary" ritual practice additional to the "classical" frame of ascetic practise, or any "scandalous" (Sabbatian) ritual practise which would have surprised an "orthodox" mind of the eighteenth century Jew. In the peak of the Sabbatian movement in the years 1665–1666, which is considered as the most penitential movement ever taken place in Jewish history (by both sources Sabbatian and non-Sabbatian alike), many details of ascetic practise performed by all strata of the Jewish

58 Ibidem.

59 *Genesis* 5,5.

60 J. 'OZER, *Sipur Ma'asei*, pp. 177–178.

61 Ibidem, p. 173.

society (Sabbatians and non-Sabbatians alike) are recorded for example; amongst them were ritual immersions at midnight and before the sunrise, flagellations, or mortification by nettles worn on the naked body under heavy clothes.⁶²

Shabbetai Zevi is famous for his transgressions of Halakhah of the time, for innovation of new ceremonies, and for giving the established rituals new meanings. The most famous are abolition the ninth of Av's fast (the ninth of Av's fast is commemorating the destruction of the Temple in the first century by the Romans. Shabbetai Zevi turned it to the celebration of his alleged birthday on this day in 1626), eating of the forbidden fat (according to the Halakhah there are certain sort of fats of several animals which are forbidden to eat, the fat above kidneys for example) and uttering the name of God aloud (uttering God's name was restricted to the priests, only once a year at the Rosh ha-Shana (the Jewish new year) and only in the Temple. Since the destruction of the Temple, the God's name is forbidden to utter for everybody). In his manic phases Shabbetai Zevi used to like pomp and ostensibility, and he did like to break the contemporary Halakhah publicly.

Contrary, Leibele Prossnitz seems that he did like to do his ascetic practise in private, behind the close doors. Similarly, he would have preferred to transgress contemporary norms this way. There is, however, one ritual of his own impulse⁶³ (this is, however, debatable, since the impulse came from two men he was seeing in his dreams, for more on the men in Leibele Prossnitz's dreams see below), which was performed semi-publicly. That is the "scandalous" episode with sacrificing the black cock to the other side, which, metaphorically said, broke his neck, because since the episode Leibele Prossnitz was in displeasure of the majority of the Jews in Prossnitz. Leibele Prossnitz announced his intentions publicly, but everybody in Prossnitz was so scared of the other side that chose rather not to be a part of the ritual. The ritual would have taken place in the Leibele Prossnitz's room, where Leibele Prossnitz would have been let alone, but the room was observed very carefully from the house across.

Believing in the existence of the evil (other side) was wide spread and throughout accepted in the early modern Jewish society. Since the Safed Kabbalistic movement, defeating the evil as the main purpose of the Jewish nation became dominant cosmogonic myth of the early modern Jewish society. The general (non-Sabbatian) Lurianic folk concept was that the evil side will be defeated after all sins of the Israel will be atoned and then the redemption shall come. Every Jew is therefore responsible for his part in

62 For more detailed explanation on ritual purity and mortification practise within the system of Lurianic Kabbalah, see G. SCHOLEM, *Major trends*, pp. 244–286 and 287–324.

63 Contrary to the famous ritual showing up the Shekhinah, which Leibele Prossnitz was forced to perform, as a proof of his prophecy by other members of the Jewish community in Prossnitz.

the process of the redemption and the only way to accomplish the individual task is the penitence and accompanied devotions. Contrary, the Sabbatian folk conception was that the messiah in the person of Shabbetai Zevi shall alone defeat the evil and the rest of the Jews could only be helpful to him in sincere repentance of their sins.

Leibele Prossnitz invented his own way which broke the both conceptions non-Sabbatian and Sabbatian alike. He caused scandal amongst the Jews in Prossnitz claiming that the other side desires for its part. There is a wide known and accepted legend about thirty six righteous men who keep the world running in the early modern Jewish society. These men are so righteous that even in the case that all the Israel was cursed, these men are able to combat the evil to the extent that the world would not collapse (there are indeed records on individual righteous men, who are said that fought their inner spiritual mystical fight with evil side) and these men are the only person considered worthy to interact the other side “directly” (indirect way were amulets and other superstitions for example). None of these righteous men ever sacrificed anything to the other side. This type of interaction with the evil was restricted to the wicked persons only. In the Sabbatian concept these men are no more essential, since the redemption time had occurred and the final battle with the other side shall be won by Shabbetai Zevi, the messiah, alone. Shabbetai Zevi did many transgressions against the contemporary Halakhah (and also many of his adherents), but he never made a sacrifice to the evil and none of his transgression was ever interpreted in this way.

The Leibele Prossnitz’s reason for the blasphemy of sacrificing the cock could be found in his inner very vivid world formed foremost by his dreams. Initially there were two rabbis (maggidim) appearing in his dreams, Isaac Luria and Shabbetai Zevi.⁶⁴ They taught Leibele Prossnitz the secret explanations of the Torah and other mysteries, which Leibele Prossnitz afterwards lectured at public. Soon after, another person entered into his dreams, a rabbi Josi ben Joezer, who told to Leibele Prossnitz that “*he [Leibele Prossnitz] is able to chained Samoel (spelling in Yiddish, in Hebrew: Samael), the first amongst the demons, and thus defeat the evil completely*”.⁶⁵ The only he and his attendant have to do, is to do study Torah and fast for forty days.⁶⁶ Samael did not let Leibele Prossnitz alone and soon Leibele Prossnitz, and thanks to Leibele Prossnitz’s very vivid dreams also other

64 J. ‘OZER, *Sipur Ma’asei*, pp. 169–172.

65 *Ibidem*, p. 175.

66 *Ibidem*, p. 176.

men visiting his synagogue, became scarred a lot of Samael.⁶⁷ To hush Samael and the very vivid dreams on him Leibele Prossnitz “invent”⁶⁸ the sacrificing of the black cock to him.

While the sacrificing to the other side by pious and devoted Jew was an innovation, the instruments used in the depiction of the event are very traditional. Samael as the first of the demons is well established in Jewish literature (foremost the Kabbalistic) since the eighth century. Samael is appearing in the Leibele Prossnitz's dreams in the form of a black dog. Dog was in the early modern Jewish mind seemed ambivalently. It was appreciated for his watching quality, but at same time it was seen as an impure animal rolling in and eating the carcasses. The collocation *black dog* did mean nothing but a creature related to the evil, something that an early modern Jew should have been avoided. Amongst the Ashkenazic Jews there was, and still is, a ritual on the day before the day of the atonement, when Jews symbolically transmits all their sins which they committed within the last year to poultry (men to a cock, women to a hen), and the poultry is afterwards given to the poor (the ritual is in Hebrew known as *kapparot*).

Leibele Prossnitz chose a black cock, because black is always connected to the other side and in this particular case also the cock, since the cock represents sins, which always come from the other side. Leibele Prossnitz is just returning to the other side what used to be its. Leibele Prossnitz justifies this “strange” ritual by referring to an old ritual of sacrificing to Azazel, a filthy ghost. The ritual was, however, abolished after the Temple's destruction, since it has to be performed by sons of Aaron (priests, in Hebrew *kohanim*, the Jewish surnames *Kohen*, *ha-Kohen*, *Katz* for example are referring to the pedigree. It is not known that Leibele Prossnitz was descendant of the pedigree) in the sanctuary and since the sanctuary (the Temple) is destroyed the ritual is forbidden to performed.

An important part, and not only in the story with the black cock, takes numbers. Figures of nine hundred and thirty and three hundred and ten have been already explained. According to *Bashraybung* the black cock had to be tied to Leibele Prossnitz's bed by a twenty one ells long rope and the rope had to encircle the one leg of the bed three times. The cock had to be tied to the bed for nine nights and the ninth night the cock was grinded.⁶⁹ The figure *three* is not need to be explained in more details, since in the variable cultures means foremost the perfection, because figure *three* has its beginning, the middle and the end. The figure *twenty one* is only a multiple of two very symbolic

67 Ibidem, pp. 176–177.

68 Sacrificing to the other side is not an innovation within the early modern Jewish society, as an example could be taken the story on Leibele Prossnitz as depicted by Jacob Emden in *Z'ot Torat*; Leibele Prossnitz should have lived in the house full of demons and to sacrifice them the incense. It is a topos that only the wicked men make sacrifices to the “other side”. The invention of Leibele Prossnitz is that a so far very pious and devoted Jew made a sacrifice to the “other side”.

69 J. 'OZER, *Sipur Ma'asei*, pp. 177–178.

figures, three and seven (in seven days God created the world, the Shabbat is the seventh day of the week). The symbolic meaning of the figure nine is not so well established in the Jewish tradition. In the Lurianic Kabbalism the figure *nine* was connected to Adam the first (sinless) man (the gematria of the word Adam is connected to the number *nine*, and also the years of Adam were *nine* hundred and thirty), but also to the other side as an imperfect number (missing one to the figure *ten*, another symbol of the perfection).

So far nothing specific Sabbatian, or of Leibele Prossnitz own invention. Nevertheless, the ritual with black cock is preceded by instructions given to Leibeles Prossnitz by the persons he is seeing in his dreams (maggidim). Afore mentioned magid Josi ben Joezer instructed Leibeles Prossnitz and his ten fellows to fast for *forty* days in order the evil side to be completely defeated and the first *four* (the number four has its symbolic meaning within the Jewish tradition, but in this context is just a tenth, a perfect fraction, of the number forty) days they had to fast completely (no food and drink all the days long). The figure forty has no symbolic meaning in the Jewish tradition, but just in the Sabbatian context. *Bashraybung* explains at another place, that after forty years of his disappearing (in the year 1666) Shabbetai Zevi is about to appear again (in 1706).⁷⁰ An explanation why just the forty years is not given in *Bashraybung*, but is found in the Nathan of Gaza's teaching (the main Sabbatian prophet and interpreter). It is a parable to the forty years that the Israel spent (get lost, disappear) at the desert of Sinai after the exodus from Egypt and before its reach of the Land of Israel.

The same idea of Shabbetai Zevi's disappearing is reflected in the depiction of rabbis appearing in the Leibeles Prossnitz's dreams. The rabbis are initial two, Isaac Luria and Shabbetai Zevi. The first is not alive and it is a ghost, but the latter is of corporeal nature, that means that he do exist,⁷¹ and he is just hiding him away from the world. Contrary to many hints on that Leibeles Prossnitz received the secret meanings of the Torah, on that he is teaching these secrets and on that he is preaching the folk, the teaching on Shabbetai Zevi's reappearing after forty years is one of only two Leibeles Prossnitz's teaching given in *Bashraybung* (needless to say that this teaching is not mentioned in *Z'ot Torat* nor in *Deed of evil person*).

The second teaching of Leibeles Prossnitz contradicts the Nathan of Gaza's teaching. It is not obvious whether this Leibeles Prossnitz's transgression of the Sabbatian teaching is an invention of his own conscious free mind or of his unconscious ignorance of the Nathan of Gaza's teaching (or the most likely is the ignorance of Leyb ben Ozer and his informants). Nevertheless, the famous ritual of showing up the Shekhinah is breaking

⁷⁰ Ibidem, p. 174.

⁷¹ Ibidem, p. 171.

the Sabbatian teaching in two manners. First, according to Nathan of Gaza only *sola fide* shall assure the living in the next world for an individual. The signs and miracles are not necessary for believing in Shabbetai Zevi's messianic role and for confirmation of the prophecy. No one should have required signs and miracles and no one should have performed any. Leibele Prossnitz performed the ritual of showing up the Shekhinah in order to confirm his "prophecy".⁷²

Second, the Nathan of Gaza's teaching explains that while the Israel has been in exile (in Hebrew: *galut*), also the Shekhinah has dwelled in exile, however, since the time of the redemption is at hand and all sins of the Israel has been atoned the Shekhinah is no more present in this world, but has dwelled already in upper worlds for some time. Leibele Prossnitz in *Bashraybung* claims, that he shall make the Shekhinah to descend from the heaven (in Yiddish and Hebrew *Shamayim*). That means from an upper place, but still of this world. In this claim the concept of the existence of the upper worlds is not reflected. The reason is not that Leibele Prossnitz (nor Leyb ben Ozer, nor his storytellers) did not be aware of the concept (and in this case the expression *from the heaven* could mean an different upper world), because in another sentence is explained that the participants of the ritual have not look at the Shekhinah directly, since it could make the worlds be collapsed.⁷³

The signs and miraculous events are the very important aspect of the Leibele Prossnitz's story in *Bashraybung*. They accompanied almost all the deeds of Leibele Prossnitz. This all-pervasive aspect of the story is a proof of that believing in God and of that the all deeds were only a manifestation of God's grace or disgrace, is not a fabrication of modern historiography, but a vivid part of the everyday life of the vast majority of the pre-modern men. Initially, the signs and miracles were in the grace of Leibele Prossnitz; to an ignorant (and simultaneously non-Kabbalist), who even cannot read (according to *Bashraybung*), are transgressed mysterious explanations of the secret meaning of the Torah by *maggidim*;⁷⁴ the veracity of the *maggidim* is confirmed by signs (Leibele Prossnitz is instructed by two rabbis in Prossnitz to look at the *maggidim*'s feet. According to a legend the demons have only four fingers on each foot);⁷⁵ Certain Elchanan Magid in Nikolsburg died wright after his reproach of Leibele Prossnitz.⁷⁶

72 He was not alone. In fact, there are many signs and miracles performed by Shabbetai Zevi or by other Sabbatians recorded in the sources (and also plenty of prophesying Sabbatians).

73 J. 'OZER, *Sipur Ma'asei*, p. 183.

74 *Ibidem*, p. 171.

75 *Ibidem*, p. 170.

76 *Ibidem*, p. 172.

Nonetheless, with the ritual of sacrificing the cock these signs and miracles turned into the Leibele Prossnitz's disgrace. Leibele Prossnitz was called to the reading of the Torah and an error in the passage he was reading occurred (the reading a weekly portion from the Torah scroll in the synagogue on Tuesday, Thursday and Shabbat is a custom held since antiquity up today). A legend on Isaac Luria is reminiscing in this event, because Isaac Luria is said that he had did not utter a blessing over the Torah scroll in which an error in the text was found later (and he even had knew the exact passage where the error is).⁷⁷ The ritual of showing up the Shekhinah was disclosed as a fraud and the disclosure was interpreted as a miracle performed by God.⁷⁸ Interesting at this aspect is that no specific Sabbatian signs, miracles or an explanation of this kind was not done.

More interesting is, however, the lack of "classical" topoi of the time, non-Sabbatian and Sabbatian alike. The story on Leibele Prossnitz is void of the seventeenth and the early eighteenth century obsession over penitential devotions. Concerning Leibele Prossnitz's obsession over the ritual purity and the ascetic practise, the lack of penitential devotions, which are mostly performed in public (in contrast to the ascetic practise), is very obscure. The peak of the Sabbatian enthusiasm in the years of 1665–1666 is symptomatic for the stress on penance, which was proclaiming by the Sabbatian leading persons. Almost all the folk (Sabbatian and non-Sabbatian) did perform the penitential devotions in those years. It is very startling, that in the year of the so long awaited appearing of Shabbetai Zevi after forty years, a leading person did not perform any penitential devotion and did not require the others do so. One possible explanation could be that Leibele Prossnitz thought the penitential effort as had been already accomplished (in the years 1665–1666) and that the reappearing of Shabbetai Zevi is enough for the completion of the redemption.

Other general topoi connected with the Sabbatians is probably also lacking in the story of Leibele Prossnitz. In the whole story on Leibele Prossnitz in *Bashraybung* is not a hint on Leibele Prossnitz violates the contemporary Halakhah, nor even an intention of his to violate the Halakhah, nor an intention of his to force others to do so. Every "strange" deed that Leibele Prossnitz ever performed was in the borders of the "orthodoxy" of the time. Leibele Prossnitz did cross contemporary morals (he sacrificed to the other side, he cheated with Shekhinah), but he did not make a deed which was consider as heretical. Nevertheless, Leyb ben Ozer indicates in one sentence that Leibele Prossnitz violated the contemporary Halakhah "... he [Leibele Prossnitz] *did many things that I heard about which cannot be depicted*".⁷⁹ Even though the way of violation is not disclosed, the blurred phrases as "that something cannot be depicted" indicate in sources on Sabbatians the

⁷⁷ Ibidem, pp. 179–180.

⁷⁸ Ibidem, p. 184.

⁷⁹ Ibidem, p. 188.

misdemeanors of sexual nature. It is hard to decide the veracity of such phrases, since there are topoi as it has been already explained above.

Conclusion

The story of Leibele Prossnitz as depicted in *Bashraybung* comprises more general contemporary non-Sabbatian topoi than Sabbatian or Leibele Prossnitz's "innovations". The Leibele Prossnitz's asceticism is extraordinary in the early eighteenth century' Jewish society on the one hand, but very ordinary in the perspective of other ascetics of the time; no ascetic practise of his own is described in *Bashraybung*. All the religious practise of Leibele Prossnitz are described within the framework of the contemporary religious culture, normative and folk alike, except the ritual of sacrificing the black cock to the other side. The penitential devotions, another practise very significant for the time, are, however, missing in *Bashraybung*. The story of Leibele Prossnitz contains, nonetheless, other significant aspects of the eighteenth century' folk culture; a *maggidim* in dreams; signs and miracles explained as God's interferences; sins and frauds seen as temptation of the evil; a legend on Isaac Luria.

The idea of re-appearing of Shabbetai Zevi after forty years of his concealment is the only specific Sabbatian aspect of the story in *Bashraybung*. Nothing else ties Leibele Prossnitz to the Sabbatian "heresy". According to *Bashraybung* Leibele Prossnitz was a Sabbatian ascetic obeying strictly contemporary Halakhah; no violations of the Halakhah, no innovations of religious practise of regular nature (the ritual of sacrificing the black cock was one time event), and no new explanation of already established ritual practise are recorded. Leibele Prossnitz, at least according to *Bashraybung* and around the year 1706, was an ordinary ascetic "orthodoxy" Jew with a charisma, who believed in the re-appearing of the Shabbetai Zevi and who managed to convince others to believe so for a moment, and who was disposed to cheat in order to confirm his believe to the others.

Mariusz MISZTAL

The Intimate Picture of Queen Victoria and her Household, 1840–1843. Extracts from the Diary of Dr Robert Ferguson, the Queen's Accoucheur

Abstract: *It is a critical edition of extracts from a virtually unknown diary of Dr Robert Ferguson, a physician and accoucheur to Queen Victoria. Acquired only in 2009, the diary is housed in the archives of the Royal College of Physicians in London. Its highlights include the details of royal arrangements for the birth of the Princess Royal, record of Ferguson's interview with the Queen regarding her mental health in 1841, and most intimate character sketches of the Queen, her husband, Prince Albert, their closest advisor Baron Christian Stockmar, or the Queen's former governess and confidante, Baroness Louise Lehzen.*

Keywords: *Queen Victoria – Prince Albert – Louise Lehzen – Christian Stockmar – Robert Ferguson's diary – Royal Household – royal physicians – royal accoucheurs*

Researching a monograph study on Queen Victoria's children, I have found in the Royal College of Physicians in London an extremely interesting diary of Dr Robert Ferguson (1799–1865). In 1840, Dr Ferguson was first appointed the Queen's physician-accoucheur and was present at all her confinements and then, in 1857, he became her physician extraordinary. His diary has been virtually unknown to historians and biographers of the Queen or her husband, Prince Albert,¹ and it should be of great interest as it reveals intimate details of the Queen's personal life and her mental health.²

1 I gratefully acknowledge the permission of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II to consult the Royal Archives in Windsor and to quote from the documents housed there.

I would like to thank the Royal College of Physicians in London for the permission to publish the extracts from Dr Robert Ferguson's Diary.

The only published reference to the diary is a short blog entry by Felix Lancashire, the assistant archivist at the Royal College of Physicians in London (later quoted as RCP). URL: <<https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/news/royal-doctor-s-diaries-reveal-intimate-details-queen-victoria-s-personal-life-and-health>> [accessed 18. 3. 2018].

2 The Royal College of Physicians in London possesses also a diary by another physician of Queen Victoria, Sir James Clark (see footnote 24 below), but Clark's diary is much less intimate. Volume one (RCP MS30/1) covers only the Queen's visits in Scotland in 1847, 1848, 1849, and to Ireland

Robert Ferguson was born in 1799 in India, where his father was a civil servant.³ Although he was thinking about a career in the army, eventually he started to study medicine in London, and then spent a few years at Heidelberg, where he learned German and studied literature. After a few more years of diligent medical studies in Edinburgh he graduated doctor of medicine in 1823. While in Scotland, he made many friends, among them Sir Walter Scott and his son-in-law, John Gibson Lockhart.⁴

In 1823 he returned to London. Letters of recommendation from Lockhart helped Ferguson to find new friends among the London literary circles, for example, William Wordsworth, Henry Taylor, Washington Irving, or the eminent publisher John Murray, as well as among the leading politicians of the day, Lord Palmerston⁵ or Lord Derby. Working as a resident medical officer of the Marylebone infirmary, Ferguson gained experience as a practitioner under the guidance of the famous Dr Robert Hooper. In 1824 he was admitted a Licentiate of the College of Physicians and devoted himself to midwifery. Soon he made friends with Dr Gooch, the leading specialist on women's diseases,⁶ by whom he was patronised, and with time took over most of his patients. Ferguson was also appointed physician to the Westminster Lying-in hospital, and when in 1831 the medical department was opened at King's College, he was nominated to the chair of midwifery and in 1837 he was admitted a Fellow of the College of Physicians.

The growing numbers of his patients, many of them from the aristocratic circles, lauded not only his skill and tact as an accoucheur, but also his courteous manner, "*a very powerful intellect, a highly cultivated mind, great literary taste and acquirements*".⁷ All this led to his appointment in 1840 as one of the physician accoucheurs to Queen Victoria. When the Queen was not any longer in need of accoucheurs, in 1857 Ferguson was

in 1849, and volume two (RCP MS30/2) covers the period of 1848–1860. A copy of Clark's diary is housed in the Royal Archives (RA VIC/MAIN/Y/206).

- 3 There does not exist a detailed biography of Robert Ferguson. All the biographical details have been drawn from a few available sources, for example, the obituaries which appeared in *The Lancet*, 1. 7. 1865, p. 25, 3. 3. 1866, 31. 3. 1866, pp. 355–356; *The Medical Times and Gazette*, Vol. II, 1865, pp. 13–15, but mainly from William MUNK (ed.), *The Roll of the Royal College of Physicians of London*, London 1878, Vol. 3: 1801–1825, pp. 295–298, which has been the basis for the later entries in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, written by Charles Creighton (1899) and John Peel (2004), s. v. "Ferguson, Robert (1899–1865)"; and his "Identity statement" prepared in 2003 for the RCP archives online catalogue by Katharine Martin.
- 4 See John Gibson LOCKHART, *Memoirs of the life of Sir Walter Scott*, 10 vols., London 1839, vol. 10: pp. 112, 121, 201, and Ferguson's description of the last illness of Scott, pp. 204–206.
- 5 After Ferguson's death, Palmerston said "*I have lost in Ferguson not only an able physician, but a personal friend.*" Sir Thomas WATSON, *Address to the Royal College of Physicians*, *The Lancet*, 31. 3. 1866.
- 6 Ferguson edited his works: Robert FERGUSON (ed.), *Gooch on some of the most important diseases peculiar to women: with other papers*, London 1859.
- 7 T. WATSON, *Address*.

appointed her physician extraordinary. Soon afterwards his health started to deteriorate and he died in 1865.

Dr Ferguson was one of the founding fathers of the *London Medical Gazette*. He published several articles in the *Quarterly Review*,⁸ not only on medical subjects but also on literature,⁹ philosophy¹⁰ or social matters.¹¹ His first publication, in 1825, was a letter to Sir Henry Halford proposing a combination of the old inoculation of smallpox with vaccination, and two of his most distinguished obstetric contributions were on diseases of the uterus and ovaria¹² and puerperal fever.¹³

The archives of the Royal College of Physicians in London house 167 papers of Robert Ferguson from 1821–1864. These are mostly his notes and notes for lectures on gynaecology and obstetrics, illustrated sometimes with diagrams, sketches and watercolour drawings, but also notes on literature or philosophy.¹⁴ The most interesting, however, seems to be his two volume diary. The diary was acquired by the Royal College of Physicians only in 2009.¹⁵ It consists of two volumes. Volume one consists of 168 handwritten pages and covers the period from 3 December 1841 till 2 January 1852,¹⁶ and volume two consists of 122 pages and covers the period from 2 February 1855 till 10 May 1860.¹⁷ It is Ferguson’s personal journal, including detailed but very irregular entries. Volume One is of special interest as it covers the period when Ferguson was an obstetrician for Queen Victoria. Its highlights include the details of royal arrangements for the birth of the Queen’s first child, Victoria, the Princess Royal, record of Ferguson’s interview with the Queen regarding her mental health in 1841, and most intimate character sketches of the Queen, her husband, Prince Albert, their closest advisor Baron Christian Stockmar, or the Queen’s former governess and confidante, Baroness Louise Lehzen. The second

8 See *Medical Times and Gazette*, 15. 7. 1876, p. 79.

9 For example, *Sir Henry Halford’s Essays and Orations*, *The Quarterly Review*, Vol. 49, 1833, pp. 175–198.

10 See his lecture, “On the Method of Induction and Its Results in Medical Science”, 1836, RCP MS416/19, attached also to his *Essays on the Most Important Diseases of Women*, London 1839.

11 For example, *Colliers and collieries*, *The Quarterly Review*, Vol. 70, 1842, pp. 158–195.

12 *Diseases of the Uterus and the Ovaria*, in: Alexander Tweedie (ed.), *A System of Practical Medicine*, Vol. IV, London 1840, pp. 300–317.

13 *An Essay on Puerperal Fever*, in: Robert Ferguson, *Essays on the Most Important Diseases of Women*, London 1839, pp. 1–274.

14 For example, RCP MS413/34 Notes on truth and logic, RCP MS413/56 Notes on literary men; mental labour; effects of over-wrought imagination on the body; RCP MS414/7 Note book on Leibnitz and Hegel, RCP MS417 Notes on philosophy and literature.

15 RCP MS4976, Catalogue for auction containing Robert Ferguson’s personal journal and *carte-de-visite* album.

16 RCP MS4973.

17 RCP MS4a974.

volume is perhaps a little less interesting as far as the royal Court is concerned, because apart from the details of his trip to France in 1856 to treat Napoleon III for suspected poisoning,¹⁸ it deals mainly with Ferguson's reflections on the death of his first wife and meeting his second wife.

In the opening paragraphs of the diary, Ferguson writes that his main reason for starting the diary is "*the desire to preserve some account of the customs, habits, manners and sentiments*" of the Royal Family and the Court, but he assures he will not report "*the gossip of idle tatters* [sic]". Despite this assertion, he often relates in detail the stories he has heard from members of the Court about the Queen's troublesome childhood, her marital problems, or the conflict between Baroness Lehzen and Prince Albert.¹⁹ And it is often thanks to these unique glimpses into everyday life of the Court which shed new light on some of the most heatedly discussed events in the early reign of the young queen, that Ferguson's diary is such a valuable document for the historians and biographers of Queen Victoria.²⁰

Notes on editing

Capital letters are used to begin each sentence. Random capitals and italics are removed except when they are evidently used by the author for emphasis. Periods are placed at the end of sentences instead of dashes, colons, or no punctuation at all. Punctuation is altered within sentences if needed to clarify meaning. Original spelling is retained and the obvious mistakes are indicated by [sic]. Abbreviations such as those for place names or surnames are spelled out in brackets, e.g. L[ocock]. Contractions, such as "thou" are retained, but superscripts are lowered to the line. Crossed-out words, if they are significant, are placed in footnotes, otherwise they are not reproduced. Omissions made by the editor

18 See also on this subject, RCP MS414/8, Note book with additional loose notes on the health of the Emperor Napoleon III, with description of symptoms and details of treatment. It comprised paper read by Dr Ferguson to the Emperor in the presence of his physician, Dr Conneau, 6. 5. 1856, giving detailed account of the Emperor's condition. Followed by notes on loss of nervous power in the Emperor, 9. 5. 1856. Also, RCP MS422 Miscellaneous note book including notes on Napoleon.

19 The best discussion of the period covered in the diary is still Cecil WOODHAM-SMITH, *Queen Victoria. Her Life and Times, 1819–1861*, London 1975, and Monica CHARLOT, *Victoria. The Young Queen*, London 1991.

20 In 1908, Ferguson's son approached the well-known publisher, Sir John Murray (1851–1928), about the possibilities of publishing the diary. Murray, however, declined, saying that although "*of the interest of this Diary there can be no doubt there are several passages, and those amongst the most interesting, which it would be undesirable to publish – now at any rate, as being too private or as referring to persons whose near relations are still living*". RCP MS4973 (insert), John Murray to Ferguson, 5. 8. 1908.

are indicated by [...]; pagination in the manuscript is indicated in brackets, e.g. [p. 5], as are the years when missing in the original text.

Extracts from the Diary of Dr Robert Ferguson, Volume One

[p. 1] December 3rd 1841

I have once more determined to write such facts and observations as the day brings before me, and yet not to note down the gossip of the idle tatters [sic], but to trace those emotions and thoughts, which have become inwoven with my own mental existence, that hereafter I may have on a retrospect, my own life in manhood, to stir up my feelings in old age, should indeed that gift of the Almighty be awarded to me.

Another motive has moreover acted as a powerful stimulus to my industry, namely a feeling of the importance of the position I hold near the highest persons of the realm, and the desire to preserve some account of the customs, habits, manners and sentiments of those who are secluded by their very position from casual observation. In all this there is the ordinary quantum of vanity; yet I do not desire to please others so much as to preserve those affections and impulses [sic] with which I have been of late moved, that I here may act as a leaven of reflection and kindle my mind in after years when my task of active duties shall have been performed and when I shall hope to live many a scene of memory over again.

[p. 2] *I have this day (Dec[ember] 3rd 1841) seen both the Queen and Prince Albert and had with the latter a most intimate conversation, in which he informed me that her Majesty, to use his own expressions, “had been reared midst fears and quarrels so that from her very infancy her mind had ever been on the stretch, and had never known what was true repose”. Her favorite attendant was and is the Baroness Lehzen,²¹ and her mortal aversion Sir John Conroy.²² The ascendancy of the latter over the Duchess of Kent was such*

21 Louise Lehzen (1784–1870) was a daughter of a Lutheran pastor from Coburg, who came to England in 1819 to be a governess of Flora, the Duchess of Kent’s daughter from her first marriage. In 1824 she became the governess of young princess Victoria, and in 1827 was made a Hanoverian baroness by George IV. She devoted her life to bringing up and caring for the Princess, and Victoria repaid her devotion with trust and “*the greatest affection*”. See Royal Archives, Windsor Castle (afterwards quoted as RA) VIC/MAIN/Y203/79, 80, 81, Baroness Lehzen to the Queen, 20. 2., 6. 9., 2. 12. 1867. In 1835 Princess Victoria wrote about Lehzen: “*I never can sufficiently repay her for all she has borne and done for me. She is the most affectionate, devoted, attached, and disinterested friend I have.*” RA VIC/MAIN/QVJ (W) Queen Victoria’s Journals (quoted afterwards as QVJ; until 16. 2. 1840 quoting from Lord Esher’s typescripts, later – from Princess Beatrice’s copies). QVJ, 5. 11. 1835. Lehzen’s influence over Victoria continued after she became queen.

22 John Ponsonby Conroy (1786–1854), was personal equerry to Victoria’s father, the Duke of Kent, and after his death in 1818 became the influential comptroller of the Duchess of Kent’s household, and she came to regard him as her most reliable friend. The best study of Conroy is Katherine HUDSON, *A Royal Conflict. Sir John Conroy and the Young Victoria*, London 1994.

as to permit him to rule the whole household. Between these two, a most determined enmity arose and a series of premeditated insults were perpetrated on the Baroness with the hope that she would rather resign, than endure them. This was the main spring of the perpetual fear in which the mind of the Queen as a child was kept, and how terrible the consequences thence traceable may be, time with show.

I have never known a pressure of fear in infancy produce other than great tendency to gloom and vain terrors in after life. Even idle tales of the nursery will leave traces on the mind when they themselves are no longer remembered. Much of my own aptitudes for gloomy anticipations I now can [p. 3] attach to the perpetual horrors with which in my own infancy my imagination was drugged. But the Queen had one more element to act on her, beside fears [...] an early and assiduous cultivation of her hatreds in the coarse tyranny of Sir John Conroy,²³ and Sir James Clarke²⁴ in one of our Windsor visits characterised her well, as one who had had all her bad passions called out and her good dispositions suppressed.

On the 27th of November last, I was sent for to the [Buckingham] Palace and was ushered up to the room of Baron Stockmar,²⁵ who at once opened up the reason for my being thus selected from among my colleagues to see her Majesty. He told me that of late, she had been

23 Conroy established a plan called the “Kensington system”, which aimed at establishing the Duchess of Kent’s strict control over the Princess, and forcing Victoria to appoint him her Private Secretary or her Privy Purse. See RA VIC/MAIN/M/7/67, Charles, Prince of Leiningen, “A Complete History of the Policy followed at Kensington, under Sir John Conroy’s Guidance”, 1840 (transl.). In October 1836, supported by the Duchess of Kent, he tried to coerce Victoria, who was much weakened then by a serious illness, into signing a paper promising to make him her private secretary when she becomes queen: “*They (Mamma and John Conroy) attempted (for I was still very ill) to make me promise beforehand, which I resisted in spite of my illness and their harshness, my beloved Lehzen supporting me alone*”, she told Lord Melbourne. QVJ, 26. 2. 1838. In 1837, a few days before she assumed throne, Victoria answered angry letters from her mother in support of Conroy’s demands: “*I declare my firm resolution and determination not to fetter or bind myself by giving any premature promises.*” RA VIC/MAIN/M/7/46, the Duchess of Kent to Princess Victoria, 12. 6. 1837; RA VIC/MAIN/M/7/50 Princess Victoria to the Duchess of Kent, 14. 6. 1837.

24 Sir James Clark (1788–1870), after being the physician of Victoria’s uncle, Prince Leopold and her mother, the Duchess of Kent, was appointed Physician-in-Ordinary to Queen Victoria and received baronetcy in 1837. *The London Gazette*, 8. 8. 1837, No 19530, p. 2072. He became a trusted advisor on medical matters to the royal family, despite his often wrong diagnoses. See W. MUNK (ed.), *The Roll*, Vol. 3: 1801–1825, pp. 222–226; A. A. CORMACK, *Two Royal Physicians: Sir James Clark, bart., 1788–1870, Sir John Forbes, 1787–1861*, London 1965; George WHITFIELD, *Beloved Sir James, The Life of Sir James Clark, Bart, Physician to Queen Victoria, 1788–1870*, London 1982. Ferguson always writes his name as “Clarke”, so does Princess Victoria in her journals, at least until 1835, but then always “Clark”. See QVJ.

25 Dr Christian Friedrich Stockmar (1787–1863), Prince Leopold’s doctor and dearest friend, was instrumental in arranging the marriage between Victoria and Albert, and then became their most trusted advisor. The Queen wrote about him: “*We confided everything to Stockmar and he was adored in this house*”. Queen Victoria to the King of the Belgians, 9. 7. 1863, George Earle BUCKLE (ed.), *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, 2nd series, 2 vols., London 1926, Vol. 1, p. 100. See

gloomy and desponding.²⁶ *That there were illusions both of the eye and the ear. By the one sense she was deceived into a belief that she saw spots on peoples [sic] faces, which turned into worms, and that coffins floated before her, while with the other, she heard words, always the same and always German... While Baron Stockmar was in the very act of recounting these facts, the Prince suddenly and hurriedly rushed in, requesting me to descend at once to her Majesty, who hearing of my arrival at the Palace became impatient [p. 4] to see me. I pleaded for a little more delay that I might be put in possession of further details before I encountered her Majesty, but this request, though seconded by Baron Stockmar, was met by the Prince with the objection that her Majesty was too anxious not to be troubled by further delaying the interview. So he hurried me out of the room, with more than his usual rapid and abrupt pace into the lower rooms, and suddenly thrust me into his own dressing rooms and at once, approaching his face close to mine with pale and haggard looks, he broke out. “The Queen has heard that you have paid much attention to mental disease,²⁷ and is afraid she is about to lose her mind! She sees visions and hears sounds, and is much troubled as to what will become of her when she is dead. She thinks of worms eating her, and is weeping and wretched”. “Does her Majesty sleep”, I asked, “Does she dream much?” “She sleeps profoundly and without a dream”. “There is not much then to be feared”, I answered. He immediately brightened up and stumped off looking over his left shoulder at me as he bade me follow [p. 5] him, and in an instant I found myself before the Queen. She was lying down, and the tears were flowing fast over her cheek as she addressed me, overwhelmed with shame at the necessity of confessing her weakness and compelled by the very burden of her mind and her sorrows to seek relief. I soon quieted her apprehensions as to mental malady by being able to trace these aberrations of sensation and emotion, which were combined with a clear intellect, to the disorder of her digestive organs, made obvious by all I had already ascertained. She was immediately much comforted and then told me*

F. Max MÜLLER (ed.), *Memoirs of Baron Stockmar*, London 1872; Pierre CRABITES, *Victoria’s Guardian Angel. A Study of Baron Stockmar*, London 1938.

26 The Queen gave birth to her son on 9. 11. and then for quite some time was suffering from acute post-natal depression. On 15. 11. she complained of “*feeling rather weak & depressed*”, and on 27. 11. she admitted that she had “*felt rather weak & depressed these last days, but far better today*”, perhaps thanks to Ferguson’s visit. QVJ, 2. 12. 1841.

27 Among Ferguson’s papers there are, e.g., RCP MS413/48A, Abstract of cases of insanity with necroscopic appearances; RCP MS413/56, Notes on literary men; mental labour; effects of overwrought imagination on the body; RCP MS413/57 Notes on influences by which the mind is warped. Influence of professions; RCP MS413/60 Notes on the physiology of the nervous system. Ferguson published also a few articles on mental diseases, e.g., *Gooch on Insanity* and *Brodie’s Psychological Inquiries*, both in the *Quarterly Review*, Vol. 41, 1829, pp. 163–183, and Vol. 96, 1854, pp. 86–117.

that once before, when Clarke first saw her in 1832,²⁸ she had been similarly affected, and that it arose at once suddenly on reading, she added, a very foolish story. “Do not, Dearest”, she said turning to the Prince, “relate the story now to Dr Ferguson, but show him the book”. He subsequently informed me that the tale referred to was contained in the *Memoirs of St Simon*,²⁹ and referred to the death of a princess whose viscera were enclosed in a vase, but the vessel breaking the whole escaped and presented so disgusting an object to the Court, that the whole of the persons witnessing fled from the horrible sight and stench.³⁰

[p. 6] My interview came to a close. I assured her Majesty that she would soon be well, but not suddenly; that her mind should be prepared against disappointment in the event of a recurrence, for the nature of these maladies was to assume an intermittent character. From that time to this day (about 10 days) the paroxysms have been fewer and slighter, but today I found her oppressed by her thoughts and weeping.³¹

The Prince said that since his marriage he had made great improvements in her condition, that he found her going to bed at three in the morning and not getting up till 11, while now

28 Dr Clark is mentioned in Princess Victoria's Journals for the first time on 16. 12. 1833, when he was one of the dinner guests. On that day Victoria “awoke at 7 very unwell... I had such a violent headache that I remained in bed till ½ past 9. I then remained in my flannel dressing-gown till ½ past 11. I then dressed half and went downstairs and lay upon the sofa. I was sick soon after which greatly relieved me. At 1 came Doctor Maton”. From 1820 to 1835, Dr W. G. Mahon had been physician to both the Duchess of Kent and Princess Victoria, but he died on 30. 3. 1835. Dr Clark had been residing with uncle Leopold in Belgium since 1830, and was appointed physician to the Duchess and the Princess in April 1835. Princess Victoria noted in her journal: “I quite forgot to mention that poor Dr Maton died the day before yesterday, after an illness of rather more than a month, at the age of 61. At ½ past 1 came Dr Clarke, our new physician.” QVJ 1. 4. 1835.

29 Louis de Rouvroy, Duke of Saint-Simon (16 January 1675–2 March 1755), was a French soldier, diplomat and the author of famous *Memoirs*. In the Queen's Journal the first mention of St Simon as the author of the *Memoirs* comes only from 1838: QVJ, 26. 10. 1838, then 14. 11. 1838, and 17. 12. 1838. But it does not seem that she read the *Memoirs* then, because on 29. 8. 1841 she relates her conversation with Lord Melbourne: “[we] talked of books & my wishing to get interesting ones to read. He mentioned St. Simon's *Memoirs*, which he said were very curious & gave an excellent account of the times of Louis XIVth & Regent & his wife”. Prince Albert read the *Memoirs* to the Queen a few days before Ferguson's visit. *Ibidem*, 18. 11. and 20. 11. 1841.

30 After death of Anne Marie Louise d'Orleans, Duchess of Montpensier (1627–1693), “her body was laid out with great state, watched for several days, two hours at a time, by a duchess or a princess, and by two ladies of quality.... A very ridiculous accident happened in the midst of this ceremony. The urn containing the entrails fell over, with a frightful noise and a stink sudden and intolerable. The ladies, the heralds, the psalmidists, everybody present fled, in confusion. Every one tried to gain the door first. The entrails had been badly embalmed, and it was their fermentation which caused the accident.” Bayle ST. JOHN (transl.), *The Memoirs of the Duke of Saint Simon on the Reign of Louis XIV, and the Regency*, 15 vols. New York 1901, here vol. 1, chap. 2, p. 30.

31 And on 26. 12., Anson noted that the Queen “was not at all well again yesterday, being again troubled with lowness”. RA VIC/MAIN/Y/54/100.

she is never out of bed at eleven and never in bed at 8 in the morning.³² It costs the Queen, he said, more to renounce a trifling habit than to bear a great misfortune, and when I stated that she might be induced to abandon such courses of action as were still injurious by his persuasion and example, he shook his head not at me, but turning away, as if unconscious of any thing beyond his own strong convictions then working in his mind.

[p. 7] December 5 [1841]

This calm judgement implied in the doubt, seemed to me not to mark the blindness of a young husband as to the faults of a youthful wife and that wife a Queen! I asked Clarke who was present in the interview whether the Prince was in love. He said, he thought he liked her.³³ On her side, however, I have no doubts. She is dotingly attached to him, and cannot bear him out of her sight. And what woman would not be fond of such a husband possessing at once temper, talent, and beauty. His profile is cut in the grace of the Grecian art in its best age. The eye is bright and without fierceness and suits well with the calmness of his expression and the evenness of his colouring. His complexion is neither pale nor tinted, but of a clear white, thro’ which the red shines just strongly enough to save it from the charge of sickliness, while its character is that of a refined and delicate mind. He is nearly six feet high, wide shouldered, rather too short in the neck, well proportioned as to the length of his limbs, tho’ the knees are not quite well clearly knit. There is a singular sweetness of expression in his grave-hilarity, which it is impossible to resist. His chiefest [p. 8] mental characteristics are good sound common sense and a thoughtfulness quite unusual at so young age (22). Perhaps it is this, which makes him look older than he is. A sketch from a slight couver talion, which I had the other day with Baron Stockmar, when he was describing the various causes, which might agitate the Queen, will convey the liveliest picture of the Prince:

“Vell den. Dere is de Prince, who has also dat in his manner to make her nervous. He is yong and vill not wait jast to see weshur de papers he has jast received should be kept or not, but he goes wis-out ceremony and opens de door queekly to ask some quasetion, which need not have been ho-reed and den ven dat is over, he goes out as fast, stomping along the paasseges like a dragoon. Never ze less, he is queek of apprehension and has a sound jodgement”.

32 Cf. the Queen’s Memorandum, in: Charles GREY, *The Early Years of His Royal Highness, the Prince Consort*, New York 1867, pp. 276–277.

33 Greville recorded in his Memoirs the impression of the Duchess of Bedford, the Queen’s Lady of the Bedchamber, that a few days after their marriage the Queen was “*excessively in love*” with Prince Albert, “*but he not a bit with her*”. Philip WHITWELL WILSON (ed.), *The Greville Diary. Including Passages Hitherto Withheld from Publication*, 3 vols, London 1927, 26. 2. 1840.

The Prince in one of his conversations with me last year at Windsor, told me that he had been a sickly youth, much subjected to croup. All his tastes are those of a student of elegant literature and art. He is a musician [p. 9] and, I believe, a draughtsman, talented rather than original and though devoid of intellectual genius, possessing in a very unusual degree tact both in discovering character, and in managing it.

The day before yesterday, when he was detailing to me the unnecessary references constantly made to the Queen by all her immediate attendants on every thing as a source of excitement, he added, "For my part I select my servants for their intelligence and give them much discretionary power, and then they do not forget nor act negligently, but when every thing is to be told and nothing is done without an order, then much must escape and more, be badly performed". His temper is sweetness itself.

The Queen is one of the most extraordinary young women I have ever seen, and this is at once visible in the play of her very mobile and finely chiselled features. No one would call her beautiful, few pretty, yet Leslie the artist, who painted her,³⁴ told me he could not catch her expression and that no one had yet succeeded in conveying it to canvass. She is singularly graceful for so short a figure, having such complete command of all her limbs, that every movement [p. 10] and action is natural, effortless and [? ...y].

The eye is prominent and light and full of a range of expression that strikes the observer. The skin is too fine, so that complexion looks, at times, slightly purple and when she lowers and is vexed, the contrast of the darkening countenance and the light rapid movements of her blue large eyes suggests the aspect of a stormy sky in [sic] a summer day lit up with flashes of lightening. There is force, character talent in her face, but no habitual repose or feminine gentleness, yet it cannot be said to be ill-tempered, and is the reverse certainly of the virago, being delicate in all its lines, save too great a roundness of the contour. It belongs to a fiery character and a nervous temperament.

I saw the Queen for the first time in May 1840 and then at short intervals during the whole of the summer previous to her first confinement. I was then told by Clarke that her assiduity to her "profession" of kingcraft was so intense as to make it incumbent on him to

34 Charles Robert Leslie (1794–1859), painted "Queen Victoria Receiving the Sacrament at her Coronation, 28 June 1838". QVJ, 28. 7. 1838. Queen Victoria was delighted with the painting too. She thought "the group of my youthful trainbearers is excessively pretty [...]. I like it so much that I have said I will buy it." Ibidem, 27. 11. 1838. She wrote to her half sister, Princess Feodora, that it was "the loveliest picture of the coronation you can imagine; [...]. He has got me so like [...] and all the others, he has got so like, I am charmed with it." See Oliver MILLAR, *The Victorian Pictures in the Collection of Her Majesty The Queen*, 2 vols, Cambridge 1992, OMV 642. He also painted *The Christening of the Princess Royal*, with a likeness of the Queen. Ibidem, OMV 463.

request the Melbourne ministers³⁵ to send her “pieces” of the dispatches instead [p. 11] of the originals. She reads all the best newspapers on either side of politics and is, I should say, the slave of public opinion. “Locock³⁶ just before her last confinement was imprudent enough to tell her one evening that a paragraph relating to her ailments had just appeared in the *Globe*. She immediately sent for it, read it, and then retired to her room and wept for two hours”. She is extremely punctual and methodical – writes her journal daily, at the same hour, and any interruption of her ordinary stated occupation, ruffles her temper or her feelings.

It certainly will demand the greatest circumspection and self command to prevent her tendencies and impetuositities from sporting a generous disposition. But Providence has shielded her in giving her a husband whose patience and example may perfect those good emotions which he has already called out. Nothing else will save her sooner or later from madness.

December 8 [1841]

I received a summons this day to proceed with Clarke to Windsor to see the Princess Royal,³⁷ who had been more than usually disordered.³⁸ [...] [p. 12]. I saw her Majesty and the Prince and discussed our plans of cure with him.³⁹ Clarke having heard that the Queen had taken a bath and afterwards complained of cold, said to the P., “Of course, it was attributed to the bath”. “Naturally”, he answered with his sweet smile. I mention this as an

35 William Lamb, 2nd viscount Melbourne (1779–1848), Prime Minister 1834, 1835–1841. The most important advisor of the young Queen.

36 Dr Charles Locock the Queen’s chief obstetrician was present (with Ferguson) at all her confinements, and also at the birth of the children of queen Victoria’s eldest daughter. See W. MUNK (ed.), *The Roll*, Vol. 3: 1801–1825, pp. 270–272; Charlie LUSH, *Lord Deliver Us. A Personal History of Sir Charles Lockock, Bt. Queen Victoria’s Favourite Physician an Celebrated Accoucheur*, Perth 2004.

37 Victoria, the eldest daughter of Queen Victoria was styled “Princess Royal”. QVJ, 22. 12. 1840, 10. 2. 1841. This purely honorary title is customarily given by the sovereign to his or her eldest daughter and was introduced by Henrietta Maria, consort of Charles I, for their eldest daughter, Princess Mary (b. 1631), imitating the French “*Madame Royal*”.

38 See QVJ, 8. 12. 1841: Pussy “has not been quite so well again”. For the first few months of her life, The Princess Royal, called by her parents “Pussy”, was in perfect health, but from the end of July, she started to have problems with digesting food and was losing weight, “is grown too thin & looks so peaked”. Ibidem, 6. 9. 1841. At the beginning of November the Queen wrote: “Till the end of August she was such a magnificent, strong, fat child, that it is a great grief to us to see her so thin, pale, & changed.” Clark and Ferguson saw the Princess regularly, sometimes joined by Locock. On 21. 10. Ferguson told the Queen, that “all her little ailments came from her teething, & that she was a perfectly healthy child, & that all would come [sic] right”. On 3. 11. he again assured her that there was “no cause for alarm, though there may be, for anxiety, & that it must take time to get her quite right”. Ibidem, 21. 10., 3. 11. 1841.

39 The new cure must have worked, as on 21. 12. the Queen was delighted to find “dear “Pussy” so much better today, in all essentials, — really better than she has been for weeks”. Ibidem, 21. 12. 1841.

instance of the sort of management under which her Majesty is, and how freely the Prince converses with us, as to these forbles.

Clarke told me that the current story as to C[onroy] and the D[utchess] of K[ent] was well founded, that the former was a foolish bad man, whose ambition was to make the D[utchess] regent by proclaiming her daughter an idiot!⁴⁰ I can scarcely credit such monstrous wickedness and folly, yet the insinuations from the Lady Stopford⁴¹ were to the same effect.

To present a notion of the sort of waiting requisite: I was in the castle [at Windsor] by 31/4. The Queen had gone out, so we lounged in the beautiful galleries that wind around the quadrangle and examined the numerous pictures and busts which fill its niches and cover its walls. At 5 we [p. 13] had our interview, at half past five we went into Baron Stockmar's room and then walked to the station at Slough,⁴² where we arrived at 25 minutes past 6.

December 9 [1841]

Baron Stockmar is now 53 years old and his position and influence are such as to make the following sketch of him requisite for understanding much, which without it would remain unintelligible. Perhaps the only true friend which the Royal Couple possess is this man, who to maintain his influence has declined place and salary,⁴³ though repeatedly offered both. He came over, I believe, with the King of the Belgians⁴⁴ prior to his marriage with the Princess Charlotte,⁴⁵ and has remained here ever since visiting occasionally one or other of the Royal Coburg family here and abroad. Clarke tells me that he lives only to do good. That he watched over the welfare, honor, and conduct of the Queen and the Prince with the anxious affection of a father, and not only does he prevent absolute faults of conduct, but

40 In 1837 John Conroy told Charles Jenkinson, 3rd Earl of Liverpool, that Victoria was “totally unfit by nature for the consideration of business, and was younger in intellect by some years than she was in age, that her tastes were light and frivolous and that she was easily caught by fashion and appearances...”. RA VIC/ADD/A/11/18 Memorandum Lord Liverpool, 17. 6. 1837.

41 Lady Mary Stopford was lady-in-waiting to the Duchess of Kent (alternating with Lady Flora Hastings). QVJ, 17. 2. 1837. She was said to be “a very nice amiable little person” and “universally liked in the house”. Ibidem, 1. 3. 1837, 25. 4. 1838. In 1839 the Queen wrote about her being very ill and “half of her lungs being destroyed”. Ibidem, 19. 1. 1839.

42 Slough was the closest railways station to the Castle until October 1849, when the Windsor Station was opened.

43 Cf. Baron Stockmar's undated letter to his brother Karl about his awkward position as unpaid mentor to Prince Albert, who married Queen Victoria. Landesbibliothek Coburg, MS 348/4.

44 Victoria's uncle, Leopold (1790–1865), prince of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld, in 1817 married Charlotte, Princess Royal. In 1830, following the country's independence, he became king of the Belgians. In 1835 Princess Victoria wrote: “I look up to him as a Father, with complete confidence, love and affection. He is the best and kindest adviser I have. He has always treated me as his child and I love him most dearly for it.” QVJ, 4. 10. 1835.

45 Charlotte (1796–1817), the Princess of Wales, the only child of George IV. In 1816 she married Prince Leopold, but died following childbirth.

so regulates it, that even the appearance of error is avoided. He has free access to both and confers with the utmost liberty and openness with them on all subjects.

Of this I had an instance, when it was [p. 14] deemed necessary to inform the Prince of the present state and future prospects of the Princess Royal, and nothing could have been more ably done than the delivery in English to a young father and a prince, of the causes and the dangers of his first born’s malady. It was fluent, lucid, uncompromising and yet feeling. Lord Ashley⁴⁶ told me that every one considered the influence of Stockmar as most beneficial. In person he is small, vivacious in movement. In mind quick and sagacious, a warm heart, perhaps a little vain, but a sharp judge of character.

Another of the palace “friends” is the Baroness Lehzen, who formerly came over with the Duchess of Kent as *gouvernante* to her daughter, the Princess Feodore, and so satisfied George the 4th of her fitness for her place, that she was entrusted with the care of the Princess Victoria, and elevated from Miss Lehzen to the title of “Baroness (of Hanover)”. Along with the rest of the public, I looked on this lady as the prime mover and director of all things respecting the Queen, and thought her either a paragon of prudence and virtue or of talent and mischief [p. 15] making. When therefore I saw her for the first time in the Queen’s first pregnancy, I was struck with the feebleness of her mental powers. She is obviously a common mind, and what there may be of talent is the “talent” which the minute attention to the humors of one or two persons gives. She can by long experience tell how the Queen will act or feel under any. Her “womans faculties” have been sharpened by the knowledge that all her existence hangs on the smiles and frowns of a girl of 22. So that even the modicum of mental light she possesses is concentrated into a focus by her fears and hopes, and enables her mind to apprehend minutiae, which a vision embracing more free and expansive scene, could never adjust itself to view. She is foolish and weak, but being filled with a strong instinctive affection for the Queen she has a guide in this, which directs her small logic with wonderful precision of prophecy.

There is a mortal hatred towards her on the part of the Prince,⁴⁷ for she never scruples to blame even him, if she imagines that any act or thought of his may obscure the blaze

46 Anthony Ashley Cooper, from 1851 7th Earl of Shaftesbury (1801–1885), politician and social reformer. In June 1842 Ferguson wrote an article *Colliers and Collieries* in support of Lord Ashley’s proposal for a bill to regulate the age and sex of children employed in mines and collieries. The *Quarterly Review*, Vol. 70, 1842, pp. 158–195. See Megan COYER, *Literature and Medicine in the Nineteenth-Century Periodical Press. Blackwood’s Edinburgh magazine, 1817–1858*, Edinburgh 2017, pp. 188–190.

47 Albert told his private secretary that “I give every person about me credit for the best intentions and honesty of purpose until they prove themselves unworthy of my confidence. I applied this my general rule to the Bs [Baroness]. She has lost it by repeated instances of animosity”. RA VIC/MAIN/Y/54/16, Prince Albert to George Anson, 24. 7. 1840. A few months later Albert was convinced that Baroness Lehzen was “a crazy, stupid intriguer, obsessed with the lust of power, who regards herself as a demi-

of virtues in her darling Victoria for whom she would lay down her life. It is curious that she is jealous if the papers note any [p. 16] thing creditable to the Prince, as if the fact was tantamount to abstracting so much credit from the wife. They tell me that her industry in prying out every thing is astonishing, both as an effort and as a mischief. [...]

It is clear then that the Royal Couple are surrounded by persons who under one name or other, whether affection, candour, sagacity, advisor, or nurse (or doctor), are aiming every one of them at influence, that is the magic, which attracts all the qualities which reside in a court. And it was only by being admitted into the penetration I saw the positive use of "Etiquette", which instead of being, as is every where represented, the mere hollow foolery of palaces, is really emphatically the "virtue" of the Court, without it these gaudy and decorated sepulchres of humanity would be filled with violence, and open to clamorous hatred. The smiles of "majesty" are substantial power and wealth [...]. When therefore we wonder at the formalities and observances which our noblest and richest, impose on themselves, in accepting the menial duties of court attendance – we really are inconsistent – for then we should equally wonder at the strife after wealth or power, by any other mode of acquiring it. It is to keep down the envy and hatred, which attempts to approach the source of political honours too near must generate, that the necessity of etiquette, or a rule of a reserve and indifference, arose. This imposes a bond of iron on the impudent and bold and makes an obvious and an easy rule of conduct for all. "It banishes all feeling", where feeling would be dangerous and guards not only those who would approach too near, but the source of honors from perplexing contacts and influence.

I find that the mutual jealousies which the striving to please "the one person" must necessarily engender are glossed over by Etiquette. The chief quality of mind which such a system must solicit is caution; it is not the circumspection of a gold heart and a wise head, but the "fear" which arises from feeling "that each is there dependant on the caprice of one individual – whose conduct regulates [p. 18] that of a million, whatever they may say to the contrary. Let the Queen dismiss any individual who may have once been her slave and the world will disgrace him". After the affair of Lady Flora Hastings⁴⁸ people would not visit

God and anyone who refuses to recognise her as such is a criminal". RA VIC/ADD/U/2/2, Prince Albert to Baron Stockmar, 16. 1. 1842 (in German).

48 Sir James Clarke's reputation was marred in 1839 by his role in the Lady Flora Hastings scandal. Lady Flora was a lady-in-waiting of the Duchess of Kent. Dr Clark, who was then the physician of the Duchess, mistakenly diagnosed Lady Flora's swollen abdomen as an illegitimate pregnancy, instead of the tumour which killed her a few months later. The public opinion blamed for the scandal the Queen and Lord Melbourne. In February, the Queen noted: "Lady Flora had not been above 2 days in the house, before Lehzen and I discovered how exceedingly suspicious her figure looked, – more have since observed this, and we have no doubt that she is – to use the plain words – with child!! Clark cannot deny the suspicion; the horrid cause of all this is the Monster and demon Incarnate, whose name I forbear to mention [i.e. Sir John Conroy]". QVJ, 2. 2. 1839. See also, for

the family! To me therefore the Court is one of the most melancholy of places where I feel I am in danger of losing my liberty by my trammels of gold. Locock has followed the bent of his nature, a weak and vulgar one, and in spite of his usefulness to the Queen he is likely to be dropped, and if so he will in spite of all his successes be little considered by the public.⁴⁹ These considerations have determined me to hold myself aloof from seeking or asking any thing – and contenting myself with simply performing what is imposed on me as far as my powers admit with a wise, a patient, and a sober understanding. At least this is my prayer at night and in the early morning.

Dec[ember] 15, 1841

A few reminiscences of the actual scenes of the accouchement I will note, and merely such as may be told without infringing the sacred ties that bend together the minister to [p. 19] wants of the Body in Suffering – and his Patient.

We were informed about our respective appointments in May 1840, when it had been determined that her Majesty was pregnant.⁵⁰ The gazetting was put in an unusual mode, as instead of a simple statement of Dr L[ocock], Blagden⁵¹ & myself being the attendants,⁵² there was a ranking of us, in the order of first second and third, a trick as it afterwards turned out of L[ocock]’s which he played us by means of his friend, Mr George Anson, who

the Queen’s point of view, *Ibidem*, 18. 1. 1839, 20., 21. and 23. 2., 9., 24. and 31. 3., 5. and 15. 4., 27. 6., 3. and 5. 7. 1839; and for Lady Flora’s and other statements, *The Late Lady Flora Hastings. Statements of the Marquis of Hastings, Marchioness of Tavistock, Lady Portman, Lord Portman, and Sir James Clark*. London 1839. Also, see, *Examiner*, 24. 3. 1839; *The Spectator*, 31. 3. 1839; *Morning Post*, 31. 3. 1839, 10. 8. 1839, 14. 9. 1839.

49 Dr Locock never lost the royal confidence and in 1857 he was made baronet. *The London Gazette*, 17. 4. 1857, No 21990, p. 1371.

50 Already at the beginning of April she gave up crazy gallops and waltzes and danced only slow quadrilles, “as I had not been feeling quite well”. QV], 2. 4. 1840.

51 Richard Blagden (1789–1861) was Surgeon Extraordinary to Princess Victoria’s father, the Duke of Kent, and, after his death, Surgeon Ordinary to the Duchess of Kent, and from 1837–1840, Surgeon-Extraordinary to the Queen. “*The special appointment held by Mr Blagden is that of Surgeon-Accoucheur to Her Majesty and since there are only two Fellows of the College of Surgeons who practise midwifery as a speciality, and physicians dare not perform operations, the appointment of Mr. Blagden became a necessity.*” *Medical Circular*, 1852, p. 282; *The Gentleman’s Magazine*, Vol. 211, 1861, pp. 207–208.

52 *St. James’s-Palace*, 16. 7. 1840: “*The Queen has been pleased to appoint Charles Locock, Esq. M. D. to be First Physician Accoucheur to Her Majesty; Robert Ferguson, Esq. M..D. to be Second Physician and Richard Blagden, Esq. to be Surgeon Accoucheur.*” *The London Gazette*, 17. 7. 1840, No 19875, p. 1679. In 1857, Ferguson resigned the position of the Queen’s physician accoucheur and was appointed her physician extraordinary.

was his patient and the Prince's Private Secretary.⁵³ This very exaltation afterwards became a mean of his abasement, and for this alone, as an instructive lesson, I have noted it here...

I continued to see her Majesty during the whole of the summer 1840 up to the time she was confined, at intervals of about 10 days. She came from Windsor to Buckingham Palace for the accouchement⁵⁴ a month nearly before the usual expected time, and after Locock had seen her,⁵⁵ I was also desired to wait on her and found such symptoms as made me suspect that labour would occur very shortly, and indeed so earnest was my conviction that on the day of my interview, I mentioned the fact [p. 20] to Mrs Villiers giving it as an excuse for my not accepting Lord Clarendon's⁵⁶ invitation to dinner at the Grove near Walford⁵⁷ on the Saturday. The event justified my surmises, for within three days after my refusal and on the very day of my invitation the Queen was confined.⁵⁸

At six in the morning I arrived and found my colleagues⁵⁹ already there. We were ushered into the private apartments, which is the north wing of the Palace, into a little room, heated by insufferably hot air and gas. There we staid [sic] until labour advanced, when we were called to a room adjoining that in which the Queen was.

Believing that the case was one of perpetual consultation, and that the public thought it of sufficient importance to charge more than one with the superintendence, I had three months before written to Clarke to ascertain what was expected from each of us, but with no definite answer to guide us.

53 George Anson (1812–1849) was appointed by Queen Victoria her future husband's private secretary in 1840 despite Prince Albert's vehement protests, but they soon became close friends. Queen Victoria to Prince Albert, 29. 11., 8., 23. and 26. 12. 1839, Arthur Christopher BENSON and VISCOUNT ESHER (eds.), *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, 1st series, London 1907, Vol. 1: pp. 253–254, 260–262. See Prince Albert to Queen Victoria, 10., 15. and 18. 12. 1839, 3. 1. 1840 in Kurt JAGOW (ed.), *Letters of the Prince Consort, 1831–1861*, London 1938, pp. 37–38, 40–42, 47–48.

54 In the nineteenth century the aristocratic ladies would traditionally go to London to give birth to their children (especially the first born). See Judith SCHNEID LEWIS, *In the Family Way: Childbearing in the British Aristocracy, 1760–1860*, New Brunswick (New Jersey) 1986, pp. 155–161. In case of the Queen London was preferred also because the protocol demanded that the most important officers of state be witnesses to the birth of the royal heirs.

55 Dr Locock saw her on 15. 11., and found her "very well & thinks the event likely to come off the 1st days of next month". QVJ, 15. 11. 1840.

56 George William Frederick Villiers, 4th earl of Clarendon (1800–1870).

57 The Grove, on the outskirts of Watford, was Lord Clarendon's country house.

58 The Queen writes that already on 17. 11. she had "rather a restless night", and on 21. 11., "just before the early hours of the morning of the 21st, I felt very uncomfortable & with difficulty aroused Albert from his sleep, who after a while, got Clark sent for. He came at ½ p. 2, Albert bringing him into the Bedroom. Clark said he would go to Locock. Tried to get to sleep again, but by 4, I got very bad and both the Doctors arrived. My beloved Albert was so dear & kind. Locock said the Baby was on the way & everything was all right. We both expressed joy that the event was at hand, & I did not feel at all nervous." QVJ, 1. 12. 1840.

59 That is, Dr Locock, Mr Blagen, and Dr Clarke.

As the event took us by surprise we were left to make out our respective positions during the very brunt of attendance – a most unwise, and unsafe plan, as I felt sure [p. 21] that L[ocock] would if every thing went on smoothly keep all in his own hands. Both Blagden and myself spoke at first as the labour was advancing of the necessity of waiting in the room, but L[ocock] would not hear of it, and brought out a hurried message that the Queen desired that none but he should be in the room – that being determined on we knew that the sole responsibility fell on L[ocock].

Nothing could exceed the tender anxiety of the Prince to his wife. He sat by her bedside during the whole time, cheered and sustained her, and covered her face with kisses ‘in the acme’ of her sharpest throes.⁶⁰ He was pale and obviously very anxious, but this though apparent in his bloodshot eye, and haggard expression, did not render his conduct tumultuous and unsettled in the smallest degree.

From time to time we were informed of the actual progress of the labour till the last stage was at hand. In the interim the officers of state had assembled in their respective uniforms⁶¹ in the room which we had reached, and which was three removed from that of her Majesty.⁶² The whole communicating by a line of folding doors.

At last her Majesty bed room door was flung open [p. 22] and a common french [sic] bedstead was discovered right in the door way, consequently in the very centre of that line of folding doors by which the whole suit of apartments were connected, hence the ministers in the furthest extremity of the suite could see the actual bed, though not her Majesty, for a screen was elevated in that half of the foot board of the bed on which she lay. The nurse, Lilly and Dr L[ocock] were seen on the left, and a person within the room next the lying in chamber might also have had a view of the Prince on the right side. The Queen was quite

60 The Queen wrote: “Dearest Albert hardly left me at all, & was the greatest support & comfort”. QVJ, 1. 12. 1840.

61 Especially after the unexpected birth of James II’s son, James Francis Edward, the great officers of state were required to witness the birth of royal heirs. Wild rumours greeted the announcement of the birth of James II’s son in 1688, the most popular being that the new prince was a changeling, who had been secretly smuggled into the queen’s chambers in a warming-pan. Cf. *The Several Declarations together with the Several Depositions made in Council on Monday, 22 October 1688, concerning the Birth of the Prince of Wales*, London 1688. The last time a Home Secretary attended the birth of a future monarch was when Elizabeth II was born in 1926.

62 Also on the occasion of the birth of the royal child to queen Charlotte in 1762, although the officers of state were summoned to attend, only the Archbishop of Canterbury was admitted into the chamber, the others remaining in a room adjoining, from whence the door was left open into the Queen’s apartment. And “so strict was attention paid to delicacy, consistent with a due regard to forms, that although Dr William Hunter was in waiting, the necessary duties were performed by Mrs Draper”. John WATKINS, *Memoirs of Her Most Excellent Majesty Sophia-Charlotte: Queen of Great Britain, from Authentic Documents*, London 1819, vol. 1, p. 153.

*invisible and in spite of her unaccustomed pains, quite inaudible even to us who were near her – so firmly did she support her anguish.*⁶³

*As soon as the doors were flung open, the medical men walked into the room and I came just within view & was seen by her Majesty, but Locock immediately vociferated that the Queen did not desire to have us – for some moments the child remained unborn. Meanwhile I began [p. 23] to believe that if not assisted it [the child] would be still born, however, its cries were soon heard and in an instant it was declared that a princess was ushered into the world. The very first words, which I heard were from the Queen: ‘I fear it will create great disappointment’.*⁶⁴

As soon as the child was removed from the bed it was carried by Mrs Pegley, the nurse for the infant,⁶⁵ naked and wrapped in a flannel, through our room, direct to the Ministers,

63 “From those who had the best means of information, we learn that her Majesty evinced a firmness and composure almost incredible – at intervals exhibiting a cheerfulness and patient submission to her sufferings, in all respects consistent with the well-known attributes of her character.” *The Observer*, 23. 11. 1840, p. 2. *Particulars of the Accouchement of her Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria, Nov 21, 1840.*

64 It is usually stated (Elizabeth LONGFORD, *Victoria R. I.*, London 2000, p. 164; C. WOODHAM-SMITH, *Queen Victoria*, p. 278; Christopher HIBBERT, *Queen Victoria. A Personal History*, London 2000, p. 133; Hannah PAKULA, *An Uncommon Woman*, New York, 1995, p. 28; Stanley WEINTRAUB, *Victoria, An Intimate Biography*, New York 1988, p. 149; IDEM, *Albert. Uncrowned King*, London 1997, p. 113; Julia BAIRD, *Victoria The Queen. An Intimate Biography of the Woman who Ruled the World*, London 2016, p. 167), that Dr Locock seeing the sex of the child declared, “*Oh, Madam it is a princess*”, to which the Queen replied: “*Never mind, the next will be a prince*.” These statements are based on Grenville’s report of his dinner on 18. 12. with the Earl of Erroll, Lord Steward of the Household, who was one of the officials present at the accouchement. Sharing with Greville “*some gossiping details*”, he said that from the room (the third in the enfilade) where he and other officials were waiting, “*he could see the Queen plainly the whole time and hear what she said*”. This belies what Ferguson wrote that the officials could see the bed, but not the Queen because of the screen – and he even included in his report the drawing of the screen which sheltered her from the eyes of the ministers. Also, it is not very probable that Erroll could hear clearly the conversation between the Queen and Dr Locock. And if he did, why the words of the Queen were not heard by other officials, who would certainly share them with others? Ph. WHITWELL WILSON (ed.), *The Greville Diary*, Vol. 2, pp. 213–214, 19. 12. 1840. The Queen read *The Greville Memoirs* when they appeared for the first time in 1874, but they were much shortened and heavily edited by Henry Reeve, who completely omitted the entry of 19. 12. 1840 dealing with the birth of the Princess Royal, so the Queen could not comment on its veracity. Strangely enough in the list of contents of Chapter IX we find Birth of the Princess Royal, but there is not one word on this subject in the text. Generally, the Queen thought that publishing the Memoirs Reeve is guilty of an “*intense indiscretion*”, but admitted that “*the accounts in many ways are very full of truth [...], though exaggerated*”. Queen Victoria to Victoria, the Crown Princess, 25. 10. 1874, Roger FULFORD (ed.), *Darling Child. Private Correspondence of Queen Victoria and the Crown Princess of Prussia, 1871–1878*, London 1976, pp. 158–159.

65 So the Queen in the journal: “*the Baby was taken by Mrs Pegley (the monthly nurse for the Baby) into the room in which they [i.e. the Ministers] were assembled*”. QVJ, 1. 12. 1840. *The Observer* writes that it was Mrs Lilly, the monthly nurse for the Queen. *The Observer*, 23. 11. 1840, p. 2, *Particulars of the Accouchement of her Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria, Nov 21, 1840.*

who looked on it and then rapidly disappeared.⁶⁶ And so ended the first and important act of this great event. [...]

[p. 26] January 5 1842

*I received a note from Sir James Clarke requesting an interview with him. On calling I found he wished me to see the Princess Royal on alternate days with him, during the period that the Queen and Prince are to be at Claremont.*⁶⁷

*After this was arranged he informed me that the hysteria of her Majesty,⁶⁸ and her anxieties, had a very natural cause her being once again pregnant. If this be true, there will be much joking scandal sufficiently annoying to her and him, for when the curious reckon the difference of age between the forthcoming infant and the last, they will discover it to be about nine months and six weeks.*⁶⁹

[p. 28] January 16 1842, Sunday

I have been thrice down to Windsor to see the poor little Princess Royal – twice during the absence of the parents at Claremont, the third visit was today, and what a scene have I witnessed! On going into the nursery Mrs Roberts, the under nurse, said she thought a greater variety in the child’s diet might be resorted to with benefit,⁷⁰ and mentioning a certain species of broth to which I assented, appealing at the same time to Clarke for his approval. He merely answered “that we could consider the subject”. In about an hour,

66 The Observer adds: “Her Royal Highness was for a moment laid upon the table for the observation of the assembled authorities; but the loud tones in which she indicated her displeasure at such an exposure, while they proved the soundness of her lungs and the maturity of her frame, rendered it advisable that she should be returned to her chamber to receive her first attire.” Ibidem.

67 Claremont house in Surrey belonged to the Queen’s uncle, Leopold, but he lent it to the Queen when he became the king of the Belgians in 1831. The Queen and prince Albert planned to go to Claremont alone to cure the ongoing “lowless” (depression) of the Queen. They left Windsor on 11. 1. The children were left in the care of Lehzen and George Anson’s wife. Pussy was “not at all well, having been much disturbed in the night & early morning. She was still very uncomfortable when we saw her, poor dear. I grieve so that she is still bothered with these constant attacks, though she gets over them quicker & better, than she did”. QVJ, 11. 1. 1842.

68 On “female hysteria” as understood and treated in the nineteenth century see, e.g., Rachel P. MAINES, *The Technology of Orgasm: “Hysteria”, the Vibrator, and Women’s Sexual Satisfaction*, Baltimore 1998; Cecilia TASCIA et al., *Women and hysteria in the history of mental health*, Clinical Practice and Epidemiology in Mental Health 8, 2012, pp. 110–119.

69 The Queen’s third child, Princess Alice, was born on 25. 4. 1843, so she got pregnant only in September 1842.

70 The Princess, who was very weak as she could not keep the food in her stomach, was usually given “chicken broth with barley gruel, twice during the day, & tomorrow twice asses milk & gruel, etc.”. QVJ, 26. 9. 1841. As the diet did not improve her condition, in October she “put under a “régime” and given only asses milk. Ibidem, 1. 10., 31. 10. and 3. 11. 1841.

both Clarke and myself were sent for by the Prince who was pale and obviously suffering. “I wish to consult you”, he said, “in a family matter in which you are concerned. There is a conspiracy in the nursery against Sir James Clarke, and Mrs Roberts has just related to some one [meaning: Baroness Lehzen] who has told the Queen that Dr Ferguson made no objections to a proposal of changing the diet, but that Sir James Clarke, would not agree”, that the Child would be starved, and the Prince added: “The Queen says if the Princess dies, the responsibility will be mine”.⁷¹ I was shocked to hear [p. 29] such a speech made by a wife to the father of her children,⁷² more so at the possibility of any one daring to sow dissension between the two most exulted persons in the realm, on whose health and happiness the welfare of the nation depends.

These turmoils are acting most injuriously on the mind of her Majesty, she is still visited by fits of gloom and hypochondria, which threaten her intellect. The poor infant, I fear, must die ere long.

The Baron Stockmar confirms the miserable accounts of Clarke, that all the mischief now going on is produced by Madame Lehzen. The audacious folly exhibited by her in attempting to rival a young husband in the mind of her Majesty is to me quite inconceivable. Clarke really believes her mad. Yet his account shews method in her madness, for finding she has lost power with the Queen since her marriage, she appears to have clung the firmer to any straw that the fates wafted towards her. Hence, she is endeavouring to influence by obtaining the mastery in the Nursery and so gaining that ascendancy over the mother which she has lost in the wife.

Were the “acts” which set man and wife by the ears “not visible”, I confess, I [p. 30] should have doubted their existence and have utterly repudiated the possibility of such a being as Lehzen doing anything. The Prince is still the model of meek manly sense, a little more of the “Devil” in him might possibly be of advantage.

Madame Lezhen [sic] is ever calm, indefatigable, cool, full of smiles, never affected by any change, at least never showing that she is. She lavished large presents on the nurse, Ratsey,⁷³ to bribe her to bring Nursery news – 50 pounds worth said Clarke of the Queen’s

71 A detailed report of the quarrel during which the Queen accused Prince Albert of almost killing the Princess Royal is given in RA VIC/ADD/U/2/1, 2, 3, 4, Prince Albert to Stockmar, 16. 1. and 18. 1. 1842 (German), The Queen to Stockmar, 16. and 17. 1. 1842.

72 Actually, Prince Albert wrote to his wife an even more shocking note: “Dr Clark has mismanaged the child and poisoned her with calomel and you have starved her. I shall have nothing more to do with it; take the child away and do as you like and if she dies you will have it on your conscience.” RA VIC/ADD/U/2/4, Prince Albert to Stockmar, 18. 1. (an enclosed, undated note; German).

73 Mrs Jane Ratsey was originally employed as the wet nurse for the Princess Royal, but remained in the nursery as a permanent nurse till at least April 1842. QVJ, 1. 12. 1840, RA M12/5, Regulations for the Nursery, n.d.; Census, England and Wales, 1841; RA VIC/ADD U2/21, 1. 4. 1842, The Queen to Stockmar.

money at a time. The moment the Prince’s back is turned Madame Lezhen [sic] works on her to his prejudice, so that he never leaves home, but with misgivings during his absence and certainties of annoyance on his return. But why do I chronicle this most degrading tissue of intense littlenesses, this loathsome delineation of scenes and characters against which I never can feel but wonder and indignation. The misery is that I am involved and mixed up with it.

January 18 Tuesday [1842]

Once more down at Windsor, where I saw every one. The Queen. The Prince. The Children and [p. 31] Stockmar. The questions discussed were a lot. The removal to Brighton, which was affirmatively resolved the only difficulty being who should be the attendant there. Now it appears that Mr Blaker⁷⁴ (?) is at the Pavillion what Brown⁷⁵ is at the Castle, viz. the home apothecary, and he, I am told, is a sensible man. So he is to be the attendant and we the visiting physicians. The next question is as to the vaccination, which I proposed should be done before the child is exposed to the crowd of the christening. All this was kindly and thoughtfully received by the Prince but! (and what a but) I hear from Clarke that Stockmar disapproves of the same! Can it be that we had not first spoken to him on the matter? That the adviser in all thing was without his role? Oh, the Court, the Court which forces these mean suspicions on me even towards one who is surely a good man.

I saw her Majesty, receiving first a hint that I was not to question her too closely as to the possibility of pregnancy to account for all her symptoms. Indeed, I scarcely believe it possible. They would be surely vexed to think it, both on account of inconvenience to their plans for the summer and especially touching the publicity attendant the rapid succession of princes. Then [p. 32] came my interview with Stockmar, who was desirous of talking to me. It was about Clarke, whose character he fully fathomed and deeply commiserated his present position – employed, but not trusted, with a determination on the part of Lezhen to damage him. She has from the beginning wished for Locoock and Blagden for the Nursery! Thus even in the very heart and core of a parent when that parent is royal, are there vermin

74 Harry (Miller) Blaker (1784–1846), he attended the Queen when in residence at Royal Pavilion in Brighton. He vaccinated the Princess Royal and the Prince of Wales. He was appointed apothecary in Brighton in 1837 (although his memorial calls him a “surgeon”) and is buried at St Nicolas Churchyard, Brighton. A. M. COOKE, *Queen Victoria’s Medical Household*, *Medical History* 26, 1982, pp. 305–320, at p. 315; URL:<www.findagrave.com/memorial/70727494/harry-blaker> [accessed 12. 3. 2018].

75 Mr Henry Brown (d. 1868) was apothecary (i.e. general practitioner) in Windsor. The Queen said she liked him “*the best of all the Doctors, for quietness of manners & reasonableness*”. QVJ, 8. 12. 1841. He looked after the Princess Royal, and then the other royal children, on daily basis, making sure that Dr Clark’s orders were followed by the nurses. See his reports to the Queen, e.g., RA VIC/MAIN/M/13/9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 22. A. M. COOKE, *Queen Victoria’s Medical Household*, p. 315, seems to be wrong in stating Brown was appointed only in 1859.

to dictate affection or pervert it. I expressed my views openly to Stockmar as to the proposing of a consultation, in which Chambers⁷⁶ and Locock should be called in to state their opinions prior to her removal to Brighton.

The Prince proposed horse exercise, which he wished could produce every good effect.

January 19 [1842]

[p. 33] [...] *The Town, or rather the "Ton", is full of that malicious history, which Madame Lezhen [sic] has set on foot against the Prince. Mrs Villiers whom I asked, as to whether the Princess Royal's illness is known, and what was said about it, told me that the cause of the poor child's present state was traced, first, to the ill treatment of the nurse Ratsey (who by the way has not eloped from her husband!);⁷⁷ 2ndly, to Clarke starving her;⁷⁸ 3rd [sic], to the Prince who took upon himself the whole responsibility and tried experiments on his own child! That this villainy should be uttered is only less astonishing than that it should be believed! And by whom is it credited and disseminated? Why, by the near relations of her Majesty – the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge⁷⁹ and Gloucester.⁸⁰*

[p. 34] *I had a long discussion with Stockmar as to poor Clarke and learned that the person who had urged him on and made use of him in all the Flora Hastings affair was Lehzen⁸¹ and now she is the first to drop him, or rather to fix on him another act of a tragedy of which the first was the death of an earl's daughter, the second that of a queen's. And all this without the intense malice which appears as the ordinary motive. It is nothing, but the desire of influence which once obtained would send her back to Clarke as readily as to her brother or any near relative. She has the greatest dread lest the Prince should be made a king. X says that some enemy has set all this rumor afloat.*

76 William Frederick Chambers (1786–1855), was appointed physician-in-ordinary to Queen Adelaide in 1836, to William IV in 1837, to Queen Victoria on 8. 8. 1837 and to the Duchess of Kent in 1839. He was the leading physician in London until 1848. W. MUNK (ed.), *Roll*, Vol. 3: 1801–1825, p. 196.

77 In January 1842 among the nursery staff there was Mrs Roberts, 34 years of age, recommended by Dr Locock, who writes that her husband proved "a very cruel and dissolute man, who so ill treated her", that after the birth of her son, she left him and she "has never seen him since". The husband does not know where she lives, and she has managed to bring up her son, who is now 12, "entirely by her own exertion". RA VIC/MAIN/M16/3, Memorandum by Dr Locock relative to the Nurse Mrs Roberts, 27. 11. 1840.

78 Lady Lytton, who in 1842 became responsible for the Nursery, thought that the Princess Royal was simply "over-watched and over-doctored... She now lives on asses' milk, and arrowroot and chicken broth, and they measure it out so carefully for fear of loading her stomach, that I fancy she always leaves off hungry".

79 Prince Adolphus (1774–1850), Duke of Cambridge, son of George III, Victoria's uncle.

80 Princess Mary (1776–1857), Duchess of Gloucester and Edinburgh, daughter of George III and sister of Victoria's father. She seems to have been Victoria's favourite aunt.

81 See QVJ, 4. and 18. 4. 1839.

What a mixture of mischief has the Court made of this character. First she is without any real faith in high matters, then her affection for the Queen is that of a dog for its master, a devotion which is as deep and as lasting as her life, and so she resents every act which tends to raise the husband as an insult to the wife, and is blunt enough to think that she will [p. 35] not be crushed in the effort to brave the husband of the Queen.

February 2, 1842

Three days ago Chambers called on me, as pleased and as happy as a young elephant. He was mysterious [...], begged I would not tell Clarke he had seen me, in a word, I conjectured what had occurred and that he had seen the Princess! On that very evening (Sunday the 30th Jan[uary]) I received a summons to meet at Clarke’s to consult about a “royal personage” and there, shortly after my arrival, we were joined by Chambers and then by Locock, who appeared thunderstruck at the apparition of a new colleague [...]. Chambers was to make a report and after much consultation about trifles and a good set of sentences from Chambers as to the necessity of our pulling well together we separated.

On the 1st Feb[ruary] I received a summons to Windsor to see her Majesty. She was still nervous, but no longer melancholic, her immediate symptoms being those of slight febrile catarrh, a state caught from the Prince who is really unwell. After our visit we descended to the Baron Stockmar’s room, and there [p. 36] being a necessity to talk of Chamber’s visit I was amused to see how well Stockmar managed the “telling of the tale”. He said he took it all on himself, and advised them (Royalties) to send for the most employed physicians, if for no other purpose, still for that of stopping scandalous tongues. Clarke, who knew nothing of the matter, received it all as if it had been gospel. He, however, is undoubtedly saved by it, in as much as we now have it under Chamber’s own hand that up to the 20th January there was no organic disease developed in the Princess Royal, that her whole state hinged on “dentition”, and that the present medication was to be continued. [...]

[p. 37] Tuesday Feb[ruary] 16 1842

I went to Brighton to see the Royal Children and found the Princess still a sad invalid, thinner than ever, tho’ less suffering.⁸² I saw the Pavillion [sic] for the first time, and inspite [sic] of all that is talked of its not being in good taste, am struck with its singularities. Every part of the inside is completely chinese [sic] – even the stairs are meant to imitate cane and bamboo basket work, tho’ the material is of stout brass and iron. The public rooms are amazingly lofty tents blazing in gold and varigated glass – some latern? – some lotus shaped

⁸² The Queen noted that “the poor little thing is still very thin, & she was not very well this morning”. QVJ, 15. 2. 1842.

lamps – and the whole when lit must, I think, shed rays such as shone out in Aladdin’s [p. 38] garden, streaming from carbuncle amythestes [sic], the diamond and the [...] chrysolite. Certainly both for comfort and eastern gorgeousness I have never seen any thing more captivating for a Brighton sojourn than the Pavillion [sic].

They appear to me to live more comfortably there than amid the state of Buckingham and Windsor – more huddled together and not kept apart by “those incidental particles”, which Dr Prout says play such a part in the body natural by keeping and repelling the molecules of its component atoms from each other.⁸³ The said particles being gentlemen and ladies in waiting. How curious is the influence of a Palace. There was the stately Lord Liverpool,⁸⁴ tall as a Maypole,⁸⁵ stalking after the meal and precise Baron Stockmar anxious to shew him the wonders of the kitchen, which the other declined as peremptorily as would the English earl the civilities of his amanuensis.

When first ushered into the ante-room I saw the Prince in a few moments – handsome and fresh and much better already, still anxious without display both as a husband and a father and as mild and sweet as his own smile. [p. 39] The Queen, whose dressing room was adjoining, not knowing that any one was there, came tripping thro’ in a morning undress gown with hair placed for dressing rather than dressed, and on discovering “the stranger” blushed like a virgin and flew like a startled roe, forgetful in the woman the state of the queen.

The Prince complained much to me of the tiresome mobbing of the crowd who turn and follow and turn again with them, whenever the Royal Couple go out to walk, necessitating therefore a constant series of stratagems to stem this annoyance. Hence at one time, the specified time of outings is changed, at another the carriage, and at a third the intended drive. The delinquents are chiefly the girls schools, and boarding schools of the other sex. I am told that the total number of these seminaries at Brighton amounts to no less than 80. [...]

[p. 40] Feb[ruary] 24 1842

Two days ago I learned from Clarke that there was an absolute certainty of the Queen not being pregnant – a great relief to every body concerned. They talked of leaving Brighton in a week. [...]

[p. 57] Dec[ember] 4 1842 Sunday Night

83 William Prout (1785–1850), chemist and physician, remembered today for “Prout’s hypothesis”. Cf. Robert HOOPER (ed.), *Lexicon Medicum: or, Medical Dictionary*, London 1839, p. 1153.

84 Charles Jenkinson, 3rd Earl of Liverpool (1784–1851), member of the Privy Council 1841, Lord Steward of the Household, 1841–1846.

85 Maypole is a painted pole, decorated with flowers, round which people traditionally dance on May Day holding long ribbons attached to the top.

The last week has developed nothing of moment. The Court have returned to Windsor – well – and I have a summons to attend her Majesty in her approaching confinement in the “month of April”. Blagden is not to be of the party.

[p. 50] November 17 1842

Madame Lezhen [sic] is gone.⁸⁶ This was at length brought about by Baron Stockmar who seeing the result of her remaining, told that broadly to the Queen. She might have departed when their Majesties were in Scotland, but was permitted to remain. I was present when the following colloquy took place, between Baron Stockmar, and Brown the surgeon of Windsor. “How is the Baroness?” “Why Sir, not at all well.” “Does she eat?” “No Sir” “Nor sleep?” “No, Sir”. I said she would die. “No, she is tough”, replied the Baron. Thus ends this domestic tragedy.⁸⁷

The Town are engaged in discussing the supposed seduction of Lady Augusta Somerset,⁸⁸ maid of honor to the Duchess of Cambridge,⁸⁹ by Prince George of Cambridge.⁹⁰ The “Times” is authorised, most unfortunately, “on the highest authority” to contradict the scandal, thus giving it the most extensive circulation. I learnt from various sources that the seduction is a villainous falsehood, that the real history is that the prince desired to marry [sic] her and wrote to the Queen, who refused her consent, and on being in a 2nd letter from the Prince George asked the reason for [p. 51] such refusal, received for answer that it was at the earnest entreaties of the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge.⁹¹ It was said that when after this the Lady Augusta was taken to Windsor, her conduct was very bald and presuming.⁹² [...]

86 Greville noted: “The Baroness Lehzen has left Windsor Castle, and is gone abroad for her health (as she says), to stay five or six months, but it is supposed never to return. This woman, who is much beloved by the women and much esteemed and liked by all who frequent the Court, who is very intelligent, and has been a faithful and devoted servant to the Queen from her birth, has for some time been supposed to be obnoxious to the Prince, and as he is now all-powerful her retirement was not unexpected. I do not know the reason of it, nor how it has been brought about”. Ph. WHITWELL WILSON (ed.), *The Greville Diary*, 5. 10. 1843.

87 In July 1843 the Queen recorded in her journal how she and Prince Albert “talked much of former times & poor Lehzen, & how ill everything went, whilst she was there. I shudder to think what my beloved Albert had to go through & put up with!” QVJ, 13. 7. 1843.

88 Charlotte Augusta Somerset (1816–1850), the eldest daughter of Henry Somerset, 7. Duke of Bedford, by his first wife. In 1844 she married Baron Neumann, Austrian Ambassador in London.

89 “At 1 the Duchess of Cambridge came and presented Lady Augusta Somerset, as her lady in waiting.” QVJ, 7. 2. 1840.

90 Prince George William Frederick (1819–1904), son of Prince Adolphus, Duke of Cambridge, queen Victoria’s uncle.

91 Cf. Ph. WHITWELL WILSON (ed.), *The Greville Diary*, 7. 11. 1842.

92 After 1. 8. 1842 all references to Lady Augusta disappear from the surviving version of the Queen’s Journal, probably removed by Princess Beatrice.

[p. 57] November 25 1842

The day before yesterday I went down to Widnsor [sic] for the purpose of seeing the Prince of Wales, who had been attacked on the lungs. But owing to my having been attending Sir James Graham's children,⁹³ in scarlet fever, I deemed it right to mention the same to Clarke, [p. 58] and thro' him to the Queen and Prince Albert, and was not surprised to find they declined letting me into the Castle. It was deemed prudent to run no risk at all since the Prince of Wales was better.⁹⁴ Had he not been so, I was to have seen him. [...]

[p. 87] June 17 1843

The Queen was confined (April 25) after a short and prosperous time of 6 hours of a princess⁹⁵ to whom she has appropriated 3 excellent names: Alice, Maud, Mary,⁹⁶ a spendthrift use of good English tokens. Lord Melbourne wrote a letter to Mr Geo[rge] Anson, the Prince's secretary, asking whence the precedent for Alice, since he knew but one such person attached to Royalty, Alice Pierce, Edward IV's Mistress.⁹⁷ [...]

[p. 95] July 12 1843

I had a most interesting conversation with Baron Stockmar about Prince Albert who (since the absence of Baroness Lehzen) has that influence which a husband should have. There is mutual trust and consultation in every thing. "He likes his position and", said the Baron, "he [p. 96] has but two faults: hurry and a very very little spice of vanity". "If," continued he, "asked: 'Where shall I find all the qualities of a good Prince?', I would point to him – he has no vices – of passion he has likewise none – avarice nothing: 'Keep me out of debt', he tells Anson, 'but then spend' – no love of gaming or any intemperance. He desires to govern with justice and affection and it will be the greatest loss that the nation can suffer if any thing should happen to him".

93 Sir James Robert Graham, from 1824 2nd Baronet (of Netherby) (1792–1861), a statesman.

94 "After luncheon we went to see the poor Baby, who is looking quite ill, so oppressed, & quite reduced by his nasty cold [...]. The poor Baby was so very unwell, weak, restless & listless, that we sent to London for Clark [...] we found the Baby continuing to improve [...] The Baby's breathing, which had been so frequent & hard these last 2 nights, became nearly normal again, & he has much less cough." QVJ, 18., 21., 23. and 24. 11. 1843.

95 "On the 25th of April after getting hardly any sleep, soon after midnight, Dr Locock was sent for & at 5 minutes past 4, a fine, healthy girl was born, & all my sufferings had come to an end!" Ibidem, 25. 4. 1843.

96 "The following are to be the names: Alice, Maud, Mary, the latter being after Aunt Gloucester, & Maud being old English for Matilde. The child will be called Alice." Ibidem, 18. 5. 1843.

97 Actually Alice Pierce (or Perrers), was the mistress of Edward III. See James PETTIT ANDREWS, *The History of Great Britain*, London 1794, p. 388; Richard BAKER, *A Chronicle of the Kings of England*, London 1733, pp. 127, 133, 137, 167.

Jiří HUTEČKA

“There Is Nothing New Out Here!” A Case Study of Communication Strategies and Gender Dynamics in the First World War Family Correspondence

Abstract: The article is a case study based on two collections of letters between couples in Moravia during the Great War. Using these collections that include either both or – rather uniquely – only the woman’s side of the correspondence, the author tries to follow the basic strategies employed by respective parties to the wartime dialogue between the frontline and the home front, ranging from discursive silence to standardized “calming phrases” and strategies, all the way to the moments when these strategies crumble under the weight of the events. In parallel, the text also focuses on the way these strategies reflected the changing gender structures and relations in wartime society, particularly the sense of empowered femininity and weakened masculinity, respectively.

Keywords: First World War – personal correspondence – wartime society – home front – gender relations – gender history

“Dear daddy! Many heartfelt hugs and kisses from us. No mail has arrived today. There is nothing new out here! We have nice weather again. Are you getting mail from me alright? And the papers? I’ll be sending you a small box tomorrow again! Write as soon as you can to let me know you are back, I can hardly wait to hear. Love and kisses, Mářa and Milda.”

Marie Zemanová to her husband, April 9, 1918¹

In early April 1918, with Russia out of the picture for good, German offensives on the Western Front losing their initial momentum, and American troops finally starting to trickle into the trenches, the Great War in France and Belgium has entered its decisive phase. At the same time, Austro-Hungarian army was building up its strength

1 Marie Zemanová to Pavel Zeman, 9 April 1918, The Zeman Letters, Vlastivědné muzeum v Olomouci (VMO), collection “Novodobé dějiny – Odboj”, acquisition number 67/2016. [hereafter cited only by the names of the correspondents and the date, as all the letters come from the same collection]. I would like to express many thanks to Dr. Karel Podolský, the curator of the Modern History and the Military History Collections at the Vlastivědné muzeum v Olomouci, who made me aware of the very existence of this recently discovered collection of files in the first place, and allowed me to study it extensively afterwards.

for a final push against the Entente lines on the Piave River, while French, British, Serbian and Greek troops were preparing for the same in the Macedonian mountains. On this largely forgotten front, in a backwater stillness of the Albanian port town of Durazzo (Durrës) on the Adriatic coast, the *Feldpostkarte* (field post card) quoted above in full was about to find its recipient soon. Marie Zemanová, a housewife from Olomouc (Olmütz), sent it to her husband, a thirty-five year old *Zugsführer* (sergeant) Pavel Zeman who was serving as an accountant at a local Austro-Hungarian headquarters. The text, written on a small piece of hard paper, encapsulates with striking efficiency all the common themes of wartime family correspondence – love, affection, anxiety, agony of waiting, eagerness for news, solidarity both emotional and material, emotional dependence, as well as seemingly useless filler typical of middle-class correspondence of the time.

War correspondence has always served historians as a useful venue of understanding military conflict on the most personal level. It is especially valid in the case of the First World War which, if we paraphrase Paul Fussell's famous claim, is more or less the first "literate war".² For the first time in human history, with a possible exception of the American Civil War, there was a major conflict where most of the active participants all the way down to the ordinary men and women at the front and at home could regularly write and read. And they did – a lot. In Western and Central Europe, the war has brought the social practice of sustained regular correspondence down the social ladder and had successfully spread it among the general population. Mail, as almost exclusive means of communication between the frontline and the home front, became an ever-present feature of existence in all social groups. Everyone involved, especially the army command itself, fully realized the importance regular mail had for the morale of the troops, putting a considerable effort into ensuring its smooth operation.³ "Write as often as you can"

2 For Fussell defining the First World War as a "literary war", see Paul FUSSELL, *The Great War and Modern Memory*, New York 1977, pp. 157–158.

3 During the busiest days, the Austro-Hungarian army postal service forwarded more than nine million cards, letters, parcels, boxes, and all other imaginable items between the homefront and its more than five hundred field offices and two hundred base post offices. Although the army thought about curtailing this huge volume by introducing a postage for letters up to one hundred grams (which were free of charge), it never did so out of fear of a public backlash. See Frederick PATKA, *Auch das war die Feldpost. Episoden aus dem dienstlichen Alltag der k.u.k. Feldpost 1914–1918*, in: Joachim Gatterer – Walter Lukan (eds.), *Studien und Dokumente zur Österreichisch-Ungarischen Feldpost im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Wien 1989, pp. 332–334; also Paul HÖGER, *Das Post- und Telegraphenwesen im Weltkrieg*, in: *ibidem*, pp. 43–48. For an overview of the situation regarding POW correspondence, see Alon RACHAMIMOV, *POWs and the Great War. Captivity on the Eastern Front*, Oxford 2002, p. 135.

became perhaps the most oft-repeated phrase in soldiers’ letters home, while emotional dependence upon news became an endemic theme in their diaries and memoirs.⁴

With the introduction of “new military history” into western historical writing in 1970s, interest in individual testimony has been on the rise, with approaches to correspondence ranging from the *Alltagsgeschichte* through psychohistories all the way down to studying wartime loyalties. In the past several decades, the new trends took more or less firm roots in the writing about wartime societies of Austria-Hungary as well.⁵ While correspondence has definitely become a topic in Czech historical writing in recent years, the First World War writings of Czech soldiers and their families seem to be relatively neglected. The few studies that had been published tend to be methodologically conservative, and while their authors acknowledge the immense potential of war correspondence, they mostly focus on summarizing its contents without posing any questions.⁶ In an effort to alleviate this, the presented article using just a humble set of sources to begin with, aims at breaking potential paths that may be taken in studying Czech-written wartime correspondence in the future.

4 On the importance of mail in soldier’s life, see Michael ROPER, *The Secret Battle. Emotional Survival in the Great War*, Manchester 2009, pp. 5–6; or Richard HOLMES, *Acts of War. Behavior of Men in Battle*, New York 1982, pp. 88–89. For the specific example of Czech soldiers, see Jiří HUTEČKA, *Muži proti ohni. Motivace, morálka a mužnost českých vojáků Velké války 1914–1918*, Praha 2016, pp. 141–143.

5 For examples from Western Europe, see M. ROPER, *The Secret Battle*; Martha HANNA, *A Republic of Letters: The Epistolary Tradition in France during the World War I*, *The American Historical Review* 108, 2003, no. 5, pp. 1338–1361; or Klaus LATZEL, *Vom Kriegserlebnis zu Kriegserfahrung: Theoretische und methodische Überlegungen zur erfahrungsgeschichtlichen Untersuchung von Feldpostbriefen*, *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 56, 1997, pp. 1–30; Bernd ULRICH, *Die Augenzeugen: Deutsche Feldpostbriefe in Kriegs- und Nachkriegszeit, 1914–1933*, Essen 1997. For Austria-Hungary, see Gerald LAMPRECHT, *Feldpost und Kriegserlebnis. Briefe als historisch-biographische Quelle*, Innsbruck 2001; also Bernd ULRICH, *Feldpostbriefe im Ersten Weltkrieg – Bedeutung und Zensur*, in: Peter Knoch (ed.), *Die Rekonstruktion des Kriegsalltags als Aufgabe der historischen Forschung und der Friedenserziehung*, Stuttgart 1989, pp. 40–83. For war correspondence being used to analyze the complicated problem of loyalties, see Péter HANÁK, *Die Volksmeinung während des letzten Kriegsjahres in Österreich-Ungarn*, in: Richard G. Plaschka – Karl-Heinz Mack (eds.), *Die Auflösung des Habsburgerreiches: Zusammenbruch und Neuorientierung im Donauraum*, Munich 1970, pp. 58–66; for an inspiring analysis of the specific case of POWs, see A. RACHAMIMOV, *POWs and the Great War*.

6 For a typical example, see Jana TEJKALOVÁ, *Haličská fronta očima českých vojáků rakousko-uherské armády*, *Historie a vojenství* 50, 2001, no. 2, pp. 332–370. David Pazdera criticized this approach in his own study, calling for correspondence to be seen not as a source of *objective* information, but as a venue towards possibility to reconstruct “*subjective perceptions*”. While he is indeed right in his appeals, his effort is rather limited in scope as he ignores most existing secondary literature, and ends up summarizing key themes only from the point of view of studying everyday life of the soldiers. See David PAZDERA, *Korespondence jako jeden z pramenů pro výzkum každodennosti českých vojáků rakousko-uherské armády ve Velké válce*, *Historie a vojenství* 52, 2003, no. 1, pp. 37–43.

The primary goal of this article is to follow the manifold themes present in wartime correspondence and to present the reader with a case study of two Moravian couples and their communication, looking for deeper structures permeating the seemingly straightforward language of wife and husband correspondence between 1914 and 1918, and the way they reflect the shifts in wartime gender structures and identities. Specifically, we will analyze two intertwined levels of communication present in wartime correspondence. First, we will focus on *communication strategies* implemented by the participants. Of course, correspondence was primarily a method of *communicating* – information, perceptions of reality, experiences, feelings, emotions. In studying correspondence or any communication for that matter, the well established methodological key is to ask – “*who is speaking, to whom, about what, and why now?*”⁷ Of course, there are all sorts of imaginable combinations of “*epistolary dialogue*” in wartime, and, as we will see, the answer to these questions more or less decides the communication strategies in use, as these are closely related to the very purpose of the communication and its social background. In this text, we will deal with a communication between partners in marriage, husbands and wives, fathers and mothers discussing their everyday toils, joys, and worries. Focus on married couples inadvertently brings us to the second level of analysis – gender dynamics as apparent in the correspondence. Seen through the lens of gender history, a communication between the aforementioned social categories is not just a communication crossing the line between the home and the front, but also a dialogue between members of gendered social groups. Husband – wife, father – mother communication necessarily exists in a context of a prevalent gender order and as such can be seen as a communication between individual experiences of masculinity and femininity.⁸ As a result, gender dynamics

7 M. ROPER, *The Secret Battle*, p. 25.

8 For a background theory on gender, masculinity and femininity, see Jiří HUTEČKA – Radmila ŠVAŘÍČKOVÁ-SLABÁKOVÁ, *Od genderu k maskulinitám*, in: Radmila Švaříčková-Slabáková – Jitka Kohoutová – Radmila Pavličková – Jiří Hutečka et al., *Konstrukce maskulinní identity v minulosti a současnosti: Koncepty, metody, perspektivy*, Praha 2012, pp. 9–20; R. W. CONNELL, *Masculinities*, Berkeley 1995 (second edition 2005); Michael ROPER – John TOSH (eds.), *Manful Assertions: Masculinities in Britain since 1800*, Oxford 1991; John TOSH, *What Should Historians Do with Masculinity? Reflections on Nineteenth-Century Britain*, *History Workshop Journal* 38, 1994, no. 1, pp. 179–202; Ute FREVERT, „*Mann und Weib, und Weib und Mann*“: *Geschlechter-Differenzen in der Moderne*, München 1995; John TOSH, *The Old Adam and the New Man: Emerging Themes in the History of English Masculinities, 1750–1850*, in: Tim Hitchcock – Michele Cohen (eds.), *English Masculinities, 1660–1800*, London 1999, pp. 217–238; Wolfgang SCHMALE, *Geschichte des Männlichkeit in Europa (1450–2000)*, Wien 2003; John TOSH, *Hegemonic Masculinity and the History of Gender*, in: Stefan Dudink – Karen Hagemann – John Tosh (eds.), *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History*, Manchester 2004, pp. 41–58; Martin DINGES (ed.), *Männer – Macht – Körper: Hegemoniale Männlichkeiten vom Mittelalter bis heute*, Frankfurt 2005; or Christopher E. FORTH, *Masculinity in the Modern West: Gender, Civilization and the Body*, London 2008.

necessarily underscores the communication of any wartime couple, putting it into an interesting social context. Using the words of the Austrian historian Christa Hämmerle, we can claim that wartime family correspondence is “*highly gendered*” out of sheer logic of the participating social structures.⁹

In Central European context, analyzing gender identity and its dynamics in wartime correspondence is not a new phenomenon, and this text fully admits taking inspiration from these earlier efforts. First Christa Hämmerle in 1997, then Benjamin Ziemann in 2003 took on the path to analyze the topic of gender in wartime letters, creating a referential framework for future study. Importantly, Christa Hämmerle did so using a rare collection of letters written by both sides of the dialogue of an upper-middle class Viennese couple. Similar theme, although more focused on specific representations of wartime masculinity, violence, and womanhood, can also be found in Dorothee Wierling’s study of letters written by a family of Berlin socialist intellectuals.¹⁰ Both her and Christa Hämmerle’s work share the same trait – they have used collections where letters of two or more sides of the communication were preserved. These give us a unique opportunity to study not only communication strategies of the soldiers themselves, as soldiers’ letters home were those usually preserved, passed on, and later edited and published much more frequently than letters of wives, mothers, fathers or children. Collections that include them have many revealing qualities, including their ability to disclose the whole dynamics of communication in complex, intimate relationships over time. As Christa Hämmerle wrote regarding those few collections of “*men’s and women’s wartime correspondence*” that include both sides’ views, these “*reveal their mutual dependence and the interconnectedness of differing modes perception and experience*”.¹¹ According to Dorothee Wierling, they give us “*unique access to interpretations of the war and frameworks of meaning as they were exchanged and negotiated between the persons involved*”.¹² We could also add that they reveal

9 Christa HÄMMERLE, ‘You Let a Weeping Woman Call You Home?’ *Private Correspondences during the First World War in Austria and Germany*, in: Rebecca Earle (ed.), *Epistolary Selves: Letters and Letter-writers, 1600–1945*, Aldershot 1999, p. 157.

10 See Christa HÄMMERLE, ‘... wirf ihnen alles hin und schau, daß du fort kommst.’ *Die Feldpost eines Paares in der Geschlechter(un)ordnung des Ersten Weltkriegs*, *Historische Anthropologie* 6, 1998, no. 3, pp. 431–458; Benjamin ZIEMANN, *Geschlechterbeziehungen in deutschen Feldpostbriefen des Ersten Weltkrieges*, in: Christa Hämmerle – Edith Saurer (eds.), *Briefskulturen und ihr Geschlecht: Zur Geschichte der privaten Korrespondenz vom 16. Jahrhundert bis heute*, Wien 2003, pp. 261–282; Dorothee WIERLING, *Imagining and Communicating Violence: The Correspondence of a Berlin Family, 1914–1918*, in: Christa Hämmerle – Oswald Überegger – Birgitta Bader-Zaar (eds.), *Gender and the First World War*, Oxford 2014, pp. 36–51. For an example from Western Europe, see Martha HANNA, *Your Death Would Be Mine: Paul and Marie Pireaud in the Great War*, Cambridge 2006.

11 Ch. HÄMMERLE, ‘You Let a Weeping Woman Call You Home?’ p. 157.

12 D. WIERLING, *Imagining and Communicating Violence*, p. 36.

partnership dynamics, values, and attitudes, filtered through specific communication strategies, all projected onto the fabric of pre-existing and ever changing social context. Using this logic, we will analyze two separate collections of sources, the Zeman letters being one of them.

Both of these collections, lucky finds in a regional museum and in private hands, respectively, are rather limited in scope, especially if we compare them with the collections used by Hämmerle or Wierling. The first one, already mentioned, is an incomplete collection of 109 *Feldpostkarte*, or field postcards, sent by Marie Zemanová to her husband, Pavel Zeman, over the span of seven months (January to July) of 1918. He was a headquarters clerk in Durazzo, Albania, far behind the lines; in a civilian life, a book-keeper living on a good address in the Moravian town of Olomouc.¹³ She was a housewife turned businesswoman, taking care of a household consisting of herself and one child, their eight year old son, Milda (Miloslav). Even in 1918, she was still able to keep a staff of one housemaid. We have no more information than that, and no other letters have been preserved, although it is clear that there *were* more letters being written even during those seven months, but these were apparently lost. Even though the collection covers only one side of the communication, the wife's (which makes it rather unique), it enables us to ascertain many aspects of communicating practices. Also, the narrative it creates makes possible to try and reconstruct the dynamics of the communication as a whole. Of course, the details of Pavel Zeman's strategies, conversational tools, and figures remain hidden to us, and any interpretation in this regard will remain more or less educated guess.

The second collection, while even smaller in numbers (about 50 letters and postcards in total), is even more interesting, as it includes letters written by several members of a single family. First, there is Jan Čundrle, a teacher in his thirties (he was born in 1882) coming from a small Moravian town of Ivančice. He had served as a reserve NCO in the 14th Company, k.u.k. Infantry Regiment 93, before being captured by the Russian army on October 13, 1914, near Ivangorod. Subsequently, he spent rest of the war as a POW in a camp somewhere in European Russia, only to join the Czechoslovak Legion in July 1918 and return home in October 1920.¹⁴ Then, we have Josefa Čundrlová, his wife, who took care of three small children (the youngest, Hanička, was born in January 1915; the

13 Other letters in the collection, sent from a family friend to Marie Zemanová, designate the address as Bäckergasse 11. See letter of Ladislav Crhák to Marie Zemanová, April 4, 1915, the Zeman Letters, VMO. As for the address of Pavel Zeman's HQ unit, all the postcards are addressed to a base post office in Durazzo with no further identification (Etappentrainwerkstätte – Etappenpostamt No. 191, Durazzo, Albanien).

14 See Jan Čundrle's record in the Military Historical Archives in Prague: URL: <<http://www.vuapraha.cz/soldier/11716976>> [accessed 1 June 2018].

other two were boys, Jiří and Ivan, in pre-school age) during the war and became a shop-assistant in Ivančice later in the war to make up for her missing husband's income. And, there are also their relatives – Jan's two sisters-in-law, and his brother.¹⁵ While Jan is clearly the focus of the whole communication and all of the letters are either written by him or addressed to him, the fact that all the parties are more or less directly represented here, even though in an incomplete manner (as far as we can estimate, the collection represents roughly a fifth of the amount of correspondence exchanged, with whole sections missing), makes for an excellent source in our effort to analyze the ways war has shaped family relationships, communication strategies, and gender order in wartime Moravia.

As already mentioned at the beginning, the above-quoted card written by Marie Zemanová to her husband, Pavel, represents a sort of an ideal type of wartime correspondence with respect to the themes involved. If we compare both collections, majority of them is almost ever-present in both of them. Of course, it is possible to plausibly argue that many of these themes are not a product of the context as much as a consequence of culturally ingrained communication strategies typical for early 20th century European middle classes, learned through the education and internalized as a universal notion of what a written communication is, how is it structured, and what literary templates and patterns are to be used in it.¹⁶ For this, the cards written by Marie Zemanová present us with ample evidence, as she repeatedly overuses a small set of standardized phrases, sometimes turning her correspondence into a patchwork of patterns interspersed with some additional information. However, as Rebecca Earle notes in the introduction to the collection of essays on historical epistolary patterns, “*letters display the signs of the distinct environments in which they were conceived*”, meaning it is not only the culturally established forms, but also the specific context of place and time which gives letters their ultimate meaning.¹⁷

Undeniably, the way Marie Zemanová addresses and greets her husband (“*Dear daddy! Many heartfelt hugs and kisses from us!*”) is a culturally standardized epistolary form learned at school; however, even here it is possible to see the wartime context

15 The collection of Jan Čundrle Papers is currently in private possession of his descendants; the author holds a digital copy, and all the future references are to this digitalized version of the collection (hereafter cited only by the name of the correspondents and the date). My many thanks go to Doc. Ivan Čundrle, who allowed me to study and copy his grandfather's correspondence for this research.

16 For pre-war epistolary culture and its possible influence on wartime correspondence, see M. HANNA, *A Republic of Letters*, pp. 1343–1348. For a more general analysis, see Stephan ELSPAß, *Between Linguistic Creativity and Formulaic Restriction: Cross-linguistic Perspectives on Nineteenth-century Lower Class Writers' Private Letters*, in: Marina Dossena – Gabriella del Lungo-Camicciotti (eds.), *Letter Writing in Late Modern Europe*, Amsterdam – Philadelphia 2012, pp. 45–64.

17 R. EARLE (ed.), *Epistolary Selves*, p. 2.

causing a slight shift in the meaning. The same is true with other standardized phrases included in the card quoted above, like the perennial “*there is nothing new out here*”, or the reports on current weather situation. While they can be seen as *topoi* typical of middle-class epistolary communication in the early 20th century, it’s the wartime context and the radically different situation of the parties involved that suddenly gives these “filler phrases” different meaning.

On top of that, looking at the same card again, we can see sections that only make sense in the context of modern society at war and it would be nigh impossible to find them in pre-war communication patterns. They include the repeated reference to wartime postal service and its regularity; or the very practice of everyday epistolary communication over long distances. Also, the ever-present anxiety connected to the lack of information, as well as large parts of the text dedicated to what we may call “material solidarity” (parcels and packages sent, received, or lost), are themes specific to the realities of a family divided by war. Indeed, these themes show clearly that it is necessary to read the whole letter *primarily* in the context of war, with the epistolary traditions of European middle-class being re-tooled for new purposes. Therefore, while we cannot forget that letter, as a literary form, is shaped by longtime cultural and social context, one which can be read as a text of a specific genre more than a reflection of reality, it is clear that it is not possible to detach this text from lived reality, at least in an analysis that focuses on the way these *forms* could be interpreted, i.e. given *meaning*, by the reader and the writer alike. As we will see, while the culturally-given form may stay the same, its meaning is actually dependent on communication strategies which can only be understood in historical context.

The purpose of every communication strategy is to pass information, opinions, and emotions in a way that fulfills the intentions of the writer. Before we get to the particular strategies used in this process, we cannot avoid mentioning the opposite practice, based on *not* passing information. Many historians dealing with the soldiers’ letters from the First World War had identified “discursive silence” as the main approach men chose in reporting their experiences to those at home, especially women.¹⁸ In the context of our analysis, it is worth noting that this strategy was often highly gendered – while men were sincerely blunt and sometimes even graphic in their descriptions of war when communicating with other men, even may have indulged in some embellishment for the sake of their self-image from time to time, women, especially spouses, were treated to dangers or gruesome realities of modern warfare being played down or outright denied.¹⁹

18 See Ch. HÄMMERLE, ‘*You Let a Weeping Woman Call You Home?*’, p. 165; also D. WIERLING, *Imagining and Communicating Violence*, p. 42.

19 For more details, see Ida SCHIKORSKY, *Kommunikation über das Unberschreibbare. Beobachtungen zum Sprachstil von Kriegsbriefen*, *Wirkendes Wort. Deutsche Sprache und Literatur in Forschung*

We can definitely see hints of this strategy in our collections. Even though we only have indirect access to Pavel Zeman’s letters through the reactions of his wife, it is more than clear that he employed this method with regards to anything disturbing that happened around him, or even to himself. However, this approach was prone to backfiring as his wife had often been left to rumors and gossip, or, as in the case of his leg injury, he was forced to reveal the true reality after some time, which shocked her even more.²⁰ The same calming strategy of “denial through silence” is to be found in Jan Čundrle’s letters from Russian captivity, too. Of course, being a POW did not bring along as many dangers as frontline service, but the sometimes harsh conditions and general uncertainties still compare well with Pavel Zeman’s safe position in the rear of the Balkans front. Also, the situation was much more difficult in terms of communicating the experience because it often took several months for a letter or a postcard to make it to arrive. Later on, with the chaos of the Russian Civil War and him joining the Czechoslovak Legion in July 1918, even Jan Čundrle might have faced his share of dangers – but he does not mention them at all. Actually, he does not mention anything of interest going on. Even the very fact that he had joined the Legion happened more or less in the background.²¹ In an effort to bridge this void, Jan repeatedly employs the simplest alternative to him being silent on surrounding realities – he tells his wife not to worry. As with Pavel Zeman, his efforts were prone to failure, as we can see in a letter to his sister-in-law: “*I got a card from Pepuška [„little Josefa“] from May 14, full of worries. I wrote to all of you many times, you don’t have to worry about me in any way.*”²² It may have been the silence on the specifics of his situation that was putting his wife off again and again, but his never ending complaints and pleas for more money and supplies (see below) had probably a lot to do with undermining his own effort in this area.

Of course, when analyzing soldiers’ communication strategies, we have to take into account wartime censorship and the fact that everyone involved was very well aware of the fact that their correspondence may have many unintended readers.²³ This knowledge

und Lehre 42, 1992, no. 2, pp. 300–301; also M. ROPER, *The Secret Battle*, pp. 59–61; for a short overview regarding Czech soldiers in the Austro-Hungarian Service, see J. HUTEČKA, *Muži proti ohni*, pp. 147–149.

20 See Marie Zemanová to Pavel Zeman, 28 June 1918.

21 He never mentions the legion in his letters home, and his wife actually wrote to him on 10 June 1919, “*I know you have joined the Legion,*” assuming he never shared that information directly (fear of censorship being a valid reason only before the end of 1918, when he has learned that the war was over and Austria-Hungary dissolved). See Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, 10 June 1919.

22 Jan Čundrle to Božena Šrotová, 7 July 1917.

23 On wartime censorship in Austria-Hungary, see Gustav SPANN, *Zensur in Österreich während des 1. Welt Krieges 1914–1918*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Vienna 1972; on the specifics regarding POWs in Russia, see A. RACHAMIMOV, *POWs and the Great War*, pp. 135–160.

may have been an important factor in the men's silence on controversial topics including – conveniently – danger. In our collections, this awareness is actually apparent in many instances. Jan Čundrle made little distinction between his female and male readers, keeping silent with respect to many controversial areas, which may be evidence of him being well aware of the fact that his letters will be passing through the hands of both Russian *and* Austrian censor. His wife was aware of this as well, at least to a certain extent, and it made her all the more wary about his “discursive silence” strategy: “*I would like to know more about you so much,*” wrote Josefa Čundrlová to her husband in early 1915, “*whether you're suffering a lot or not. Because people around here say that you must write only the good things.*”²⁴

Fear of censorship could influence the way women wrote their letters, too, albeit in a more indirect way. Marie Zemanová, while not very subtle when dealing with the sensitive topic of a black market tobacco operation she and her husband ran during 1918, puts a lot of effort into hiding the true nature of the “goods” under a simple abbreviation of “t...”. While she freely discusses other merchandise her husband sent home (rice, lemons, olive oil, and other luxury food, as well as caraway and other spices), even mentioning its black market re-sale value, with tobacco she is much more cautious, perhaps because of the doubly illegal nature of the whole enterprise – producing and selling tobacco was a long-established state monopoly in Austria-Hungary.²⁵ Even though censorship of outgoing correspondence was patchy at best, mostly because of its sheer volume, it is clear she was definitely aware of the dangers and tried to hide (with little subtlety, though) the part of her communications that she found most legally offending.²⁶ On the other hand, she is prone to outbursts of anti-war rhetoric from time to time: “*To hell with the whole war!*” and “*This whole war is a devil's deed!*” are her favorite phrases in such moments, betraying the rather low limits of self-censorship in her correspondence.²⁷ Therefore, it seems that while self-censorship may have played a role in soldiers' communication with home, the writers at home – while aware of the existence of censorship – felt less

24 Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, not dated, probably January or February 1915. Emphasis original.

25 In a postcard written on 30 June 1918, she actually mentions the possibility of a “renewed censorship” of soldiers' mail, adding that “*you won't be able to send any more t... then, won't you?*” See Marie Zemanová to Pavel Zeman, 30 April 1918. The state monopoly on cultivation and sale of tobacco (called *k.k. Tabakregie*) was introduced by Joseph II in 1784. See Ernst TROST, *Zur allgemeinen Erleichterung... Kultur- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Tabaks in Österreichs*, Wien 1984; in Czech, see Marie MACKOVÁ, *To byla c. k. trafiká*, Praha 2010; or (with specific attention given to the First World War) Marie MACKOVÁ, *Limity tabák v rakouském státním tabákovém monopolu*, *Theatrum Historiae* 2007, no. 2, pp. 275-290.

26 On censorship of outgoing mail (limited to certain strategic areas, mostly industrial, or those close to the frontlines), see G. SPANN, *Zensur in Österreich*, pp. 113–115.

27 See Marie Zemanová to Pavel Zeman, 3 April, 8 June and 28 June 1918.

constricted. The contents of their writings were therefore dictated mostly by the needs of the communication itself. With them, any discursive strategies involving denial, embellishment, or just plain silence about wartime reality were primarily a product of personal communication strategy vis-à-vis their spouse. Any fears of the censor’s office came only second after concerns for feelings and anxieties of the recipient and were, as with Marie Zemanová, reserved only to the offences they saw as particularly grave. As a result, the women’s strategies in our collections seem to be much more nuanced than those employed by their husbands.

It is in this context we need to interpret the phrase that is more or less central not only to the postcard quoted in the introduction, but to almost *every single postcard* Marie Zemanová sent to her husband during 1918. She reports that “*there is nothing new in here*” in 106 out of 109 existing postcards, almost always using this exact wording. It is clear that along with a small-talk regarding weather (“*We have a nice weather again.*”), it constitutes a cornerstone of her communication with her husband. On one level, it seems that it represents a typical culturally determined communication mode regularly used by an educated middle-class woman. However, the all-important context of wartime reality turned this “filler” into something much more substantial – a “standardized assurance” that constituted a core of what we may call a “calming strategy” permeating Marie’s communication, at least in 1918. It is worth considering how much of this effort is based on the official government propaganda with respect to the image and expected behavior of a good “*Frau im Kriege*”, “*conveyed by daily newspapers and magazines, in the public appeals*” and in other venues.²⁸ While it is impossible to completely disregard this notion, the whole context of Marie’s correspondence, her pragmatic and rather disillusioned attitude, and the fact the cards were written during the last year of the war, put its influence into doubt. Looking at the collection as a whole, it is perhaps more likely that it is a homefront variation of a *topos* that Christa Hämmerle and others often identify in soldiers’ letters. A *topos* that establishes the groundwork for the communication in the image of static normality connected to the familiar and idealized past realities. First, there is an effort to rhetorically surround oneself in normalcy by describing everyday wartime existence in the familiar terms of civilian life (which, on the homefront, is less apparent, but still present), and second, there is the tendency “*to orient [oneself] towards the normality of the pre-war period*” which remains “*the horizon of all their hopes and wishes*”.²⁹ Here, we can actually see Marie Zemanová employing this figure to ease her husband’s worries – the simple phrase “*there is nothing new in here*” inserted in every letter carries a notion

28 Ch. HÄMMERLE, ‘You Let a Weeping Woman Call You Home?’, p. 156.

29 Ibidem, p. 165; also I. SCHIKORSKY, *Kommunikation über das Unberschreibbare*, p. 301.

of a static world that has not changed since Pavel Zeman has seen it the last time; a world where everything is as it used to be; a world that is the anchor to his uncertain existence; a world where changes in weather, however slight or non-consequential to anything, are still worth mentioning as nothing more serious is apparently happening.

In comparison, Josefa Čundrlová employed a much more straightforward strategy of direct assurances combined with playing down difficulties, or highly embellishing the family's everyday life. For example, in March 1917, she wrote to her husband: "*As for us, we are well in every aspect of life.*"³⁰ However, even she had resorted to the use of the above-mentioned figure from time to time: "*You can be assured that we are as well as we used to be before the war.*"³¹ The same strategy, using the idyllic images of pre-war life, is especially pronounced in her letter from early December 1917, with detailed description of Christmas preparations including a list of gifts to the children and "*a tree as we have always had*".³² As the war progressed, however, one can see a growing level of frustration and sometimes irritation between the lines, with reality "slipping in" almost inadvertently. For example, on June 20, 1917, she wrote to her husband alluding to the things past yet again: "*It's all as it has always been here [...]. I did not need any loans so far [...]. We have no shortages here, not at all.*"³³ Only two weeks later, however, she briefly mentioned that the family situation is already rather tense, possibly undermining her intended strategy: "*Granma and grandad are helping us out a lot [...]. I hope they will continue to do so. Without them we'd be starving.*"³⁴

The problem with such communication strategy was that it depended on the author being able to keep slip-ups like this to a minimum. Another limit to the "calming strategy" manifested itself clearly in Josefa's case – her in-laws represented alternative source of information and kept her husband informed of the many difficulties facing his family at home. Thus, Jan's sister-in-law Cyrila started her letter in a rather familiar way of de-escalating anxiety through a ritual reference to the past: "*Everything's as it was with us.*" But then, she continued: "*Only, your Pepa [Josefa] has had no maid for a few months now. We are afraid she will exhaust herself. She's got headaches often, too [...]*" To make things even worse, she then went on saying that "*typhus was widespread here, but now the danger is over*".³⁵ Later, Cyrila wrote to Jan that "*P[epa]'s kids were sick. Hanička had a fever from too much fruit, and she had to call a doctor to little Ivan, as he has perhaps eaten the fruit*

30 Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, 9 March 1917.

31 Ibidem, 21 January 1917.

32 Ibidem, 9 December 1917.

33 Ibidem, 20 June 1917.

34 Ibidem, 7 August 1917.

35 Cyrila to Jan Čundrle, 23 March 1917.

as well. And Jurka's got the chickenpox. But now they're all alright.”³⁶ One can only imagine the effect this set of information had on Jan in the POW camp, but it is quite clear that, in the context of Jan Čundrlé's rather moody correspondence from Russian captivity (see below), Josefa Čundrlová tried to solve the problem of communicating family life to her husband by painting an idealized image of reality in her letters, difficult reality notwithstanding.

The indiscretion of relatives presents us with one of the many moments in both collections when the “calming strategies” crumble, often leading to a crisis in the couple's communication. However, it did not always have to be a chatty in-law who caused the problem. Another cause of tension apparent in both collections are the war stories, rumors and outright gossip always circulating among the population at home. Very often, these were of personal nature and included unverified, exaggerated, or completely false information on the spouse's well-being. There is an almost ideal example of the mechanics of such a rumor in the Zeman collection. It all begins with Marie's letter to Pavel written on June 30, 1918: “I ran into Natzler yesterday in the afternoon, and he asked me if it's true that you were gravely wounded! Is there any truth to it? Don't you dare to hide anything from me, and tell me everything!”³⁷ The sharp rebuke at the end shows that the rumor circulating in Marie's social circle in Olomouc had torpedoed any calming strategy Pavel Zeman might have been using at the time. The resulting doubt and uncertainty regarding her husband's health then got only deeper as the rumor escalated: “What is with your wound? Is it getting better?”, Marie asked the following day, not even waiting for any reaction to her original inquest. Adding another reproach and revealing the emotional price the husband's silence had cost her: “Why didn't you let me know that you have been wounded? When Natzler told me [later] that he has heard you're supposedly dead, I thought I was going to have a stroke! I've been crying the whole night!”³⁸ The whole crisis culminated the next day, as the rumor now reported that “you are said to have lost both legs”. More anger follows, a consequence of a wife's willingness to put faith in her husband's communication strategy being completely shattered: “Why did not you tell what had happened to you? It was all the more cruel to learn it from strangers, and everyone is telling me something different! I am really desperate now! Tell me what had happened!”³⁹

It is also no accident that the above described crisis came around at the same time when the Zeman family communication experienced, according to Marie, one of the many “outages” in mail service, resulting in much slower circulation of any

³⁶ Ibidem, 5 August 1917.

³⁷ Marie Zemanová to Pavel Zeman, 30 June 1918.

³⁸ Ibidem, 1 July 1918.

³⁹ Ibidem, 2 July 1918.

information whatsoever. Reliability of mail service was one of the key themes in wartime correspondence,⁴⁰ and frequency and the “effectiveness” of wartime rumors seemed to be closely tied to it. If the quantity of the communication suffered, its perceived quality was harmed as well, and the resulting void was filled by rumor and gossip. These were hard to verify or debunk, and the resulting uncertainty gave them even more credibility. Ironically, the “discursive silence” of many soldiers, be it intentional or not, made the situation even worse. There is telling a moment in the Čundrle family correspondence in June 1919, when Josefa wrote to her husband: “*In March, right before I have received your letter from last November, there were rumors around that you were wounded in the hand, and others saying that you have lost both your arms and your legs, too.*”⁴¹ The long delays in correspondence between Czechoslovakia and the Legion in war-torn Russia meant that even an absurd gossip may have sounded plausible for a moment. It is an evidence of the ultimate fragility of the calming strategy, as it was based on a “suspense of disbelief” that quickly eroded in the face of delayed mail, reaching a point where the thirst for news overwhelmed their possible credibility.

Anxious waiting for news represents a typical pattern of wartime correspondence. As written by Marie Zemanová: “*I Can Hardly Wait to Hear.*” The emotional consequences of the waiting, leading to a devastating uncertainty, is well summarized in Josefa Čundrlová’s letter written in January 1915. She reacted to the news that Jan was alive and in captivity after all, after not hearing from him (or of him) for almost four months: “*I cried so much after your letters stopped coming in October [of 1914], I was picturing the worst possible things, but even such uncertainty, such terrible fears and worries, did not made me to think about the worst [...].*”⁴² The letter confirms Christa Hämmerle’s claim that “*the many delays and interruptions of the postal service resulted in a feeling of insecurity that went much deeper and often led to conflict*” – and it was not only the insecurity in terms of worries for the partner’s well-being, but also uncertainty about his loyalty to the cause of common partnership itself: “*Had the other partner really written a letter? Did he or she truly write regularly every day, or perhaps only casually, in passing?*”⁴³ There were of course many delays caused by the ebb and flow of war, and even regular mail took some time to arrive – about ten days in the case of the Zemans and months in the case of the Čundrles. As a result, information got “stacked up”, dialogues went out of sync, and the insecurity about the other’s mailing efforts were constantly peeking in the background.

40 For a perfect example, see the card quoted at the beginning: “*No mail has arrived today. Are you getting mail from me alright? And the papers? Write as soon as you can to let me know you are back!*”

41 Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, 10 June 1919.

42 Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, letter not dated, probably from January 1915.

43 Ch. HÄMMERLE, “*You Let a Weeping Woman Call You Home?*”, p. 158.

The dynamics of the whole partnership could become very unstable as a consequence. This issue is present especially – and, considering the lengthy delays in their conversation, perhaps understandably – in the correspondence of Josefa and Jan Čundrle. Although both of them swear emphatically and repeatedly that they “*send four to five letters a month regularly*”, their faith in the other and in their relationship is again and again subject to repeated crisis of confidence.⁴⁴ “*Why do you write me so little,*” asks dejected Jan in February 1918. “*Just a few pathetic words from each of you would be enough, so I’d have a general picture, and you – nothing. Why?!*”⁴⁵ In a reaction to other similar outbursts, his wife has written before: “*You whine that we don’t write you enough – as for me, I write you every week either on Saturday after work, or on Sunday afternoon.*”⁴⁶ However, neither Josefa was immune to the pressures of insecurity and the crisis of confidence: “*Oh, my dear Jan,*” she wrote in March 1917, “*I have no word from you since November. Letters are coming once a week or even every other day from some of the guys in Omsk. I write to you every week [...]*”⁴⁷ The well-targeted complaint says a lot about her loss of confidence in husband’s loyalty to their relationship. Ironically, roles had changed just a week later, when Josefa wrote another letter in reaction to similar rebukes in Jan’s letter that has finally arrived in the meantime: “*Oh, our dearest daddy – you say that you have not got any news from us since July, and I write you every week.*”⁴⁸

Another limit to the effectiveness of calming strategies came from the nature of information itself. The underlying purpose of communication strategies was, after all, to share information in such a way that was emotionally palatable for the recipient, and it is clear from both collections that calming strategies did not necessarily work only through denying information, but also through balancing it through proper language, timing and context. We have already seen this with the phrases and figures invoking the images of “positive normalcy” and of the past as its measure. We can ascribe the same general purpose to the “filler” in the shape of Marie Zemanová’s small-talk dictums. For example, if we look closely at the way she passes information on to her husband in Albania, we can see that often, right before or after she ensures him that “*there is nothing new in here*”, she adds a piece of information that suggests otherwise and hints at the difficulties of sustaining a middle-class home in a 1918 Moravian town. Besides the already mentioned anti-war outbursts, which usually follow either complaints about rising black-market

44 For other examples of similar assurances, see Jan Čundrle to Josefa Čundrlová, 7 August 1917; and Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, 21 January 1917.

45 Jan Čundrle to Josefa Čundrlová, 16 February 1918.

46 Ibidem, 24 March 1916.

47 Ibidem, 5 March 1917.

48 Ibidem, 18 March 1917, emphasis original.

prices or dwindling rations received from the government, telling Pavel Zeman that things are far from the ideal, we see events being mentioned that are a bit at odds with the presented façade of temporal stillness: “*There is nothing new in here. It’s overcast again. There was a huge fire yesterday in Chválkovice, we watched it out of the window.*”⁴⁹ It seems obvious that Marie Zemanová tends to use the “calming phrases” as a sort of cover in revealing potentially disturbing information, hinting there is probably much more going on than is readily apparent. Sometimes, it happens almost inadvertently, like when she repeatedly apologizes for the quality of bread buns she sends to her husband with “*you have to forgive me, I have so many worries*” – with no specific worries mentioned in any of that week’s postcards, which are (besides general complaints about the war and slow mail) more or less filled with the pretense of a “positive normalcy”.⁵⁰

Even more revealing contrast between a purposeful communication strategy at the forefront and the unspoken reality in the background is one of the threads winding through the whole series of Marie’s letters. Sometime in late March or early April 1918, she had apparently contracted an unspecified disease, which might have been a result of malnutrition or other dietary deficiency. However, in the postcards available (and there seem to be no breaks in the flow of correspondence during the spring of 1918), she always mentions her situation in retrospect (“*I’m not completely healthy yet.*”), perhaps when it is clear her condition would be hard not to report over a long period of time (“*The doctor in the hospital told me that it may take up to half a year till I’m cured! It is said to be a protracted illness! There is nothing new!*”)⁵¹ And while during the following months Marie is apparently trying to avoid the topic of her illness as much as possible, so her husband will not get anxious, her condition gets bad enough to warrant a doctor’s request for hospitalization in early June, which she refuses and proudly reports to her husband that the treatment she has received instead is helping for the moment. Then, in subsequent weeks, she plays out the same pattern – announcing past bouts of illness or complaining about limitations it carries (by the physician’s order, she’s not allowed outside during June and July) throughout the rest of the summer, only to put a positive spin on the situation at the end of every letter by reporting she already feels better for the moment and “*there is nothing new in here.*”⁵² Thus, her illness, however grave or at least difficult it is, is used to reinforce the intended calming effect, with the traditional calming phrases serving as a counterbalance to the information she feels bound to pass to her husband.

49 Marie Zemanová to Pavel Zeman, 12 June 1918. Chválkovice was a village north-east of Olomouc, today one of the city suburbs, about two miles from where the Zeman family apartment was located.

50 Ibidem, 9 June 1918.

51 Ibidem, 13 April 1918.

52 Ibidem, quotations from 1 and 2 June 1918.

The same method of sharing information in a way that gives the recipient a general idea of present hardships while trying to lessen the consequent worries is clearly present in the way Marie discusses another key area of wartime existence – homefront economy. Especially in the summer of 1918, she repeatedly mentions not only rising prices (a staple complaint of her previous letters), but general food shortages as well. However, almost always she adds that the family’s situation is far from critical: “Up here it’s really bad as far as food is concerned,” Marie wrote on May 30, “but you don’t have to worry about us, I’ll always get something, and we have t[obacco] to exchange.”⁵³ “It’s really bad here concerning food,” was the report three days later, “but we have plenty, you don’t have to worry. There is nothing new!”⁵⁴ Again, we see positive phrases serving to counterbalance whatever disturbing news Marie Zemanová felt obliged to tell her husband. On the other hand, it is clear from the context of her letters that the family was indeed far from starvation that crept through the streets of many Cisleithenian towns and cities in the last year of the war – with his wife defending her decision to keep a housemaid on the payroll in April 1918, Pavel Zeman could be content that there are still reserves in the family finances. Therefore, her complaints brought him news on a contextual more than on a personal level. Also, the difference in the economic situation of both families may be the very reason why Marie Zemanová’s calming strategy differed from that of that of Josefa Čundrlová.

In her case, the small-town middle-class teacher’s household of four, living off an unspecified job in a local store Josefa got during the war, had suffered much more under the wartime economy constraints than the bourgeoisie book-keeper’s two-member Zeman family with access to black market profits ever had. The family situation forced Josefa to try and calm her husband with especially pronounced emphasis on the notions of family idyll, economic stability, and pre-war normality, as already discussed. At the same time, she was trying to hide the family’s economic situation in particular from him as much as possible, with only the above-mentioned slip-ups by herself or her relatives suggesting otherwise.

Of course, images of wartime reality flashing between the lines did not go unnoticed by the men who were on the receiving end of this strategy. By the end of June 1918, Pavel Zeman was apparently at least a bit alarmed by his wife’s illness, pressuring her – in an ironical parallel to the same crisis of confidence she had before – into admitting that the situation is actually worse than he was being told: “You’re asking me, what’s going on with my illness! To be frank, it got worse. On Wednesday, I was in the hospital, I had an appointment for ultraviolet rays, but the doctor said I have to wait till I get better, saying

⁵³ Ibidem, 30 May 1918.

⁵⁴ Ibidem, 2 June 1918.

*it's not good to mix too many things together. There is nothing new out here!*⁵⁵ As for Jan Čundrle, despite the occasional slip-ups and disclosing remarks of his wife and relatives, he seemed content in believing whatever information is passed to him (as long as he has at least some). However, his correspondence with his wife betrays another set of themes clearly reflecting another level of dynamics in a communication between partners. These themes, revolving around gender representations and dynamics, are, to a lesser extent, apparent in the Zeman family correspondence as well, and it would therefore be wrong to ignore them.

As Christa Hämmerle mentioned in her study of the Viennese bourgeois couple during the war, the social development during wartime has created a “contradictory female identity”. Many a wife “*had become a more critical, independent and probably more self-confident*” while, at the same time, preserving all the hopes for “*the prospect of a ‘fulfilling’ marriage in accordance with traditional expectations*”.⁵⁶ There is ample evidence for this claim in both out collections. For example, in June 1917, Josefa Čundrlová wrote with barely hidden pride: “*Everything is as usual with us. I manage the household as we have always had, perhaps even better.*”⁵⁷ Two years later, in a similar vein but with even more air of independence from economic as well as patriarchal power of her husband, she wrote: “*Over time, I got so used to doing everything by myself that I hardly know of anything that I would share with you. Actually, I can no longer imagine there is someone in the world who cares about me, about my children, about my issues.*”⁵⁸ In an example of a disclosing remark, her efforts to calm her husband through references to her newly established independence fall short, basically telling him that his presence as a breadwinner and family patriarch is not needed anymore (because she can do things “*perhaps even better*”). In this particular letter, all family matters are symbolically appropriated by the wife proud of her ability to take care of them. She even rhetorically appropriates the whole of the parenting, claiming the children to be “*hers*”, assuming the masculine position at the head of the family.⁵⁹ However, what follows almost immediately after the second quotation is the following re-assurance: “*But there you are – our everything!*”⁶⁰ While in the first part, we have seen Josefa Čundrlová experiencing a shift in gender roles,

55 Ibidem, 15 July 1918.

56 Ch. HÄMMERLE, *You Let a Weeping Woman Call You Home?*, p. 175.

57 Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, 20 June 1917.

58 Ibidem, 17 July 1919.

59 For family roles and masculinity in early 20th century, see for example . M. ROPER – J. TOSH (eds.), *Manful Assertions*; J. TOSH, *What Should Historians Do with Masculinity?*; John TOSH, *A Man's Place: Masculinity and the Middle-class Home in Victorian England*, London 2007; or U. FREVERT, „*Mann und Weib, und Weib und Mann*“.

60 Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, 17 July 1919. Emphasis original.

with this sentence, she somewhat re-establishes her femininity by re-emphasizing herself as a part of a whole, putting forward her emotionality (traditionally seen as feminine) again. Combined with Josefa's similar “emotional assurances” repeated throughout her correspondence (“*Only that you, my beloved Jan, you are so far away, oh so far away.*”)⁶¹, and her calming-strategy motivated efforts to present the family as living as close to normalcy as possible, it is clear that her situation indeed becomes contradictory – on the one hand, she is keeping alive the notion of female emotionality, dependence, and care; on the other hand, experiencing and expressing new feelings even by invoking traditionally masculine imagery of “strength”. Symptomatically, she puts this “strength” into a direct connection to the “feminine” part of her identity based on her loving feelings for her husband: „*I don't want to imagine that you are suffering as well, it would drain my strength.*”⁶²

Similar pattern of a woman betraying, in terms of the gender order, traits socially defined as masculine, is also apparent in the field cards by Marie Zemanová. While there is no doubt that, at least in writing, she fulfills her feminine role of a middle-class wife and mother, using it as a part of her calming strategy, deeper gender dynamics is clearly at play here. Not only she often gives her husband advice on how to deal with a new commander (“*Even if he's not in a mood and is berating everyone, just stay silent and do what he says! And let me know how you get along with him!*”)⁶³ – this can be interpreted as still well inside the traditionally feminine field of interpersonal relations. Notably, throughout the whole series of letters written in 1918, it seems that Marie is the “brains” behind the family black market operation involving the import and re-sale of goods that were scarcely available to an urban family in Moravia, but plentiful to a headquarters clerk in Albania.⁶⁴ As far as we can tell from her side of the conversation, Pavel Zeman is relegated to the role of a supplier. While he clearly helps to support the family through his parcels in a substantial way, the whole business seems to be directed by his wife. While he has the key access to the goods, it is Marie who has all the necessary market knowledge. She has the grasp of the black market, how it works, what are the prices, where to find buyers, as well as what are the family's immediate needs. As a result, she is more or less directing her husband in their common effort to make it through the war

61 Ibidem, 24 June 1918. It would be difficult and probably meaningless to list all instances when Josefa Čundrlová expresses loving feelings to her husband, as it happens almost endemically throughout their correspondence. As an example, see: “*As always, we will be remembering our distant beloved daddy with an indescribable desire.*” Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, 9 June 1917.

62 See ibidem, 7 August 1917.

63 Marie Zemanová to Pavel Zeman, 28 April 1918.

64 For a typical example, see the card written on 10 June 1918: “*I guess you could send the rice, if possible! I was asking around for the price of lard, and they say 1 kg raw fat for 50 Kor [koruna]. That would be worth exchanging!*” Ibidem.

with as little discomfort as possible.⁶⁵ In the process, Marie Zemanová becomes a highly confident businesswoman: “*I did not exchange the t... from you yet. You bet I will not be duped easily, that’s for sure!*”⁶⁶

However, it is worth noting that while she establishes herself, at least rhetorically, as the leader of the common business venture, acquiring many masculine traits in the process (being decisive, possessing the knowledge, and being in power as a result), she is always – at least formally – informing her husband on whatever transaction is going on: “*I’ll let you know as soon as I’ll exchange it!*”⁶⁷ Her intention seems to be to keep the traditional gender order alive at least through formal acknowledgment of the notion that – even though he has little say in the whole process – it’s the man’s role to have the final say. With these efforts, the sense of “gender normality” was kept on a symbolic level – as she was informing her husband only *ex post*, and the decision had already been taken. As we see a similar pattern in the case of Josefa Čundrlová as well, it seems that men were bound to experience a radical repositioning of themselves in the gender order, with the power structure within their families radically changing. Because of wartime reality, men become mere executors of instructions given to them by their wives, as knowledge and skills necessary for the family well-being are increasingly found solely with the woman, who is slowly becoming aware of the fact. It is the same process the historian Rudolf Kučera described in his study of wartime working class in Bohemia – even though the workers’ families were still living in the same households. Logically, with families where husbands became separated by thousands of miles, the same dynamics was much more pronounced.⁶⁸ What the men distanced from their families experienced was a process in many ways opposite to the dynamics of the “contradictory” wartime femininity of their spouses. While they were still the male members of the family, fathers of the children, and legal husbands to their wives, and they were still at least formally acknowledged as such they faced gradual loss of any ability to exercise the traditional patriarchal role while

65 Ibidem. See for example the card written on 19 May 1918: “*Ask around if you couldn’t get black pepper, but on a cheap! We can make a fortune out of it!*” Or a card from 30 May 1918: “*As for food supplies, it is really bad around here, but you don’t have to worry about us, I’ll always get something, and we have [obacco] to exchange!*” The fact that knowledge of the market became a sole dominion of the wife is clearly apparent in many of the cards. For example, 5 June 1918: “*Don’t buy that rice, it’s too expensive!*” Or 13 June 1918: “*I have sold the oil to the Vyměťals for 50 K. They were really happy! And don’t send the garlic, it costs 40 hal. [haler] a bulb over here! It wouldn’t be worth it.*”

66 Ibidem, 21 May 1918.

67 Ibidem.

68 Rudolf KUČERA, *Život na příděl: Válečná každodennost a politiky dělnické třídy v českých zemích 1914–1918*, Praha 2013 (for an English edition, see *Rationed Life. Science, Everyday Life, and Working-Class Politics in the Bohemian Lands 1914–1918*, Oxford 2016).

being pushed into a secondary, sometimes even subordinate and dependent position in their partnerships.

This is apparent in both of the cases analyzed here. First, at purely material level, both families were supporting their patriarchs with parcels of food and other goods (the Zeman's), or with money (both cases). In the case of the Zemans, this support was of course mutual and did not make Pavel obviously dependent, but it still played an important role in his existence and in his wife's correspondence. Partially thanks to their business venture that he supplied with luxury goods, Marie Zemanová was able to supply her husband with many basic as well as luxury items. For example, in May 1918, she had sent him “a loaf of bread, 2 pieces of sausages, 15 cigars, and 20 caramel sweets”, adding “a bread bun and 3 sausages” only four days later.⁶⁹ On July 19 she reports to Pavel that she has sent “2 parcels” and two weeks later, she adds “200 K [koruna] and 25 cigars”.⁷⁰ Pavel Zeman participated in this exchange, of course – in June, for example, he added “two boxes [... containing] beans, 4 lemons, blue packet of tobacco [...], a bottle of oil, 6 pieces of soap, 3 packets of cigarettes [...]” to his regular shipments of tobacco.⁷¹ But by sheer count, it seems that most of the parcels (excluding the tobacco) travelled in the direction from Moravia to Albania. Economic dependence on the operation directed by his wife was even more clear when it came to money – a sentence “if you need money, let me know and I will send some” appears often in his wife's letters during the summer of the last year of the war. Moreover, it is clear from his wife's tracking of the parcels that he had to ask for this kind of support several times over. For a man of his age and social status, it had to be a new experience indeed, being financially supported by his wife and her business abilities.⁷²

Jan Čundrle had apparently experienced a situation much worse not only in terms material well-being, but also with regards to consequent shifts in gender identity. To start with, he repeatedly ended up desperately pleading with his wife and several (female) relatives for financial support in his captivity: “I got a letter from Pepuška today, along with money – 8.50 rubles. I really need more, so please tell Pepuška to send more, if she can,” he wrote to his sister-in-law in July 1917.⁷³ Not a month went by and Jan repeated his plea: “I've got the money, 8 payments in total. If Pepuška can manage, please let her send more.”⁷⁴ Not only was Jan Čundrle entering a gender minefield of decidedly emasculating

69 She reports all this in a summary two weeks later. See Marie Zemanová to Pavel Zeman, 17 June 1918.

70 Ibidem, 19 July and 31 July 1918.

71 Ibidem, 13 June 1918.

72 See for example cards written by Marie Zemanová on 16 May, 5 June or 13 June 1918.

73 Jan Čundrle to Božena Šrotová, 17 July 1917.

74 Ibidem, 7 July 1917.

financial dependence – he was also, through his ignorance of realities at home, causing conflict. This conflict can be understood, somewhat paradoxically, as a consequence of Josefa's communication strategies resulting in Jan's inability to see how difficult is her predicament; however, even taking her various modes of calming strategies into consideration, it seems his understanding of the situation was quite low. As a consequence, we can see the partnership experience several crises accompanied by sharp repositioning of the gender roles. It is the moments when Josefa's reactions to his financial needs shift from offering all the available support to more or less open criticism of his unmanly attitude: "I'm sending you the money, 30 K every month. I hope it's enough. If you need more, let me know, I'd send more," she wrote in December 1916.⁷⁵ Then, in May 1917, Jan basically forced his wife to raise her efforts, leading Josefa to an irritated comment: "I will be sending 40 K after June 1. We will have to manage the loss. As long as you can live better [...]"⁷⁶ When Jan's pleas for further support, both direct and indirect, did not cease, and actually escalated into an unrealistic request for "a coat, waistcoat, trousers and 2 shirts with collars", Josefa wrote "I do not what to say" and went on describing the truth about the clothing situation back home (where all Jan's clothes were used up as a source of material for children's clothes).⁷⁷ Jan's increasingly unrealistic requests incited an even harsher backlash from his relatives: "Pepa [...] cannot send you more money [...]. I think you should earn some yourself," wrote his sister-in-law Cyrila, while his other sister-in-law, Božena, could barely conceal her exasperation with his pleas for clothes: "Get your hands on something out there!"⁷⁸ In the context of this conflict, even the innocuous question of Josefa's from February 1916 acquired a new meaning: "You never write what job you do; the others do so."⁷⁹ If we consider the gender dynamics at play here, it is more than clear that while the women involved are empowered and in control (i.e., acquiring some basic traits of masculinity), Jan Čundrle's masculinity is endangered by his wartime situation, pushing him into a role of passive, dependent family member – a role traditionally designated as feminine, a role potentially made worse by the fact that as a POW, he had lost almost any semblance of masculine status – independence, freedom of action, or any action at all – and he went on existing in a "liminal" state as far as wartime gender order was concerned.⁸⁰

75 Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, 27 December 1916.

76 Ibidem, 19 May 1917.

77 Jan Čundrle to Božena Šrotová, 7 August 1917; for Josefa's reaction, see Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, 25 November 1917.

78 Cyrila to Jan Čundrle, 25 October 1917; Božena Šrotová to Jan Čundrle, 2 December 1917.

79 Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, 22 February 1916.

80 For more context on the gendered liminality of the POW experience in Russia, and the need to compensate for the apparent emasculation of the POWs, see Alon RACHAMIMOV, *The Disruptive*

Soldiers’ masculinity was problematized not only by the pressures of wartime economies, but also in the important area of parenting. On the one hand, we witness in the correspondence the immense emotional pressure of “distant fatherhood” forced upon everyone involved, and the on-going importance of the father for the family. It is actually the one part of wartime reality that cuts through most of the calming strategies – it seems that while women apply all sorts of communication strategies limiting access of the men to disturbing information in such areas as economy, with regards to the children, they tend to be much more open, targeting men’s emotional attachment to the children more or less openly in an effort to keep the parent-child relationship as informed and heart-felt as possible, revealing their dependency on the help of the other parent in bringing up and disciplining the children in the process. Thus, Josefa Čundrlová repeatedly tells her husband in the spring of 1915 that his daughter Hana was born in January of that year, also mentioning what she probably thought of most when thinking about wartime distant fatherhood: “*I would like to know, if you will love her as much as you do the boys, even though you have not seen her yet,*” she wrote in March, 1916, adding a month later: “*What will Hanička say when she sees you? Her dad that she hasn’t seen yet?*”⁸¹ The same worries stayed with Josefa throughout the war: “*The kids are growing up, not knowing their dad,*” she wrote in January, 1917. “*Hanička says ‘good night’ to her daddy every evening, and she even hasn’t seen him yet [...]*”⁸² Notably, all the cards written by Marie Zemanová to her husband address him as “*Dear daddy!*” – a phrase which, while it could come off as banal in a different context, here it represents a decidedly ambivalent call out to the missing parent to keep his role in mind.⁸³ With some caution, we may conclude that while men were more or less easily replaced by women in the area of economy, it was much more difficult, perhaps impossible to replace them as fathers.

Besides being missed in purely emotional terms, men were much needed as authority figures in children’s upbringing as well. Wartime reality more or less denied them a chance to actively participate in this “venue” of masculinity,⁸⁴ but it was not for lack of trying

Comforts of Drag: (Trans)Gender Performances among Prisoners of War in Russia, 1914–1920, American Historical Review 111, 2006, no. 2, pp. 368–372.

81 Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, 6 March 1916; *ibidem*, 16 April 1918.

82 *Ibidem*, 17 January 1917.

83 We can discern the same intention in the oft-used communication strategy of ensuring men that they are still central to their children’s thoughts, even though it meant putting emotional strain on their husbands minds. See for example *ibidem*, 21 January 1917: “*Little Ivan is playing with a construction kit, and I’m writing to you, which makes him stop crying.*” Or Marie Zemanová to Pavel Zeman, 21 March 1918: “*When Milda woke up, he did not cry, but he did so in the evening, calling out for his daddy, saying he really misses you! We both miss you a lot!*”

84 For fatherhood and its position in early 20th century masculinity, see for example Jitka KOHOUTOVÁ, *Konstrukce otcovské identity v 19. století: aspekt otce-živitele v rodinách české intelektuální buržoazie*,

on the part of themselves or their spouses. It was here more than in any other field of familial relations where women tried hard to keep their husbands “on board”, obviously missing their help. Marie Zemanová never ceased to update her husband on their son, Milda, and his successes and failures at school, in German-language classes, and in the process of growing up in general. Even in his absence, she is still using her husband in the traditional masculine father-role of the ultimate authority figure, and tries to keep Pavel involved in disciplining Milda as well: “*You should write to Milda and tell him not to let me force him into studying so much, and to study by himself.*”⁸⁵ Josefa Čundrlová, too, uses every opportunity to mention the children to her husband, and actually meditates on the irreplaceable role the father has in the children’s upbringing: “*There’s hardly any discipline around. I’m just glad I’m able to take proper care of their bodies. Anyway, it will be your task in the future. Actually, it will be an educational and disciplinary task for both of us.*”⁸⁶

The men themselves were loath to lose their prerogative to direct or at least influence their children’s upbringing, and their efforts can tell us a lot about the development of wartime masculinity. Using the example of the Čundrle family correspondence, we can identify a clear dynamics where Jan, notwithstanding the lack of information about the situation at home, repeatedly comments on his wife’s educational efforts (more than on anything else bar mail shortages and lack of money), with mixed success. While he seems to be obsessed with the moral qualities of his children’s upbringing, advising on them being “*left to enjoy the joys of childhood*”, as “*it is early to introduce them to the drudgery of life*”, and noting that musical education is a way to do so, his wife seems to be more preoccupied with the realities of feeding the children properly. It almost seems as his comments are a symbolic way to exercise at least some notion of patriarchal control and power over the family, therefore preserving his sense of masculinity. In the process, however, it is clear that because of the lack of information, most of his efforts are hopelessly out of touch with reality of the home front – such as when Jan Čundrle expresses doubts about his wife’s ability to take care of the children after being sent a family photograph in January 1917, only to provoke her exasperated, defensive answer: “*You also say we do not look good – it’s just an illusion, the photograph does not do us justice!*”⁸⁷

in: R. Švaříčková-Slabáková – J. Kohoutová – R. Pavlíčková – J. Hutečka et al., *Konstrukce maskulinní identity*, p. 175. See also Trev Lynn BROUGHTON – Helen ROGERS, *Gender and Fatherhood in the Nineteenth Century*, New York 2007 or J. TOSH, *A Man’s Place*, pp. 79–101.

85 Marie Zemanová to Pavel Zeman, 18 May 1918. She even makes Milda to write a letter to his father, which more than a loving child’s letter to his dad resembles a report to a headmaster, promising “*to behave and study*” so the father “*will be proud of me again*”. See Milda to Pavel Zeman, 3 May 1918.

86 Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, 8 June 1917.

87 Jan Čundrle to Josefa Čundrlová, 18 August 1918 and 17 July 1917; Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, 21 January 1917.

Here again emerges the same issue we have encountered before – an information gap resulting in a shift in the gender order. While men become more and more passive, receiving not only material support, but also instructions and news from or through their wives (who supply them with newspapers as well as with updates on social life), the women acquire control and power through almost exclusive access to the knowledge of the world, beginning with the economic reality and ending with politics.⁸⁸ While men still try, as we have seen, to act upon their traditional roles as much as possible over distance, and women are still dependent upon them emotionally as well as in the invaluable parenting role (where the dependence is mutual), and they still honor their patriarchal role by reporting to them all the important actions they take, the decision-making process shifts along the lines of societal knowledge, i.e. to the women, and the whole communication becomes a sort of a symbolic, formalized ritual, a calming communication strategy designed not only to keep semblance of normalcy to make the separation emotionally bearable, but also to mask the dynamic changes in the gender order. On the other hand, women gradually became more and more emboldened to reflect this shift in the correspondence. Thus, Marie Zemanová retorted to her husband’s effort to speed up the transfer of tobacco by using his comrades going on a leave as messengers: “*I really don’t get it. You were already cheated once, and you get cheated again,*” she almost berates him in a condescending way, putting his apparently uninformed judgment into doubt.⁸⁹

Therefore, while women experience what Christa Hämmerle has called “contradictory female identity”, men had experienced perhaps even more serious gender reversal, presenting them with a shattered and partially “feminized” notion of their own masculinity. With some caution, we may even claim that in the process of losing direct touch with their families and resorting to the venue of correspondence, their communication strategy becomes, perhaps unconsciously, more emotional than would be preferred, closing the gap between the supposedly rational communications related to masculinity and the emotionality of feminine correspondence.⁹⁰ Jan Čundrle, in particular, is a great example of this process. As we have already seen he often succumbs to despair when writing home, especially in his oft-repeated pleas for a more intensive communication: “*Why, oh why do you write to me so little?*” he asked his wife in his perhaps most emotionally charged outburst in February 1918. “*Why?!*”⁹¹ It is clear that communication with home was one

88 Christa Hämmerle actually came to the same conclusion. See Ch. HÄMMERLE, *You Let a Weeping Woman Call You Home?*, pp. 162–171.

89 Marie Zemanová to Pavel Zeman, 9 June 1918.

90 For the letter as a form of communication culturally, especially in 18th and 19th centuries, ascribed to women, see Carolyn STEEDMAN, *A Woman Writing a Letter*, in: R. Earle (ed.), *Epistolary Selves*, pp. 111–133.

91 Jan Čundrle to Josefa Čundrlová, 16 February 1918.

of the few beacons of hope and meaning in Jan Čundrle's life that brought him a sense of normality – that was indeed true for most of the soldiers of the First World War, or, rather, typical for any soldier anywhere at any time.⁹² As a result, he became deeply emotionally dependent on it, projecting all his hidden worries, anxieties and fears onto it. And while his wife actually did everything possible in her strategy to make him feel better, difficult mail connection led him to despond and pessimism. He was desperately clinging to any news from home he could get – literally any news, as he was not necessarily seeking information, but re-assurance in terms of an emotional connection – that he is not forgotten, that his family is still emotionally attached to him. This symbolic meaning attached to his communication with home is all but clear throughout his communication – see for example his plea for “*a few pathetic words*”. Of course, the family, thousands of miles away and burdened with wartime reality, could not always readily provide such support. Resulting tensions were reflected in the reactions of his relatives, which actually betray a gendered discourse in their understanding of the whole situation.

Thus, at one moment, Josefa Čundrlová tactfully noted to her husband that she is often without any news for months, and she still stays patient: “*Our most dearest daddy, you say that you haven't received anything from us in a long time – I am also very sad, and very often, because there is no letter coming from you [...]*”⁹³ Even before that, she had to calm her husband: “*You say that we don't write enough [...]* I often don't get anything from you for three months, too, and what can I do – I wait patiently. There is no use in whining [...]”⁹⁴ Here, we are witnessing a sort of a reversal in gender coding in epistolary discourse. Man becomes emotionally dependent on mutual communication, seeking reassurances through shared emotions. As such, he becomes more feminine, his masculinity beleaguered by the crushing impotence to perform in many of its key areas (as already mentioned, the position of a POW made the situation even worse in this regard). Woman is the one who is rational, calm, and reassuring, acquiring traits traditionally reserved for masculinity. Furthermore, Jan's sister-in-law responded in a rather condescending way to his gradually more and more desperate pleas and complaints, saying: “*You are whining that we don't write. I write you every fortnight. It's just because the post is so slow. Be calm, even though you receive no mail.*”⁹⁵ The same reaction came from his other sister-in-law as well: “*You say that you're not receiving any news from us. We write you a lot, all of us.*

92 For the example of Czech soldiers in Austro-Hungarian army, see J. HUTEČKA, *Muži proti ohni*, pp. 138–141. For a more analysis, see Richard HOLMES, *Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle*, New York 1986, pp. 87–90.

93 Josefa Čundrlová to Jan Čundrle, 17 January 1917.

94 Ibidem, 13 May 1916.

95 Cyrila to Jan Čundrle, 26 March 1917.

*Pepa writes the most.*⁹⁶ Later, she adds a telling sidenote: “*Karel also complains that I don’t write him enough.*”⁹⁷

Can we therefore assume that her husband, serving on the Italian front, was experiencing his separation from the family in similar terms, experiencing the same gender reversal? Of course, it is difficult to tell thanks to the minuscule nature of the source sample we have used here, and a final conclusion will have to be left for a further research that would cover a much wider spectrum of soldiers’ family correspondence. But it seems that at least in some cases, wartime realities led men to adopt a communications discourse, forms, and figures culturally attached to femininity – like heightened emotionality and a desire for frequent, reassuring communication, in order to “emotionally survive” their condition. While navigating the maze of wartime communication strategies we tried to analyze here, it seems that many men going to war in 1914 to 1918 came out with an experience parallel to that of their wives, only in reverse. And, as many historians have shown, women tried to keep to their traditional notions of femininity while their social and economic roles expanded for them for the time being (only to be mostly reversed post-war), men, at the same time, were gradually losing control and power while experiencing unprecedented levels of passivity and dependency. And while both themselves and their partners in communication tried hard, as we have seen, to keep the gender order as much intact as possible on a symbolic level, the reality had often betrayed their efforts. Possible exceptions such as parenting were too few and far between. We may as well argue that “the contradictory nature” should not be reserved just for the female wartime identity, as deeply contradictory tendencies seemed to permeate the whole gender order during the war years.

96 Božena Šrotová to Jan Čundrle, 15 May 1916.

97 Ibidem, 26 June 1917.

Zbyněk VYDRA

British Jewry and the Attempted Boycott of Nazi Germany, 1933–1939¹

Abstract: The article deals with the boycott of Nazi Germany, which the British Jews attempted in the years 1933–1939. The main question is why the Jewish boycott in Britain culminated in the summer of 1933 and why it was followed by years of stagnation. To what extent did the boycott movement have the chance to succeed is another key question as the main goal of the movement was nothing less significant than removing Hitler's regime and thus preventing the war. The study is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on the initial phase of the boycott (1933–1934) and emphasises the fact that the main organisation representing British Jews, The Board of Deputies of British Jews, refused to make the boycott official. The second part points out gradual stagnation and the boycott's downturn in the years 1935–1939. Although the Berlin Olympics in 1936 would have been a great incentive for the movement, they were not boycotted in the end. Then the movement was further weakened by the British policy of appeasement. The third phase of the study shows how the representatives of British Jewry attempted to influence the opinion of the government, especially the Foreign Office. Nevertheless, they failed in swinging political opinion towards the support of German Jews or the idea of a boycott. It became clear that the success of the boycott movement strongly depended on the official support; however, the mainstream political opinion preferred negotiations and agreement with Germany. The whole article is significantly based on yet unpublished sources from British and German archives.

Keywords: Jewish boycott – Nazi Germany – 1930's – Jews in Britain – international relations

On 20 July 1933, London saw a mass demonstration proceeding from the East End to the northeast edge of Hyde Park, near Marble Arch. More than thirty thousand people came out to protest against the anti-Semitic policy of Nazi Germany. The East End as the main starting point of the march had been for days literally flooded with anti-Nazi leaflets. Jewish entrepreneurs had been receiving calls to close their shops on July 20th and join the protest to show their solidarity with the persecuted Jews in Germany. Most responded and therefore, almost all Jewish shops in Whitechapel,

¹ The study is a part of GACR (Grant Agency of the Czech Republic) Project no. 16–02274S *Jewish Boycott of Nazi Germany (1933–1941)*.

Mile End, Stepney and Hackney remained closed. Not a single stall of the Middlesex Street Market opened that day. Cars with banners calling for the boycott of German goods were cruising the streets of London.

The march itself commenced from Stepney Green in the early afternoon. People started pouring in from other streets and the crowd soon had to slow down because it had become too difficult to manage for the assisting policemen. The route of the march covered Whitechapel Road, Commercial Street, Great Eastern Street, City Road, Pentonville Road and Euston Road to the Marble Arch. At around five p.m. the march reached Hyde Park. The demonstration was quiet, only few protesters carried banners proclaiming “Hitler is violating the laws and men and God” or “Restore the rights of Jews in Germany; protect the world against Hitlerism”.² The press wrote about the impressive calm and peace of the march.

Many other protest marches followed: in October 1935, *the British Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi Council*³ organised another march in Hyde Park and the event was attended by around 20,000 protesters. Still, the march of July 20th, 1933 remained the most powerful of these protests – in size as well as the response it incited. This date represents the culmination point of the boycott campaign. Although many Jewish organisations participated in the march, there was one significant exception. There were no representatives of *The Board of Deputies of British Jews* (hereinafter referred to as the BoD). The oldest and most significant organisation representing Jews in Britain⁴ distanced itself from the march. Three days later, after closed negotiations, the BoD decided to openly reject the official boycott, which had been spontaneously spreading through many countries, including Great Britain, since March 1933.⁵ This was the end (although not definite) of long-lasting discussions concerning the standpoint of the official Jewish representatives on the boycott campaign.

Why did the BoD choose to reject the boycott, when it could have taken on the campaign’s leadership as the main Jewish organisation in Britain? Many questions can

2 *The Times*, 21 July 1933, p. 13.

3 *The Times*, 28 October 1935, p. 16. *The British Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi Council* was a British version of the American *Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League to Champion Human Rights* founded in New York in 1934. Its main goal was to spread the boycott idea as a matter of general urgency, not a merely Jewish issue.

4 *The Board of Deputies of British Jews* was founded in London in 1760 as George III ascended the British throne. The Board originally consisted of seven members representing the English community of Sephardic Jews. They were soon joined by the representatives of the Ashkenazi Jews. Todd M. ENDELMAN, *The Jews of Britain, 1656–2000*, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London 2002, pp. 105–106.

5 *The Manchester Guardian*, 24 July 1933, p. 11; *The Times*, 24 July 1933, p. 7; *The Jewish Chronicle*, 28 July 1933. For *The Jewish Chronicle* see: London Metropolitan Archives (LMA), ACC 3121/E3/36/1.

be asked about the boycott's culmination in the summer of 1933 and its stagnation in the following years, when the Nazi anti-Semitic policies continued with greater intensity. The boycott's failure to reach its main goal, i.e. bringing down Hitler's regime, also requires deeper analysis. Did such an ambition have any chance in the first place? It is true that the members of the boycott movement were very determined in the beginning and their aim to overthrow Hitler was repeatedly declared.⁶

The above-mentioned questions have been posed, but historiographers have so far focused mainly on British anti-Semitism or anti-Nazi campaign. Except for refugees (mainly Jewish) from Germany,⁷ the Nazi Germany boycott issues⁸ have been generally left aside not only by the British, but also Czech historiography.⁹ Although several important studies concerning the Jewish boycott are available (even if focusing mainly on the BoD activities)¹⁰ and an abundance of archive material is available,¹¹ it is still true that

-
- 6 Overthrowing Hitler was the movement's main goal repeatedly declared mainly by the boycott committees and organisations in the United States. The boycott itself was seen as a very effective process equal to armed intervention throughout 1930's. In April 1938, one of the boycott's leaders in the U.S., dr. Joseph Tenenbaum, claimed: "Economic pressure can stop Hitler without blood shed." See Archives of the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research (New York), RG 283, Dr. Joseph Tenenbaum Papers, box 1, folder 1. Compare: *Nazis Against the World. The Counter-Boycott is the Only Defensive Weapon against Hitlerism's World-Threat to Civilization*, New York 1935; Moshe GOTTLIEB, *American Anti-Nazi Resistance, 1933–1941. An Historical Analysis*, New York 1982.
 - 7 Louis LONDON, *Whitehall and the Jews, 1933–1948: British Immigration Policy and the Holocaust*, Cambridge 2000; Ari Joshua SHERMAN, *Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich, 1933–1939*, London 1973.
 - 8 Gisela C. LEBZELTER, *Political Anti-Semitism in England 1918–1939*, Basingstoke – London 1978; David ROSENBERG, *Facing Up to Antisemitism: How Jews in Britain Countered the Threats of the 1930s*, London 1985; Elaine R. SMITH, *Jewish Responses to Political Antisemitism and Fascism in the East End of London, 1920–1939*, in: Tony Kushner – Kenneth Lunn (eds.), *Traditions of Intolerance: Historical Perspectives on Fascism and Race Discourse in Britain*, Manchester 1989, pp. 53–71.
 - 9 See the study of Martin Kovář and two monographs of Jakub Drábik. Martin KOVÁŘ, *Sir Oswald Mosley, British Union of Fascists and British Political Elites in Interwar Britain*, in: *Prague Papers on the History of International Relations* 2007, pp. 457–462; IDEM, *A Contribution to the Development of Fascism and Anti-Semitism in Great Britain between the Two World Wars (1918–1939)*, in: *Prague Papers on History of International Relations* 2004, pp. 229–249; IDEM, *Fascism and Anti-Semitism as a Part of Political Extremism in Great Britain in the 1920s and 1930s*, *Prager wirtschafts- und sozialhistorische Mitteilungen = Prague Economic and Social History Papers* 8, 2007–2008, pp. 141–148; Jakub DRÁBIK, *Mýtus o znovuzrození: Britská unie fašistů a její propaganda*, Praha 2014; IDEM, *Fašista: Příběh sira Oswalda Mosleyho*, Praha 2017.
 - 10 Sharon GEWIRTZ, *Anglo-Jewish Responses to Nazi Germany 1933–39: The Anti-Nazi Boycott and the Board of Deputies of British Jews*, *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, 1991, pp. 255–276; Bernard KRIKLER, *Anglo-Jewish Attitudes to the Rise of Nazism*, unpublished typescript, The Wiener Library, London.
 - 11 Mainly the large fonds of the BoD (fonds ACC 3121) in London Metropolitan Archives (LMA). Other sources are available in The National Archives (TNA) in Kew, which are, however, not in form of a single fond. The most sources related to the Jewish boycott of Germany can be found in different sections of the Foreign Office archive. German perception of the boycott movement can be studied

“despite this wealth of material, the boycott presents the historian with peculiar difficulties. The material itself – the same hope and despair, the same resolutions, the same desperate urgency reflecting the frustration rather than the achievements of those involved – is endlessly repetitive”, as Bernard Krikler claimed fifty years ago.¹² The lack of historiographic interest is probably caused by the boycott’s failure. The movement failed in improving the treatment of Jews in Germany and thus, its complex activities have been almost forgotten.

The Jewish community in Britain, beginning of the boycott movement (1933–1934)

Jewish communal life in Britain had been traditionally led by the assimilated Sephardic elite, i.e. families mutually interconnected through marriage and economic ties. This old elite, which successfully struggled for Jewish equality in 1840’s–50’s, was gradually replaced by a new generation of immigrants. In the years 1881–1914 Britain saw the arrival of 120,000–150,000 Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, especially Russia. Many Jews came with the plan to join the English middle class and integrate economically and socially.¹³ In practical life it meant above all to accept middle-class ideals. Being tolerated and gradually accepted brought with it a great degree of caution. Once a Jewish immigrant gained the trust of his English middle-class neighbours, he did everything not to lose it. Therefore, since 1860’s, there were clear attempts to limit further immigration to Great Britain. The existing Jewish community feared that an uncontrolled influx of their poor compatriots from Eastern Europe would disrupt their well-established position within British society.¹⁴ At the same time, the assimilated elite were resolute in their refusal of alternatives of Anglicisation. The traditional ideal of Anglicisation could not be attained by all due to mass immigration and thus, there existed many alternatives: socialism, Zionism, various forms of orthodoxy which did not correspond with the standards of the Anglicised orthodoxy of the existing elite. Such alternatives were fully legitimate

from the sources archived in Berlin: in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive and the Bundesarchiv. In both archives, the sources are not centralised into a single fond. As to the Bundesarchiv, most sources can be found in the Reichstag fond (R-43), in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive the sources are available in Referat Deutschland.

- 12 Bernard KRIKLER, *Boycotting Nazi Germany*, Wiener Library Bulletin 23, 1969, no. 4 (New Series no. 17), p. 26.
- 13 Jewish community in 1881–1914 with a view to immigration see T. M. ENDELMAN, *The Jews of Britain*, chapter 4, “Native Jews and Foreign Jews”, pp. 127–180.
- 14 Geoffrey ALDERMAN, *Modern British Jewry*, London 1992, p. 115; Daniel GUTWEIN, *The Divided Elite: Economics, politics and Anglo-Jewry, 1882–1917*, Leiden 1992, p. 13. British reaction to pogroms in Russia in 1881–1882 see in: Sam JOHNSON, *Pogroms, Peasants, Jews. Britain and Eastern Europe’s “Jewish Question”, 1867–1925*, New York 2011 (esp. chapter 2, pp. 41–66).

because the ideal of assimilation was neither available nor attractive for everybody. Many immigrants from Eastern Europe brought to Britain the influence of new ideologies.

The interwar Jewish community in Britain was ideologically rather fragmented and refused to blindly accept the official policy represented by the BoD. Despite all kinds of pressure from the BoD, the Jewish community kept its plurality of opinions, which became clear in the varied approach to the boycott movement. British Jews had indubitably followed the situation in Germany carefully and had viewed Nazi policy with great concern even before Hitler's official step into the position of the Reich's Chancellor (30 January 1933). In November 1932, *The Jewish Chronicle* foretold the grim future of the Jews in Germany in the article entitled "*In darkest Germany. The Nazi Peril – Questions which Hitler Will Not Answer. A program of persecution*".¹⁵ On the other hand, a large segment of the British public saw anti-Semitism as an inappropriate, but unfortunately significant feature of the Nazi Party programme. In 1933, the prevailing opinion viewed anti-Semitism as a necessary but temporary tactic helping the Nazis to gain power rather than the core belief of the party. It was hoped that such radicalism would naturally die down.¹⁶

The British boycott started in the second half of March.¹⁷ It was part of an international reaction to the anti-Jewish actions which took place in Germany in the first two weeks of March.¹⁸ On the 24th of March, around two thousand Jewish as well as non-Jewish East Enders demonstrated in front of the German embassy. Cars passing the streets of East End bore banners with "*Buy no German goods*" and many shop windows displayed posters ordering "*Boycott German imports. Agents representing German manufacturers, please do not call.*"¹⁹

The early enthusiasm was displayed also in *The Jewish Chronicle*:

*"If, as seems evident from the flood of letters that have poured into this office, there is a strong longing to institute a boycott of German goods and services, by all means let it be done. Let Jews, here and in every land, borrow from Germans their weapons of the boycott and turn it against them... In America, Poland, Romania, Palestine, the boycott is being preached, or has actually begun. It must be widespread, if this is to be effective, and it must be unflinchingly pursued. 'Not an ounce of German goods!' 'Not an atom of German service!' till the Nazis desist from their devilries. To the cry of 'Perish Judea!' let the answer 'Jewry, awake!'"*²⁰

15 B. KRIKLER, *Anglo-Jewish Attitudes*, pp. 25–26.

16 *Ibidem*, p. 17.

17 The German embassy first mentioned the boycott in its report of 22 March 1933. See Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PAAA), Referat Deutschland, R 98 443. See also B. KRIKLER, *Anti-Jewish Attitudes*, p. 54.

18 S. GEWIRTZ, *Anglo-Jewish Responses*, s. 258. See the articles in newspapers: *Manchester Guardian*, 13, 24, 29, 30 March 1933; *The Daily Telegraph*, 30 March 1933.

19 *The Manchester Guardian*, 25 March 1933.

20 *The Jewish Chronicle*, 24 March 1933.

The BoD reacted with restraint and kept their caution throughout the whole of 1930's. Silent agreement was gradually overshadowed by an over-cautious policy and the inability to voice official support for the boycott. At the BoD meeting held on March 26, the calls for an official boycott and the organisation of a Jewish protest meeting were rejected. The BoD president, Neville Laski (1890–1969), referred to the tense situation in Germany and the fear of even greater radicalisation of the Nazis:

*“You must remember that a Jewish meeting of protest will be the registration of an axiomatic fact, namely, the sympathy which any Jew, however far removed from his people, must as a Jew, feel for his German brethren. So long as there is the slightest chance (and there is some chance) of an amelioration of the situation, we must do nothing and say nothing which can be misinterpreted and utilized by the left wing of the Nazi movement to crush the advice and the execution of the advice which von Papen and the moderates in the German government have given to their followers...”*²¹

When asked whether the BoD support the boycott of German goods, Laski answered:

*“The Board of Deputies are taking no part in it. The Board recognize not only as a body, but as individuals composing a body – as every individual must recognize – that feeling in the Jewish community in a time of such crisis must necessarily run high. These boycotts and these meetings are spontaneous outbursts of indignation. They would lose their value if they were organized. It is only because of my official position that I do not take part in the boycott. I stand aside and watch, but as an individual I watch it gladly.”*²²

At the same time Laski stressed that German Jewry itself are asking the BoD for reticence and do not wish for a boycott of any form. That was true to some extent: the German Jewish organisations, especially *Zentralverein der deutschen Bürger des jüdischen Glaubens* (Central Association of German Citizens of Jewish Faith), issued resolutions and sent out requests to stop the boycott. They feared further escalation of radical Nazi policies.²³ Laski also hoped that there still was a chance of improvement after the German revolution “calmed down.”²⁴

But the situation only seemingly defused and the position of Jews kept worsening. April 1 saw a one-day boycott of Jewish shops in the whole Germany. This excess gained only very limited popularity among Germans and was widely condemned abroad and therefore, the discrimination of Jews became more sophisticated. Several anti-Jewish acts

21 BoD Minutes, 26 March 1933, in: LMA, ACC 3121/A/026 (original document), quotations from the microfilm: LMA, MF 041/049, pp. 53–54.

22 *The Times*, 27 March 1933, p. 14.

23 PAAA, Microfiche No. J, BN 9844; PAAA, Referat Deutschland, R 98448.

24 At the end of March, world press briefly reported about the supposed end of anti-Semitic excesses, see: “Nazis End Attacks”, *The New York Times*, 27 March 1933.

were passed in April 1933 with the aim to gradually isolate Jews in Germany. *Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service* was passed on April 7. Its section 3 became known as the “Aryan Paragraph” and it excluded non-Aryans from civil service. Another act was passed on April 25, it was *the Law Against the Overcrowding of German Schools* which affected strictly non-Aryan students. Within the same month, Jews began to be gradually pushed out of legal and medical professions.²⁵

None of these events had any impact on the cautious standpoint of the BoD, which is proved by Laski’s proclamation of 15 May 1933:

*“It has been said that our policy has not succeeded; this must be admittedly true if you argue that the Nazi regime and policies are still in force. But world opinion is in our favour, and we must see that we retain it. I give you my word that we have been active... The Jewish masses may be dissatisfied with our work, as you have been told, but I do not believe it. We of the Board of Deputies can have no official association with a boycott.”*²⁶

Such proclamations completely entrapped *The Jewish Chronicle*. Its positive approach towards the boycott was replaced by the loyalty to the BoD, which meant another victory of political caution. Instead of the repeated call “*Jewry Awake*”, the paper in the summer of 1933 reported:

*“This brings us to the resolution in favour of an official sponsorship of the boycott, which is to be proposed at next Sunday’s meeting of the Deputies [...]”, hoping that “this motion will not be pressed. If the Jews of this country are what we may call boycott-minded [...] they will not need the stimulus of official sanction to act and organise [...] An official pronouncement [...] will make little difference in matter of sheer effectiveness, but it may very well have the result of consolidating the German front.”*²⁷

During the next few months, *The Jewish Chronicle* fully supported the official standpoint of the BoD leadership and refused the official boycott. It, however, retained certain degree of autonomy as it simultaneously campaigned against all contacts with Nazi Germany.²⁸

The actions taken by the BoD in 1933 and later years followed three main rules: 1) gain majority support of English Jewry and formulate a policy which would not divide the

25 On anti-Jewish legislation see Saul FRIEDLÄNDER, *Nazi Germany and the Jews. Vol. 1. The Years of Persecution, 1933–1939*, pp. 26 ff.

26 *JTA Bulletin*, 15 May 1933. BoD Minutes, volume 26, 1932–1934. Original document: LMA, ACC 3121/A/026. Microfilm: LMA/MF/041/049.

27 *The Jewish Chronicle*, 21 July 1933.

28 David CESARANI, *The Jewish Chronicle and the Anglo-Jewry, 1841–1991*, Cambridge 1994, pp. 145–147.

community; 2) take no action which would be adversary to the government; 3) take no action which would further complicate the position of German Jews.²⁹ All steps towards helping German Jewry had to be taken with those rules in mind.

Older historiography assesses this approach rather negatively.

*[...] it does seem, in the early years anyway, that the Board failed to identify itself sufficiently with the mass of the community, and failed also to provide the positive leadership that was needed. It may have been partly a failure of public relations but also it revealed deeper schisms within the community. Certainly public opinion and public militancy seemed often to run ahead of the Board and its cautious pronouncements.*³⁰

Nevertheless, the above-mentioned BoD's approach had its internal critics from the very beginning. Boycott supporters saw it as a sign of unacceptable passivity. They perceived the official policy pronounced by the BoD as the *"policy of the assimilationist Jews; that is Jews as Jews don't count, we are to act only as citizens of the country. We are to leave it to others, to the great men, to the Press to make a protest. We are to do nothing ourselves."*³¹ Pinchas Horowitz was one of the most perseverant critics of such passivity. He was one of the BoD members and, at the same time, one of the leaders of the *Jewish Representative Council for the Boycott of German Goods and Services*. At the BoD meeting on 18 February 1934, Horowitz said:

*"From the very beginning there have been two opposing attitudes. Yours was 'All we can do is to protest. Positive action on our part would do more harm than good.' Against this there was another attitude: 'We must proclaim in words and actions our hostility to that philosophy of life which excludes Jews from the life of the nation'. We do not believe in lying low and keeping quiet. If there is one thing that is likely to impress public opinion, impress Hitler and rouse the spirit of Jewry throughout the world it is a clear and unequivocal declaration of our attitude."*³²

Those, who spoke after Horowitz, labeled his criticism as unconstructive and Neville Laski was suspicious of Horowitz's power ambitions. Horowitz represented the BoD's Zionist section, the rise of which worried Laski and his colleagues. Horowitz, however, declared the organization of the boycott as his only ambition and denied any attempts

29 B. KRIKLER, *Anglo-Jewish Attitudes*, p. 39. See Laski's proclamation of 26 March 1933 cited on the previous page.

30 B. KRIKLER, *Anglo-Jewish Attitudes*, p. 36.

31 Morris Meyer's speech at the BoD meeting, 14 May 1933. *JTA Bulletin*, 15 May 1933. Original document: ACC 3121/A/026. Quotation from microfilm: LMA, MF/041/049.

32 *JTA Bulletin*, 19 February 1934. Original document: LMA, ACC 3121/A/027. Quotation from microfilm: LMA, MF/041/049.

to gain power or a higher position in the BoD.³³ Laski's worry is partly understandable. Laski, who came from a rich and fully assimilated Mancunian family, was elected the BoD president rather recent, on 16 January 1933. The opposing candidate, Major Salomon Nathan, was a Labour MP and a member of the Zionist section of the BoD. Laski received 128 votes against 79 and he was aware of the growing Zionist influence over British Jewry.³⁴

The BoD refused to take part in the international boycott events. They refused participation in the World Jewish Economic Conference in the summer of 1933 as well as in the World Jewish Conferences in Geneva (1934, 1935), to which they were repeatedly invited. Preparations of the Jewish Economic Conference had started before the boycott. It was originally meant to take place in June, parallel to the World Economic Conference, but in the end the event was moved to July to enable the participation of dr. Samuel Untermyer (1858–1940) from New York.³⁵ This lawyer, a Zionist, member of the Democratic Party and a well-known civil rights activist was one of the most fervent boycott organisers in the U.S. On 28 February 1933, Neville Laski met the representatives of the Federation of Jewish Relief Organization and spoke rather sceptically about the possible success of the conference.³⁶ He was mainly referring to the absence of the American Jewish Committee, a U.S. organisation of a similar position as the BoD held in Britain, which also refused to join the boycott.³⁷ The conference venue was moved from London to Amsterdam and the actual event of 19–21 July 1933 did receive some publicity, although its results were disappointing. Had Untermyer travelled to Britain with the aim to make the BoD actively support the boycott movement, he tried in vain. Untermyer saw Britain as the weak point of the world's boycott movement and tried to provide another incentive for British involvement by organising an international conference in London in November 1934. This second attempt to gain official support of the BoD was equally unsuccessful as the previous one. Some degree of support was expressed by individuals, such as Lord Melchett or a Conservative M. P., Thomas Levy.³⁸

The World Jewish Conferences in Geneva had a rather complex agenda focusing mainly on the preparation of the World Jewish Congress. Although the boycott was

33 *JTA Bulletin*, 18 September 1933. BoD Minutes, volume 26, 1932–1934. Original document: LMA, ACC 3121/A/026. Microfilm, LMA/MF/041/049.

34 *JTA Bulletin*, 17 January 1933; *The Jewish Chronicle*, 20 January 1933. BoD Minutes, volume 26, 1932–1934. Original document: LMA, ACC 3121/A/026. Microfilm, LMA/MF/041/049.

35 M. GOTTLIEB, *American Anti-Nazi Resistance*, pp. 71–75.

36 LMA, ACC 3121/B04/WO/022.

37 M. GOTTLIEB, *American Anti-Nazi Resistance*, pp. 42–43.

38 Thomas Levy (1871–1953), in 1931–1945 a Conservative M. P. (the constituency of Elland, Yorkshire). The conference in London on 26–28 October 1934 see the Gestapo report of 28 December 1934, PAAA, Referat Deutschland, R 99532.

mentioned during some sessions, most of the agenda was devoted to the Jewish refugees from Germany. The BoD refused to participate in both 2nd conference (5–8 September 1933) and 3rd conference (20–23 August 1934).³⁹

The BoD's lack of interest certainly did not mean that British Jewry had ignored the Amsterdam Conference or the World Conferences in Geneva. Neither had they all rejected the official boycott. Sir Henry Ludwig Mond, the 2nd Baron of Melchett (1898–1949), actively supported the conferences in 1933–1934 trying to expand their agenda by discussing the boycott and gain greater support for its implementation. Although Lord Melchett was the Chairman of the Administrative Board of *Imperial Chemical Industries*, one of the world's largest industrial conglomerates,⁴⁰ it had very little impact on his chances to push the boycott idea through. He never acted on behalf of the conglomerate, but always chose to speak of his individual views or on behalf of Jewish organisations or committees. His opinions, adverse to the official BoD standpoints, burdened his negotiations with the Foreign Office which he strove to involve in his boycott plans. Soon after the beginning of World War II, in the autumn of 1939 and again in 1940, he proposed the involvement of neutral countries, especially in America, in the German boycott. His initiative, however, was met with a reserved reaction by the British government.⁴¹

The BoD's reluctance towards a general boycott led many individuals and organisations that simply wanted "to do something" to finding an organisation which would coordinate all boycott activities. *The Jewish Representative Council for the Boycott of German Goods and Services* (JRC) was established in September, much to the dislike of the BoD leaders. They were not only in opposition to the official boycott, but also feared that their authority as the spokesmen of British Jewry may be undermined.⁴² Zionist inclinations of several

39 Conference reports, including the mention of British absence see in PAAA, Referat Deutschland, R 98458. See also M. GOTTLIEB, *American Anti-Nazi Resistance*, pp. 71–75.

40 Imperial Chemical Industries were founded in December 1926 through a merger of Brunner Mond (family firm of the Mondes), Nobel Explosives, the United Alkali Company and British Dyestuffs Corporation. It was Britain's largest employer and one of the world's most important corporations in chemical industry. Alfred Moritz Mond, the 1st Baron of Melchett (1868–1930) was the first Chairman of the Administrative Board.

41 On 14 September 1939, Melchett sent his proposals to the Minister of Economic Warfare, Sir Ronald Cross. See NA, CO 852/266/9. On September 28, he received the minister's polite but dismissive answer. The Foreign Office received similarly negative reactions from British diplomats in the neutrals states (Argentina, Brazil, Denmark, the Netherlands). They all preferred to keep low profile believing that putting pressure on neutral governments would result in their inclination towards Germany or increased anti-Semitism. See NA, FO 371/23949; FO 371/25169.

42 Gordon Liverman, treasurer of the BoD, speaking at the BoD meeting on 17 September 1933. *JTA Bulletin*, 18 September 1933. BoD Minutes, Volume 26, 1932–1934. Original document: LMA, ACC 3121/A/026; microfilm: LMA, MF/041/049.

JRC's leaders, e.g. its president Morris Harold Davis (1894–1985) or Pinchas Horowitz and Lord Melchett, were another obstacle.⁴³

The JRC was established at a conference on 5 November 1933, was attended by 360 Jewish organisations with a total of 170,000 members. 530 conference delegates declared their readiness to “*abstain from the purchase or use of German goods and services so long as full equality of status shall continue to be denied to the Jews of Germany*”.⁴⁴ Still, this powerful boycott declaration failed to win the BoD's backing. Neville Laski tried to discourage the JRC from an official declaration of the boycott and forwarded letters from Germany in which individual Jews and whole organisations expressed their fear of a Nazi reaction to the official boycott. A letter from Nuremberg addressed the JRC conference on their boycott announcement:

“The result of such an announcement would undoubtedly be similar attacks on the Jews, such as the ones that took place in Nuremberg nine weeks ago. Is it not possible to induce Mr. Laski to prevent such action? Why not allow it to remain unofficial? Matters cannot be improved by shouting it from the rooftops. [...] Any body taking responsibility of an official boycott will have cause to regret it.”⁴⁵

The very first months thus showed how deeply the approach to the idea of official boycott divided British Jewry. Enthusiasm of the boycott movement and the desire to act was clashing with the official low-profile strategy. Inaction of the BoD leaders permanently scarred the reputation of the Board within the Jewish community.

Laski and other BoD leaders in their proclamations suggested that they did not refrain from the boycott as a strategy of individuals, but they refused to support it officially. All protest actions seemed to fulfil one main goal: to meet the emotional need to vent one's frustration over the situation in Germany. Leonard Montefiore, of the Joint Foreign Committee (JFC) of the BoD said, “*People must express their feelings or they will burst*”.⁴⁶ The old elite were weakening the meaning of the boycott primarily to its psychological function, denying its power as a political or economic weapon.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, people participating in the boycott movement had higher aims. The main goal was terminating Jewish persecution by overthrowing Hitler and the boycott

43 Morris Davis was a Labour Party member. G. ALDERMAN, *Modern British Jewry*, p. 173.

44 *The Manchester Guardian*, 6 November 1933; *The Daily Telegraph*, 6 November 1933.

45 Laski's letter to Horowitz (1 November 1933) with attached letters from Germany. LMA ACC 3121/E3/36/1.

46 JTA Bulletin, 27 March 1933. BoD Minutes, volume 26, 1932–1934. Original document: LMA, ACC 3121/A/026; microfilm: LMA, MF MF/041/049.

47 S. GEWIRTZ, *Anglo-Jewish Responses*, p. 261.

was meant to be one of the means of bringing Germany down on its knees. The main argument during the first year of the boycott was clear:

*“Once the sixteen million Jews inhabiting the world stop buying German goods, they will represent a power which no country will be able to ignore” and “A properly carried out boycott will cause Germany’s economic collapse within a year”.*⁴⁸

Those optimistic words may well have been uttered to strengthen the boycott movement. It was virtually impossible to estimate the actual impact of the boycott on the German economy. On one hand, the German press suggested that the boycott did have the desired effect. On 28 October 1933, *The Manchester Guardian* reprinted an article from *Berliner Börsen Zeitung*, a German financial paper:

*“It is useless to close our eyes to the fact that the boycott propaganda abroad is producing serious results. Gradually German products are being replaced by British, Swiss or Italian goods... This is especially true of goods in which Germany previously had a monopoly – chemicals, electro-chemical articles, textiles and metallurgical goods, particularly machinery.”*⁴⁹ *On the other hand, Great Britain still was one of Germany’s main economic partners. A lower rate of German foreign trade was connected to the ending economic crisis as well as the growing isolationism of the country, which was preparing for the war.*⁵⁰

The boycott movement continued throughout 1934. It was joined by individuals as well as organisations and from the beginning, it was more than a purely Jewish activity. One of the most fervent organisers of the boycott, Captain Walter Joseph Webber, invested so much of his own financial resources in the movement that he got on the verge of bankruptcy.⁵¹ *Captain’s Webber’s British Boycott Organization* had its headquarters in London’s East End and it carried out intensive propaganda in Yiddish and English. It was aiming at both Jewish and non-Jewish businessmen trying to persuade them not to sell or buy German products (see the picture 1).⁵²

Not all Jewish businessmen, however, embraced the boycott idea. Reluctance of some shop-owners was often balanced by eagerness of their customers. In July 1933, just a day after the large protest march from the East End to Hyde Park, a woman noticed the sign “Made in Germany” on a parcel delivered to the warehouse of an importer of toys in

48 Opinion of Mr. Pinchas Horowitz (*The Manchester Guardian*, 16 November 1933) and Mr. Samuel Untermyer (*The Daily Telegraph*, 6 November 1933).

49 *The Manchester Guardian*, 28 October 1933.

50 B. KRIKLER, *Boycotting Nazi Germany*, p. 30.

51 The National Archives (TNA), Metropolitan Police, MEPO 2/3282. Article on Webber in *Sunday Referee*, 30 June 1935.

52 LMA, ACC 3121/E3/36/1 (see the pictures 1 and 2).

Whitechapel. The report spread quickly and within just minutes, the place was flooded with hundreds of people. The police were called to disperse the crowd, but they were not successful. Captain Webber described his impressions for *The Manchester Guardian*:

*“There must have been more than a thousand people surrounding both the shop in Sidney Street and the warehouse in Wolsey Street. Things were looking very ugly, but the importer at once accepted my advice to send the goods back. Not until every case had been taken away did the people disperse.”*⁵³

Similar events showed people’s willingness to participate in the boycott. The official opinion, however, saw these activities as undesirable and disruptive to public order.

The boycott’s implementation had been complicated from the beginning by the so-called Transfer Agreement (Ha’avarah in Hebrew). It was an agreement concluded between the Zionists in Palestine and Germany and enabled Jews to emigrate from Germany with a part of their financial capital. Capital was transferred by means of purchase of German goods, which expanded German export to Palestine.⁵⁴ Rather than a boost of foreign trade, Germany saw this as a blow to the Jewish boycott and an incitement for Jewish emigration. With the diminishing fear of the boycott, the Nazis continued to fulfil the provisions of Transfer Agreement mainly because they wanted to get rid of Jews.⁵⁵

Transfer Agreement proved the internal weakness and fragmentation of the movement. It was basically a sabotage of the boycott, which was immediately seized by the German propaganda. The German press reported on the Palestinian “hole in the boycott”.⁵⁶ The Zionist movement itself saw the Agreement as rather controversial.⁵⁷ It was rejected by the representatives of the American Jewish Congress as well as the Zionist Revisionist party.⁵⁸ Their leader, Vladimir Jabotinsky, on the 18th Zionist Congress in Prague (21 August – 3 September 1933) strictly declined the Ha’avarah and expressed his support of the boycott:

53 *The Manchester Guardian*, 22 July 1933.

54 David YISRAELI, *The Third Reich and the Transfer Agreement*, *Journal of Contemporary History* 6/2, 1971, pp. 129–178; Yfaat WEISS, *The Transfer Agreement and the Boycott Movement: A Jewish Dilemma on the Ave of the Holocaust*, *Yad Vashem Studies* 26, 1998, pp. 129–172 [electronic version: https://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20203231.pdf; 3 August 2017]. German politics in Palestine see Ernst MARCUS, *The German Foreign Office and the Palestine Question in Period 1933–1939*, *Yad Vashem Studies* 2, 1958, pp. 179–204; Christopher BROWNING, *Referat Deutschland: Jewish Policy and the German Foreign Office (1933–1940)*, *Yad Vashem Studies* 12, 1977, pp. 37–73; Francis R. NICOSIA, *The Third Reich and the Palestine Question*, Austin 1985.

55 Yehuda BAUER, *Jews for Sale? Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1933–1945*, New Haven – London 1994, pp. 9–10, 15–16.

56 *Westdeutscher Beobachter*, 27 May 1935. LMA, ACC 3121/C11/12/37. See Y. BAUER, *Jews for Sale?*, p. 19.

57 Dr. Chaim Arlosoroff, left-wing Zionist and the main organiser of the Agreement, was murdered two days after his return from Germany. It has never been proved that the murder was motivated by him signing the Agreement, but the timing of his assassination supports this theory.

58 Y. BAUER, *Jews for Sale?*, pp. 16–17; B. KRICKLER, *Boycotting Nazi Germany*, p. 29.

*“The Revisionist party would constitute itself as the guiding body for organizing and directing an anti-German economic boycott. [...] German threats to hold half a million German Jews as hostages if world Jewry does not keep silent will be ignored.”*⁵⁹

His speeches at the Zionist-Revisionist Congress in Krakow (8–11 January 1934) or during his visit of Czechoslovakia in 1935 were held in a similar tone.⁶⁰

The assessment of the boycott’s first year would not be complete without the German view. German embassies kept Berlin informed on the course of the boycott in individual countries. The London embassy also provided its government with regular and detailed reports sent several times per month in the years 1933 and 1934. These reports captured well the boycott movement’s problems. The report of 13 September 1933 stated that the Jewish boycott had no official support and the organisations traditionally considered to be the main representatives of British Jewry, i.e. the BoD and the *Anglo-Jewish Association*, repeatedly refused the idea of organised boycott. Thus, the boycott remained largely an activity of individuals and individual businesses. There were also significant regional contrasts: the boycott was strong in London’s East End, Manchester and Leeds with significant Jewish populations. The overall scope and impact of the boycott can hardly be estimated: *“The field which suffers most, is fur trade and the cheaper, yet important, goods such as toys, haberdashery, home appliances and kitchen utensils, women’s clothing. Jewish doctors have stopped buying German pharmaceutical goods. German boats have lost almost all Jewish passengers.”*⁶¹

Since 1934 the reports concerning the boycott became less frequent until they stopped mentioning the issue altogether. It could have signified the movement’s stagnation or the conclusion of German diplomats that the boycott’s impact was insignificant and therefore did not have to be dealt with.

59 B. KRIKLER, *Boycotting Nazi Germany*, p. 30; *The Manchester Guardian*, 27 August 1933; *The New York Times*, 22 August 1933.

60 The Congress in Krakow see Gestapo report of 6 February 1935, PAAA, Referat Deutschland, R 99532. Visit in Czechoslovakia see PAAA, Ref. 117, Altes Amt, Deutsches Konsulat Kaschau, Paket 4a, Aktenzeichen Aia Juden, Band 1 (1933–1938), Judenfrage und Boykott deutschen Ware; PAAA, Referat Deutschland, R 99 532.

61 NA, GFM 33/4735/L1670, Referat Deutschland: Jewish Boycott Conference, pp. 1–5 (quotation p. 4). The same report is located in Berlin’s Archive of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: PAAA, BN 98427.

The boycott's stagnation and downturn (1935–1939)

Legislative persecution of the Jews in Germany peaked in 1935 by the so-called Nuremberg Acts.⁶² It became clear that the Nazis had no intention to seize their anti-Jewish policy. Even Neville Laski had to acknowledge this in his speech at the BoD meeting on 2 October 1935. He referred to the main anti-Jewish acts and other acts of oppression suffered by the Jews in Germany. He admitted that his original view of Hitler as “a moderate politician” was wrong: “*He is apparently at one with Herr Streicher, dr. Goebbels, and the violently anti-Semitic leaders of the party.*” His speech was full of resignation and open scepticism about helping to change the fate of Jewish communities in Germany:

“The question we anxiously put to ourselves is: In what way can we hope to help the Jews of Germany? It is sometimes doubtful whether the adoption of some courses has been helpful at all. Protests by eminent Jews and by Jewish organisations have been made in large numbers. They have relieved our feelings; they have manifested our resentment and self-respect. Yet it has still to be shown that they have had the slightest influence on the oppressor.”

Most Jews had to rely on the help of non-Jewish subjects. Their involvement in the boycott was especially welcomed by Laski. He also admitted that many Jews in Britain had expected more decisive action against Germany. In this respect, however, Laski's views remained the same: the Jews, as loyal citizens, were supposed to obey the official course of British policy.

“Many feel that our attitude and conduct in this country lacks aggressiveness and that it is not sufficient merely to bring succour to our friends. They wish to strike the enemy. Their feelings are understandable. I have said on more than one occasion that no self-respecting Jew would buy German goods or make use of German services. I emphatically repeat that statement. I would go further and say that every action designed to show the Nazi regime that persecution does not pay is commendable, but I would add, and as a loyal citizen it is essential that I should add, that such action as is taken must be always be conditioned by and be subject to the overriding consideration of duty and loyalty to the country of which we are citizens.”⁶³

Great opportunity to “hit the enemy” and liven up the boycott movement came about in 1936 with the Olympic Games in Germany (winter Olympics in Garmisch-Partenkirchen and summer Olympics in Berlin). Boycotting the Olympics would have a great impact because it would be a single decisive action concentrating the total

62 S. FRIEDLÄNDER, *Nazi Germany*, pp. 141–151.

63 LMA, ACC 3121/C11/12/21/2.

power of the movement.⁶⁴ Discussions of the Olympic boycott were intensive and most serious, especially in the U.S. and had already started in 1933. It is clear that without U.S. participation, the Olympic Games would have been significantly undermined. That, however, did not happen. The *American Olympic Committee* stood for U.S. participation and after some hesitation was joined by the *Amateur Athletic Union*, the leading sports organisation in the U.S.A.⁶⁵

The possibility of the Olympic boycott had been discussed in Great Britain during the end of 1935. An impulse for such discussion came with the controversial invitation of the German national football team to England in December 1935. Both the Foreign Office and Home Office were flooded with letters of protest, mainly from British Jewry, left-wing organisations and the unions. The main argument against the invitation was Nazi control over German sports and the fear of agents infiltrating Britain. The Home Secretary, Sir John Simon, was also worried about the possibility of violent demonstrations. Calling the match off would, however, mean admitting loss of control and would be rather inconvenient for the ongoing political negotiations with Germany (the naval agreement was concluded on 18 June 1935). Furthermore, according to British tradition the state stayed away from the matters of sports organisations. The only satisfaction was that the English national football team won the match at the stadium of Tottenham Hotspur 3:0.⁶⁶

The football controversy was at the root of the debate concerning British participation in Berlin Olympics. This debate was not as heated as in the U.S. and although the boycott was proposed, the Amateur Athletic Association unanimously refused it. Olympic participation was supported even by the famous Jewish sportsmen, e.g. Harold Abrahams, winner of the 100m sprint from the Paris Olympics in 1924, currently a member of the AAA committee. Such an approach helped to marginalise the anti-Olympic sentiment. The Nazis promised not to prevent Jewish participation in the games.⁶⁷ The British government, especially The Foreign Office, made it repeatedly clear that they would not interfere in sporting matters. At the same time, it was completely clear that they politically preferred Britain's participation in the Olympics. The Olympic boycott failed because individual governments refused to intervene and neither the International Olympic

64 B. KRIKLER, *Boycotting Nazi Germany*, p. 31.

65 M. GOTTLIEB, *Anti-Nazi Resistance*, pp. 231–235; Allen GUTTMANN, *The 'Nazi Olympics' and the American Boycott Controversy*, in: Pierre Arnaud – James Riordan (eds.), *Sport and International Politics, The Impact of Fascism and Communism on Sport*, London 1998, pp. 31–50.

66 Richard HOLT, *The Foreign Office and the Football Association. British sport and appeasement, 1935–1938*, in: P. Arnaud – J. Riordan (eds.), *Sport and International Politics*, pp. 53–58.

67 *Ibidem*, pp. 58–60; *The Manchester Guardian*, 5 December 1935.

Committee, not majority of national Olympic committees found the courage to denounce the Olympics in Germany.⁶⁸

After the Olympic Games the boycott theme slowly faded out of press reports. Although the U.S. boycott movement kept its activities going, in Great Britain the interest was definitely lost. The boycott's downturn was clear from the lower frequency of articles on this theme published in the main British papers in comparison with the years 1933 and 1934.

The first year of the boycott movement indicated that the low-profile policy of the BoD was partly motivated by their fear of growing Zionist influence. Neville Laski and Leonard Montefiore saw Zionism as a threat to the BoD's unity as well as their individual positions. In March 1936, Zionists within the BoD requested a delegation to be sent to the World Jewish Congress (WJC). One of the aims of the Congress was to coordinate the global economic boycott of Germany. Laski, who had originally been just cautious, changed his opinion within a single month towards a complete refusal and did his best to prevent participation in the WJC.⁶⁹ Zionists then complained that Laski had manipulated the BoD members and that he had abused his power of the president to block WJC participation.⁷⁰ The refusal of WJC participation was again connected to British official government policy. The prevailing opinion in the BoD believed that the Congress would strengthen the boycott movement, but the BoD's participation would lead to the loss of influence on the British government.⁷¹

The boycott movement died down in the second half of 1936 also due to growing anti-Semitism in Britain. The BoD and other Jewish organisations have traditionally devoted their efforts to fighting anti-Semitism in Britain and thus, they logically focused more on this matter rather than on the boycott of Germany. The British Union of Fascists led by Sir Oswald Mosley were stepping up their anti-Jewish activities, which culminated on 6 October 1936 by the so-called Battle of Cable Street.⁷² Growing politically-motivated violence in the streets of London, especially the East End, led to passing an act on political

68 B. KRIKLER, *Boycotting Nazi Germany*, pp. 31–32.

69 LMA, ACC/3121/C/11/10/1.

70 Ibidem, letters from M. H. Davis, P. Horowitz, H. Jochelman, M. Myer and M. L. Perlzweig to Laski, 29 April 1936 and 1 May 1936.

71 LMA, ACC/3131/C/11/10/1. Letter of Lionel L. Cohen to Neville Laski, 20 March 1933.

72 See Tony KUSHNER – Nadia VALMAN (eds.), *Remembering Cable Street. Fascism and Anti-Fascism in British Society*, London – Portland 2000. "The battle of Cable Street" was a peak of a long conflict. The first violent clashes between Mosley's Fascists and their Jewish and non-Jewish opponents took place in London in the spring of 1933. See Daniel TILLES, *British Fascist Antisemitism and the Jewish Responses, 1932–1940*, London 2015, pp. 101–103. Generally, on anti-Fascism in interwar Britain see Nigel COPSEY – Andrzej OLECHNOWICZ (eds.), *Varieties of Anti-Fascism. Britain in the Inter-War Period*, Basingstoke 2010.

extremism. *Public Order Act* forbade wearing political uniforms at all political events or in public places. At the same time, the Metropolitan Police, on order of Sir John Simon issued on 16 July 1936, started monitoring the activity of both Fascists and anti-Fascists with even greater intensity.⁷³ Regular monthly reports speak of frequent anti-Fascist activities in which the BoD played a completely insignificant part. The BoD's leadership pursued their low-profile strategy, which was however no longer appealing to the Jewish population of the East End, especially its youth.⁷⁴

In 1938 the boycott movement reached a dead end. The endeavour of individuals and organisations, Jews and non-Jews, could not bring the Nazi regime down. Without the support of state governments, the movement was bound to fail. While the boycott movement strove to influence customers, the British government concluded trade agreements and political pacts with Germany. In spite of the boycott, Great Britain was in the 1930's, Germany's main trading partner.⁷⁵ The above-mentioned naval agreement, signed in 1935, represents a breaking point from which Britain took the path of open appeasement with the aim of preventing the war. When Neville Chamberlain became the Prime Minister in 1937, the appeasement policy grew stronger and culminated in 1938.

Peaceful diplomacy instead of the boycott? The BoD and its version of the appeasement

The Jewish boycott of Germany was an international activity and can be understood as a type of Jewish foreign policy. Within the BoD, foreign policy was the responsibility of *The Joint Foreign Committee* (JFC), a joint body of the BoD and the Anglo-Jewish Association, founded in 1878. The JFC had traditionally monitored the situation of Jews in other countries focusing especially on anti-Semitism and informed British public as well as official political representatives. The JFC reports enabled the BoD to take action and try to make the British government act. In 1933–1939 the JFC was led by two co-presidents, Neville Laski (as the BoD's president) and Leonard Montefiore (president of the Anglo-Jewish Association).

73 NA, MEPO 2/3043, pp. 329–331. The police with the secret services (MI5) monitored the radical right-wing and Fascist movement since mid-1920's. Nevertheless, the order of Sir John Simon, influenced by the personal intervention of Harold Laski, made the police act with even greater intensity.

74 Metropolitan Police report to the Home Office of 5 November 1936, NA, MEPO 2/3043, pp. 256–257, 265.

75 Martin GILBERT – R. GOTT, *The Appeasers*, London 1953; chapter 11 and especially pp. 189–190; Benny MORRIS, *The Roots of Appeasement The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany During 1930's*, London 1991, pp. 67 ff. On the Anglo-German Naval Agreement see Zara STEINER, *The Triumph of the Dark. European International History 1933–1939*, Oxford 2013, pp. 90–93.

The JFC's original attitude was no different to that of the British public and press (e.g. *The Times*): violence against the Jews was probably just a temporary phenomenon related to the overall radicalisation of German politics; anti-Semitism was promoted by the "left-wing" of the Nazi party and it was hoped to be erased by the moderate political elements. No steps which would anger the German government were to be taken to keep mutual relations open to the negotiations held between Britain and Germany. This attitude was clear from the first BoD meeting openly addressing the situation of the Jews in Germany.⁷⁶

The optimistic view of German anti-Semitism as a "temporary excess" was rather short-lived. After the declaration of the anti-Jewish boycott on April 1 (although it was only a one-day event) together with the implementation of the "Aryan Paragraph" in Germany in April 1933, made the JFC leaders believe that Nazi persecution is no "fleeting hysteria".⁷⁷ An abrupt end to the illusion that Hitler is a responsible politician, while anti-Semitism is promoted only by Julius Streicher and Joseph Goebbels, came about with the Nuremberg Acts.⁷⁸

The JFC closely cooperated with organisations handling Jewish emigration and got involved in fundraising for refugees. After Hitler came to power, the Zionists turned their attention to the support of emigration which they saw as the only solution for German Jewry. The non-Zionist JFC persisted in trying to ensure "civic equality" for the Jews in Germany. Only after the November pogroms in 1938 did the officials acknowledge their failure and admitted that there is no point in continuing this effort. Neville Laski came with a statement full of resignation: "*Life of Jewry in Germany has been actually destroyed*".⁷⁹

The JFC's attempts to re-establish civic equality of Jews in Germany led to two types of activity. First, the JFC contacted prominent public figures to make them protest against the persecution of German Jews. In June 1933, the JFC organised a non-Jewish meeting of protest titled "On the Oppression of German Jews" and invited leading members of the Conservative Party. Speakers including Viscount Buckmaster⁸⁰, the Earl of Iddesleigh⁸¹ or

76 Neville Laski speech at the BoD meeting, 26 March 1933. LMA, ACC/3121/A/026; cited from the microfilm: LMA/MF/041/049, Minutes Volume 26, 1932–1934.

77 Leonard Stein, delivering report of JFC at BoD meeting on 18 June 1933, *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 18 June 1933.

78 Neville Laski speech at the BoD meeting, 2 October 1935. Original document: LMA, ACC 3121/A/028. Microfilm: LMA/MF/041/050. BoD Minutes, volume 28, 1935–1936.

79 For the quotation see the microfilm: LMA, MF/041/050 (original document ACC/3121/A/029), BoD Minutes, vol. 30, 1938–1940. Further see: Laski speech at BoD meeting on 16 November 1938, in: *The Jewish Chronicle*, 25 November 1938.

80 Stanley Owen Buckmaster, 1st Viscount Buckmaster (1861–1934), liberal politician and lawyer.

81 Henry Stafford Northcote, 3rd Earl of Iddesleigh (1901–1970).

the Archbishop of Canterbury⁸² expressed their respect for Germany's right to "go its own way" and sympathy for the German "national movement", but they called for tolerance, justice and equality of all nations living in Germany.⁸³ The Earl of Iddesleigh said:

*"Our purpose to-night is to protest against certain acts of injustice that have taken place in Germany: respectfully but very firmly to tell Herr Hitler that these acts have shocked our consciences, and, as subjects of a friendly state, to warn him that, in our opinion, the continuance of such policies will nullify all the good which he has wrought and may end in the collapse of his regime."*⁸⁴

The second type of activities mainly included the dialogue with the British government on the possibility of diplomatic intervention to help the Jews in Germany. This strategy was rooted in the belief of the British Jewish community that the government will support them as long as they keep loyal to its policies.⁸⁵ That, however, proved wrong. The official British standpoint was clear from the very beginning. On 2 March 1933, The Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, informed the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold, about how worried the Jews in Britain were about their fellow Jews in Germany. At the same time though, Sir John stressed that while Britain must report every Nazi action against British Jews to the German government, the Jews in Germany are not their responsibility: "*We have no locus standi to make representation as regards German subjects.*"⁸⁶ The British government was equally resolute in lifting no obstacles to Jewish immigration, as John Gilmour, the Home Secretary, explained to the House of Commons on 9 March 1933.⁸⁷ For the rest of the decade, the British government kept averting its eyes from all matters which would complicate British-German relations and thus threaten the on-going negotiations. Thus, a mere reference to the Jewish question, let alone diplomatic pressure, was out of the question.

The Foreign Office carried out a type of policy which could be summarised by a single imperative: "stay out of it". Robert Hankey explained the situation to both Leonard Monterfiore and Neville Laski on 21 March 1933. When Laski mentioned the possibility of the anti-German boycott, Hankey dismissed the possibility claiming that such action

82 William Cosmo Gordon Lang, 1st Baron Lang of Lambeth (1864–1945), Archbishop of Canterbury (1928–1942).

83 Speeches delivered at a Meeting of Protest held at the Queen's Hall, Langham Place, W1 on Tuesday, 27 June 1933. LMA, ACC/3121/B4/Q/2.

84 *Ibidem*, p. 17.

85 Laski's speech at the BoD meeting of 26 March 1933; BoD Minutes, vol. 26, 1932–1934. Original document: LMA, ACC 3121/A/026. Microfilm: LMA, MF/041/049.

86 John P. FOX, *Great Britain and the German Jews 1933*, Wiener Library Bulletin 26/1–2, 1972, p. 41.

87 *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, Fifth Series, vol. 274, col. 1597; vol. 275, cols. 1351–1352.

would seriously hurt German Jewry and Sir Horace Rumbold in Berlin agreed.⁸⁸ When the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart, informed Rumbold on 12 May 1933 about how worried the main Rabbi and others were by the reports of Nazi repressions of Jewish communities in Germany and asked him to enquire unofficially about the situation, Rumbold sceptically responded that he would only be told “to mind his own business”.⁸⁹

The JFC retained their belief in “peaceful diplomacy” for the whole of 1930’s. At the same time, they defended the government policy against those who demanded a more decisive reaction. At the BoD meeting in December 1934, Laski claimed:

*“We must realise that for statesmen European peace is the paramount consideration; and that the Jews are only one facet in the problems which have arisen since the signing of peace [...] Flamboyant protests can do no good. But much can be done by discussion face to face and by gentle conversations across the table [...] We must look at the matter in proper proportion, and we cannot expect that the Jewish question should assume first consideration. We can only do our best with the limited means to our hands.”*⁹⁰

When negotiating with the Foreign Office, Laski stressed that he acted as a British subject representing the opinion of the majority. He referred to prominent public figures who had voiced their concern about the situation in Germany. He kept providing the Foreign Office with documents proving the continuing and growing discrimination of Jews in Germany and other European countries.⁹¹

The BoD put great effort into getting the Foreign Office on their side. This tedious process may have projected the government’s negative approach to the boycott into the standpoints of the BoD leadership. The BoD leaders were, above all, British subjects and had no intention of provoking their own government. The government’s negative reaction to the Jewish protest movement was rather clear: on 13 October 1934, Neville Laski met with Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, who voiced his grave concern about the Jewish boycott and especially its intensity in the East End. Vansittart warned Laski about the possible adverse effects of the boycott

88 TNA, FO 371/16720, fol. 82 ff (Record of the conversation on 21st March with Leonard Montefiore and Neville Laski); *Documents on British Foreign Policy, Second Series*, vol. 5, London 1956, p. 14 (Sir Horace Rumbold to Sir John Simon, 31 March 1933).

89 TNA, FO 371/16723, fol. 187, 199.

90 The BoD meeting on 16 December 1934. See LMA/MF/041/049 (original document ACC/3121/A/027), BoD Minutes, volume 27, 1934–1935.

91 A letter to Vansittart, 25 February 1935: LMA, ACC/3121/C/11/6/4/2. Memorandum on the position of Jews in Italy and Tripolitania, sent to Vansittart by 15 April 1937: LMA, ACC/3121/C/11/6/4/2. Memorandum on the position of Jews in European countries sent to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, on 31 October 1938: LMA, ACC 3121/C11/6/4/1.

movement organised by the JRC, especially the risk of growing anti-Semitism in Britain. He referred to the U.S., especially the American Jewish Congress and the activities of Samuel Untermyer. Although Vansittart did not directly oppose the economic boycott of Germany, he disagreed with methods that were too radical.⁹²

Laski clearly hoped that humanistic tradition, as well as the power of liberal thinking, would prevail and the Foreign Office would officially denounce the situation in Germany. The exchange, which took place on 1 January 1937 between Laski and Orme G. Sargent, the Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, was rather typical.⁹³ Laski proposed that the British government in its own interest should step up pressure on Germany “*at the appropriate time, in a firm but friendly manner*”. The response he got must have disappointed him: Sargent reacted with great restraint, exactly in line with the official policy. The British government had no intention to act. They merely declared their readiness to “*keep a close watch on the situation*” and “*to take advantage of any favourable opportunity that might present itself*”.⁹⁴ Unfortunately, such favourable opportunity occurred only after the outbreak of World War II. The British government officially denounced Nazi anti-Jewish policy on 31 October 1939.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, by that time the war had completely changed the situation and the boycott, in the form in which it was carried out in 1930’s, lost its meaning.

Conclusion

The beginning of World War II meant total failure of the boycott movement. The hope that Hitler’s regime would be destroyed, without the war, was a disappointment for many reasons. Even without analysing the boycott’s international dimension and focusing only the boycott movement in Britain, the reasons are clear. Above all, there was the inability to make the boycott a collective, official matter, which would be pushed through as part of official British policy. The boycott could have only succeeded if supported by the government. However, the government never even considered a step as radical. The fact that the influential Jewish organisations, especially the BoD, refused the official boycott too, represents another key factor. Although many Jews disagreed, the BoD’s standpoint remained the same. Part of the problem was that the boycott in Britain was pushed by

92 Report of the meeting with Sir Robert Vansittart. LMA, ACC 3121/C/11/6/4/2.

93 Interview at the Foreign Office with Mr. O. G. Sargent. LMA, ACC 3121/C/11/6/4/2.

94 Ibidem.

95 S. GEWIRTZ, *Anglo-Jewish Responses*, p. 267. Laski speech at the BoD meeting, 16 November 1938. LMA, MF/041/050 (original document ACC/3121/A/029). BoD minutes, volume 30, 1938–1940.

the Zionists, while the traditional non-Zionist BoD leaders tried to limit their growing influence.

Older historiography had a rather sceptical view of the boycott. Bernard Krikler holds that the boycott was doomed from the beginning: “*Given the industrial potential of Nazi Germany and the acquiescence of the major powers, these fundamental weaknesses – the source of endless conflict, apology and escapism – doomed the boycott from its inception.*”⁹⁶ On the other hand, some, like the author of this text, believe that the boycott’s effect should not be underestimated. It is important from the point of view of modern Jewish identity and the strengthening of Jewish self-respect. Rather like Zionism, the boycott movement denounced the traditional image of Jews as passive victims of their fate.⁹⁷ All in all, the boycott of 1930’s represented one of the few Jewish weapons (if not the only one). The boycott movement concerned the whole country and carried across the whole Jewish community, both men and women. Last, but not least, the boycott’s failure finally uncovered the paranoid core of anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitic myth is rooted in the belief in the omnipotent global Jewish conspiracy attempting to seize the rule of the world. Had something like that existed, the boycott would have had to succeed. Therefore, even though the boycott effort was only partially successful, its importance cannot be denied, although it had more significance for the British Jews rather than for the situation in Germany. The boycott contributed to the differentiation of Jewry and confirmed that already in 1930’s there was no single organisation which would represent all British Jews.⁹⁸ Likewise, no single organisation would be able to carry out a policy which would please the whole community. Despite the popular anti-Semitic belief in a unified British Jewry, there was no such single entity.


The study of the boycott uncovers a plethora of other relationships, issues and topics. It indicates different forms of anti-Fascist movements; internal tensions within Jewish communities; the clash between traditional assimilated elites and the Zionist orientation of “new people”; the complex issue of immigration; etc. Although marginally, the boycott movement does belong to the realm of international relations and great-power diplomacy, which in the end determined the boycott’s failure. Jewish organisations attempted to persuade different governments to join their effort, but failed. British relationship with Germany was defined by the attempts to prevent the war and the appeasement policy did not allow for the full development of the boycott as a tool for putting pressure on Germany. The boycott lost most of its drive mainly under Chamberlain’s government, during which the appeasement policy peaked. Jewish organisations, mainly the Board

96 B. KRIKLER, *Boycotting Nazi Germany*, p. 27.

97 *Ibidem*.

98 *Ibidem*; B. KRIKLER, *Anglo-Jewish Attitudes*, p. 60; S. GEWIRTZ, *Anglo-Jewish Responses*, p. 256.

of Jewish Deputies, were bound by their loyalty to the government and their careful attempts to provoke action had no chance of succeeding once the chosen path led through negotiations and compromises with Nazi Germany.



An Appeal to the Great British Public
Jews and Non-Jews

Support this Boycott Certificate
Refuse to buy where this sign is not displayed

We appeal to ALL BUSINESSES to replace their German Goods with British Made and bring Trade and Prosperity to England and give work to the Unemployed.


CAPT WEBBER'S ORGANISATION
for ending
HOSTILITIES TO THE GERMAN JEWS
HEADQUARTERS:
66 SOUTHWARK BRIDGE ROAD S.E.1
TELEPHONE: POP 6844

**BOYCOTT CAMPAIGN
CERTIFICATE**

I the undersigned hereby declare that I will not buy any German Goods as and from the date at foot hereof until the Hitler Government renounces its policy of Anti-Semitic persecution and general hostilities against Jews in Germany.

Signed _____

Dated *July 10th* 1933



Look always for this Boycott Certificate as above
in Shops and Businesses. This is the ONLY real
Boycott Campaign Certificate.

*The only genuine sign of Jewish self-respect—
Refuse any other Boycott Poster.*

Fig. 1-2: Two examples of anti-German boycott leaflets issued by Captain Webber's Boycott Organization in London in 1934. London Metropolitan Archives, Board of Deputies of British Jews, ACC 3121/E3/36/1.

Reports and reviews

HRBEK, Jiří, *Proměny valdštejské reprezentace. Symbolické sítě valdštejského rodu v 17. a 18. Století* [Development of the Waldstein Representation. Symbolic Networks of the Waldstein Family during the 17th and 18th Centuries], Prague: Togga – Charles University in Prague 2015, 422 pp. ISBN 978–80–7476–082–2, ISBN 978–80–7308–651–0.

When I wrote a review of the work of Jiří Hrbek *Barokní Valdštejnové* [Baroque Waldsteins],¹ I expressed the opinion that some lifestyle themes and everyday life of the members of this noble family were omitted. At the same time, I expressed the wish that the author would return to them in his next work.² Little did I know back then, that such was about to happen and that Jiří Hrbek was going to gift us with another piece from his very impressive work. It would certainly be wrong of one to expect this book to be a mere footnote to the author's previous books (judging from the depth of the prior work). The book I am reviewing here contains none of such nonsense and any reader to encounter the concept of the work can see that.

Jiří Hrbek introduces a unique conception of representation of aristocracy that is interpreted as a system of symbols divided into three dimensions which reflect in everyday reality of aristocracy. Only noblemen attributed their lives

with the legacy of their ancestry while remembering the bequest to their future offspring. These three dimensions of the targeted representation of antiquity, nobility, wealth and other kinds of exceptional social status were then dedicated three individual chapters.

The former is called *Minulost: dějiny jako základ pro rodovou reprezentaci* [The Past: History as the Basis for Representation of Ancestry] (pp. 13–125), where Hrbek focuses on the sources of information the Waldstein dynasty applied in creation of their legacy. The family dynasty's historiography written by renowned genealogists is analysed, including written resources from the inheritance of the important family's members. The author even touches upon the places these resources were preserved in (establishing of libraries and archives). On this basis, the second part of the chapter discusses the Waldstein dynasty's views on their own ancestry. Since their house is originally of Czech ancestry with roots reaching as far as the Middle Ages, Waldstein family was mainly interested in the circumstances of their origin and the activities of their important ancestors. The lack of written resources was then

1 Jiří HRBEK, *Barokní Valdštejnové v Čechách 1640–1740* [Baroque Waldsteins in Bohemia 1640–1740], Prague 2013.

2 Český časopis historický 112, 2014, No. 4, pp. 770–774.

balanced with family legends that improved the image of the dynasty in public. Such was the manner of ensuring the dynasty's good reputation based upon histories of antiquity, Catholic orthodoxy, loyalty and even family connections with the Bohemian king (George of Poděbrady in this case). That is why they emphasized the soldier members of the dynasty (the most desired representatives being those who fought the Hussites), Catholic ecclesiastic dignitaries and they sometimes even forged an idealised image of mighty but officially treacherous Albrecht of Wallenstein. For this purpose were used both genealogical works and his portraits in family galleries and objects of artistic crafts. I consider this part of the book in the context of contemporary historiography to be the most successful and the most beneficial, although I would welcome more extensive comparative passages focused on the question of how the other noble Bohemian and Moravian families worked with the past and in what way did members of the Waldstein dynasty differed (we can use f. e. the legend of the Kolowrats, the richly decorated ancestral halls of the castle in Vranov nad Dyjí built by the Althanns or of the castle in Milotice built by the Serényis).³

The second chapter is titled *Přítomnost: prožívaná urozenost jako základ šlechtického habitu* [The Present: Experiencing the noble origin as the basis for noble habits (pp. 127–224). The author once again divided it into two parts. The first part deals with how the Waldsteins experienced weekdays (where they lived, what courts surrounded them, what they ate, etc.) and holidays (hunting, theatre and listening to music), and the second half is dedicated to the very little explored phenomenon of casual writings that came to existence when the given members of the family came to office, as well as at the occasion of birthdays, namedays or weddings. The author also did not forget the question of dedication of books and academical theses. His interpretation takes the form of analysis of sources that no historian had systematically investigated so far. The importance of Hrbek's contribution here is indisputable, despite the fact that the text in itself somewhat suffers from excessive descriptiveness. The first part of this chapter can be labelled as one of the weaker spots of this work. The author attempts to summarize the essentially intangible and complex issue of the relatively well-explored aristocratic lifestyle, so he logically had to choose only relevant key themes and could not include everything. Still, he tried to mention almost

3 The author unfortunately did not use the works Tomáš KNOZ, *Althannové v sále předků – mezi legendou a skutečností* [Althann Family in the Hall of Ancestors – Between Legend and Reality], in: Bohumil Samek (red.), *Sál předků na zámku ve Vranově nad Dyjí*, Brno 2003, pp. 7–24; Tomáš JERÁBEK, *Barokní zámek Milotice* [Baroque Castle Milotice], Brno

1998 or Jaroslav SEDLÁŘ, *K ikonologii fresky F. Ř. I. Ecksteina v zámku Miloticích u Kyjova* [On Iconology of the Fresco by F. Eckstein in the Castle of Milotice], *Sborník prací Filozofické fakulty Brněnské univerzity*, F 5, 1961, pp. 341–348.

everything, and thus got into a situation where the volume of data from sources sometimes prevailed over him. It seems to me that the author does not make sufficient use of his theoretical concept, and that in some passages he does not work with relevant contextual literature. This is particularly evident in pp. 128–150, where the work lacks engagement with recent research on itineraries,⁴ inventories,⁵ about aristocratic residences⁶ and their inner structures (the issue of apartments, representative rooms and other specialized premises),⁷ about

noble courts⁸ or contemporary furniture. Then there is the issue of author's tendency to incline towards generalisations that are without doubt of very disputable nature.⁹ Similarly, the passages on hunting lack reference to the latest bibliography,¹⁰ whereby I have to admit to have been slightly disappointed by the lack of information about uniquely conceived hunting castle Waldsteinruhe situated near Bělá pod Bezdězem, possibly founded and built at the order of Franz Ernst von Waldstein in 1720s.¹¹

4 Petr MAŤA, *Soumrak venkovských rezidencí. "Urbanizace" české aristokracie mezi stavovstvím a absolutismem* [Urbanisation of the Lifestyle of Bohemian Nobility around 1600], in: Václav Bůžek – Pavel Král (eds.), *Aristokratické rezidence a dvory v raném novověku*, České Budějovice 1999, pp. 139–162; Vítězslav PRCHAL, *Sídlo a jeho pán. Reziidenční strategie hraběte Františka Karla Swéerts-Sporcka ve 2. čtvrtině 18. století* [Residential Strategies of Franz Karl von Swéerts-Sporck in the Second Quarter of 18 Century], *Theatrum historiae* 9, 2011, pp. 45–78.

5 Andrea HOLASOVÁ, *Poznámky k problematice studia inventářů raněnovověkých šlechtických sídel jako jednoho z pramenů poznání kultury společnosti* [On the Research of Inventories of Early Modern Noble Residences], *Theatrum historiae* 2, 2007, pp. 109–122.

6 Jiří KUBEŠ, *Reprezentační funkce sídel vyšší šlechty z českých zemí (1500–1740)* [Representative Function of the Residences of Higher Nobility from the Czech Lands (1500–1740)], Dissertation, University of South Bohemia, České Budějovice 2005.

7 Jiří KUBEŠ, *Hlavní sál – sebereflexe šlechty ve výzdobě společenských místností venkovských rezidencí (na příkladě českých zemí 17. a první poloviny 18. století)* [Main Hall and its Decoration: Self-Reflection of Bohemian and Moravian Nobility in their Country Residence-

es, 1600–1750], *Česko-slovenská historická ročenka* 2005, Brno 2005, pp. 31–59; IDEM, *Vývoj obytné jednotky v sídlech vyšší šlechty z českých zemí (1550–1750)* [Development of the Apartment in the Residences of Bohemian and Moravian Nobility, 1550–1750], *Svorník* 6, 2008, pp. 79–90.

8 Jiří KUBEŠ, *Die Dienerschaft der Aristokraten in den böhmischen Ländern in den Jahren 1550–1750*, in: Anna Fundárková – István Fazekas et alii (eds.), *Die kirchliche und weltliche Elite aus dem Königreich Böhmen und Königreich Ungarn am Wiener Kaiserhof im 16. – 17. Jahrhundert*, Wien 2013, pp. 273–299.

9 On page 133, for example, there is a statement: “The inventories [...] captured accurately the condition of the residence...” Researchers, however, came to the conclusion that the possibilities of this type of source can not be overestimated because they do not include some of the items found in the residence. Viz A. HOLASOVÁ, *Poznámky*, pp. 119–120; J. KUBEŠ, *Reprezentační funkce*, pp. 29–30.

10 Especially Jan IVANEGA, *Lovecký zámek Ohrada a schwarzenberská sídla na panství Hluboká nad Vltavou* [Hunting Lodge Ohrada and Residences of the Schwarzenbergs on the Estate Hluboká nad Vltavou], Prague 2014.

11 František ZUMAN, *Lovčí zámek Valdštejn* [Hunting Lodge Waldsteinruhe], *Časopis*

The third chapter is named *Budoucnost: touha po věčnosti a paměti potomků* [Future: the Desire for Eternity and the Memories of the Following Generations] (pp. 225–364). It is again divided into two parts – the first part deals with the issues of death of a nobleman, last wills, last places of rest of the Waldstein family and the author analysed funeral orations, including other documents written post-mortem. This material perfectly illustrates how the Waldsteins construed their posthumous image. Hrbek then discusses the church administration in Waldstein estates and describes the duties members of the family did when in office as collators and how they provided their following generations with better conditions for development of their spiritual life. That is why he gives special attention to the issue of recatholisation, regulation of the parish network, occupation of posts of priests and chaplains, and also with the organization of religious life at manors. In my opinion, these parts together with the first chapter belong to the group of the best written passages of the whole work, where I can criticise only few unimportant details.¹²

In conclusion, Czech historiography gained a conceptually very inspirational work, which has two premises in my point of view. For it overcomes the descriptiveness of older works based mainly on the research of inventories and focused on aristocratic housing and the associated representation, wherein I also appreciate the fact that the author attempted to complexly depict the various aspects of aristocratic, over-generational attitudes to representation in pre-modern times. It thus only remains to be said that I hope this work will attract more followers who will find interest in other noble families to produce similar studies with the help of which we could compare the Waldsteins with both the ancient Czech noble families and those who settled in the Czech lands in the course of early modern times.

Jiří Kubeš

Společnosti přátel starožitností českých 25, 1917, pp. 41–49.

12 E.g. poor translation of a quotation on page 236. In footnote 49 in the end of the quotation, it is said that the writer of certain letter does not doubt that his brother-in-law, Lanthieri, is going to formally announce the death of his sister to the addressee – “*zweiffle gar nicht, daß mein Schwager Lanthieri es förmlich berichten werde*”. According to Hrbek’s translation, however, the writer provided the news of the death “*without any sign of compassion and with*

the hope that his brother-in-law will describe her death in detail”. In the passages about the last wills (pp. 241–246), I would welcome more rigorous analysis using quantitative methods. For it thus appears that the last wills were by men only.

VAVERKOVÁ, Zuzana, *Zbraně a zbroje na Státním zámku Hluboká. Poklady zbrojnic na hradech a zámcích ve správě Národního památkového ústavu* [Arms and Armours at the State Château Hluboká. The Hidden Gems of Armouries at Castles and Châteaux under the Administration of the Národní památkový ústav], Brno: Národní památkový ústav, územní odborné pracoviště v Brně 2017, 272 pp. ISBN 978–80–87967–04–1.

This publication, whose author is Zuzana Vaverková, represents one of the results of project called *Symboly moci či předměty sběratelského zájmu? Zhodnocení a interpretace sbírkových fondů militarií na státních hradech a zámcích ve správě Národního památkového ústavu* [Symbols of Power or Collectibles? Evaluation and interpretation of military collection funds at state castles and châteaux under the administration of the Národní památkový ústav] and complements previously published publications of *Zbrojnice na státním zámku Lysice* [Armoury at Lysice State Château] (2014) and *Malované zbroje na Státním zámku Konopiště* [Coloured Armour at Konopiště State Château] (2015). All three works were produced by the Národní památkový ústav (National Heritage Institute) of the Czech Republic. It can be said that the topic of the project can be welcomed since, under the administration of the Národní památkový ústav, there are many valuable and interesting collections, which unfortunately are seldom professionally elaborated and made available to the research community.

Zuzana Vaverková focused on the *militaria* from the collection of the State Château Hluboká nad Vltavou. Local funds undoubtedly deserve research attention. The

former Schwarzenberg armoury belongs, thanks to its quality and range, to the leading collections in Bohemia and Moravia, which the author rightly emphasizes and characterizes the Hluboká collection as the second most important one after the collection of *militaria* from the Konopiště château, while remaining comparable to any other collection of arms outside the Czech Republic.

In the introductory parts, Zuzana Vaverková puts – in connection with the targeting of the project – a key question that in itself makes the book somewhat more than just a catalogue. For it poses the question: What are the factors behind the establishment of the castle collections of the military? That is, whether *militaria* were understood primarily as a symbol of power, or whether it was rather a matter of personal interest. To this question, Zuzana Vaverková says correctly that the answer is rarely unambiguous. Castle armouries collected not only monuments connected with famous ancestries and commemorated “glorious” history of noble family, but also diplomatic gifts and war prey. And last but not least, the castle’s collection also reflects the fashion of the eras of romanticism and historicism. Such aspect is, in fact, essential for the author’s study of the formation of

the Schwarzenberg collection of *militaria*. Even the archival resources carefully studied by Zuzana Vaverková show that the origin of the Hluboká fund lies in all the above-mentioned factors.

The catalogue of *militaria* of Hluboká château is preceded by an extensive introduction which presents other positives of this publication. Zuzana Vaverková did not confine the text to working with the military artefacts solely, but also set out to study archival sources of Schwarzenberg provenance, which enabled her to gain a deep insight into the history and transformations of the Hluboká Château armoury. The origin of the organized Schwarzenberg collection of weapons dates back to the first half of the 19th century, when the antiquities found on the family estates were collected into the form of a “*kunstkammer*”, but at that time at the Český Krumlov (*Krummau*) Castle, which had the status of a main family country residence. We also have a preserved inventory of the Schwarzenberg military collection from 1854. This represents a valuable source for the history of the collection, but above all it demonstrates the conscious interest of the owner in the creation of the collection and thus also in its records. Between 1853 and 1860, most of the objects were transferred to Hluboká (*Frauenberg*), which replaced Český Krumlov as the main residence of the family. The Hluboká collection contains not only artefacts connected with the Schwarzenberg family’s history, that is to say from times since 1661, but also objects that the new

owners inherited after the Eggenbergs and Rožmberks (in German *Rosenbergs*). The format of the exhibition was then fundamentally influenced by the Neo-Gothic reconstruction of Hluboká château that commenced in 1839. In 1890–1896, a total inventory of collections was made in Hluboká, resulting in a three-volume catalogue. This is a valuable source, although it also has its limits as the author points out. The last inventory took place in 1936. The Hluboká collection of weapons and armours was then confiscated by the state along with other Schwarzenberg estates, and thus became the property of the Czechoslovak Republic. In 1950s it was also for the first time scholarly studied and well documented. This, however, has not prevented a number of often negative interventions into the integrity of the collection in 1948–1989, which were guided by an ideological motivation, as the author explains. Zuzana Vaverková carefully observes the fate of the armoury – the chapter on the history of the Hluboká collection contains citations from archival resources accompanied by suitably chosen photographic material, which enhances the attractiveness of the text. Both reveal both the author’s attention and the depth of insight into the studied subject.

In other chapters, the author introduces the chronological and thematic structure of the Hluboká collection and draws attention to selected unique items from the fund. The complexity of the author’s approach is testified by the fact that the text is accompanied by an excursion to the

collection of Schwarzenberg provenance weapons, now managed by the Národní zemědělské muzeum (National Museum of Agriculture) at the Castle of Ohrada, which were once a part of one whole collection along with the Hluboká collection. The author also remembered to introduce Schwarzenberg court's gunsmiths, who represent another very interesting area to study. At the end of the textual part, Zuzana Vaverková, on the basis of the studied materials, draws the conclusion that until the end of the 19th century, the Hluboká collection had played mainly representative and decorative role. Vaverková emphasizes, however, that weapons and armour have always been seen as symbols of power, which also applies, to a certain extent, to their other collections, which have always been the symbols of power closely related to the ancestry's legacy.

The second part of the book is then logically a catalogue of weapons and armour from Hluboká château. With regard to the range of the collection, including several hundred items, this is only a sample. Conscious of this limitation, the author attempted to choose from the most representative items in the Schwarzenberg collection that would equally present all kinds of military from the deep collections. The catalogue is so thematically divided into several categories including melee weapons, armours, firearms, a separate category consisting of oriental weapons and miscellanea. To summarise, the catalogue part of the book provides information about

150 collection items from the Hluboká State Château collection. The records themselves are structured in classical terms: they contain information about the inventory number (or original inventory number), date, provenance and dimensions, a brief description of the subject, or a reference to literature or analogies from other collections. Each described item comes with high-quality photographic materials, which is not so common with this type of publications, but this title belongs to the better group, where the role of graphic materials is balanced and does not claim more than enough of the reader's attention. Not everything is perfect, however, but there are only rare instances of marginal mistakes. To the positive impression which this book makes also contributes the inclusion of historical photographs of the installation of the Schwarzenberg armoury, which were used to illustrate the author's arguments in the text. Part of the book is also a mandatory list of used resources and bibliography, as well as the name and local index, which makes the reader's seeking in the text easier.

In sum, it can be stated that the work of Zuzana Vaverková, dedicated to the collection of weapons and armour from the collections of the Hluboká château, is a successful piece, both thanks to the choice of the topic and the depth of the text and the detailed catalogue. The author has fully proved her erudition in the wide field of *militaria*, as well as the deep reception of archive materials, as well as the ability to effectively connect written texts with

photographic materials. The great public has thus been rewarded by this valuable comprehensive study of *militaria*, in a form that allows any further research. Together with previously published publications on the armouries of the Lysice and Konopiště châteaux, Zuzana Vaverková's book

constitutes a valuable complete set which will certainly be appreciated by all those interested in the broad history of *militaria* and military culture.

Josef Šrámek

VIKTOŘÍK, Michael, *Hinter den Wällen der Festungsstadt. Ein Beitrag zu Alltagsleben, Organisation und Einrichtung der Festungsstadt im 19. Jahrhundert (am Beispiel der Festung Olmütz)*, České Budějovice: Bohumír NĚMEC – VEDUTA 2018. ISBN 978–80–88030–28–7.

German-language book published for Palacký University in Olomouc as the output of the GA CR project No. 15–03720S called *Pevnostní město v 19. století ve střední Evropě* [*Fortress City in the 19th Century in Central Europe*] is an ambitious publication which attempts to compile several research areas into one single text linked to the city's base and the Olomouc fortress. The author gave a brief description of the development of the Olomouc fortress in the period under review. Among other things, he touches upon the interesting issue of the workforce in the construction of the forts, especially its not yet sufficiently explored origin – in the first half of the 19th century it was very important that, with regard to the ruling legal situation, workers and craftsmen were supervised by their *Obrigkeit* who was then responsible for the entire course of fortification works too. The following chapter deals with the guardian policy in the fortress, which from an unusual point of view brings to life

everyday life in the fortress and in part its influence on the city. The main protagonist of the next text became the fortification director Emanuel Zitta. He had written several proposals for the modernization of the Olomouc fortress into the camp type and Viktorík analysed it in a very wide range of personal and factual contexts.

The book's rather rough chronology then continues into the setting of the second half of the 19th century, which shows the Olomouc fortress as being still counted at as a strategic factor by the Austrian state and even at that time it was still being invested in. The events of 1866 are described with regard to the situation of the civic population in the Olomouc fortress, both at the beginning of the conflict and after the Battle of Sadová. The penetration of the military and civilian world is indicated in the chapter on the belt of the fortress and demolition rules. Further text returns to a primarily military point of view, whether it is the number of men

in the fortress, military education or the structure of technical and rear units in this system. An important and interesting topic is the hygienic conditions of the city and the fortress in the period under review, in which the author tries to distinguish the extent to which the generally dismal image of the city was the result of contemporary journalism and the reality of the fortress city. Part of this characteristic is the reflection on the booming business of prostitution in the Olomouc fortress. The primary archival resources are also used in a section dealing with accommodation options and habits, which brings extraordinarily interesting and detailed new data. Equally interesting is the part that deals with the seemingly marginal elements such as communications, which, however, significantly affected the everyday life in the fortress city. The author then came to an interesting conclusion through a survey of the economic relations between the city and the fortress, which appeared to have been somewhat inconsistent at the time of the existence of the guild system and then subjected to considerable fluctuations that gave room for speculation. The careful selection of graphic documentation must also be noted and appreciated, as it presents us with hidden gems in some instances.

In spite of the fact that the author considers the whole text to be an “initial

entry into the issue”, it is not only a comparison of numerous Czech, Slovak, Austrian, German and Polish published research findings from the field, but above all it is a separate output based on a broad primary research. In doing so, the author managed to maintain the proportionality between the general and the specific level of the text’s message and to preserve the text’s overview of generally provable dimensions while providing adequate detail of the microprojection at the same time. The text also shows the author’s deep interest in the locality under examination, which however does not diminish the ability to soberly evaluate and remains sympathetic to the reader. The choice of German as a language of the book corresponds to the current trend of internationalization of the origins and application of the results of the research, and the very theme, which in its time “took place” in that language, is thus honoured and very well reflected. On the other hand, however, the work is undoubtedly interesting for present-day lovers of military history of the 19th century as well as Moravian non-scientific regionalists and can be quite demanding to them due to the text’s chosen language.

Marie Macková

List of reviewers (in alphabetical order)

Mgr. Martin Bakeš (University of Pardubice, Czech Republic)

Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Klaus Davidowicz (University of Vienna, Austria)

Mgr. Jakub Drábik, Ph.D. (Slovak Academy of Sciences, Slovakia)

Wiesława Duży, Ph.D. (Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland)

prof. UP dr hab. Andrzej Kuropatnicki (Pedagogical University Cracow, Poland)

Dr Jan Láníček (The University of New South Wales, Australia)

prof. PhDr. Milena Lenderová, CSc. (University of Pardubice, Czech Republic)

prof. Leoš Müller (University of Stockholm, Sweden)

doc. Mgr. Radmila Prchal Pavlíčková, Ph.D. (Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic)

PhDr. Alexandr Putík (Jewish Museum Prague, Czech Republic)

Mgr. Tomáš Sterneček, Ph.D. (Czech Academy of Sciences, České Budějovice, Czech Republic)

PhDr. Dalibor Vácha, Ph.D. (České Budějovice, Czech Republic)

prof. Benjamin Ziemann, M.A., Ph.D. (The University of Sheffield, Great Britain)

PhDr. Miroslav Žitný (University of South Bohemia, České Budějovice, Czech Republic)

List of contributors (in alphabetical order)

Mgr. Miroslav Dyrčák (Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic)

Mgr. Jiří Hutečka, Ph.D. (University of Hradec Králové, Czech Republic)

prof. UP dr hab. Mariusz Misztal (Pedagogical University Cracow, Poland)

Christof Muigg, M.A. (University of Vienna, Museum of Military History in Vienna, Austria)

prof. PhDr. Petr Vorel, CSc. (University of Pardubice, Czech Republic)

Mgr. Zbyněk Vydra, Ph.D. (University of Pardubice, Czech Republic)

Theatrum historiae 21 (2017)

<http://uhv.upce.cz/en/theatrum-historiae/>

Publisher: University of Pardubice
(Studentská 95, 532 10 Pardubice, IČO 00216275)

Issue: 21

Release date: 20 December 2017

At least two issues a year

First edition – 234 pages, 120 copies

The authors are responsible

for the language correctness of their contributions.

Registration number MK ČR E 19534

ISSN 1802–2502

Editorial Staff:

editor in chief: prof. PhDr. Petr Vorel, CSc. (Univerzita Pardubice);

deputy editor: prof. PhDr. Jiří Mikulec, CSc. (HÚ AV ČR Praha);

executive editor: doc. Mgr. Jiří Kubeš, Ph.D. (Univerzita Pardubice);

technical editor: Mgr. Lukáš Vavrečka

Scientific Board:

doc. Mgr. Petr Grulich, Ph.D. (Univerzita Hradec Králové)

doc. PhDr. Tomáš Jiránek, Ph.D. (Univerzita Pardubice)

doc. Mgr. Antonín Kalous, M.A. Ph.D. (Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci)

prof. PhDr. Milena Lenderová, CSc. (Univerzita Pardubice)

prof. PhDr. Eduard Maur, CSc. (Univerzita Pardubice)

Dr. Françoise Mayer (Université Paul Valéry Montpellier)

prof. PhDr. Miloš Řezník, Ph.D. (Technische Universität Chemnitz)

doc. Mgr. Jan Stejskal, M.A. Ph.D. (Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci)

PhDr. Luboš Velek, Ph.D. (Univerzita Karlova v Praze).

Editorial office address:

Institute of Historical Sciences

Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, University of Pardubice

Studentská 84, 532 10 Pardubice

tel.: 466 036 210

e-mail: Jiri.Kubes@upce.cz

